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Abstract
This thesis, the first in English on this topic, is an examination of central aspects of 
Joseph de Maistre’s constitutional thought: namely the concepts of constituent power, 
constitutions, sovereignty and forms of government. Research for the thesis has been 
conducted with the use of archival sources and French texts and it describes and 
analyses the above concepts in some detail. The thesis also takes into account both 
historical and modem scholarship written in French and English.
It argues that Maistre’s constitutional thought is a useful tool with which to investigate 
some contemporary constitutional problems in liberal constitutional theory, e.g. those of 
constitutional self -  binding, the circularity of the notion of the sovereignty of the 
people and the nature of sovereignty in the modern state. Maistre’s thought provides a 
view of constitutional matters which opposes certain enlightenment - inspired 
perspectives that now dominate constitutional discourse and which treat the constitution 
as a purely normative phenomenon, rather than as a relational concept which cannot be 
separated entirely from political considerations.
The thesis carries out these tasks with reference to other constitutional and public law 
thinkers in order historically and intellectually to contextualise Maistre’s constitutional 
thought. It seeks to place Maistre within an intellectual tradition stretching from Bodin, 
Hobbes and Pufendorf, through Rousseau and Montesquieu, to Carl Schmitt and 
Michael Oakeshott. In doing this, the thesis argues that Maistre is a modern thinker, 
whose work although cast in the language of reaction, actually belongs to a mainstream 
constitutional tradition.
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CHAPTER ONE: SITUATING MAISTRE
Introduction
Despite the apparently unexpected upheaval of the Revolution, a retreat from 
constitutional traditionalism in France had begun some time before 1789. A far 
more convoluted affair than in many other emerging modern European states, where 
religious dissenters allied themselves with ‘enlightened’ monarchs against 
ecclesiastical establishments, in France religious dissent found secular support 
against a monarchy that was allied to the ecclesiastical establishment. This dissent 
was expressed within the constitutional and legal structure of the country -  in the 
Courts and Parlements. The religious history of France in the lead-up to the 
Revolution was thus inseparable from constitutional considerations,1 and once the 
ancien Regime had fractured irreparably this rich marrow of theology, law and 
politics oozed from the broken bone.
Joseph de Maistre’s constitutional thought, which is permeated with these vital 
ingredients of religion, law and politics, gives an insight into the moment after the 
French Revolution, that dramatic period of transformation in the nature of the State 
that was inspired by the Enlightenment.2 This thesis examines central aspects of
1 Dale K.Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution, (Yale: Yale University Press, 
1996) p. 7: . .the religious history of eighteenth-century France is entwined in that of constitutional 
contestation between the parlements and Bourbon absolutism -  entwined in political history, that is, 
even more than elsewhere on the European continent”.
2 See Joseph de Maistre, Oeuvres Completes (Hildesheim, Zurich: Georg Olms Verlag, 1984) Volume 
1, Tome 1, p. 2 “But the French Revolution and all that took place in Europe at that moment is as 
marvelous of its kind as the instantaneous fructification of a tree in the month of January”. Hereafter
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Maistre’s constitutional thought in its historical context and uses it as a tool with 
which to probe some of the most widespread assumptions of modem liberal 
constitutional theory.
With the publication in 1797 of Considerations sur la France, those opposed to the 
French Revolution discovered a voice.3 In its pages, conservative thought met the 
radicalism of the French Revolution head on. Maistre’s work -  a masterpiece of 
counter-revolutionary invective -  did not simply criticise parts of the revolution or 
bemoan its excesses, it excoriated it in its entirety.4 And the Considerations was to 
be only the first of a series of works, many published posthumously, in which 
Maistre fiercely opposed the Enlightenment inspirations of the revolution, and 
challenged the onset of post-revolutionary modernity on religious, philosophical and 
political grounds. As a result, Maistre5 has become not only a symbol of reactionary 
thought and authoritarianism, a patron saint of dark and irrational right wing forces, 
but also an illiberal critic of the overwhelming political and cultural dominance of 
liberal discourse.
all quotations from Maistre’s complete works will be cited in the form OC V [ ]T [ ], p. [ ] All 
translations from the French are my own unless otherwise stated. The original French text of 
Maistre’s writing is set out in an Appendix to this thesis.
3 Dictionnaire des Oeuvres Politiques (Paris: PUF, 1986), p. 501.
4 See, for example, OC V 1, T 1, p. 13: “Each drop of Louis XVI’s blood will cost France torrents; 
perhaps four million Frenchmen will perhaps pay with their heads for the great national crime of an 
antireligious and antisocial insurrection, crowned by a regicide”.
5 When only his surname is cited, this thesis does not use the prefix ‘de’. This is in accordance with 
Maistre’s own preference, as stated in a letter to M. de Syon dated 11 November 1820: “Would you 
permit me to make a little grammatical diversion? The participle ‘de’ in French may not be joined to 
a proper noun commencing by a consonant, at least when it does not follow a title: thus you may very 
correctly say ‘le Viscomte de Bonald said’ but not ‘ de Bonald said’ : one must say ‘Bonald said’ 
even though one would say ‘D ’Alembert said’ : thus grammar commands. You are therefore obliged, 
Monsieur, to say, ‘Finally Maistre appeared etc...”
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Yet for a thinker renowned for his extreme intransigence, a “praetorian of the 
Vatican”,6 Maistre has proved to be a surprisingly mutable object in the eyes of his 
many commentators. A debate has continued for two centuries as to what exactly 
constitutes his thought, and what is its significance. He has been presented as a 
thinker whose ideas belong more properly in the medieval era; conversely, his work 
has also been portrayed almost as a vade mecum for the critical theorist of a 
postmodern bent.
The common feature of both of these positions is their failure appropriately to 
contextualise Maistre’s thought, which has been portrayed as having somehow fallen 
outside of time, a characterisation made perhaps most famously (in the English 
speaking world at least) in Isaiah Berlin’s study.7 Due to the brilliance of his 
invective, Maistre’s words were, and are, considered as pearls of wisdom by some 
and as corrosive as acid by others, but either way they are frequently considered to 
possess a transcendental, a-historical value. Seeing him as an a-historical prophet 
figure has come at an inevitable price: commentators have, despite their best 
intentions, typically seen him as a one-dimensional figure, an austere “prophet of the 
past”,8 whether or not they agree with his views.
One example will go some way to demonstrating that Maistre does not deserve this 
unique reputation, but should take his place within a genre of anti-philosophe
6 Emile Faguet, Politiques et Moralistes du Dix Neuvieme Siecle (Paris: Boivin (Nouvelle 
Bibliotheque Litteraire), 1890), p. 60.
7 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 91.
8 Barbey d’Aurevilly, Les Prophetes du Passe (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1889), p. 63.
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discourse. Here are the words of Charles-Louis Richard, written in 1785, which 
match the content of any of Maistre’s supposedly unique flights of prose for their 
intensity:
Everywhere philosophie lights the torch of discord and of war, prepares 
poisons, sharpens swords, lays fires, orders murder, massacre and carnage, 
sacrifices fathers by the hands of sons and sons by the hand of fathers. It 
directs lances and swords at the needs and breasts of sovereigns, placing 
them on scaffolds which it yearns to see flowing with sovereign’s blood -  
blood that it will drink in deep draughts as it feasts its eyes on the horrible 
spectre of their torn, mutilated and bloody members.9
These words are as gruesome and as partisan as anything written by Maistre, and yet 
it is Maistre who has come, de-contextualised, to the world’s attention as the 
embodiment of its worst fears of right wing, religious thought. In fact, Maistre’s 
thought contains much that is creative, measured and worthy of serious analysis.
In adopting an approach that seeks to intellectually contextualise its subject as well 
as to provide a comparative analysis of his thought, this thesis is intended to run 
alongside a new wave of Maistrian studies which has principally emerged from 
France over the last decade, but which remains underdeveloped in the United 
Kingdom. This is in contrast to much of the initial scholarship, which viewed its
9 Charles-Louis Richard, Exposition de la Doctrine des Philosophes Modernes (Paris, 1785), pp. 52- 
53, quoted in Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment 
and the making of Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 27.
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principal task as one of pointing out that there was more to Maistre than a sectarian 
caricature. This initial attitude towards him, however, has not completely 
disappeared, as the following extracts will demonstrate.
In his book, A Modem Maistre, published in 1999, Owen Bradley states:
At first glance and even at second glance, no one would seem further from 
our horizons than Joseph de Maistre. If he is known at all to contemporary 
readers, it is as the ultraconservative defender of Catholicism against the 
Enlightenment, monarchy against democracy, tradition against innovation, 
the advocate of the executioner, sacrifice and papal authority.... Each of these 
claims will have to be considered closely...where it will be seen that 
Maistre’s arguments were neither so one-sided nor so backward as they 
might appear and they may indeed provide insight into some of the defining 
themes of modem thought.10
Writing in 1935, Frederick Holds worth expressed similar sentiments:
We try to indicate in the round the fruit of our researches, which we dare to 
believe will have revealed to the public a Maistre almost totally unknown, a 
completely new Maistre from all points of view because, contrary to general 
opinion, he is very “modem”. It is time to revise judgments on Joseph de
10 Owen Bradley, A Modern Maistre (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), p. ix.
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Maistre as much for his supporters as for his adversaries, by the 
traditionalists as well as by the soi-disant liberals.11
In another example, from 1998, Frank Lafage writes: “Maistre’s anonymity presents 
however an eminent advantage... to strip Maistre of the hagiographic excesses and 
polemical caricatures inherited from the combat of centuries past which have 
contributed to the distortion in his interpretation”.12 Writing in 1944, Francis Bayle 
had covered comparable terrain:
Too often commentators have represented him as the symbol of sectarianism 
and intolerance. Knowledge of his private life but also a comprehensive 
reading of his work oblige us to reject this assertion.. .the exaggerated 
severity of judgments reached upon him coming most often in effect from an 
incomplete study of his work.13
These examples demonstrate that Maistre has been so little considered in the 
academic world that, until very recently each new person taking him as a subject, 
could believe that that they had discovered him afresh.
11 Frederick Holdsworth, Joseph de Maistre et V Angleterre (Doctoral thesis, University of Paris, 
1935), p. 278. The same preoccupations were put rather more bluntly by the author of an 1858 article 
in the Quarterly Review Vol. XCVIII (1855-56), p. 538: “Most English readers will wonder who is 
this Count de Maistre and how he comes to be quoted as an authority necessary to corroborate and 
crown that of the rest of mankind?”
12 Franck Lafage, Le Comte Joseph de Maistre, Itineraire Intellectuel d ’un Theologien de la Politique 
(Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1998), p. 27.
13 Francis Bayle, Les Idees Politiques de Joseph de Maistre (Lyon: Imprimerie des Beaux-Arts,
1944), p. 6.
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It is one of the arguments of this thesis that scholarly enquiry into Maistre’s thought 
needs to advance beyond the purely descriptive. It is important for Maistrian 
scholarship to embark upon a more nuanced and deliberative consideration of his 
work.14 There is also a need to contextualise accounts of Maistre’s thought 
historically. To do so we need to utilise recent scholarship, but this must be done 
without neglecting the valuable task of presenting Maistre’s constitutional thought 
clearly and in comparison with the constitutional thought of other thinkers.
One particular area of neglect has been Maistre’s constitutional thought, considered 
from a predominantly juridical perspective. There has been only one study in this 
area, which was written in 1961, and there exist none at all in English.15 This 
present study is thus the first concerned solely with Maistre’s constitutional thought 
to be written in English, and to have had access to the recently fully opened Maistre 
archives in Chambery. These archives now hold a comprehensive collection of 
Maistrian material, including previously unavailable papers formerly held privately 
by the Maistre family.16 In addition, this thesis examines and synthesises both 
established and more recent scholarship on Maistre, in both French and English, in 
the context of works on constitutional theory and public law, drawing upon some of
14 See, in this respect, ‘Etat Present de la Recherche Maistrienne, Communication par Jean Louis 
Darcel’, in Cahiers de VAssociation Internationale des Etudes Francaises, Societe d ’Edition Les 
Belles Lettres (Paris: Societe d ’Edition Les Belles Lettres, 2000), p. 82 . Note Bruno Berthier’s 
suggestions for further study, which include materials on the Russian context of Maistre’s thought, its 
Masonic context and Maistre’s own diplomatic correspondence.
15 Jean-Pierre Cordelier, La Theorie Constitutionelle de Joseph De Maistre (Doctoral thesis, 
University of Paris, 1961), of which only 90 of 184 pages are given over to a specific discussion of 
constitutional themes.
16 The Maistre family archives are now in the Archives Departmental de Savoie, Chambery. I am 
grateful for the assistance of the chief archivist, M. Jean Luquet in the preparation of this thesis.
There are also collections of correspondence in the Archivio de Stato, Turin, and the Bibliotheque 
Nationale de Paris, Department de Manuscrits, Fonds Nouvelles Acquisitions Francaises. All 
references to Archival Material are to the Savoy Archives unless otherwise stated.
12
the greatest political and constitutional thinkers of modernity -  Bodin, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, Locke, Hobbes and Pufendorf. It also explores the resonances that 
Maistre’s work has with certain thinkers who have come after him, such as Carl 
Schmitt and Michael Oakeshott.
More precisely, this thesis has the following aims. First, it is intended to provide a 
critical exposition of the substantive content of Maistre’s constitutional thought in 
the light of a consideration of the primary sources and both Anglophone and 
Francophone scholarship. Second, it is intended to add to Maistrian scholarship 
through an examination and further exploration of the historical and intellectual 
context of Maistre’s constitutional thought. In the light of these aims, the thesis is 
intended to address the following questions: how did Maistre express traditionalist 
constitutional values in the modem, post-revolutionary environment? What is the 
significance of this iteration for modem constitutional theory? In answering these 
questions, it is hoped that a full and critical account of Maistre’s constitutional 
thought will emerge.
The substantive chapters of this thesis will examine the content of Maistre’s 
constitutional thought. Chapters 2, 3 ,4  and 5 will examine constituent power, 
constitutions, sovereignty, authority and power, and governing and forms of 
government respectively. Chapter 6, the conclusion, will discuss the significance of 
Maistre’s thinking for public law and constitutional thought in the light of the 
preceding substantive chapters.
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Before this analysis though, there are several preliminary tasks that this introduction 
must perform. First, some biographical context must be provided. Second, it is 
necessary to examine the existing scholarship on Maistre and evaluate it, in order to 
show the various ways in which his work has been construed over the years. Third, 
it is important to examine the ideas of the counter-Enlightenment and their relevance 
to Maistre, particularly in the arena of constitutional thought. Finally, some of 
Maistre’s core presuppositions will be examined and his intellectual alignment 
considered within the theoretical framework of conservative thought in general. The 
cumulative effect of this analysis will be to provide a comprehensive overview of 
Maistre’s constitutional thought, assessing his work factually, intellectually and in 
terms of his academic reception.
A Brief Biography
Bom on the 1 April 1753 in Chambery, the capital of the Duchy of Savoy, which 
itself formed part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Maistre was the eldest of ten 
children.17 He studied at the College Royal of Chambery and was educated by the 
Society of Jesus. From the Jesuits he received a well-rounded education; as well as 
French, Latin and Greek, Maistre had at least a passable knowledge of several other
17 There are several biographical accounts of Maistre’s life. See, for example Robert Triomphe, 
Joseph de Maistre: Etude sur la Vie et sur la Doctrine d ’un Materialiste Mystique (Geneva: Droz, 
1968); Richard Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre: An Intellectual Militant (Montreal: MacGill-Queens 
University Press, 1988); Henri de Maistre, Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Perrin, 1991); Claude 
Boncompain et Francois Vermale, Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Korin, 2004).
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foreign languages. From the age of 15 he filled notebooks with records and notes of 
his reading, which included the Bible, classical authors, the Church Fathers, the 
humanists of the Renaissance and the French writers of le grand Siecle. Maistre 
supplemented this traditional education by reading contemporary francophone 
philosophers such as Voltaire and Rousseau; he owned a copy of the Encyclopedic 
and he also enjoyed reading English philosophy.
In 1771 Maistre went to Turin University to study law, receiving a doctorate in 
1772. He then returned to Savoy, where he began a career as a magistrate. At the 
age of 35 he was made a senator, and in 1774 he began to practice freemasonry,18 
first in the Trois Mortiers lodge and afterwards in the Rectified Scottish Rite in La 
Parfaite Since rite, a lodge with illuminist sympathies. Maistre possessed a deep 
Catholic faith, and this influenced his political thought, in which his inclination was 
to support the idea of a wise monarchy. Nevertheless, he distrusted any movement 
towards either absolutism or enlightened despotism. Instead, Maistre hoped for the 
institution of an elite group of counsellors who would be capable of supporting the 
king in promoting cautious and prudent reform.
From 1788 onwards, Maistre looked on anxiously at the political tumult engulfing 
neighbouring France. When revolution finally broke out, he disapproved of those 
innovators who wished to abolish fundamental laws that had been in existence for
18 For a discussion of Maistre and freemasonry, see Paul Vaulliaud, Joseph de Maistre Franc-macon 
(Milan: Reed. Arche & Edidit, 1990). For an example of Maistre’s Masonic writing, see Memoire au 
Due de Brunswick (1782) in Ecrits Maconniques de Joseph de Maistre, edited by J. Rebotton 
(Geneva: Slatkine, 1983).
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centuries; laws which to Maistre formed the basic identity of the nation. In contrast 
to most of his fellow senators, he condemned the meeting of the clergy, the nobility 
and the third estate, and from July 1789 he was predicting the disastrous effects of 
this dismantling of the political hierarchy.
When the revolutionary armies invaded Savoy on 22 September 1792, Maistre 
(along with his family) was the only senator to leave his homeland out of loyalty to 
Victor Amadeus III. Even so, this was a period in which the Piedmontese cabinet 
regarded the intellectual elites of the kingdom with mistrust, and so Maistre was still 
suspected of harbouring revolutionary sympathies. In spite of his continued service 
and devotion to the kingdom of Savoy and Sardinia, these suspicions were to dog 
him for the rest of his life.
At the beginning of 1793, Maistre returned to Chambery in an attempt to protect his 
property, which had been threatened with confiscation, but the risk of arrest meant 
that he once again had to flee the country. Making his way to Switzerland, he began 
his career as a counter-revolutionary writer. In Lausanne he published his Lettres 
d ’un Royaliste Savoisien, in the hope of gaining converts to the monarchical cause 
and in order to prepare the way for an attempt to re take the Savoy by a joint 
Sardinian and Austrian force. However, after the abject failure of this campaign, 
Maistre devoted himself to caring for newly arrived French emigres, and was 
regularly informed of the atrocities being committed by the revolutionaries. It was 
in this context that Maistre wrote Etude sur la Souverainete, which concentrates on
16
dismantling the theories of Rousseau outlined in the Discours and Du Contrat 
Social, works which -  along with those of Voltaire -  had created the intellectual 
climate in which, so Maistre believed, the Terror could be perpetrated.
At the end of 1796, the results of the elections of Germinal Year V allowed Maistre 
to believe for a time in the re-establishment of royalty, and prompted him to write 
Considerations sur la France. This work, which gave a providential aspect to the 
events of the revolution, predicted that once the revolution’s outpouring of satanic 
energy was exhausted, monarchical sovereignty would then return without further 
bloodshed -  a sort of regenerative chastisement -  because, he believed, monarchy 
alone was truly constitutional for France. These sentiments, which were seen by the 
agents of the Restoration as somehow prophetic, were, however, initially prevented 
from gaining widespread distribution because the coup d'etat of 18 Fructidor 
intervened.
At the beginning of 1797, Maistre was recalled to Turin by the new King of 
Piedmont, Charles Emmanuel IV. Shortly afterwards, France annexed the Kingdom 
of Piedmont -  a new disaster. Maistre went into exile, sojourning in Venice for 
several months, after which he was ordered to go to Sardinia as a magistrate, where 
he attempted to reorganise the Sardinian judiciary. This proved to be an impossible 
task, and Maistre was opposed at every turn in his efforts by the Viceroy, Charles- 
Felix. On the 23 October 1802 he was nominated as ambassador to the Court of the 
Tsar in Saint Petersburg, but this seemingly prestigious appointment was limited by
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the sorts of financial constraints that were continually to darken his diplomatic 
career. For economic reasons, Maistre was prevented from bringing his family with 
him to Russia, and in February 1805 he wrote, “At six hundred leagues distant, the 
idea of my family, the memories of my childhood, devastate me with sadness. I see 
my mother, who walks up and down in my room -  such a good person -  and on 
writing this I am crying like a child”. His letters from Russia frequently contain 
profound expressions of dismay and discouragement.
Arriving in St Petersburg in 1803, Maistre became well integrated with the local 
aristocracy in a matter of months, and in June he was presented to Tsar Alexander I. 
Maistre had discovered that the Russian government was intercepting his diplomatic 
communications to the Sardinian government and passing them on for the Tsar to 
read, and he tailored his correspondence accordingly, in an attempt to influence the 
thinking of the Russian Monarch. Through this and other means, his influence 
became disproportionate to the importance of the government that he represented at 
the court, and Maistre became a well-known figure in the salons of St Petersburg.
From Russia, Maistre watched Napoleon’s meteoric rise in horror. Day after day his 
correspondence attests to his disbelief at the success of the man he called a 
“usurper”, and in July 1807, after the signature of the treaty of Tilsit (which 
confirmed an alliance between Alexander and Napoleon), Maistre’s diplomatic 
mission in Russia became much more complex. Maistre now became the 
representative of a sovereign (King Charles of Piedmont) at war with France, who
18
was yet still allied to Russia. Maistre continued to act for the Piedmontese 
government on an informal basis, but a new danger arose after the annexation of 
Savoy by France, because Maistre had never sought to obtain Piedmontese 
nationality. Technically therefore, with the annexation Maistre became French, not 
Savoyard, and so became a fugitive who could be repatriated by the Revolutionary 
authorities.
Forced to limit his official duties, he began to read and write more, and to circulate 
his writings across the aristocratic salons of St Petersburg. Maistre felt the necessity 
to act because Alexander I, inspired by the reformer Count Speranski, was 
considering the implementation of constitutional reform that involved some form of 
limited representation by foreign diplomats, based on the French political model. In 
response to this threat, Maistre wrote the Essai sur le Principe Generateur des 
Constitutions Politiques, denouncing what he saw as the dangers of the mania for 
written constitutions during the period now known as the Enlightenment.
It was at this time that he began working on Les Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg, a 
series of symposia concerning the temporal application of Providence, the 
composition of which he interrupted in 1810 in order to write a number of articles in 
support of the Jesuits, who were attempting to establish a number of schools and 
colleges in Russia at that time. In 1812, Alexander abandoned all attempts at 
liberalisation and Speranski was dismissed, the Franco-Russian Alliance broke down 
and Maistre was called to the Tsar’s court to act as a counsellor. In October 1814,
19
his family re-joined him in St Petersburg after eleven years of separation. However, 
due to his loyalty to his own sovereign, he turned down the opportunity to enter into 
the Tsar’s service, even though this would have assured both his and his family’s 
security. This action did not lead to any display of gratitude from the Sardinian 
King, neither did it result in any preferment. Indeed, when his family arrived in 
Russia, Maistre was forced to borrow money to cover the expenses of their journey.
In February 1816, in addition to these financial difficulties, there came political 
disgrace. The Russian government ordered Maistre’s repatriation to Turin because 
he had been tainted by the scandal in which several influential aristocratic families 
converted to Catholicism. Accused of proselytising on behalf of the Jesuits, Maistre 
left St Petersburg in June 1817, a year and a half after the decree banning the Society 
of Jesus from Russia. En route for Turin, he travelled through France and visited 
Paris for the first time. Here, on 7 July 1817, he had an audience with Louis XVIII, 
a meeting which was not a success because the king interpreted the Essai sur le 
Principe Generateur des Constitutions Politiques as an attack on la Charte, and thus 
on his own legitimacy.
Finally, on Maistre’s return to Turin he became aware that he was considered an 
embarrassment to the government of the day, and he had to wait until 1818 until he 
was given the position of Regent of the Great Chancellery, an honorific function 
which gave him no active political role. The last few years of his life were to be 
marred by material difficulties and bitterness. In 1819 he published Du Pape, the
20
argument of which was that all political association should rest, not on a 
constitutional monarchy or an association of Christian princes, but on the infallible 
authority of the sovereign pontiff. Badly received, these ideas provoked controversy 
not only within the French Church but also in the Vatican. In 1820 Maistre finally 
completed the 11th symposium of the Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg, which was 
published shortly after he died on 26 February, 1821.
Academic Opinion
The majority of studies on Maistre are, quite understandably, in French; and as they 
are the most numerous, and stretch from Maistre’s lifetime to the present day, they 
will be considered first, with English language scholarship on Maistre being 
considered afterwards.
Francophone Scholarship
Until relatively recently the Francophone literature on Maistre fell into two polarised 
categories, reflecting deep-seated divisions in French political and cultural life. In 
the first camp are those opponents of Maistre who dismissed his ideas as being 
synonymous either with stereotypes of repressive inquisitorial Catholicism or 20th- 
century fascism, without troubling to consider the historical impossibility of either
21
stance.19 In the second camp are those who have sought to establish a Maistrian 
hagiography. Studies in this latter category are really a branch of conservative, 
French-Catholic apologetics.20 The fluency of Maistre’s prose and the 
persuasiveness with which he expresses counter-cultural concepts go some way to 
explaining his why he was so readily exploitable in the propaganda wars between 
these two factions (he was utilised primarily by right-wing thinkers and proponents 
of traditional Catholicism, but also served as a bogeyman for both liberalism and 
Protestantism.) And this exploitation ensured that Maistre has maintained some 
form of presence in French constitutional and political thought throughout 
successive centuries.
Robert Triomphe has similarly suggested that there have been two distinct phases of 
scholarly interest in Joseph de Maistre (unrelated to the categorisation made above). 
The first, according to Triomphe, was at the time of the confrontation between 
monarchical legitimism and republican laicisme at the beginning of the Third 
Republic, and the second occurred as France approached the Second World War.21 
Jean-Louis Darcel, another eminent Maistrian, adds another category, that of 
renewed post-war interest, which, according to him, was rekindled with Triomphe’s 
thesis, which was originally written in 1955 and was published in expanded form in 
1968. To these categories may be added a further phase of interest in Maistre of a
19 Even those who now seek to restore Maistre’s reputation have a tendency in this regard. See 
Bradley A Modern Maistre, p. 10, who makes the following assertion: “.. .the step from a theory of 
violence to an affirmation of violence was prepared by him, for which he must bear some 
responsibility (just as Nietzsche for the misappropriation of his thought by the Nazis)”.
20 See, for example, F. Vermale, Notes sur Joseph de Maistre Inconnu (Chambery, France: Librairie 
Dardel, 1921). See also Stephane Rials, Le Legitisme (Paris: PUF, 1983).
21 See Triomphe, Joseph de Maistre: Etude sur la Vie, pp. 9-19.
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more contemporary nature, in which scholars have expressed an interest in other 
aspects of Maistre’s work, beyond examining areas such as his influence on 
domestic French far-right politics and ultra-montane Catholic thought.
This latter phase of scholarship has been influenced by critical theory and an 
increasing disillusionment with the universalising values of Enlightenment. It is a 
revival due in no small part to a growing discontent with liberal political and 
constitutional theory. Modem scholarship attributes to Maistre a host of radical 
qualities: he is a writer capable of de-stabilising and problematising the liberal 
bourgeois social and political consensus, and it is as part of this movement that the 
most recent Anglophone and Francophone scholarship finds common ground.
Maistre’s principal works were already known in France between 1817 and 1821, 
the year in which he died. He was well known to his contemporaries Germaine de 
Stael22 and Chateaubriand, and his writings were also known to Louis de Bonald, 
that other paradigmatic counter-revolutionary theorist, with whom Maistre 
corresponded.23 In the period immediately following his death, Maistre’s life itself 
became a subject of interest both on account of his trenchant religious views and 
because of the Kulturkampfen that were spreading through continental Europe. One 
writer who perpetuated a romantically inspired image of Maistre was Saint-Beuve.
In the Revue de Deux Mondes in 1843, Saint-Beuve ranked the Savoyard alongside 
De Stael and Chateaubriand in the following manner, saying: “Three writers of great
22 See, for example, Madame de Stael, ‘Dix Annees d’Exil,’ in Oeuvres Completes, ed. Paul Gautier 
(Paris:Plon-Nourrit, 1904), VIII, p. 298.
23 See, for example, Letter from Maistre to Bonald, 13 July 1814 in OC V 6 T 12, pp. 437-438.
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renown made their debut.. .at the same moment.. .under the exciting impulse of the 
French Revolution”.24
In fact, Saint-Beuve had no doubt that Maistre’s work would have longevity, and 
believed that the Considerations had “prophetic audacity”25 and represented the 
foundation of all Maistre’s other work. He called the Soirees “the finest work by M. 
de Maistre, the most durable, the one that addresses itself to the most numerous class 
of free and intelligent readers.. .In his work, imagination and colour in the bosom of 
a lofty thought make eternal problems ever present”.26 But he was puzzled by how a 
Catholic thinker was prepared to consider so many unorthodox notions (Maistre 
advocates, for example, the use of religion as a mode of political and social control). 
Saint-Beuve’s views are of interest because they demonstrate that, even as early as 
1843, at least one commentator was pursuing concerns -  the a-historicity and 
orthodoxy of Maistre’s ideas -  which persist into our own day.
It is this potential to detect a lack of orthodoxy in Maistre’s writings that perhaps 
attracted Lamartine to them. Whilst disagreeing with him in many ways, Lamartine 
shared certain of Maistre’s esoteric views on religion. Speaking of the Soirees, 
Lamartine writes: “Such is this book...a style astonishing in its vigour and 
flexibility, new profound insights immeasurable in their range concerning 
legislation, dogmas, mysteries and sometimes pleasantries out of place in serious
24 C.A de Saint-Beuve, Portraits Litteraires, Paris n.d. II, 42, D.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 448.
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subject matter...a declamatory Diderot in a sincere and Christian philosopher”.27 
Here can be seen the advent of a much-used technique in Maistrian scholarship (and 
one which thesis adopts to an extent) -  that of using him as one element in a 
comparative study, an approach which suggests that Maistre was deemed either not 
suitable or significant enough to be the sole subject of a scholarly study.
Alfred de Vigny,28 Balzac29 and Stendahl30 all engaged with Maistre’s thought, as 
did, more surprisingly, Saint-Simon and Comte, who both read and approved of it.31 
Comte saw in Du Pape, the Soirees and the Considerations a compelling description 
of primitive society and the justification for a moral order. He was introduced to 
Maistre by Saint-Simon, who detected in Maistre the outlines for a society free from 
the chaos of revolution, and one that might function in a moral manner.32 Of course, 
both Saint-Simon and Comte overlooked the religious components of Maistre’s 
work. Over the course of the century, however, commentators increasingly noted a 
strongly sectarian tendency in his writings, so that by the middle of the 19th century 
Maistre was being judged almost entirely in sectarian terms.
George Codogan’s work is an example of this late-19th century French Catholic 
hagiographic strain of Maistre criticism. Of Maistre, Codogan said: “His life gives a
27 Alphonse de Lamartine, ‘Vie et oeuvres du comte de Maistre’, in Cours Familier de Litterature 
(Paris: Calmann Levy 1859), VIII, Entretien XLIII, p.44.
28 See Alfred de Vigny, Stello (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1882), p. 176.
29 ‘Memoires de Sanson’, in Oeuvres Diverses (Paris: Editions Louis Conard, 1956), I, p. 219.
30 See Selected Journalism from the English Reviews by Stendahl, ed. Geoffery Strickland (New 
York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 276.
31 See Henri Gouhier, La Jeunesse d ’Auguste Comte et la Formation du Positivisme; Auguste Comte 
et Saint-Simon (Paris: Vrin 1941), pp. 334-335.
32 See Bayle, Les Idees Politiques, p. 135.
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rare and perfect example of a complete and intellectual moral unity”.33 On the other 
hand, Edmund Scherer, a Protestant commentator writing in 1860, remarked: “What 
would he say...in noticing that the centre of gravity in the world has moved and that 
modem civilisation is essentially a Protestant civilisation?”34 Writing in the same 
era, Raymond Fevrier had an agenda that was specifically anti-Catholic and anti- 
papal, asking of Maistre: “How does it come to pass that this man with such 
intelligence, was unable to judge with such perspicacity political and religious 
events...?”35
Meanwhile, Renan regarded Maistre as a dogmatist, and identified a feature of his 
work -  its decisionistic character -  which was to be developed further in the 20th 
century: “Joseph de Maistre, a great Lord impatient with the slow discussions of 
philosophy. For God’s sake! A decision and let it be ended, true or false, little 
matter. The important thing is that I be at rest”.36 Emile Faguet, on the other hand, 
gives us what has become the archetypal image of Maistre; his darkly luminous 
words have made a lasting impression: “A fierce absolutist, a furious theocrat, an 
intransigent legitimist, apostle of a monstrous trinity composed of pope, King and 
hangman, always and everywhere the champion of the hardest, narrowest and most 
inflexible dogmatism, a dark figure out of the Middle Ages, part learned doctor, part 
inquisitor, part executioner”.37
33 George Cogordan, Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1894), p. 130.
34 Edmond Scherer, Melanges de Critiques Religieuses (Paris: Cherbouliez, 1860), VIII, pp. 294-295.
35 Raymond Fevrier, Etude sur Joseph de Maistre, Theocrate Catholique (Geneva: Imprimerie 
Ramboz et Schuchardt, 1877), p. 5.
36 Ernest Renan, VAvenir de la Science (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1860), p. 62.
37 Faguet, Politiques et Moralistes, p. 1.
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Before the First World War, there was a flourishing of neo-monarchism in France, 
accompanied by a strong Catholic revival38. Writers such as Maritain, Peguy and 
Bourget inspired a new flourishing in Catholic intellectual life.39 But it was in the 
1930s that a second crop of studies, whose emergence coincided with the fear of 
Bolshevism and the strengthening of far-right movements in France and Europe, 
used Maistre’s work once more in an explicitly polemical fashion. The Abbe Carret, 
writing in 1938, gave Maistre’s divinely inspired politics a new function as a 
bulwark against atheistic materialism, saying: “Maistre learned that the idea which 
groups men by their natural affinities in hierarchical society is the divine thought 
which forms institutions because it is the creator of our nature and our needs: man is 
a political animal because he is an animal with reason, and he is one and the other at 
the same time because he is a creature of the Sovereign by whom other sovereigns
• »>40reign.
Interest in Maistre continued well into the time of the Second World War: in 1944 
Francis Bayle produced his thesis, in which he emphasised the political aspects of 
Maistre’s thought and acknowledged his influence on Comte and Saint-Simon, but 
also took Maistre seriously as a political thinker in his own right. Writing in the 
1950s, Camus noted the similarities between Maistre and Marx: “We find in Marx 
the same sort of creative fatalism. Maistre undoubtedly justified the established
38 Personified, for example, in the figure of Saint Therese of Lisieux. See Owen Chadwick, The 
Secularisation of the European Mind (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), p 251.
39 See Paul Bourget, Pages de Critique et de Doctrine (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1912), p. 264.
40 Abbe Carret, Finesse et Geometrie dans Joseph de Maistre: Politique, Guerre, Tradition (Isere: 
Imprimerie Paillet, 1938), p. 12.
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order. But Marx justifies the order which is established in time...Another order must 
be established that will demand in the name of history a new conformity. As for the 
means, they are the same for Marx as for Maistre: political realism, discipline, 
force.. ..”41 This Marxian theme was taken up by Cioran in 1957 in his Essai sur la 
Pensee Reactionnaire: “To attribute to the historical process a significance is to 
subscribe more or less explicitly to a form of providence. Bossuet, Hegel and Marx, 
in the way that they assign to events a sense, belong to the same family [as 
Maistre]”.42
Robert Triomphe’s biography, published in 1968 is Janus-faced. It marks the start 
of a new, more academically analytical form of Maistre scholarship, and it is a tour 
deforce of detailed research, amounting to 628 pages of precisely written prose.
Yet, despite its careful consideration of Maistre’s work and the sources, it also 
suffers from the defect common to so many of those studies that had gone before. It 
adopts not just a critical but an unrelentingly hostile tone, and is at times 
unreasonably cynical as to the motivations of its subject.43 At about the same time, 
Isaiah Berlin was unsuccessfully submitting his now seminal extended essay on 
Maistre to the Journal o f the History o f Ideas.44 When Berlin’s piece was finally 
published, it was taken by many in Britain to be the first study of Maistre outside the 
Francophone scholarly community. And yet, despite the feeling that Maistre had
41 Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2000).
42 E.M. Cioran, Essai sur la Pensee Reactionnaire (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1977), p. 17.
43 This was recognized by Triomphe in later editions of his work, in which he inserted an introductory 
note asking the reader “to excuse certain hasty or severe judgments, products of an excessive 
impatience and the heated climate [climat passionee] of the immediate aftermath of war”.
44 See Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity. The essay was begun in the 1940s and put aside 
until the 1960s as being in need of further revision.
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suddenly emerged into the consciousness of Europeans, in fact his work had already 
been available in several European countries, and even in the United States of 
America, at a relatively early stage.45 Indeed, an examination of the level of 
awareness of Maistre in Britain and America will give us a further indication of how 
inaccurate are claims by writers to have ‘unearthed’ Maistre in the second half of the 
20th century.
Anglophone Scholarship
In fact, even at the time when he was writing, Maistre was read -  in the original 
French -  outside of France, and his works were held in several major public and 
private libraries in Western and Eastern Europe. Translations of his works also 
appeared quite swiftly 46 His principal works were translated into German between 
1822 and 1824, for example, and in 1838 a minor, but religiously sensitive, work -  
Les Letters a un Gentilhomme Rousse sur VInquisition -  was translated into English. 
By 1847, Maistre’s work was also known in the United States. Throughout the 
1850s a series of articles analysing Maistre’s work appeared in certain British 
periodicals; the authors’ discussions of Maistre thought and oeuvre ranged quite 
widely, and included analyses of Maistre’s judgments of Milton and his ideas on 
Russia, but a typical assessment in the Edinburgh Review was to become an all-too 
familiar treatment of Maistre’s work: “No writer of anything like equal eminence
45 See Darcel, Cahiers de VAssociation Internationale, p. 2.
46 Ibid., p. 3.
29
has given expression to so startling an amount of prejudice, liberality and insulting 
arrogance in his books; whilst his familiar letters teem with proofs of a kindly and 
loving nature of candour, liberality and Christian virtues”.47
The first complete study of Maistre in English, written by John Viscount Morley, 
appeared in 1871. First sketching out a history of French thought at the beginning of 
the 19th century, Morely then argues for the existence of three schools of thought -  
the sensational, the Catholic and the eclectic. He then proposes to study the 
principles of the second of these three schools through the medium of Maistre’s 
writing, the “incontestable chief of the Catholic group in France”.48 Maistre 
continued to be referred to periodically in journals throughout the last thirty years of 
the 19th century,49 but interest in him then appears to have died out in Great Britain, 
with the exception of a study by Harold Laski in 191750 and a thesis (written in 
French) by Holdsworth, until a revival of interest occasioned by Berlin’s essay.51
Berlin’s interpretation was offered as part of a project charting the intellectual 
currents of the counter-Enlightenment, and in making it he brought Maistre to the 
wider attention of the English-speaking intellectual community. Berlin’s essay is 
famous for its characterisation of Maistre as the progenitor of modern fascism, a
47 Edinburgh Review,Vol. 124 (1856), pp. 343-344; see also Edinburgh Review 103 (1856), p. 491.
48 Viscount Morley, Critical Miscellanies (London: 1871) reprinted (London: MacMillan, 1923), p. 
117.
49 See, for example, Quarterly Review 145 (1878), pp. 143-144; Quarterly Review 148 (1879), pp. 
432-452.
50 Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
51 See Holdsworth, .Joseph de Maistre et I'Angleterre.
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distorted and anachronistic portrayal which has nevertheless proved to have had a 
lasting impact.
Berlin’s work inspired a number of more detailed studies among his students at 
Oxford University, many of which were of a comparative nature. Notable were 
studies by Larry Siedentop (on Maistre and Maine de Biran),52 Cyprian Blamires (on 
Bonald and Saint-Simon)53 and Graeme Garrard (on Rousseau).54 In 1960, at the 
University of Sussex, Jack Lively produced a translation of a number of Maistre’s 
works, in which he attempted to highlight the similarities between Maistre and 
Rousseau.55 All of these works were concerned primarily with political theory;56 
indeed, apart from Benjamin Thurston’s doctoral thesis on Maistre’s theory of 
linguistics, it was Maistre’s political beliefs that formed the focus of most critiques 
of his work.57
In North America, Richard Lebrun has done more than anyone to bring Maistre to 
the attention of the academic world, with two informative studies and several 
translations of Maistre’s work.58 It might be said of Lebrun that, in contradistinction
52 The Limits of the Enlightenment: A Study of Conservative Political and Social Thought in Early 
Nineteenth Century France (D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1965).
53 Three Critiques of the French Revolution: Maistre, Bonald, Saint-Simon (D. Phil thesis, Oxford 
University, 1986).
54 Maistre, Judge of Jean-Jacques (D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1995).
55 Jack Lively, ed. and trans. The Works of Joseph de Maistre (New York: MacMillan, 1965).
56 See also Max Huber, Die Staatsphilosophie von Joseph de Maistre im Lichte des Thomismus 
(Helbing und Lichtenbahn, Bael, 1958); A. Caponigri, Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Joseph de 
Maistre (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 1942).
57 Joseph de Maistre: Logos and Logomachy (Unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 2001).
58 See Richard Lebrun, Throne and Altar: the Political and Religious Thought of Joseph de Maistre 
(Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press 1962), Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre: An Intellectual Militant, 
and Lebrun, Against Rousseau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univesity Press 1996).
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to Triomphe, his studies have not been as critical of his subject as they might.59 
More recently, another North American scholar, Owen Bradley, has written A 
Modern Maistre, a study that reflects the trend towards critical theory and 
postmodern criticism of liberalism. In it, the author treats Sacrifice as being the 
central theme of Maistre’s work, and attempts to position the rest of the Allobroge’s 
thought around this organising conceit.60 And most recently, Cara Camcastle’s 
study, entitled The More Moderate Side o f Joseph de Maistre, offers an evaluation 
of Maistre’s views on political liberty and political economy.61
Contemporary Scholarship
In France, there are a number of modem scholars involved in Maistrian studies, 
although none work specifically in the area of Maistre’s constitutional theory: Jean- 
Louis Darcel, Yves Madouas, Jean Rebotton, Patrick Malvezin, Gerald Gengembre, 
Pierre Glaudes and Jeans-Yves Pranchere.62 A taste of the type of scholarship 
currently being conducted is provided by Pranchere’s essay, “Dans la Dialectique 
des Lumieres”, which examines Maistre’s writings with reference to Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s formulation of the irrationality of the Enlightenment; characteristic of 
Pranchere’s approach is his statement: “the traditionalism of Maistre did not express
59 Lebrun, An Intellectual Militant, p. 157.
60 See Bradley, A Modern Maistre.
61 Cara Camcastle, The More Moderate Side of Joseph de Maistre: Views on Political Liberty and 
Political Economy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2005).
62 For example, Gerald Gengembre, La Contre Revolution ou VHistorire des Esperances (Paris: 
Imago, 1989); Pierre Glaudes, Joseph de Maistre et les Figures de VHistoire (Clermont Ferrand: 
Librairie Nizet, 1997).
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the revulsion of a thinker against a mode of thought foreign to him, it was rather the 
development and exploitation of authoritarian potentialities already contained in 
certain version of the rational politics of the enlightenment.”63 With sentiments such 
as these, it is clear that Maistrian scholarship has taken another tack, and this is 
mirrored in the work of English language, with writers such as John Gray citing 
Maistre with approval on several occasions, in Gray’s case in order to bolster his 
arguments against certain Enlightenment-influenced ideas.64
A potential problem arises once more in this most recent bout of scholarship: that of 
developing a distinct degree of empathy with Maistre, and identifying with his views 
without taking into account the context of his beliefs. Maistre is taken by this type 
of scholarship to be a postmodern critic rather than a deeply reactionary 19th century 
Catholic; commentators who fall into this trap typically see his thought as having 
emerged spontaneously, through an entirely individual process of reasoning, 
ignoring the fact that this reasoning coincided with and formed a part of certain 
conservative views on liberalism and Enlightenment.
When we examine Maistre’s work, therefore, we need to provide an intellectual as 
well as an historical context for them, because if Maistre’s 19th-century interpreters 
tended towards a-historicism, those of the late 20th and 21st centuries have begun to 
strip him of his ideological context. Above all else, we have to accept that, although
63 See Jean-Yves Pranchere, Dans la Dialectique des Lumieres, p. 105.
64 See John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995).
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the results of his thinking may seem startlingly radical, they were in fact the product 
of a particular intellectual context.
Constitutional Thought and the Counter-Enlightenment
As many commentators have noted, one of the factors that makes Maistre such an 
interesting subject is the fact that it is difficult to determine the boundaries of his 
thought. This is a twofold issue. First there is the question of categorisation: 
determining which discipline best defines his thought. Second there is the question 
of whether it is possible to identify the larger intellectual movement to which he 
belongs. These questions are both equally pertinent: for instance, the present study 
is specifically an examination of the constitutional elements of Maistre’s work, but it 
is not possible to perform this task in disciplinary isolation. In one sense, all of 
Maistre’s thought is constitutional, in that it is constantly pre-occupied with the 
order of things, with the relationships between those in authority and those who 
submit to authority,65 but in pursuit of this objective, Maistre’s enquiry ranges over a 
large number of topics.
Whilst certain themes -  the state, authority, sovereignty and the nature of 
constitutions -  recur regularly, and are clearly recognisable as belonging to the field 
of constitutional thought, they are entwined with other -  predominantly theological
65OC V 1 T 1, p. 1: “What is most admirable in the universal order of things is the actions of free 
beings under the divine hand. Freely enslaved, they operate at the same time voluntarily and 
necessarily. They are able to do what they wish but without being able to disturb the general plans”.
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-  ideas which certainly are not. Maistre’s work is shot through with these inter­
disciplinary moments, and these strata cannot be ignored if a comprehensive 
understanding of Maistre’s constitutional thought is to be attained. It will therefore 
be necessary to trespass from time to time on topics which may, initially, seem more 
relevant to the fields of history, theology and philosophy.
Maistre remarked that “Twitched one way by philosophy and the other by the law, I 
believe that I will escape by the diagonal”.66 It is one of the aims of this thesis to 
examine whether the large part of Maistre’s work that fits neither philosophy nor 
law in a positivist sense finds its ‘diagonal’ in constitutional theory, an autonomous 
and identifiable area of study susceptible to analysis.67 If it does, then the question 
remains as to whether or not Maistre’s work has had any lasting impact upon 
constitutional thought more generally, or on the way in which we modem Europeans 
perceive the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed in particular.
In this regard, this thesis will argue that, although he was a minor figure in the 
history of political thought, Maistre can rightfully be analysed alongside that group 
of modem constitutional and political thinkers -  beginning with Bodin, Hobbes and 
Pufendorf and proceeding through Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau -  whose 
object was the analysis of that most influential modem European political form, the 
state. These are thinkers whose area of expertise is situated where the practice of
66 Letter to the Marquise de Barol, 24 July, 1785 cited in Lebrun, Throne and Altar, p. 9.
67 See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p. 1.
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governing and the juridical form of droit publique intersect, a place which is neither 
raw politics nor positive law.
It is of course both inaccurate and unfair to dismiss all constitutional thought in these 
negative terms, as being neither law nor politics. Above all, the positive task of 
constitutional thought is to explicate the relationships between those in authority in 
the state and those who are subject to it. Between politics and normativity, between 
statecraft and judicial procedure, between power and authority, there exists a living 
culture of public law.68 It is concerned with matters of real significance, ranging 
from the existential (such as, what is man’s nature? How is man to live, given this 
nature?) to the technical -  questions about the “constitution, maintenance and 
regulation of governmental authority”.69
One of the issues that this thesis will seek to resolve is just how distinctive is the 
process of constitutional thought in Maistre’s work, and how this distinctiveness 
manifests itself. To begin with, it is important to realise that until the latter part of 
the 17th century there was no clear distinction between a ruler and the function of 
ruling.70 The political existed less as an autonomous field of endeavour than as a 
species of applied theology.71 This fundamental concept was then gradually 
elaborated into a theory of society and governance which could not be considered 
political in the modem sense. The development of political theory in the early
68 Ibid,, p. 30.
69 Ibid.
70 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), p. 170.
71 Ibid., p. 171.
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modem era was shaped by Machiavelli, whose innovation was to suggest that 
activity in the political sphere should not be regulated by Christian morality.72 Then, 
from the early 17th century onwards, the concept of the state was developed rapidly 
through the work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.
To understand Maistre’s position and the context of his thought, it is important to 
recognise that the secular Enlightenment, inspired by these writers, was not 
universally accepted.73 At the end of the 18th century, most of Western Europe was 
still participating in a vibrant religious culture, with access to, and an understanding 
of, so-called pre-Enlightenment values, which were held to be not curiosities but 
functioning truths,74 a situation which continued into the early 20th century.75 At the 
same time, if we consider the notion of Papal Infallibility (a concept influenced by 
Maistre’s writings, and in particular Du Pape) and the process by which it was 
officially recognised, it is possible to see the impact of secularised modernity on 
even such a supposedly Enlightenment-resistant and tradition-oriented structure as 
the Roman Catholic Church. The very fact that the notion of a divinely bestowed 
dogmatic absolutism had to be promulgated through the first Vatican Council like a 
piece of secular legislation was an admission that the epistemology of the faithful
72 Ibid., p. 174.
73 See Darrin McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment, p. 5 : “However irresistible, however 
justified, historians’ fascination with the glittering lights of 1778 has tended to blind them from the 
considerable number of men and women who read Voltaire’s triumph in an altogether different way”.
74 “Paris is a whole world. Everything there is on a grand scale, both good and evil. Go to the theatres, 
the promenades, the haunts of pleasure, all are crowded. Go to the churches: every one is packed” 
Goldoni, quoted in N. Hampson, The Enlightenment (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 132.
75 See Chadwick, The Secularisation of the European Mind, p. 262: “Was it more difficult in 1900 
than in 1800, was it a bigger act of faith by 1900 than by 1800 to trust that all the hairs of your head 
are numbered and that not a sparrow shall fall to the ground, without purpose? For all the shipwrecks 
and railway accidents, for all of natural selection or Marxist theory, it is not certain that the answer to 
that question is in the affirmative”.
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was no longer entirely, unselfconsciously rooted in the ancient world, but rather
7  f \understood itself as able to act individually and question authority.
One of the major questions of this thesis is whether this sense of transition is 
apparent in Maistre’s thought, which is certainly caught at the moment when the 
concepts of theodicy and providence were in retreat -  in other words, seen as less 
and less able for the task of explaining the human condition -  whilst the concepts of 
history, the state, science and the law came to the fore. Whilst Maistre perceived 
one of his main tasks as being to decry the de-sacralisation of the world, was he able 
to do so without making reference to ideas which are necessarily influenced by 
modernity?77 In his defence of ancient methods, does Maistre conceive of the state 
and constitutional function in a manner which owes as much to modern political 
thought as it does to that of the scholastics?78
There have been several attempts to explain in general this transitional phase 
between the two intellectual paradigms of tradition and modernity.79 In his book, 
Liberalism and the Origins o f European Social Theory, Steven Seidman seeks to
76 See, for example, Euchyrridion Symbolorum, ed. D. Rahner (Rome: Henrici Denzigwe, 1957), p. 
508: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is when exercising the office of pastor 
and teacher of all Christians, he defines.. .a doctrine concerning faith and morals to be held by the 
whole church, through the divine assistance promised to him in Saint Peter, is possessed of that 
infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished his Church to be endowed.. ..and therefore such 
definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not from the consent of the 
Church”.
77 See Zeev Stemhell, Les Anti-Lumieres: Du XVIII Siecle a la Guerre Froid (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 
p.132 and p.257.
8 McMahon, Enemies of Enlightenment, p 14: “Its defence of tradition was not traditional, its 
reverence for history was a historical departure, and its arguments for the family and patriarchal 
power were a response to novel threats both real and perceived”.
9 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962).
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define the counter-enlightenment as one of these moments.80 Influenced by Kuhn’s 
methodology, Seidman does not see the counter-Enlightenment as a reactionary 
movement in a straightforward dialectic with the Enlightenment, but understands it 
as a description of the transition between the traditional order and a new, post-
O 1
revolutionary epoch. Seidman’s understanding of the counter-Enlightenment is 
one which sees more continuity than discontinuity between the Enlightenment and 
the counter-Enlightenment,82 a position also explored by John Gray.83
At the other end of the spectrum there is the classic characterisation of the counter- 
Enlightenment put forward by Isaiah Berlin,84 who saw it as literally the antithesis of 
the Enlightenment. To him, the movement was a German affair, involving Hamann, 
Jacobi, Herder and Moser, and whilst Maistre is included as an honorary Teuton, “at 
one with German irrationalism and fideism”, he does not sit comfortably in this 
categorisation.85 As Darrin McMahon points out, Berlin’s approach of first 
identifying the main tenets of the Enlightenment and then understanding the counter- 
Enlightenment relative to it, in purely negative terms, limits the range of his enquiry, 
especially regarding the issues of context and influence. For McMahon, “in the 
end, it is almost certainly the case that the Catholic Counter Enlightenment 
discussed in these pages is only one of a range of oppositional responses to
80 See Steven Seidman, Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory (California: University 
of California Press, 1983), pp. 42-77.
81 Ibid., p. 42.
82 Ibid. “The blend of traditionalism and modernism among the critics of the Enlightenment suggest 
that, though they frequently defined themselves as opponents of the philosophes, in fact they were as 
much their heirs as critics”.
83 See John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 165.
84 He was not, however, the first to use it. See Stemhell, Les Anti-Lumieres, pp. 9-10:
85 See Berlin, The Crooked Timber, pp. 101, 110.
86 See McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment, p. 9.
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enlightenment movements, spanning a broad geographical spectrum of regional and 
confessional difference”.87
In a similar vein, Graeme Garrard’s study of the term ‘anti-Enlightenment’ 
emphasises its multifarious usages, and points out the distinct lack of agreement 
concerning its core characteristics.88 He suggests that: “In the face of...mounting 
complexity, some have advocated abandoning the term ‘the Enlightenment’ 
altogether on the grounds that it is an essentialising concept that homogenises many 
disparate movements and obscures important distinctions”.89 However, the fact that 
the idea of the ‘anti-Enlightenment’ itself cannot be defined tightly enough to be 
useful as anything more than a superficial organising concept does not mean that the 
intellectual root of Maistre’s thought cannot be classified. Where, then, can we 
search for characteristics with which to analyse and order its content? A number of 
different approaches have been taken in response to this task, and it is useful to look 
at two key authors who have made use of more strictly defined terms to categorise 
Maistre’s thought.
The first is Stephen Holmes, whose term of choice is ‘antiliberal’. In his Anatomy o f 
Antliberalism, Holmes attacks Maistre for being the doyen of a movement which is 
implacably hostile to liberalism, believing liberalism to be the source of a number of
87 Ibid., p. 10.
88 See, however, Stemhell, Les Anti-Lumieres, p. 11: “Without wishing to pervert the complex 
realities of the period, which lasts from the beginning of the 18th century to our own day, it is 
permissible to affirm that there does exist a coherence and a logic in each of the two intellectual 
traditions”. Stemhell also asserts that: “I believe that the relationships between ideas, politics and 
culture are direct relationships” (p. 33).
89 Graham Garrard, Counter Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (London: 
Routledge, 2006).
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societal and spiritual woes. Of the so-called ‘antiliberals’ Holmes says: “Their 
enmity is typically lavished on individualism, rationalism, humanitarianism, 
rootlesness, permissiveness, universalism, materialism skepticism and 
cosmopolitanism”.90 But Holmes’s attempts at defining this tradition, of which 
Maistre is supposedly the godfather, founder on imprecision. “An all purpose label 
such as antiliberal does not suffice to describe the theorists I analyze”,91 Holmes 
admits, and he goes on to say that “Even at its most philosophical, admittedly, 
antiliberalism is as much a mindset as a theory. It is always a sensibility as well as 
an argument”.92 Holmes’ vituperative hostility to the movement he invents is only 
matched by the difficulty he has in providing a sufficiently rigorous framework for 
analysing it.
Another much-used term to describe Maistre is ‘reactionary’; he is described as such 
in Joseph Femia’s book, Against the Masses, an application of A.O. Hirschman’s 
analytical framework to a survey of anti-democratic thought since the French 
Revolution.93 Following Hirschman, Femia explores three broad forms of 
reactionary thought: the perversity thesis, the futility thesis and the jeopardy thesis. 
According to the perversity thesis, “any purposive action to improve some feature of 
the political, social or economic order only serves to exacerbate the condition one
90 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996), p.5.
91 Ibid., p. 3.
92 Ibid., p. 5.
93 Joseph Femia, Against the Masses: Varieties of Anti-Democratic Thought Since the French 
Revolution (Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2001); Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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wishes to remedy”.94 The futility thesis, on the other hand, “holds that attempts at 
social transformation will be unavailing”95 -  in other words, attempts to right a 
social or political wrong will have no appreciable effect. Any alleged change “is, 
was or will be largely surface, a facade, cosmetic, and hence illusory as the deep 
structures of society remain wholly untouched”.96 Finally, the jeopardy thesis 
asserts that proposed change, however desirable in itself, involves unacceptable 
costs or consequences of one sort or another. Progress in human societies is so 
problematic that any new proposed forward move will endanger or cause damage to 
dearly held traditional values. Femia categorises Maistre as a perversity theorist, but 
in doing so he unwittingly exposes the limitations of this approach: the threefold 
categorisation is essentially arbitrary, and Maistre could readily be defined by any 
one of them. John Dunn, in his critique of this model, even goes so far as to suggest
Q7that Hirschman’s categories are actually indistinguishable from one another.
Clearly, our attempt to classify Maistre’s intellectual allegiance appears not to have 
progressed. However, there does seem to be one common denominator that 
explicitly links the work of Seidman, Femia and Hirschman, and implicitly connects 
that of Garrard and Holmes: the idea that Maistre’s thought is conservative.
Seidman, for example, believes that the counter-Enlightenment movement should be 
sub-divided into categories, one of which -  the category that includes Maistre -  is
94 See Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction, p. 7.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 43.
97 See J. Dunn, “A New Book by Albert Hirschman”, in Government and Opposition, 26, Issue 4 
(1991), 520-525.
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conservatism.98 For his part, Femia, commenting on Hirschman’s use of the term 
‘reactionary’, remarks, “It might have been advisable for him to settle for 
‘conservative’ instead”.99 Garrard characterises Maistre’s thought as defined by the 
Savoyard’s horror of philosophical reasoning, but he does endorse Seidman’s 
categorisation of Maistre.100 Finally, Holmes takes as his starting point Maistre’s 
conservative credentials, even if his ultimate purpose is to supplement them with 
charges of more heinous allegiances.101 In the light of this commonalty amongst the 
critics, then, it would seem appropriate to examine Maistre’s conservatism in greater 
depth, in order to see whether it allows us to gain a firmer grasp of his general 
intellectual alignment.
A Conservative Thinker?
Imperfection
Conservative thought frequently emphasises the imperfection of the individual, and 
conservative thinkers have based their faith in human imperfection on various
1 f)9foundations, whether moral, cognitive and/or biological. For Maistre, the 
overriding pre-requisite of any thought was the axiomatic belief that humanity
98 Seidman, Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory, p. 54.
99 Femia, Against the Masses, p. 7, n. 14.
100 Garrard, Counter Enlightenments, pp. 3-4.
101 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 15.
102 For an example of a conservative argument, that of imperfection derived from biology, see Arnold 
Gehlen, “Mensch und Institutionen”, in Arnold Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung (Hamburg: 
Reinbeck/Rowohlt, 1961), pp. 69-77.
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possessed an explicitly sinful, fallen nature. In his writings, he places a strong 
emphasis on this form of imperfection, the result of “original sin which explains 
everything and without which nothing is explained.”103 Man’s condition is 
expressed in something approaching Pauline terms: “He does not know what he 
wants; he wants what he does not want; he does not want what he wants; he wants to 
want; he sees within himself something which is not himself and which is stronger 
than himself. The wise man resists and cries, ‘Who will deliver me?’ The fool gives 
in and calls his weakness happiness”.104
Maistre believes that the liberation of humanity in the Enlightenment sense, whereby 
humanity is able to rely on its own autonomous reason in order to achieve 
perfection, is impossible, and that any attempts to attain a secular salvation will end 
in chaotic, nightmarish failure. Man’s brokenness is the beginning of the need for 
government. It follows that hierarchical structures -  the government, the state and 
sovereignty -  are necessary because of this corruption; this is aptly demonstrated in 
the following passage, which, in characteristic style, oscillates between metaphysical 
concerns and second-order considerations.
Hobbes is perfectly right, provided that one does not give too much 
extension to his principles. Society is really a state of war; we find here the 
necessity of government -  for since man is bad he must be 
governed.. .Government therefore is not an affair of choice, it results from
103 O C V  2 T 4, pp. 61.
104 OC V 2 T 4, pp. 67-68.
44
the very nature of things. It is impossible that man be what he is and not be 
governed, for a being that is social and bad must be under the yoke.105
Conservative thought has a tendency to express epistemological imperfection, and so 
society is far too complicated an organism to be interpreted and understood as if it 
were a blueprint or plan.106 Falling into line with this view, Maistre once again 
draws upon the notion of original sin, and in so doing he strikes a distinctly 
Augustinian note: “The incapacity to enjoy the sun is, if I am not mistaken, the 
unique consequence of original sin.... Reason, can, it seems to me, raise itself up to 
that; and I believe that it has the right to congratulate itself on this without ceasing to 
be docile”.107 No matter how hard man tries, he will never be able to perfect himself: 
this is a conservative value that Maistre’s with which Maistre’s work is deeply 
imbued.
Epistemology
In the realm of pure philosophy, Maistre extols his belief in the imperfections of the 
human intellect, which leads to a profound clash with Enlightenment thinking. On 
the question of the perception and acquisition of knowledge, Maistre positions
105 O C Y  4 T 7 ,  p. 563.
106 See Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1991), p.6: “[the 
rationalist] is the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or 
habitual.. .he is fortified by a belief in a ‘reason’ common to all mankind, a common power of 
rational consideration”.
107 OC V 2 T 4, pp. 71-72.
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himself in direct opposition to Bacon and Locke.108 He offers a critique of 
sensationalism in which he rejects the claim that sense experience itself is enough to 
acquire knowledge, or that only knowledge gained by natural scientific method is 
valid. Instead, Maistre offers up a theory of innate ideas, saying that there are 
original notions common to all men “without which they would not be men”.109 In 
this way, Maistre postulates an idealist position, a Christianised, Platonic perspective 
on humanity in which “all the truths are within us, they are us and when man thinks 
to discover them he has only to look within himself and say YES”.110 This process 
of discovery is configured as revelation, “that draws back the fatal veil which does 
not permit man to read in man”.111 In an echo of Saint Paul, Maistre goes so far as
1 1 2
to conjecture that the visible world may just be a world of appearances.
While his pure philosophical thought is derivative, consisting as it does of platonic 
and neo-platonic influences filtered through readings of Augustine, Bossuet and 
Barruel, it does have an original impact on the structure and content of important 
elements of Maistre’s constitutional thought. For example, his epistemology, as 
outlined here, is closely linked to his views on revelation and reason, the
108 Maistre’s critique of Bacon is to be found in his Examen de Bacon, OC V 3 T 6, and Soirees, OC 
V 2 T 4, pp. 256-257 and 269-272. His critique of Locke can be found in Soirees OC V 2 T 4, pp. 
109-121,317-377.
109 OC V 2 T 4, p. 353. This is expressed further at p. 354: “All rational doctrine is founded upon an 
antecedent knowledge, for man can only learn by that which he knows, Since syllogism and induction 
always proceed from principles posed as already known, it is necessary to acknowledge that before 
arriving at a particular truth we already know it in part”.. See also OC V 2 T 4, pp. 354-355: “In 
effect the essence of principles is that they are anterior, evident, non-derived, indemonstrable, and are
causes in relation to the conclusion; otherwise they would have to be demonstrated themselves, which
is to say they would cease to be principles”.
110 OC V 3 T 5, p. 54, n. 1.
111 OC V 3 T 6, p. 270.
112 Hebrews 11:3.
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epistemological roots of Catholicism. These in turn feed into his conception of 
the foundation of government. Like Bonald, Maistre possesses a belief in primitive 
divine revelation, suggesting that man’s first act of knowledge must be an act of 
faith based on the revelatory aspect of authority structures: “Human reason is 
manifestly impotent for guiding men: for few are in a position to reason well and 
none to reason well on everything; so that in general it is good, whatever is said, to 
start with authority.”114 The conservative belief that all is not knowable to reason 
chimes perfectly with Maistre’s understanding of man as fallen being and with his 
conviction that truths are discovered, not by the imperfect individual’s puny reason, 
but through the revelation of a greater Providential plan.
Institutions
Maistre’s belief in human imperfection, which is a consequence and expression of 
his faith, leads him to endorse institutions, or what he terms “patterned social 
formations with their own rules, norms, rewards and sanctions”.115 To the 
conservative mind, institutions are vital for ensuring that humanity flourishes; 
without them, human beings are bound to err. As Burke commented, “the restraints
113 See the Catechism of the Catholic Church,(London: Chapman, 1996) paragraph 156, note 124, p. 
39: “What moves us to believe is not the fact that revealed truths appear as true and intelligible in the 
light of our natural reason: we believe because of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, 
who can neither deceive or be deceived.”
114 OC V 2 T 4, p. 108.
115 Jerry Z. Muller, Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to 
the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 11.
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of men as well as their liberties are to be reckoned amongst their rights”.116 This 
paradoxical idea of a liberating restraint is a strong feature of Maistrian thought in 
particular, and authoritarian thought in general. Institutions provide a particular type 
of liberation, which is didactic in nature, channelled towards a final destination, and 
decided not by but for  those whose goals are to be achieved through conformity with 
the practical application of a given theory (theory and practice being intrinsically 
linked).117
Custom, Habit and Prejudice
Faith in institutions is closely connected with another tenet of conservative thought -  
the reliance on and endorsement of custom, habit and prejudice. Plato’s myth of 
metals is probably the most famous expression of this in terms of political theory.118 
In the same way, conservatives argue that society should rely on customary moral 
rules, even when those rules cannot be rationally justified, in order to reinforce the 
hierarchical order. Words such as ‘duty’ and ‘faith’ are therefore important in the 
vocabulary of the conservative thinker.
We have already seen how Maistre’s views on revelation and accepted authority are 
connected to this proposition. He treats the fundamental constitutional problem of
116 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 85.
117 See Stephen Holmes, “The Constitution of Sovereignty in Jean Bodin”, in Passions and 
Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 
108-109.
118 Plato, Republic, ed. G.M.A. Grub, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).
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legitimacy, for example, purely in terms of the endorsement of custom, a form of 
historical utilitarianism which is a defining characteristic of conservative thought.119 
Thus he says ”We must begin with a general and incontestable principle: we know 
that every government is good when it is established and it has existed without 
dispute for a long time”.120 Similarly, his conception of authority has as one of its 
elements the weight of precedent, established by the generally accepted thinking of 
the past: “the traditions of the peoples, and especially general traditions, are, in a 
sense, necessarily true, that is to say that they admit of alteration, exaggeration and 
other ingredients of human weakness, but that their general character is unalterable 
and necessarily founded on truth. In effect, a tradition whose object is not a 
particular fact cannot commence against the truth: there is no way to make this 
hypothesis”.121
The Role o f Religion
For Maistre religion plays as much of a part in political and social processes as it 
does for many other conservative thinkers. Although not all conservative thinkers 
agree on the use of religion as a tool to maintain the status quo, religion, for most, 
plays a significant role in society. Religion diffuses social discontent, legitimates 
the state and promotes conformist behaviour. And for his part, Maistre approaches
119 See Muller, Conservatism, p. 10.
120 OCW  IT  2, p. 253.
121 OC V 4 T 7, p. 547.
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religion not simply as a believing Catholic but also as a conservative who is fully 
aware of its social utility.122
And yet here we encounter one of the more fundamental ambiguities in Maistre’s 
work, and one which forms one of the central questions of the whole of his 
thought.123 His cast of mind, at once traditionally Catholic and of its age, does not 
prevent Maistre from adopting a conservative position in asserting that institutions 
and social structures arise following a process of historical development, a 
standpoint which involves a rejection of universalism which is at the heart of 
Catholic thought. In so doing Maistre endorses the view that, just as people are 
different to one another, so will their social and conceptual structures be differently 
constructed, not only in different cultures but also in different epochs.124 All in all, 
these factors loosely contextualise Maistre’s constitutional thought, but there is one 
other concept that more concretely links this more general philosophy with his 
constitutional thought: the concept of unity.125
122 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 299-300: “The more an institution’s basis is divine, the more durable it is. For 
greater clarity, we should add that the religious principle is, by its nature, creative and conservative in 
two different ways. First, since it acts more strongly on the human mind than does any element, it 
draws prodigious efforts from it.... Second, although the religious principle is so powerful in the way 
that it works, it is infinitely more so in what it prevents, because of the veneration with which it 
imbues everything under its protection... If you wish to conserve everything, dedicate everything”.
123 OC V 1 T 2, pp. ix-x: “The dogmas and even the maxims of high Catholic discipline are only, in 
great part, the laws of the world divinised, and sometimes also innate notions or venerable traditions 
sanctioned by revelation”.
124 OC V 1 T 2, pp. 235-236: “Each century has its prejudices and its manner of seeing according to 
which it must be judged. It is an insupportable sophism of ours to suppose constantly that what 
would be condemnable in our time was the same in times past”.
125 O C V  1 T 1 pp. 375-376: “Religious and political dogmas, mixed and, entwined, must form a 
universal reason or national reason strong enough to suppress the aberrations of individual reason, 
which is by its very nature the mortal enemy of every association, no matter what, because it only 
ever produces divergent opinions”.
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The Quest for Constitutional Unity
Maistre believed that modern constitutional developments were a distortion of 
humanity, and, like his Enlightenment adversaries, he tracked the course of this
1 9 f \mutation from the Renaissance through the Reformation to the French Revolution. 
Unlike them, however, he viewed this progress as facilitating the destruction of the 
state of Being, which he saw as representing a unified conception of wholeness that 
governed all existence. And Maistre was particularly concerned to examine the 
effects that a philosophical withdrawal from an acceptance of the world as
197something cosmologically defined would have upon the constitutional order.
For Maistre, unity comprises three important ingredients: hierarchy, authority and 
community. Consequently, the effects of a withdrawal from a unified view of the 
world are manifested in three ways in the constitutional environment: the destruction 
of hierarchies, structures of authority and communitarian links. In place of 
hierarchy there emerges the notion of equality; the destruction of authority entails 
the autonomisation of human reason; and the abolition of communitarian links goes 
hand in hand with the unchecked growth of atomistic individualism.128
126 OC V 5 T 9, p. 169: “I have often drawn attention in exposing the surprising analogy of the 
revolution of the 16th century and that which we see, which is nothing but a political Calvinism”.
127 OC V 4 T 8, p. 65.
128 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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One of the major philosophic bases of this flight from communitarian unity might be 
said to be the advent of man’s self-consciousness as a subject. Maistre interprets the 
political developments of revolution as the latest stage in this process, one which for 
Maistre could not be further from liberation. On the contrary, Maistre sees this 
increase in subjectivity as leading to a de-authentication of experience, ultimately 
resulting in man’s de-humanisation.129
It is possible to see here an implicit, and occasionally explicit, critique of Cartesian 
philosophy, which in the eyes of conservative thinkers such as Maistre brought into 
doubt the value of received wisdom and created a carte blanche with regard to 
tradition. It invested in man the belief in his capacity to think independently without 
reference to his context. Ultimately, Maistre believed that through renaissance, 
reform, enlightenment and revolution man has come to see himself as the first 
foundation and the ultimate end, clearly an astonishing inversion of the traditional,
1 3 0religious understanding of human existence.
Maistre sees these as destructive impulses, and as factors which brought about the 
beginning of Protestantism. This reform movement was, for him, the religious 
expression of Cartesian thought -  allowing the examination of scripture by 
individual reason.131 From here it was possible to plot the course to social contract
129 OC V 4 T 8, p. 95: “The Protestant is a man who is not catholic in the sense that Protestantism is 
only a negation. That which is real is Catholic”.
130 Ibid., p. 64: “The great enemy of Europe, which demands to be snuffed out by all means which are 
not criminal; the dreadful ulcer which attaches itself to all sovereignties, and which eats away at them 
without ceasing, the son of pride; the father of anarchy; the universal dissolvent: Protestantism”.
131 Ibid.
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theories, a belief in the shared equality of man and the idea of mankind as being 
naturally in isolation. This movement led to an emphasis on those constitutional 
values of equality, independence and individualism that were so crucial to the 
revolutionary and Enlightenment ideal.
Indeed, Maistre saw the Enlightenment as the philosophic expression of this 
threefold demand, whilst the Revolution was the project to bring these values to 
political fruition. All three were connected, in Maistre’s eyes, by the breaking of the 
bonds which exist between humans, a moment which constituted a rejection of 
transcendence and entailed a vast intellectual arrogance which puts individual 
reason, rather than God, as Founder. Maistre’s way of dealing with this intense 
subjectivisation is by believing that man has not placed himself in these situations, 
but rather has been placed in them. This leads Maistre to a cultivation of a complex 
theory of Providence which, whilst outside the scope of this present thesis, underpins 
the whole of his work.132
For Maistre, revolution is merely a new form of despotism, a descent into 
arbitrariness and servitude. The individual independence which results from the 
destruction of hierarchies involves a social atomism which separates individuals 
from their ancient modes of protection, rendering them powerless and incapable of
132 The importance of this pre-constitutional orientation has been noted by several commentators. 
Pierre Manent has declared that providentialism is “the Maistrian theme par excellence” (Introduction 
to Considerations sur la France (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1988), p. ix). Franck Lafage states that 
“the originality of Maistrian thought resided essentially in its providentialism” (Le Comte Joseph de 
Maistre: Itineraire Intellectual d ’un Theologien de la Politique (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1998), p. 106), 
whilst for Aidan Nichols, “the foundations of Maistre’s theological counter-revolutionism lies in his 
acute understanding of the practical correlates of original sin” (Catholic Thought Since the 
Enlightenment: A Survey (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 1998), p. 37.
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accomplishing anything worthwhile or of lasting value. Maistre’s constitutional 
thought is a way of expressing his belief that hierarchy, heteronomy and 
communitarian values are the necessary conditions for authentic human co­
existence, and are the means by which the critical constitutional value of unity is 
sustained.
Of course, this necessitates a hierarchical view of the state in which some are 
destined to command and lead whilst others obey and serve. Arendt comments that a 
hierarchical, authoritarian constitutional structure of the type that Maistre envisages 
must entail the belief that submission to principles comes from a source external to 
the structure.133 This explains the existence of a gap between governors and 
governed, an engaging argument in that it dispenses with the need to have to deal 
with the problem of circularity inherent in liberal democracies, which are based 
upon a theory of the sovereignty of the people.
When the hierarchical principle is used to found a political community, it cannot be 
said to proceed from superiors, rest on the consent of inferiors or be established by 
an accord between people. If a human origin were allowed to be suggested, this 
would intimate the possibility of original equality, and thus hierarchy would no 
longer be the guiding principle. Certainly it may be sustained by force, but the 
system must be established as if it were more ancient, more fundamental that the 
human force which maintains it or the wills which conserve it.
133 Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” In The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (London: 
Penguin, 2003), p. 467.
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These, then, are the most pressing of a number of constitutional concerns that run 
through Maistre’s work, and considering them leads us to questions of a different 
order: how does a traditionalist thinker respond to the new political realities? Does 
Maistre’s traditionalist constitutional position remain pertinent for a modem, post­
revolutionary age? The remainder of this thesis seeks to address these questions. 
Through an examination of Maistre’s thought on a number of important themes -  
including constituent power, constitutions, sovereignty and government -  we will 
see how Maistre’s work re-states constitutional traditionalism for post-revolutionary 
modernity.
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CHAPTER TWO: MAISTRE AND CONSTITUENT POWER
Introduction
The problem of constituent power (i.e. the source of authority in political society) 
presents a challenge to modem constitutional theory, because the series of 
transformations from which it is formed are both vital to and yet suppressed by 
liberal constitutional thought. These transformations involve the shift from 
multitude to people; nature to civil society; isolation to community and from liberty 
to law and are crucial to an understanding of modem constitutions. One could go as 
far as to say, as Yves-Charles Zarka does, that the history of modem sovereignty 
turns on these issues, “even in relation to those thinkers whose intention is to show 
that the notion of the sovereignty of the people is fundamentally unviable”.1 Maistre 
is one such thinker, and his views on constituent power are a vital element in his 
constitutional thought.
Constituent power provides an account of the formation of society, and the role of 
the modem individual within it, in a way which does not rely on any traditional 
notion of authority or order. For this reason its existence tends to be suppressed in 
modem constitutional discourse, because the ability of individuals to determine and 
re-determine the political order (one of the implications of using the contract as a
1 Yves-Charles Zarka, “Le Toumant Rousseauiste ou la Reinvention de la Souverainete du Peuple”, 
in Penser la Souverainete a I’Epoque Modeme et Contemporaine, eds. Gian Mario Cazzaniga and 
Yves Charles Zarka, (Paris: J. Vrin, 2001), p. 287.
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constitutional principle) is a powerful and potentially uncontrollable force. 
Consequently, constituent power is a concept that those who subscribe to modem 
contractualist modes of state formation have often been eager to neutralise.2
The concepts of constituent power, the state of nature and the social contract -  all 
elements key to a modem understanding of the constitution -  were of critical 
importance to Maistre. Indeed, his vehement opposition to these ideas and their 
consequences is a dominant motif of his work, in particular the Examination o f a
'l
Work by J-J. Rousseau (which is a critique of Rousseau’s Discours sur VOrigine et 
les Fondements de VInegalite Parmi les Hommes)4 and Book One of the Study on 
Sovereignty,5 a critique of Du Contrat Social,6 although his antipathy towards 
contractual constitutionalism can be traced throughout the whole of his writing and 
correspondence.7
2 And not only by modem theorists, such as John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972) or Bernard Yack in “Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism”, in Political 
Theory 29 (2001), pp. 517-36; the same technique was also used by Grotius in De Jure Belli ac 
Pads, I, IE, VII, trans. Jean Barbeyrac as Le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix (Amsterdam, 1724), 
reprinted in Bibliotheque de Philosophic Politique etJuridique (Caen: Universite de Caen, 1984).
See also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991) and Burlamaqui, Principes du Droit Publique (Amsterdam, 1751), reprinted in Bibliotheque de 
Philosophic Politique et Juridique (Caen: Universite de Caen, 1984).
3 Joseph de Maistre, OC V 4, T 7, pp. 509-566.
4 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur VOrigine et les Fondements de VInegalite Parmi les 
Hommes/Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, with an introduction by Jacques Roger (Paris: G.F. 
Flammarion, 1972).
5 O C V  1 T 1, pp. 311-554.
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, with an introduction by Bruno Bemardi (Paris: GF 
Flammarion, 2001).
7 See, for example, the Maistre Family Archives, Departement de Savoie, Chambery, where a 
notebook entitled Miscellanea contains a note on Principe Fondemental du Droits des Souverains 
(1788), mentioning “Rousseau’s terrible maxim that sovereignty resides essentially in the people”. 
And in OC V 5 T 9, p. 494 (1805): “The principle of the sovereignty of the people is so dangerous 
that, even in the case that it were true, it would be necessary not to allow it to be demonstrated”.
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The story of Maistre’s critique of the modem theory of constituent power is that of 
his reaction to the philosophical fruits of political trauma in early modem England, 
and, of course, the upheaval of the French Revolution. After the political and 
intellectual turmoil of civil war, Hobbes’ innovative version of the social contract 
theory provided a basis for sovereignty that was not predicated on a theory of divine 
entitlement to Kingship.8 For its part, the French Revolution provided the conditions 
for the practical expression of this theory, which resulted in the promulgation of the 
political doctrine of democracy.9
This chapter will analyse two aspects of Maistre’s approach to constituent power and 
the emergence of democracy. First it will deal with Maistre’s critique of the modem 
theory of the establishment of sovereignty, which involves an examination of his 
views on the state of nature and the social contract. Second, it will explore his 
alternative to the modem conception of constituent power, namely the figure of the 
legislator, which illustrates a significant aspect of Maistre’s constitutional thought. 
From this it will become apparent that Maistre’s ideas on constituent power hold 
some significance for constitutional theory today, not least because the issue of 
constituent power and the viability of the sovereignty of the people remain 
problematic, if largely unexamined,10 concepts.
8 For a French perspective, see Bossuet, Politique Tiree des Propres Paroles de I’Ecriture Sainte, ed. 
J. Le Bran (Geneva: Slatkine, 1967); and for an English perspective, see Sir Robert Filmer,
Patriarcha and Other Political Works, ed. P. Laslett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949).
9 Robespierre, for example, proposed to include in the Declaration of the Rights of man the clause 
that “every institution which does not suppose the people good and the magistrate corrupt is vice­
ridden”. Speech of 24 April 1793, quoted in Maxmillien Robespierre, Textes Choisis (Paris: Editions 
Sociales, 1958).
10 For treatments of the contemporary notion of constituent power, see Olivier Beaud, La Puissance 
de I’Etat (Paris: PUF, 1994); Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State
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The Overthrow of the Old Order
The state o f nature
For Maistre, the state of nature is the first stage in the singularly modern process of 
imagining the founding of sovereignty without reference to theological or naturalist 
teleological conceptions.11 All those thinkers who espouse the social contract affirm 
that a state prior to any formative pact must exist: that is, a state in which political 
institutions are absent and in which some form of equality exists between human 
beings. It is obvious that, even when reduced to this basic formulation, such a 
conception fundamentally destabilises the traditional understanding of the 
foundation of political society.
This radical effect of the state of nature expresses itself in three ways. First, the idea 
that individuals are independent and equal denies to individuals all rights to 
command by virtue of superior birth or status.12 Second, the fact that civil society is
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); and Claude Klein, Theorie et Practique du 
Pouvoir Constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996).
11 For an account of medieval political belief in a unified constitutional environment, see Otto Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederick Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1922). For example, at p. 9: “Now the constitutive principle of the Universe is in the first place 
Unity. God, the absolutely one, is before and above all the World’s Plurality, and is the one source 
and one goal of every Being”.
12 Benedict Spinoza, Traite Theologico-Politique, Chap xx, trans. C. Appuhn (Paris: G F 
Flammarion, 1965), pp. 329-332.
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formed through a renunciation of the state of nature by naturally good individuals is 
a rejection of the Augustinian notion that man’s political subjection is the result of 
original sin. Third, the fact that the state of nature does not necessarily lead to the 
foundation of civil society, nor does it lead to the use of the covenant to legitimate 
its foundation, implies that man is not, by nature, a political animal; this is a 
rejection of any theory that political authority can be exercised as a divine right.13 
These conclusions have a resounding impact on the perception of constitutional 
order, because they breach the unity of the cosmological hierarchy of creation. It 
follows from them that man is the creator of the conditions of his existence, rather 
than the effect of them, and the difference between man and other created beings is 
no longer as a result of his natural quality of political association. The polis is no 
longer a fact of nature; rather, it is something artificial that free and independent 
men provide for themselves in order to further their own objectives, and which is 
only legitimate on the condition that it fulfils these ends. In applying the doctrine of 
the state of nature, the idea of the political order is instrumentalised and the classical 
relations of political determination are inverted.
The Social Contract Theorists
Whilst the theorists who effected this rupture all rejected a classical-scholastic 
teleology in their assessment of the origins and development of a political society, it 
would be too simplistic to suggest that they were all identical in the detail of their
13 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Philosophic Politique xvi-xx Siecle (Paris: PUF, 1987), p. 206.
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thought. Whilst the general aim of a theory of the state of nature was to remove man 
from the web of traditions, practises and associations which had previously helped 
political theorists define the conditions of a fully human existence, the writings of, 
say, Pufendorf and Locke are notably different to those of Hobbes and Rousseau.
Pufendorf and Locke, for example, sustain that aspect of the theory which suggests 
that the natural law gives rights and imposes obligations.14 Men in the state of nature 
constitute a kind of natural community: each individual is subject to duties as well as 
being in possession of rights. The problem is that human beings are not capable of 
determining with certainty the application and limits of such rights and duties, and it 
is thus necessary to found a political power to make them effective.15 For Hobbes, 
on the other hand, this natural moral state does not exist and the law of nature 
changes its sense: it does not possess a transcendental character. Hobbes’s unique 
contribution was to introduce the idea that man is not naturally a being of duty;16 for 
him there are only appetites and desires, which individuals eventually discover they 
cannot satisfy unless they renounce their unbounded natural rights for a limited civil
17right. Rousseau also underlines the fact that there are no duties in the state of
14 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and the Citizen, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), II.l sec. 8 (p. 117), U.2 sec. 3 (p. 120); John Locke, Two Treatises on 
Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Second Treatise, p. 6: 
“[T] hough [the state of nature] be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of Licence.. ..The State of 
nature has a Law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that law, 
teaches all Mankind.. .that.. .no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or 
Possessions”.
15 Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man, II.l sec. 9 (on an absence of security); II.l sec. 8-10 (on 
enforcement of duties and settlement of disputes on a voluntary basis); 11.5 sec. 9 (on failure of self- 
government); n.5 sec. 9, H.6 sec. 4-6 (on states removing the causes of insecurity).
6 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92.
17 Ibid., p. 89, p.117.
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nature, there is only the existence of desire for well-being and peace, which is 
limited by the lack of development of man’s faculties.18
Even though they differ markedly in the nature of the desire that they attribute to 
natural man, both Hobbes and Rousseau share the same basic view of this state as 
being de-juridified. The political state is artificial because, in order to realise it, it is 
necessary to pass from an understanding of the individual as a being of appetite to an 
understanding of him as a being of law.19 According to these two theorists, it is only 
in this interpretation of the state of nature that there exists an authentic 
understanding of the transformative capacity of the social contract as a human act 
which gives birth to a relationship of law.20 This is significant for constitutional 
thought because it introduces the fact of the self-generated opposition of law and 
liberty that is crucial to an understanding of political modernity.21
18 Rousseau, Discours sur I’Origin, p. 224.
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89 “The Desires and other passions of man are in themselves no Sin. Nor are 
Actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes 
be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall 
make it”.
20 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 60: “This passage from the state of nature to the civil state 
produces a really remarkable change in man in substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and in 
giving to his actions a morality which was hitherto lacking”.
21 See below, p. 89 ff.
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Maistre and Rousseau22
This tension between the concepts of law and liberty in Rousseau’s thought is 
emblematic of a well-documented ambiguity of purpose in his works as a whole. As 
a consequence, even in a brief survey of the contemporary secondary literature 
available in English it is evident that there are few modern assessments of his work 
which do not take the form of a belief in the “desirability of resolving antinomies”,24 
antinomies which are witnessed by the fact that his work was taken up both by
9 ^  9 f \Catholic apologists for the ancien regime and by Robespierre.
22 For the relationship between the two, see, for example, Ernest Seilliere, “Joseph de Maistre et Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau”, in Seances et Travaux de VAcademie des Sciences Morales et Politiques CXIV 
(1920) pp. 321-363; Jack Lively, Introduction to The Works of Joseph de Maistre (New York: 
Macmillan, 1964), pp. 1-45; Richard Lebrun, “Joseph de Maistre and Rousseau”, in Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century LXXXVII ( 1972), pp. 881-98; Jean-Louis Darcel, Introduction 
to De I’Etat de Nature in Revue de Etudes Maistriennes no. 2 ( 1976), pp. 58-99.
23 See, for example, Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment: An Evaluation of its Assumptions, 
Attitudes and Values (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 9: “It may be argued with equal plausibility that 
Rousseau was either one of the greatest writers of the Enlightenment or its most eloquent and 
effective opponent”; Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F. C. Koelln and J.
P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 273: “Rousseau is a true son of the 
Enlightenment even when he attacks it and triumphs over it”; Robert Wokler, ed. Rousseau and 
Liberty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. ix: “He at once belonged to the 
Enlightenment and opposed it”; Raymond Tallis, Enemies of Hope (London: Macmillan 1998), p. 2: 
“It is arguable that in the person of Rousseau, Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment were bom 
twins”; Maurice Cranston, In Search of Humanity: The Role of the Enlightenment in Modem History 
(New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 160: “It is impossible to say that he was only a man of the 
Enlightenment, but equally difficult to say that he was not a man of the Enlightenment”.
24 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, in Vision of Politics Vol. I 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 71.
25 See Derrin McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the 
Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 34-35.
26 Robespierre, “Dedication to Jean-Jacques Rousseau”, in Carol Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of 
Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), pp. 156-7: “Divine man you taught me to know myself; while I was still young you 
made me appreciate the dignity of my nature and reflect upon the great principles of the social order”.
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Like those who supported the French Monarchy in its final throes, post­
revolutionary, counter-Enlightenment thinkers have enjoyed an ambivalent relation 
with Rousseau. On the one hand he is identified as the ancestor of Jacobinism and 
the Terror; on the other it is impossible to mistake Rousseau’s imprint on counter­
revolutionary literature. According to Jean-Yves Pranchere, this ambivalence is 
present in Chateaubriand and in the German Romantics, and apparent in authors 
such as Bonald or Ferrand, who “cite Rousseau as often as they are able”.27
This ambivalence extends apparently to Maistre, who, for example, shares with 
Rousseau the view that the rights of sovereignty should be absolute. Rousseau is a 
privileged adversary for Maistre, because, for Maistre, the ultimate political 
alternative is represented by the choice between the Rousseauist doctrine of a 
sovereign people and Maistre’s own understanding of sovereignty as a single entity. 
This relationship has even led some commentators to argue for a resemblance 
between the two writers,28 for example by Graeme Garrard, who has argued strongly 
to that effect, suggesting that Rousseau acted as a ‘precursor’ to the counter- 
Enlightenment ideas of Maistre,29 and that Maistre “selectively appropriates” 
Rousseau’s ideas.30
27 Jean-Yves Pranchere, L ’Autorite Contre les Lumieres: La Philosophie de Joseph de Maistre 
(Geneva: Droz, 2004), p. 200.
28 For an earlier essay in the same vein, see Lively, The Works of Joseph de Maistre, pp. 1-45.
29 Graham Garrard, “Rousseau, Maistre and the Counter-Enlightenment”, in History of Political 
Thought 15 (Spring 1994), pp. 97-120.
30 Ibid, p. 98.
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This focus on similarities almost inevitably masks the real difference between the 
two thinkers, which perhaps comes from mistaking shared terminology for shared 
meaning,31 or from placing too strong an emphasis on the superficially similar 
conclusions and not enough on the radically different causes of those conclusions 
advanced by the two thinkers.32 For Maistre, Rousseau was the epitome of 
Enlightenment thought33, the “prophet and founder of the French Revolution.” 34 
who incarnated all the horror of the Terror: the immorality, the political and 
individual autonomy of the will and the egalitarianism that Maistre, following 
Bergier and Bonald, sets out to refute.35 “It is Rousseau,” writes Maistre, “who 
breathed everywhere the scorn for authority and the spirit of insurrection... who 
traced the code of anarchy and who...posed the disastrous principles of which the 
horrors we have seen are only the immediate consequences”. But it is not solely 
because he is “the author of revolution”37 that Maistre confronts Rousseau. It is also 
because Rousseauist social contract theory is contract theory taken to its logical
31 Maistre himself is conscious of this terminological difference; see OC V 4 T 7, p. 552: “one can 
observe in all his works that he takes all abstract terms to have their common meaning”.
32 For an example of this, see Richard Lebrun, Introduction to Against Rousseau (Montreal: McGill 
Queen University Press, 1996): “Maistre and Rousseau are in fact in rather close agreement about the 
nature of the political problem. The vocabulary and the approach are different, with Rousseau 
repudiating the old Christian explanation of original sin and Maistre continuing to maintain that it 
“explains everything” but for both the state is a necessary remedy for human failings” (p xiv - xv)
33 OC V 1 T 1, p. 407: “Ultimately, the glory of having made the revolution belongs exclusively 
neither to Voltaire nor to Rousseau.... The one undermined politics in corrupting morals and the 
other undermined morals by corrupting politics”.
34 See Gordon McNeil, “The Anti-revolutionary Rousseau”, in American Historical Review LVm  
(1953), pp. 808-823 at p. 808.
35 See Pranchere, L'Autorite Contre les Lumieres, p. 201.
360 C V  1 T 1, pp. 407-408.
37 Ibid., pp. 405 -6. See also Zeev Stemhell, Les Anti-Lumieres Du xviii Siecle a la Guerre Froide 
(Paris: Fayard, 2006), pp. 52-53: “The hundred pages of the Discours sur VOrigine de VInegalite 
Parmi les Hommes, where Rousseau enquires into the origins of civil society, gives us an 
extraordinary philosophical anthropology without God. Rousseau as man of the Enlightenment 
produces a history of the origins of humanity which destroys the religious conception of life. This is 
why he was the most hated thinker of the enemies of Enlightenment, the one who eliminated 
Revelation from the life of men and the one who raised, with the very first stirrings of capitalism, the 
flag of revolt against social injustice”.
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conclusion: to demonstrate its incoherence will be to refute the whole notion of the 
social pact.38 This, above all, is Maistre’s aim in negotiating Rousseau.
Rousseau’s Description o f the State o f Nature
Rousseau’s version of the state of nature, as set out in the Discours sur VOrigine et 
les Fondements de VInegalite Parmi les Hommes, is founded upon the conceit that 
individuals in their natural state live in virtual isolation.39 Rousseau believed that 
the mistake of previous contract theorists was that they extrapolated the 
characteristics of man in the state of nature from contemporary conditions in society, 
which led them to conclude that there was an inevitability about the composition of 
civil society.40 Rousseau’s theory, on the other hand, involved a complete rejection 
of any such teleological impulse.41
Since Rousseau believed that man is not primarily political or social, he divests man 
of all qualities connected with life in the community, the most important of these
38 See Pranchere, VAutorite Contre les Lumieres, p. 199.
39 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 181.
40 For example, take Locke’s views on property: Locke, Two Treatises on Government, p. 27 (on the 
natural right to property) and pp. 138-39 (on the preservation of property being the goal of 
government). See also Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 229.
1 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 158, in a striking passage: “Just like the statue of Glaucus, which 
time, the sea and storms had truly disfigured, so that it looked less like a God than a ferocious beast, 
so the human soul, altered within society by a thousand causes, recurring ceaselessly by the 
acquisition of a multitude of facts and errors, by the changes visited upon the construction of the body 
and by the continual shock of the passions, has, so to speak, changed its appearance to the point of 
being almost unrecognisable”.
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being reason.42 Rousseau believed, however, that there are two principles that 
humans exhibit prior to developing this faculty: self-love and pity 43 In contrast to 
Hobbes, Rousseau’s rejection of original sin leads him to the view that the savage’s 
actions are characterised by goodness and innocence, and that any inequality that 
exists is due to man’s natural limitations.44 Furthermore, man is distinguished by 
two capacities which remain as potentialities within them: the potential for free will 
and the potential for self-protection.45
Maistre's Critique o f the State o f Nature
The basic structure of Maistre’s thought throughout his critique of the state of nature 
and the social contract is a form of modified Aristotelian naturalism, an alignment 
that allows him to reject Rousseau’s central premise that man is not naturally a 
sociable being. This critique is twofold -  in the Examination Maistre offers a 
methodological criticism of the state of nature described in the Discours sur 
VOrigine et Fondements de VInegalite Parmi les Hommes\ he also uses this work as 
a touchstone for his own substantive ideas on the nature of political society.
The methodological critique that Maistre advances in the Examination depends on a 
literal reading of the text, and in it he is concerned with pointing out the
42 Ibid., p. 195.
43 Ibid., p. 161.
44 Ibid., pp. 219-220.
45 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
67
inconsistencies in Rousseau’s account.46 Where modem commentators find it
difficult to repress the urge to attempt to harmonise contradictions in Rousseau’s 
work and to lend it a sense of internal consistency,47 Maistre sees only incoherence. 
Take, for example, Maistre’s analysis of Rousseau’s description of the advent and 
progress of inequality among men. After having performed a detailed exegesis of 
the text,48 Maistre comes to the derisory conclusion that, for Rousseau, inequality 
has “three first epochs and two second epochs. What an analysis! What profundity! 
What clarity!”49 In his zeal to highlight Rousseau’s inconsistencies, Maistre calls 
on the services of different disciplines, including Enlightenment science50 and, most 
importantly, history. Indeed, his most significant methodological criticism concerns 
the Rousseau’s failure to accurately refer to history, a discipline of vital importance 
to Maistre in establishing objective, concrete truth:51 “One may only imagine two 
ways of knowing the destination of man: history and anatomy. The first shows that
46 Pranchere, L'Autorite Contre les Lumieres, p.201-202: “Maistre’s reading of Rousseau is an 
impatient reading, which does not proceed without malice or contradiction; his polemical excesses 
limit its authentically critical significance. It would, however, be hasty to conclude that it is devoid of 
all objective foundation. Maistre’s affirmation that Rousseau, “has consecrated half his book to 
refuting the other half’ is not simply polemic; even the most charitable commentator cannot avoid 
noting with Alexis Philonenko that “the social contract has for its first and principal objection the 
social contract itself.””(A.Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la pensee du malheur,(Paris: Vrin, 
1984), t.3, p.65.
47 Although note Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding”, p. 68: “If it is first assumed for example 
that the business of interpreting Rousseau’s philosophy must centre on the discovery of his most 
fundamental thought, it will readily cease to seem a matter of importance that he contributed over 
several decades to several different forms of enquiry”.
48 0 C V 4 T 7 , p .  515.
49 Ibid., p. 515 and p. 530, “Rousseau who abuses all words, none more so than those of nature. He 
uses it without defining it; he annoys good sense”.
50 Ibid., p. 542: “One may invoke here a general principle, which the illustrious Newton has made one 
of the bases of his philosophy: it is that in philosophy one must not admit more causes than are 
necessary to explain natural phenomena” And on p. 543 he says: “ Linnaeus applied this 
incontestable maxim to the object which occupies us in this chapter”.
51 Jean-Louis Darcel, Introduction to De la Souverainete du Peuple (Paris: PUF, 1992), p. 12: “To 
argue against the sovereignty of the people Maistre uses three factors: historical, philosophical and 
polemical. The work is a reflection on the comparative history of political institutions from antiquity 
to modem states.. ..The only approach which appears to him to be appropriate to refute the 
hypothetical-deductive method adopted by Rousseau ...is recourse to erudition”.
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which he has always been; the second shows how his organs respond to his 
destination and certify it”.52
History, Maistre believes, is a barrier against universalising abstraction. The most 
direct and wisest way to know the nature of man is undoubtedly to learn what has 
always been the case.53 The advent of theories which exist unsupported by, or even 
opposed to, fact is a disastrous development.54 In commenting that “the imaginary 
man of the philosophes is foreign to the statesman who works only with what 
exists”,55 Maistre makes a clear distinction between the abstractions of the 
Enlightenment and the reality of modes of thought rooted in tradition, and this idea 
is developed further to form a link between history and politics. “History,” says 
Maistre, “is experimental politics”.56
According to Maistre, both history and politics are disciplines which are reflective 
and backward looking, and which look to practical reason and not to theoretical 
knowledge in their operation. In this, Maistre is reminiscent of Burke, whose view 
is that “human nature cannot be found in those shaky metaphysical principles on 
which French revolutionaries liked to found their Droits de VHomme et du Citoyen, 
but only how human nature articulated itself in the historical institutions human
52 OC V 4 T 7, p. 539.
53 OC V4 T 7, p. 539 -  540: “...in general, it is not such a bad method to establish the law by fact: the 
quickest and the wisest way to know the nature of man is undoubtedly to know that which he has 
always been. Since when have theories been able to be opposed to facts?”
54See also Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997), p. 488: “As a matter of fact, the instrumentalism underlying a practice that directly 
attempts to realize theory has had disastrous effects”.
55 Ibid., p. 541.
56 Ibid., p. 540.
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beings gave themselves in the course of time.”57 Like all the philosophes, 
Rousseau’s tendency towards the abstract leads him towards a vacuous 
cosmopolitanism -  he “confuses the progress of human-kind in general with the 
progress of particular nations”.58 This insistence on a uniform cosmopolitanism 
leads Rousseau -  in Maistre’s eyes -  to neglect the historical. History, according to 
Maistre, disproves the abstractions of the state of nature theorists: “Wherever man 
has been able to observe man, he has always found him in society: this state is 
therefore for him, the state of nature”.59
But Maistre’s conception of history transcends the empirical and embraces a wider 
cultural-mythical understanding, an ideological leap which distinguishes it from the 
more pragmatic conservatism of Burke. Maistre turns to Ovid,60 Homer61 and 
Plutarch to support his argument that man has always been a political being. He 
delves into a wide variety of sources, taking in the Greeks, the Egyptians and 
“Orientals really more ancient than them”,64 even extending his search to include 
myth and tradition because “it should never be forgotten that the traditions of 
peoples, and especially the general traditions, are necessarily true in a sense, which 
is to say that though they admit of alteration, exaggeration and other ingredients of
57 F.R. Ankersmit, “Edmund Burke: Natural Right and History”, in Political 
Representation,(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 35-59, 44.
58 OC V. 4, T. 7, p. 516.
59 Ibid., p. 549.
60 Ibid p.540.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p.541.
63 Ibid.: “It is necessary to know, thanks to the writers who teach us, that which men have done and 
thought throughout the ages.. ..now if we ask of history what man is, history answers that man is a 
social being, and that he is always seen in society”.
64 Ibid., p. 546: “If we pass from the Egyptians to Orientals really much more ancient than them.. .we 
will find again a myriad of centuries, and always the reign of Gods preceding that of men”.
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human weakness, still their general character is inalterable and necessarily founded 
upon the truth”.65 Significantly, there is nothing in tradition or myth about the state 
of nature. In this way Maistre attempts to argue that the expansive reasoning of the 
philosophes must ultimately be constrained by the political realities embedded in 
history and tradition. In classical authors and in the myths of ancient civilisations, 
Maistre finds paradigmatic examples of his own view that man is only man when 
fully contextualised, a social animal not a creature of nature, and thus understood not 
as a function of abstract reason but as embedded in a particular culture.
Following on from this rebuttal, Maistre turns to his substantive critique of the 
Discours to analyse what Rousseau actually means by the term ‘nature’. Citing 
Pufendorf to support his argument66 that the “state of nature pure and simple... is not
fnthe state to which nature has destined man”, Maistre asserts the seeming paradox 
that the state of nature for man is to be against nature,68 whereas Rousseau’s man “is 
only man less all that he has from the institutions that surround him...which is to say 
a man who is not a man”.69 As an alternative to Rousseau’s conception, then, 
Maistre provides two linked definitions of the state of nature: it is divine action
65 Ibid., p. 547.
66 Ibid., p. 526: “I quote the famous Jurisconsult even though he is not in fashion because he 
expresses ideas which are,more or less, in all minds and which it only a question of developing”.
67 Ibid., p. 525 - 526: Maistre quoting Pufendorf, Droit de Nature et des Gens, in Jean Barbeyrac’s 
translation, Book 1.11.4. Other sections of the translation that Maistre quotes in support of the same 
argument are at p. 526 (I.n sec. 1): “It [the state of nature which is against nature] is when one 
understands that each is placed by birth, making abstraction of all inventions and establishments that 
are purely human or whose inspiration are divinely inspired .. and by which we understand not only 
the diverse types of arts with all the comforts of life in general, but also civil societies whose 
formation is the principal source of good order apparent among men” and p. 526 (I.II sec. 2): “ “In a 
word, man in the state of nature is a man who has fallen from the clouds.”
68 Ibid., p. 526: “That is to say that the state of nature is against nature, or, in other words, that nature 
does not wish man to live in a state of nature”.
69 Ibid.
71
manifested in the universe; and it is a cause acting under direction of the divine 
action. Thus, when one says nature, one necessarily invokes the idea of an 
intelligence and a will.70
Maistre then presses home this point by providing another definition of the term: he 
defines it as the state capable of being modified by human action, before it has been 
acted upon by humans.71Maistre’s refutation of Rousseau’s state of nature is thus 
now clearly founded upon a critique of Rousseau’s distinction between nature and 
art:72 Maistre seeks to show that man has never been in a state of nature, because
no
there has never been a time when there has not been any human art . In fact, 
attempting to oppose human artifice to nature, as Rousseau does, is doomed to 
failure, because it is impossible to discern any clear dividing line between the two.74
Even on the question of human art, the two philosophers disagree. The human art 
par excellence, says Maistre, is perfectibility. This is a quality which Rousseau also
70 Ibid., p. 527.
71 OC V 4 T 7, p. 525: “Man, being an agent whose action extends over all that he can reach, has the 
power to change a host of beings and to change himself; thus it was necessary to explain the state of 
these beings before and after they had been subject to human action and, on this point of view, nature 
is opposed to art (which is human power)”.
72 Ibid., p. 530; see also p. 533, which contains a truncated form of the following quotation from 
Rousseau’s Discours: “For it is not an easy undertaking to separate that which is original and that 
which is artificial in human nature and truly to know a state which no longer exists...”
73 Ibid., p. 533 “M. Burke has said with a profundity that cannot be admired enough that “art is the 
nature of man”. Here is the great saying which encapsulates more truth and more wisdom than the 
works of twenty philosophers that I know”.
74 Ibid., p. 532: “From the moment that one opposes art and human nature, one does not know where 
to stop. It is perhaps as far from the cavern to the cabin as from the cabin to the Corinthian column, 
and.. .all is artificial in man”. See also p. 532: “I suppose then that this man, suffering from the 
intemperate air, takes shelter in a cave; until then he is still natural man; but if, finding it too narrow, 
he decides to lengthen the shelter and weave some branches together, supported by posts, this is, 
incontestably, art. Does he cease then to be a natural man; and this roof of foliage: does it belong to 
the divine will or to human art?”
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uses, and their understanding of the term superficially appears to be similar.75 But
for Rousseau, perfectibility is a quality like any other, whilst for Maistre, 
“perfectibility is the quality of all other qualities”,76 a view that not only echoes the 
concept of the platonic ideal, but also brings to mind the scholastic quality of 
practical reason.77 As for man’s faculties, for Maistre it is unacceptable that they be 
either left dormant or used against the will of the Creator in contravention of the 
teleological order, in the manner that Rousseau states.78 The teleological quality of 
societal development and the existence of human faculties together prove that man is 
made for society, because a creature cannot have received faculties that he is not 
meant to use 79 For Maistre, morality only refers to doing good or evil in one’s
75 Rousseau, Discours sur VOrigine, p. 184. For Rousseau, perfectibility is an open-ended process of 
improvement without any predetermined goal, and with no concept of achieved perfection.
According to Nicholas Dent in Rousseau (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 61, perfectibility refers to 
man’s “capacity to learn about his environment and to acquire new skills to enable him the better to 
make use of it for his own benefit.”
76 OC V. 4, T. 7, p. 551.
77 See Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (Penguin: London, 1955), p. 239, and John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 100-101: “practical 
reasonableness...is participated in precisely by shaping one’s participation in the other basic goods, 
by guiding one’s commitments, one’s selections of projects, and what one does in carrying them
out.. ..The principles that express the general ends of human life do not acquire what would nowadays 
be called a ‘moral’ force until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project, disposition or 
action.. .how they are thus brought to bear is the problem for practical reasonableness”.
78 OC V 4 T 7, p. 533; “It is absurd to imagine that the Creator gave faculties to a being which it must 
never develop and even more absurd to suppose that any being whatsoever might give itself those 
faculties or use those which he received to establish an order of things contrary to the will of the 
Creator”. Also see Rousseau, Discours sur VOrigine, p. 169: “Religion tells us to believe that God 
himself, having drawn men from the state of nature immediately after creation, created them unequal 
because he wanted them to be that way; but we are not prevented from conjecturing -  drawing upon 
the nature of man alone and the beings which surround him -  about what would have become of the 
human race had it been left to itself’.
79 Maistre uses the example of language to illustrate this point. OC V 4 T 7, p. 553ff.: “Besides, 
language alone would prove that man is a social being in essence.. .if man is made to talk, it is 
apparently to talk to someone”. This reflects an orthodox Catholic position; see Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, trans. Richard Regan (London: Hackett Publishing, 2007), p. 17: 
“Language is a property only of man, because in comparison with other beings it is the privilege of 
man to have the knowledge of good and evil and consequently of the just and unjust and the like, of 
what can be uttered by language. Therefore, language is by nature due to man and has as its natural 
end that man may live in community for good or evil, for right or wrong, it must be concluded, on 
the strength of the axiom that nature does not produce anything for nothing, that man, impelled by 
nature shall live in community.” See also Benjamin Thurston, “Joseph de Maistre et la Tour de
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apportioned place: it does not entail being able to change that order.80 
Consequently, Maistre rejects Rousseau’s view that, to make a change in the order, 
man may use that which is a potential within him, but it is also possible that this 
potential may remain dormant: it is absurd, Maistre thinks, to believe that man 
possesses faculties that could remain undeveloped.81
These, then, are the positive aspects of the Maistrian critique of the state of nature, in 
which he stresses the natural development of political society and emphasizes the 
fact that man has a unique capacity for perfectibility which leads him to exercise his 
qualities in relation to other human beings, and which renders a capacity for 
association a part of his nature. This is the fundamental structure of Maistre’s 
political theory -  that man has a capacity to relate to his fellows and to strive 
towards perfection. Unlike Rousseau, Maistre believed that socio-political 
structures were a fundamental part of human nature, not an assumed set of structures 
that pervert that nature.
Despite these positive assertions regarding the nature of human association, 
however, his work also reveals the presence of darker forces. Certainly, says 
Maistre, quoting Marcus Aurelius, man is sociable because he is reasonable, but he 
is also corrupt in his essence, and as a consequence must be governed.82 If 
scholastic reasoning shows its influence in the positive aspects of Maistre’s theory of
Babel”, in Joseph de Maistre, ed. Phillippe Barthelet (Lausanne: Editions L’Age d’Homme, 2005), p. 
309.
80 Ibid.
81 O C V  4 T 7 ,  p. 551.
82 Ibid., p. 556.
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political society, then this element of pessimism is influenced by the Augustinian 
heritage in European thought, as well as Maistre’s detailed reading of Hobbes.83 
Thus, where Rousseau asserts that man is naturally good and that his vices derive 
not from his nature, but from society,84 Maistre’s view is the opposite. For him, man 
is composed of two warring essences, one of which is good, the other bad.85 “How 
can such a being live with his fellows?”86 Maistre asks.
The answer is that, without some form of intervention, he cannot: since he is as least 
in part evil, he must be governed.87 Here, a theological motif is incorporated into a 
political anthropology by Maistre to form a definition of government based on the 
need to resolve conflict between individuals.88 But this government comes from the
OQ
nature of things and is not a matter of choice. Here then, contrary to orthodox 
Catholic political thought,90 Maistre describes a complex situation in which a 
Hobbes-like view of the state of man without government as being akin to warfare,
83 For the influence of Augustine on Hobbes, see Luc Foisneau, “Obeissance Politique et Salut du 
Chretien: Hobbes et I’Augustinisme”, in Religion et Politique: Les Avatars de I’Augustinisme (Saint- 
Etienne: Publications de l’Universite de Saint-Etienne, 1998) p.83; Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s 
Ethics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
p. 218. For Maistre’s reading of Hobbes, see, for example, Archives Cote 2J 19 Notebook, p. 667 et 
seq., comprising Maistre’s notes on De Corpore Politico.
84 Rousseau, Discours sur VOrigine, annotation to p. 184: “Men are bad; a sad and continual 
experience unnecessary to prove; however, man is naturally good. I believe that I have shown this”.
85 OC V 4, T 7, p. 561: “One of his [i.e. Socrates’] most illustrious disciples has transmitted to us the 
ideas of his master on this astonishing contradiction which is in man. Nature, Socrates said, has 
united in this being the principles of sociability and of dissension”.
86 Ibid., p. 563.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.: “It is necessary that, when several people want the same thing, a power superior to all the 
competitors judges the matter and prevents them from fighting”.
89 Ibid.: “Government is not, then, a matter of choice, it is as a result of the nature of things”.
90 Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (New York: Greenwood Press 1945), p. 228: 
“The state is not a consequence of sin. The doctors had to uphold this proposition against several 
sects which declared that the state originated in sin”.
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is grafted onto a naturalist view of political society, to establish the existence of an 
unbridgeable nature of the relationship between the governors and the governed.91
In the Examination o f a Piece by J-J Rousseau, Maistre shows a distinct empathy 
with Hobbes’ description of the human condition in the state of nature, suggesting 
that “Hobbes was perfectly right, providing that his principles are not taken too 
far”.92 For Maistre, the sociable state exhibits the hallmarks of the state of war, even 
under the reign of Sovereigns.93 This is not so different from the thought of Hobbes, 
whose examples of this condition once having existed are drawn from his 
observation of man’s condition within society.94 Maistre goes so far as to say that, 
during revolutions, “when the divine power is suspended”, nations quickly fall into 
what Hobbes terms a state of warfare, and become “tormented by a deluge of 
crimes”.95
Ultimately, Maistre’s political anthropology is not idealistic, and he offers no 
resolution to this conception of human society as fundamentally broken. He accepts 
the continuing irreconcilability of antithetical values as part of the political 
condition, believing that this antithesis can only be fully resolved if unity exists as
91 OC V 4 T 7, p. 563: “It is impossible that man be that which he is and not be governed, because a 
social and an evil being must be under the yoke”.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid. “Society is really a state of war.. .one must have a sovereign and laws, and even under their 
auspices, is not society still a raging battle field?”
94 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89: “ It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these 
things, that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and 
he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the 
same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he 
armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when 
even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there be lawes, and publicke Officers, 
armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done to him”.
95 O C V  4 T 7 ,  p. 563.
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an organising concept that prevails throughout the constitutional order. For 
adherents to the contractarian theory however, the existence of political life, 
predicated on a moment of transition, renders a different theory of man’s nature 
necessary. The rejection of traditional authority pushes the search for perfectibility 
into the realm of the political: the possibility of salvation comes with the moment of 
consent to the formation of the commonwealth.96
The Social Contract
Rousseau's Theory o f the Social Contract
The passage from the state of nature to that of law defines the ordering of political 
society in liberal modernity. Constituent power emerges as a theme in political 
thought, alongside the conviction that the authority of government rests upon the 
consent of the people. It is the crystallisation of the idea that legitimate government 
is the artificial product of the voluntary agreement of free moral agents. As Hobbes 
states in Leviathan, “From this Institution of a common-welth are derived all the 
Rights and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred 
by the consent of the People assembled”.97
96 See Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, ed. Timothy Fuller 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 39.
97 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 121.
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It is this version of the social contract described in Du Contrat Social, rather than the 
version presented in the Discours, which is the target of Maistre’s criticism.98 
Rousseau holds true to the common features of the contractarian tradition -  the state 
is the outcome of a covenant amongst men, its purpose is the protection of the 
people to which it owes its being and the figure of the sovereign must have enough 
power to provide some protection. To this extent, Rousseau is in accord with 
Hobbes’ assertion that sovereignty must be absolute or not at all.99
But Rousseau disagrees with an associated conclusion of Hobbes, that man must 
either be free or constrained by the rule of the sovereign,100 for Rousseau’s radical 
version of the social contract maintains that men can, at the same time, be both free 
and members of a political society.101 Whereas for Hobbes once the multitude 
performs its covenanting function it ceases to perform a political role,102 for
98 Rousseau, Discours sur I’Origine, pp. 238-9. In the Discours, Rousseau represents the social 
contract as a trick played by the rich and powerful on the poor and weak. The rich stress the 
necessity for law in order to bring stability to society and to reduce the conflict which has grown up 
in the state of nature., but this form of the social contract only gives increased power to the rich and 
further oppresses the weak. In the Du Contrat Social, by comparison, the act of contracting is more 
abstract, a hypothetical coming together of equals -  see Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 55.
99 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p 55: “I suppose that men come to the point where the obstacles 
which detract from their preservation in the state of nature are greater than the strength that each 
individual has to survive in this state. So, this state no longer being able to exist, humans would 
perish if they did not change their way of life. Now as men may not create new forces, but can only 
unite and direct those which exist, the only method of preserving themselves is by forming, by 
aggregation, the sum of their forces by which they can overcome any resistance, putting them in 
operation by a single force and making them act in concert”.
1 0 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 148.
101 Whence the infamous passage by Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 60: “In order that the Social 
pact not be a vain formula, it is tacitly stated in this commitment, which alone can give force to 
others, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained by the whole body; that 
which means nothing other than he will be forced to be free”.
102 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 121.
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Rousseau, the people as a people retain a purpose.103 Rousseau’s conception builds, 
perhaps, on Locke’s acknowledgment of the people’s continuing role, with its 
implicit recognition of its destabilising potential as a political force.104 And from 
Locke’s admittedly ambiguous account of the people there emerges the fundamental 
question as to how a multitude might determine the appropriate structure of political 
authority.
The solution proffered by Rousseau returns to the terms of the fundamental tension 
expressed in the notion of constituent power. His solution in fact represents an 
attempt to synthesise this most profound of constitutional antinomies, that between 
liberty and law: the essence of the transition from nature to civil society.105 
Rousseau’s belief is that man can be both ruled and free if he rules himself. 
Following from this, a people can be free if it retains sovereignty over itself.106 
Rousseau dispenses with the Hobbesian notion of alienation from sovereignty and 
instead adopts a principle of thought which is originally Stoic in conception,107 and 
in so doing he is able to proffer a solution to the problem caused by the falling away 
of ancient hierarchical authority forms. In Maurice Cranston’s words, “Rousseau’s
103 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 65: “I say then that sovereignty being only the exercise of the 
general will may never be alienated, and that the sovereign, which is only a collective being, may 
only be represented by itself’.
104 Locke, Two Treatises on Government, p. 385: “There remains still in the People a Supream Power 
to remove or alter the Legislative”. See also J.H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
105 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 60.
106 Ibid., p. 61: “That which man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited 
right to all that which tempts him and that he may attain; that which he gains is civil liberty and the 
ownership of all that he possesses.... To that which has preceded one could add moral liberty to the 
acquisition of the civil state, which alone makes man truly master of himself’.
107 See Malcolm Schofield, “Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought”, in The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christophe Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 444.
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solution of the problem of how to be at the same time ruled and free might plausibly 
be expressed as democracy”.108 And it is this double aspect of Rousseau’s work -  
embracing the possibility of consent to form a political society and the associated 
possibility that sovereignty might reside in the people -  that Maistre understands 
provided the basis for post-revolutionary democracy.
Maistre’s Critique o f the Social Contract
Rather than interpreting Rousseau’s alignment of liberty with law as a neo-Stoic 
“pure act of the intellect with all passions subdued,” as one commentator has put 
it,109 Maistre believed that Rousseau’s formulation of the people as sovereign 
expressed the terrible dangers inherent in the political contradictions of modem 
constitutional thought.110 To Maistre, the sovereignty of the people promised 
perpetual political impermanence, anarchic fragmentation and /or despotic 
consolidation; in any event, it hastened the retreat from unity that Maistre feared.111 
The result of that withdrawal, and the corresponding advance of the constituent 
notion of the sovereignty of the people, involves the imposition of the unfulfillable
108 Maurice Cranston, Introduction to the Social Contract (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 30.
109 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 105.
1,0 OC V 5 T 9, p. 494: “The principle of the sovereignty of the people is so dangerous that even in 
the event that it were true, it would be necessary not to permit to be demonstrated”.
111 OC V 1 T 1, p. 320: “It is Rousseau’s eternal mania to mock the philosophes without suspecting 
that he too is a philosophe in the full sense of the meaning that he attributes to this word; thus the 
Social Contract denies from start to finish man’s nature -  which exists, to explain the social contract 
-  which does not. This is how one reasons when man is separated from God”.
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task of eliding the governors with the governed.112 This manoeuvre, though doomed
11-5
to failure, will nevertheless generate dangerous political and social incoherence.
Maistre’s Study on Sovereignty is thus, in Jean Louis Darcel’s words, “an anti-social 
contract”,114 which focuses upon and rejects this very notion of the constituent 
power of the people as a means of founding political sovereignty. Maistre’s critique 
can be divided into three parts: the examination of the theory of the consent of the 
people and its relationship to the notion of sovereignty; the notion of the sovereignty 
of the people itself; and a critique of the abstraction that results from the uniform 
application of the social contract.
In considering the impact of the social contract, Maistre turns once more to the 
discipline of history in order to re-affirm certain Aristotelian certainties,115 arguing 
in particular that there is not a single example of a people who have been constituted 
in a contractarian manner into a political body.116 Although he refutes the idea that
112 Ibid., p. 324: “Everyone knows this famous line: the first to be king was a lucky soldier. Perhaps 
nothing so false has ever been said: on the contrary it must be said that the first soldier was sent to 
war by a king.
113 Ibid.: “The term ‘the people’ is a relative one which has absolutely no meaning separated from the 
idea of sovereignty”.
114 Jean-Louis Darcel, Introduction to Joseph de Maistre, De la Souverainete du Peuple (Paris: PUF, 
1992), p. 13: “De la Souverainete du Peuple is on this basis an anti-social contract. Just as Locke had 
written his treatise to refute Robert Filmer’s thesis supporting Anglican theocracy, and just as 
Rousseau had written the Du Contrat Social in response to the theories of the school of natural law 
and to refute those writers (in particular Grotius) whom he saw as proponents of despotism, so Joseph 
de Maistre refutes...the Citizen of Geneva”.
115 OC V 1 T 1, p. 321: “The question comes down to knowing if man became a political animal as 
Aristotle said, by or against the divine will”.
116 Ibid., p. 315: “... in place of the perfectly simple proposition that is self evident, the subject of 
metaphysics is manipulated to support vague hypotheses which are disproved both by good sense and 
by experience”.
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consensus demonstrates the validity of a proposition,117 Maistre does concede that in 
an ‘inferior’ sense, it may be argued that human consent founds sovereignty, because 
if a people suddenly decided not to obey a ruler, sovereignty would disappear and it 
would be impossible to imagine the establishment of a sovereign without imagining
1 1 o
a people consenting to obey. In introducing this observation in opposition to those 
statements of his that deal with constituent power as coming from God, Maistre 
blurs the distinction between the Divine and the mundane in the constituent process.
This is reminiscent of Pufendorf s project to situate political power somewhere 
between an impenetrable transcendentalism and rationalist sufficiency,119 and these 
ideas lead to the conclusion that the positive laws of civil society have the obligatory 
force of divine law.120 Pufendorf s attempt to shift the locus of authoritative 
political power away from the theological realm resulted in ambiguity, however, and 
Maistre’s thought also inhabits an indistinct zone of meaning somewhere between 
the theological and the political.121 The effect of this is that certain privileged 
concepts can have more than one sense. In this way, Maistre tempers the pure 
absolutist view that Divine authority directly constitutes the political order without
117 Maistre Family Archives, Cote 2J 15-18 CD 49, NB 94: “What proof! All the people have 
believed in magic, in astrology, in the influence of the moon!”
118 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 312-13: “It is very true, in an inferior and crude sense, that sovereignty is founded 
on human consent, for if any people agreed suddenly not to obey, sovereignty would disappear, and it 
is impossible to imagine the establishment of sovereignty without imagining a people who consent to 
obey”.
119 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Philosphie Politique, XVI-XX Siecle (Paris: PUF, 1987), p. 257.
120 Pufendorf, Droit de la Nature et les Gens, Ref,. II, IE, sec. 24, trans Jean Barbeyrac, p. 258.
121 See, for example, OC V 1 T 2, p. ix: “The dogmas and even the maxims of high Catholic practice 
are only for the large part the laws of the world divinised”.
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accepting the power of the masses, and reveals himself to be in a different category 
to, say, divine-right theorists such as Bossuet and Filmer.122
This blurring of the notion of constituent power is emphasised when Maistre returns 
to the theme of the law and its relationship with the process of founding political 
society. Sovereignty, says Maistre, comes from God in the same way that laws 
do.123 Maistre argues that, just as the statements ‘the law comes from God’ and ‘the 
law come from man’ are not mutually contradictory, so it is with sovereignty.124 
The crucial question, Maistre believes, is to examine the concept of sovereignty 
itself in order “to examine what is divine and human within it”.125
In addition, the implicit recognition of the political existence of the people, which, 
however undesirable it is, cannot be denied, adds to the sense that his thought is 
marked with the stamp of modernity.126 Again, this is not to say that Maistre 
believed that God qua God is precluded entirely from the process of the formation of 
political society. To deny that sovereignty comes from God just because he uses 
man to establish it is akin to saying that God has not created man because every 
human being has a mother and a father.127 Yet, as much as this statement of the 
respective roles of God and man in the establishment of sovereignty is a
122 OC V l T l , p .  313: “God not having judged it appropriate to employ supernatural instruments for 
the establishment of empires, it is certain that.. .everything has to be done by men”.
123 Ibid., p. 313-314.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 On the emergence of the people as a political phenomenon, see Margaret Canovan, The People 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2005) and Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: the Politics and Morals of 
Political Membership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
127 O C V  1, T 1, p. 313.
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pronouncement of theological belief, it also affirms temporal, hierarchical political
values -  there is no question of pact or contract or the meeting of wills - and
removes any decisive constituent function from the domain of the masses. Authority
128derives as much from the fact of its otherness as from the identity of its source.
Maistre’s hybrid conception contains no egalitarian implications -  whilst people and 
sovereign necessarily coincide,129 it is impossible for a people to exist without a 
sovereign. As soon as families, the basic unit of community, come into contact with 
each other, they need a sovereign130 and this sovereign makes them a people by 
giving them laws. Society therefore only exists through a sovereign. This account 
of the constitution of the political regime is suffused with a belief in the importance 
of unity. The idea of a people “is the aggregation around a common centre”,131
namely the sovereign, without which a people cannot come together or attain
112political unity.
Thus, Maistre describes a complex inter-relationship which contains a juridical or 
relational element, and is not merely defined by its physical characteristics or by the 
fact of dominance;133 the population, whatever its anterior organisation into family
128 OC V 1 T 1, p. 265 “It is always necessary for the origin of sovereignty to appear as being outside 
the sphere of human control, so that the very men who appear to be directly involved are nevertheless 
only circumstances”.
129 Ibid., p. 323.
130 Ibid., p.324.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., annotation to p. 323: “In observing that no human association may exist without some kind 
of domination, I do not intend to establish an exact equivalence between paternal authority and 
sovereign authority”. See also Christophe Boutin, “Le “Caractere National” chez Joseph de Maistre: 
Patriotisme Contre Indentite Juridique”, in Joseph de Maistre, ed. Barthelet, p. 458.
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or tribe, forms a people at the moment it recognises a common sovereign.134 This is 
why Rousseau’s idea of sovereignty as “a principle of equality which identified the 
ruled element or subjects themselves as supreme authority”135 is nonsensical to 
Maistre, because this is to suggest that the populace must be sovereign over itself, 
meaning that the people are both sovereign and subject -  a nonsense because “the 
people that commands is not the people that obeys”.136
To enunciate the idea of the sovereignty of the people is to enunciate a new way of 
thinking about the world, although, as John Dunn notes, this “is never wholly
1 ^ 7convincing”. The notion of the people as sovereign is an attempt to reconcile the 
tensions between freedom and necessity which run through constitutional discourse, 
in order to narrow the perception of the gulf between the governors and the
1 78governed. For Maistre, the impossibility of identifying those in authority with 
those under it is vital to the correct sequencing of constitutional order; without such 
a hierarchy the very sense of the questions involved is altered.
134 OC V 1 T 1, p. 324: “As soon as families meet, there must be a sovereign over them”.
135 Robert Wokler, “Ancient Post-modernism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. 
Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 423.
136 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 311-12: “There is here surely some equivocation, if there is not a mistake, 
because the people who commands is not the people who obeys”.
137 John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), p. 
142.
138 See Niccolo Machiavelli, II Principe (Einaudi: Turin 1995), pp. 5-6: “And I hope it may not be 
accounted presumptuous if a man of lowly and humble station ventures to discuss and direct the 
conduct of princes, for as those who wish to delineate countries place themselves low in the plain to 
observe the form and character of mountains and high places, and for the purpose of studying the 
nature of the low country place themselves high upon an eminence, so must one be a prince to know 
well the character of the people and to understand the nature o f the prince well one must be of the 
people”.
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The challenge of the modem theory of constituent power is to demonstrate this 
contrary stance, “to show the governed that the authority which confronts them is 
their own, that it is their will which stands behind it and their interests which it is in 
the end compelled to serve.”139 The point of the modem notion of constituent power 
is that it is not linked to particular traditions or integrated into national histories or 
cultural customs. Like much of Enlightenment thought, it is an abstract notion that 
possesses a quality of universalised instrumentality, a quality that came to exist after 
the old doctrine of the essence of man as a compound substance was abandoned for 
Cartesian rationalism.140
It is these implications that Maistre understands, and by which he is repelled, and his 
objections to them continue to have a resonance in contemporary considerations of 
the notion of constituent power. Jurgen Habermas, for example, believes that 
Maistre’s arguments should be used “to remind overly naive believers in progress of 
the limits of what can be done. The overextended project of a self-organising 
society, so the argument goes, carelessly disregards the weight of traditions, 
organically developing reserves and resources that cannot be created at will”.141 The 
social contract as a mechanism for instigating sovereign power does not possess the 
capacity to discern the differences in political society that may exist due to the 
varied characteristics of different communities and their different cultural traditions.
139 Dunn, Setting the People Free, p. 142.
140 See Michel Villey, La Formation de la Pense Juridique Modeme (Paris: PUF, 2006), p. 507; 
Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, p. 225.
141 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 488.
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Maistre, on the other hand, is fascinated by different cultures and cultural practices 
and takes a relativist attitude towards the merits of differing political systems.142 In 
doing so, he defends tradition in whichever form it is expressed against the 
uniformity of modernity by referring to the diversity of actual cultural and political 
systems and with an insistence on the reality, rather than the Enlightenment ideal, of 
political form.143 The power that created social authority and sovereignty has 
determined that there should be different modifications to it, according to the 
varying circumstances of nations. As a result, Maistre believes that institutions must 
accommodate a myriad of historical and cultural factors.144 This opposition to the 
universalising, imperialist tendencies of rational European modernity’s quest for 
cosmopolitan pre-eminence shows up strongly in Maistre’s critique of constituent
145power.
According to this view, the same laws cannot suit different countries. “Put away 
from you these absurd theories which they send you from France...what! All men 
are made for the same government and that government is pure democracy! What! 
Are all political philosophers mistaken from Aristotle up until the time of 
Montesquieu?”146 For Maistre, nations possess a common soul and a moral unity
142 OC V 1 T 1, p. 328: “From these different national characters are bom the different modifications 
of governments. It may be said that each has its character”.
143 Ibid., p. 328, “The general objects of every good institution must be modified in each country by 
the relationships which come as much from the local position as from the character of the inhabitants; 
and it is on these relationships that a system of institutions must be assigned to each people which are 
the best, not perhaps in themselves but for the State to which it is destined”.
144 Ibid., p. 329.
145 For a detailed discussion of this point in relation to constitutions, see Chapter 4 below.
146 OC V 4 T 7, p. 222; see also OC V 1 T 1, p. 328: “It must not therefore be believed that “every 
form of government suits every country: liberty for example, not being a fruit of every climate, is not
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which is unique to that constitutional configuration.147 It follows that the social 
contract is a chimera.148 If there are as many different governments as there are 
people, and if the forms of these governments are determined by moral, physical and 
geographical positions, then one cannot speak of a universalised, uniform pact.149
Maistre thus denies the possibility of the people constituting itself into a sovereign 
body. He finds just as abhorrent the suggestion that the sovereignty of the people is 
a uniform concept, which, its proponents believe, will fit every constitutional 
scenario, and as equally unacceptable to Maistre are the implications for traditional 
constitutional order of the political system with which the sovereignty of the people 
is intimately connected -  democracy. “Despotism”, says Maistre with seeming 
equanimity, “is as natural and legitimate as democracy for another”.150 But the 
mildness of this even-handed statement belies the vehemence with which Maistre 
goes on to oppose the idea of democracy and examine the associated concepts of law 
and liberty.
available for all people”. The more one meditates on this principle established by Montesquieu, the 
more one senses its truth”.
147 It is important to note that Maistre’s notion of diversity is one based upon there being an 
international plurality of cultures and does not depend upon an intra-national multiculturalism. For 
Maistre, as for Carl Schmitt, homogeneity is of some constitutional significance. See Chapter 6, 
below.
148 OCV IT  l ,p.329.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.; also see the annotation on p. 329: “Will one say even in this hypothesis that there is always a 
pact in virtue of which each contracting party is held to maintain government, such as it is? In this 
case, for despotism or absolute monarchy, the pact will be precisely that which Rousseau ridiculed at 
the end of his pitiable chapter on servitude. “I make with you a convention totally to your 
disadvantage and totally to my profit which I will observe as along as it pleases me and you will 
observe as long as it pleases me””. (Maistre is quoting from Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 54).
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Democracy, Law, Liberty
Democracy
For Maistre, democracy, which was bom out of the French Revolution, is 
synonymous with the sovereignty of the people151. The French Revolution appeared 
to him, “to express the idea of constituent power in all its direct, historical 
specificity”,152 representing a moment when the implications of a power grounded in 
the will of the multitude became startlingly apparent. Throughout his work, Maistre 
offers a number of formulations of this new and -  for him -  troubling political
1 SIphenomenon. It is, “an association of men without sovereignty”, which reflects 
his view that the sovereignty of the people is an impossibility, but he also defines it 
as “a government in which the masses exercise sovereignty”,154
These two contrasting formulations serve to illustrate different aspects of Maistre’s 
view of the formation of political society by means of the power of the people. The 
first statement expresses the idea that the construct that is ‘the people’ is not equal to 
the task of bearing authority. In such a case, democracy leads inevitably to 
disintegration, anarchy and incoherence. In the second statement, Maistre uses the
151 For Maistre, “Pure democracy exists no more than absolute despotism.. ..The idea of a entire 
people as both sovereign and legislator shocks good sense so strongly that the Greek 
politicians... never spoke of democracy as a legitimate form of government... Aristotle especially 
defines democracy as an excess of republic” (OC V 1 T 1, p. 464). For the limited occasions in 
which Maistre specifically considers democracy as a viable political form, see Chapter 6 below.
152 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 109.
153 OCW  l T l , p .  465.
154 Ibid., p. 42.
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term ‘masses’ to demonstrate his explicit awareness of the existence of this modem 
unit of constitutional discourse and his recognition of its constitutional energy.
There is thus in Maistre’s work an acknowledgment of the relation between 
democracy and the raw political force of the people155 -  although he may have been 
conservative in principle, he was clearly not blind to the political realities of the day.
Law
Just as significantly, both of these formulations exclude any mention of the law, a 
theme which, as we have seen, threads itself throughout Maistre’s discussion of the 
validity of the foundation of political society. The conception of the law as the will 
of a governing entity is a fundamental element of his belief in the constitution as 
unity. The existence of law implies the generation of obligation, a vital part of 
Maistre’s understanding of the individual’s relation to the constitutional 
community.156 Law, which must emanate from a single source outside the control of 
those who are subject to its authority, entails obligation; obligation defines the 
nature of the hierarchical structure, which in turn explicates the correct ordering of 
the constitutional scheme. Law necessarily presupposes a superior will that must be 
obeyed.157
155 See, for example, OC V 5 T 9, p. 11: “I do not know how to express to you how it has reinforced
my anti-democratic ideas....I understand very well how systems fermenting in human heads become 
passionate; believe me that one could not abhor too much this abominable assembly”.
*56 O C V  1 T 1, p. 236.
Maistre contrasts this view of the law, which represents an answer to Rousseau’s 
“greatest political problem”,158 with that of Locke, who in attempting to reconcile 
democracy with the claims of law sought to find democracy’s source in the 
unification of wills, the modem constituent act. For Maistre, in contrast, it is 
precisely democracy’s character as a collection of wills which excludes the idea of 
law from it, and consequently prevents democracy from ever forming a lasting 
political settlement.159 His belief that law is the product of a superior will, a thing 
designed to control and which is oriented towards the past, means that he sees law as 
a political imperative linked not only with revelation but with tradition.160 In this 
way it stands in contrast not only with the nomocratic impulses of the 
Enlightenment,161 which understood law to be an explication of Universal Reason, 
but also with the ideals of democracy as an expansive, forward -looking and 
irresistible force.162
158 See Rousseau, Lettres Philosophiques (Paris: Flammarion), p. 98: “That of a doctrine of law 
whose foundation is placed above man”.
159 OC V 1 T 1, p. 237: “Law is only properly law and has a genuine sanction if it is taken as 
emanating from a superior will; so that its essential feature is that it is not the will of all. Otherwise 
law would be only regulations, and as the author [Bergier] already cited earlier says again, “those 
who have had the liberty to make these compacts have no less the power to revoke them; and their 
descendants, who have no part in them, are even less obliged to observe them”” (Maistre quotes 
Bergier’s, Traite historique et dogmatique de la religion, V HI, Ch IV, s. 12, pp. 330, 331).
160 OC V 4 T 7, p. 154: “There are excellent prejudices which are the most sacred and the most 
ancient of laws”.
161 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Philosophic Politique XVI -X X  Siecle (Paris: PUF, 1987), p. 267, in 
which are listed significant texts on legislation:
1755: Le Code de la Nature by Morelly
1756: VAmi des Hommes ou Traite de la Population by Mirabeau 
1764: Treaty of Delicts and Punishments by Cesare Beccaria 
1765: Commentaries on the laws of England by Blackstone 
1767: Treaty on civil laws by Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet 
1776: On Legislation, or, The Principles of the Laws by Mably 
1789: Introduction to Moral Principles and Legislation by Bentham 
1802: Treatise on civil and criminal law by Bentham
162 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 100: “Democracy is not easily reconciled to law. It is an 
expression of an expansive or innovative movement that asserts the capacity of the people to decide 
for themselves the type of ordering under which they might live. As the primary legitimating
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Maistre clearly states his conviction that it is impossible to reconcile democracy with 
law as a function of unity: “The accord of the people is impossible.. .and accord is 
absolutely not law and does not obligate anyone”.163 Recalling the first definition of 
democracy given above (“an association of men without sovereignty”), Maistre 
states that the sovereignty of the people lacks the force of law, which is a vital 
ingredient of any valid political structure. Democracy is antithetical to law in 
Maistre’s thought -  its acceptance emphasises the upheaval of traditional 
constitutional values that bind society together in the correct hierarchical sequence. 
And bound to this new, expansive political form is the concept of liberty, which, 
understood in its modem sense, is another challenge to Maistre’s understanding of 
the law.
Liberty
Another formulation of the law proffered by Maistre is that it is a general rule 
without passion to limit the passions.164 According to this formulation, law opposes 
the modern value of liberty, an opposition which is just one aspect of a dialectic 
between authority and liberty that emerges at every stage of the argument between 
Maistre and the contractarians. Liberty is a value privileged by the thinkers of 
liberal democratic modernity, who at the same time are conscious of the
principle of modem political order, democracy fixes on the present and is orientated towards the 
future”.
163 O C V  1 T 1, p. 236.
164 O C V  4 T 7 ,  p. 147.
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consequences of allowing unmediated democratic power to remain intact.165 
Maistre’s conception of liberty reflects his view that there are political values that 
override negative freedom, understood to be an attribute of democracy.166 Any 
understanding of Maistre’s view on constituent power and the sovereignty of the 
people must therefore address his conception of liberty.
Like Hobbes, Maistre believes that man has a fundamental need of order,167 but 
unlike Hobbes there is no question of Maistre accepting the premise that man has a 
pre-existing liberty to renounce in the way that the social contract theorists 
describe.168 For Maistre, liberty as a political consideration does not take 
precedence over the other concepts with which, in his writing, it is intimately linked 
-  those of mastery, servitude and government.169 Rather, the implications of liberty, 
as undermining the core constitutional value of unity, leads him to speak of it in 
pejorative tones: “There are no two words which fight each other and exclude each 
other more visibly that those of liberty and the law common to all [ droit commun]: 
because if you ask to live like all others, you do not then want liberties; and if on the 
other hand you ask for it, you exclude explicitly the law common to everyone”.170
165 See, for example, Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 9.
166 See Paul Kelly, Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 61.
167 OC V 1 T 2, p. 339: “Man in general is too wicked to be free”. See also Hobbes, Leviathan, p.
120.
168 Ibid., p. 338: “The opposite of this foolish assertion, man was bom free is the truth”. See Hobbes, 
Leviathan, p. 86.
169 O C V  2 T 3, p. 252.
170 Ibid.
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It is possible to see here the influence of ancient conceptions of the idea of liberty, 
and in particular the Platonic view of political freedom as the goal of democracies: 
in other words, the absence of control over the activities of individuals and of the 
people as a whole.171 Certainly, in claiming that the quest for a private domain 
corrupts one’s attachment to the community, Maistre opposes Constant’s definition 
of modem liberty in which the liberty of the private individual must be defended
172against the State. But Maistre by no means shares a view of liberty with all 
ancient conceptions of the term; in particular he rejects that strain of thought which
173identifies liberty with self-mastery, strongly believing that man is incapable of 
ruling himself.174 This enables him to conclude that liberty consists only in obeying 
the law, understood as an external force,175 a belief he holds without identifying with 
Rousseau’s faith in the idea of communitarian allegiance.
Whilst Maistre states that liberty, in a political sense, “can only ever be a negative 
expression which signifies the absence of an obstacle”,176 it is also the gift of kings 
and cannot be willed or created by man,177 and it is certainly not an essential 
political value -  “men are not in general made for liberty or even a degree of
171 Plato, The Republic, p. 319.
172 Constant, “De la Liberte des Anciens Comparee a Celle des Modemes”, in De TEsprit de 
Conquete et de I’Usurpation (Paris: GF-Flammarion, 1986), p. 265.
173 See, for example, Saint Paul, Romans 7; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 115; although see OC V 2 T 4, 
p. 43: “It [i.e. philosophy] well understood that the strongest inclination of man is vicious to the point 
where he tends towards the destruction of society, so that there is no greater enemy than himself, and 
he understood that when he has learned to conquer himself, he knows all”.
174 OC V 1 T 2, p. 175: “The efforts of the peoples to create or increase their liberties result almost
always by putting them in irons”. Also OC V 7 T 13, p. 73: “It is the servitude of a part of this people
which renders this State [i.e. Russia] peaceful: if each individual were master of his actions, I do not 
believe that peace would be possible at the present time”.
175 Archives, Cote 2J 22 Bis, CD No. 19, p. 46; Notebook page 119.
176 OCV 2 T 3, p. 252.
177 OCV 1 T 1, p. 68; OCV 7 T 13, p. 46.
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liberty”.178 Political movements like democracy have obscured this truth and have 
led to a misconception of the term. Furthermore, the Enlightenment insistence on 
emphasising liberty as an absolute right will, in Maistre’s eyes, lead to calamity: 
“Liberty and equality have come to present themselves to you under the guise of two 
divinities, but soon, throwing away these misleading disguises and deploying their 
dismal wings, they have glided down onto an unfortunate earth and shown their 
bloody ways”.179 And this is just one of a number of deleterious effects that the 
sovereignty of the people and its political expression of democracy will engender, 
effects which Maistre goes on to examine in some detail.
Effects o f Democracy
In any state, Maistre believes that a bond of allegiance is generated between an 
individual and the sovereign, no matter what form the figure of the sovereign takes. 
In a democracy, Maistre believes, that bond is between an individual and all the 
other members of the state, as sovereignty is divided between them. Thus the 
strength of attraction between the individual and the state is diluted, because instead 
of it going to an indivisible entity, it goes to every member of society.180 
Consequently, democracies can only sustain themselves through a process of
178 OC V 4, T 7, p. 149; see also OC, V 7 T 14, p. 167: “Among the innumerable stupidities of the 
moment...is to believe that liberty is something absolute”.
179 OCV 4 T 7, p. 161.
180 Ibid., p. 223.
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‘exaltation’,181 but exaltation is not a natural state for human beings to maintain.182 
When the fervour for democratic unity dies away, the government is left with “no 
centre, no unity, the people no longer know what to do with their power, they do not 
know any longer where their power resides”.183 Here, then, is one possible effect of 
democracy that Maistre gives: its potential to induce political and social 
fragmentation, the opposite of Maistre’s own “constituent principle... [which] is 
unity”.184 For Maistre, constituent power without a strong organising principle is 
doomed to failure, and that organising principle cannot come from within 
democracy, because the realities of the social order will impinge upon any 
democratic ideal. Democracy could not exist for a moment if it were not tempered 
by aristocracy.185
But in his second definition of democracy (“ a government in which the masses 
exercise sovereignty”) Maistre anticipates the possible emergence of despotism. For 
Maistre, the tyranny of democracy is seen in its potential to generate power without 
restraint, with devastating consequences: “A light excess of severity.. .revolted a few 
months ago. In the most severe acts of the old government you always saw a 
marked moderation... The most absolutist of princes was aware of a multitude of 
restraints: he was restrained by his own character, by religion, by shame, by politics, 
by salutary counsel, by public opinion: but popular tyranny has absolutely no
181 Ibid., p. 224.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 0 C V 6 T  12,p. 471.
185 O C V  1 T 1, p. 473.
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decency”.186 These hypothetical consequences of democracy -  the atomisation of 
society on the one hand, the danger of despotism on the other, and above all the need 
to temper the rawness of democratic power -  will be familiar themes to readers of 
Tocqueville, who was almost certainly aware of Maistre’s writing,187 and who shares 
Maistre’s deep concern with the root of these problems, namely an individualism 
that has inspired and is also the fruit of democracy. This, individualism, Tocqueville 
and Maistre both argue, has bred a faith in individual reason as the sole basis for 
opinion and belief.188
Both men identify the paradoxical result of modernity’s demand for constitutional 
uniformity, which is based on the acceptance of Rousseau’s figure of the subject- 
sovereign and his understanding of the human being as being split into man and 
citizen.189 According to Tocqueville and Maistre, in the modern state the democratic 
man is -  as well as being an expression of political will -  an individual separated 
from all established institutional relationships with his fellow man, for with the 
advent of civil society each being is freed from the static hierarchy of tradition, and
186 OC V 4 T 7, p. 100. In a subsequent, powerful passage (pp. 102-103) Maistre describes a crypto- 
Orwellian state of affairs: “A smile, an innocent gesture may pass as a conspiracy...Thoughts are 
crimes. It is necessary to remain and suffer, this is the law. The towns are nothing but great prisons 
in which all the public functionaries are gaolers. And do not believe that these misfortunes are only 
passing sufferings.. .a type of tunnel through which one must pass in order to arrive at happiness and 
liberty. The principles of the law that they preach to you are essentially vicious, their basis 
detestable. And again at OC V 1 T 1, p. 474: “When one opines on the rooftops, one cuts throats in 
the streets”.
187 Through Tocqueville’s close association with Mme. Swetchine. For Maistre’s association with 
her, see, for example, OC V 7 T 13, pp. 417-426.
188 OC V 4 T 8, p. 66; Maistre, speaking of the Reformation, which he sees as a pre-figuration of 
political insurrection, writes: “In freeing the people from the yoke of obedience and giving to it 
religious sovereignty, it unchained the general pride against authority and put discussion in place of 
obedience”. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Democratic en Amerique, Vol II (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1961), p. 143.
189 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, pp. 57-58; Tocqueville, De la Democratie, p. 140.
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is bound now only by the network of fleeting contacts that he has with his fellow 
citizens.190 As a result, he comes to be defined only by his own interests, and thus 
lacks any idea of civic obligation.191 As a result, man is separated from his peers 
twice in the sequence of modem political thought, once at each extreme of 
modernity’s conception of civilisation: first as an isolated man in the state of nature 
and then as a democratic individual.
Democratic man is as much of an artificial construct as man in a state of nature.192
The reality of man does not correspond with the abstract construction of the Godless
democratic illusion. Contractualist modernity has effected a separation between the
person rooted in a unified culture and tradition and the democratic individual whose
1image is subject to identical reproduction ad infinitum. Where Tocqueville’s
solution to this problem is to accept the existence of democracy as a providential 
creation and to believe in its powers to overcome its own shortcomings,194 Maistre 
proposes an alternative version of constituent power that is consonant with the 
values that he upholds: the figure of the Legislator.
190 OC V 1 T 1, p. 467; Tocqueville, De la Democratic, p. 23.
191 O C V  1 T 1, pp. 468-69; Tocqueville, De la Democratic, p. 144.
192 O C V  1 T 1, p. 464.
193 Ibid., p. 74: “The 1795 constitution, like its predecessors, was made for man. But there is no such 
thing as man in the world. During my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians and so on; 
thanks to Montesquieu I even know that one can be Persian, but I must say that, as for man, I have 
never come across him anywhere; if he exists, he is completely unknown to m e...a constitution made 
for all nations is made for none; it is a pure abstraction, an academic exercise of the mind, according 
to some a hypothetical ideal, that should be addressed to man, in whatever imaginary realm he 
inhabits”. See also Theodor W. Adomo and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 
John Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), p. 120.
194 Tocqueville, De la Democratic, p 42: “To want to halt democracy appears then to be to fight 
against God himself, and it only remains open to nations to accommodate themselves to the social 
state which has been imposed on them by Providence”.
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The Legislator
As we have seen, Maistre forcefully refutes the possibility that valid constituent 
power can emanate from the multitude, because its political expression, democracy, 
is the antithesis of what he believes to be the primary constitutional building block, 
the law. Democracy, to Maistre, is an uncontrollable, destructive power which 
presents itself either in the atomisation of society or the emergence of a form of 
tyranny. And yet, despite his qualms about democracy, Maistre does not deny the 
existence of a constituent political process per se, and even attempts to explain the 
transition from raw unformed, political energy into an organised constitutional 
format. Given what we have learned of Maistre’s political ideology so far, it should 
not come as a surprise to discover that Maistre’s theory is an historically grounded, 
teleological process that places an emphasis on unity, law and decisive authority. It 
mediates between the (putatively divine) origins of political power (which stand 
outside the closed system of constitutional positivism) and the formalised patterns of 
constitutional energy. At the same time, Maistre describes an important aspect of 
his notion of the sovereign, which helps to shed light on the theoretical structure as a 
whole.
Social contract theorists describe the transformation from constituent to constituted 
power in terms of how the multitude are able to deliberate on the appropriate 
structure of constituted authority. This leads to a series of conceptual difficulties
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and the subsequent need for circumlocution on the topic. The social contract theorist 
is involved in a process of justifying a certain view of political authority, but in so 
doing he holds two simultaneous aims in view. The first involves explaining in real 
political terms the division between governors and governed, whilst the second 
involves explaining why, in theory, this divide is illusory (because those who govern 
are authorised by the governed). This paradoxical state of affairs results in attempts 
to conflate profound antinomies that lie at the heart of constitutional thought, and 
which by the nature of liberal-democratic constitutional structures will remain 
antithetical, no matter how much effort is expended in reconciling them.
And theories of constituent power based on the contractualist model cannot readily 
explain the foundation of political authority in constitutional arrangements which are 
not those of nation states. The political authority of a modern-day institution such as 
the European Union singularly fails to fit the hypothetical requirements of 
contractualist discourse, because it appears to be a product of a singular will -  in 
other words, it is a product of the law rather than of democratic constituent energy, 
and its legitimacy defies any attempt to identify those who exercise authority with 
those over whom it is exercised.
Maistre’s thought is able to avoid these sorts of constitutional conundrums, because 
in his model constituent power is transformed into a viable constitutional form by a 
unitary entity, which acts in keeping with the precepts of the law whilst performing a 
function imbued with creative constitutional energy. Avoiding the abstract,
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deliberative techniques of democratic theorists,195 Maistre turns instead to a figure 
enmeshed in and yet reaching beyond tradition and particularity, a figure which 
offers a solution to the problem of translating the fact of political power into the 
norm of the constitution. This figure is the legislator, who assimilates political, 
factual power and juridified function in a single body.
Both Rousseau and Maistre use the figure of the law-giver, which is drawn from 
their readings of classical sources and in particular from Plutarch’s account of 
Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan constitutional order.196 Historians of the 
classical world now interpret the existence of law-givers such as Lycurgus as 
evidence that the constitution of the polis was not seen to have been ordained by 
divine sanction or fixed by tradition, but that it was mutable by human decision; to a
107large extent, Maistre’s interpretation conforms to this view.
The law-giver is also, of course, a figure of modern political theory, first appearing 
in Machiavelli198 and then reaching its apogee in the Enlightenment.199 But both 
Rousseau and Maistre depart from the model in that they pay scant regard to the 
concept of natural law:200 Rousseau’s law-giver performs a highly elaborate and 
complex functional role, whilst Maistre’s bestrides a constitutional decision that
195 For contemporary examples, see J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for  
Democratic Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds., 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
196 Plutarch, On Sparta, trans. Richard J. A. Talbert (Penguin: London, 1988), pp. 3-38.
197 Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Poets, Lawgivers and the Beginnings of Political Reflection in Archaic 
Greece”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 42.
198 Machiavelli, The Discourses, trans. Leslie J. Walker (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 109.
199 See above, p. 91.
200 Lebrun, Against Rousseau, p. xix.
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takes place at a specified moment in history.201 It is perhaps the fact that Maistre’s 
law-giver -  the product of history as much as law -  “belongs only to the ancient 
world or in the youth of nations”202 that further distances this figure from its 
seventeenth and eighteenth century predecessors and makes it, if anything, 
reminiscent of the Hegelian world-historical individual.203
The task of the legislator in Rousseau’s model is “to succeed in attaching the citizen 
to his city with indissoluble links in such a fashion that the love of the fatherland 
fashions all his existence”.204 He must bring to the social body the light that it needs 
by bringing an individual into conformity with the general will, so that the individual 
may be incorporated into something greater than himself and so enjoy a new 
communal existence 205 In short, the legislator organises the multitude into a people.
Rousseau’s legislator is thus an attempt to find a solution to what some 
commentators have identified as the central problem of all Rousseau’s thought: ‘To 
find a form of non- authoritarian educative authority that will “make men what they 
ought to be”, without (permanently) depriving them of the freedom without which 
“neither virtues, nor vices, nor merit, nor demerit, nor morality in human actions” 
are conceivable.206 Conscious of the problematic status of liberty in his model,
201 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, pp. 79-83.
202 OCV.  I, T. 1, p. 229.
203 G. W. Hegel, “Introduction to the Philosophy of History”, in Hegel: Selections, ed. J. Lowenberg 
(New York: Charles Scribner, 1929), p. 375.
204 Bronislaw Baczko, “Moise, legislateur...”, in Rousseau (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1982), p. 124.
205 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 80.
206 Patrick Riley, “Rousseau’s General Will”, in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 126.
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Rousseau cannot allow the legislator to rule, but only help the people find the 
general will it is seeking -  or would seek if it knew of it. Assuming the legislator 
had decisive authority, “he would not have to bend over backwards to persuade 
without convincing -  so that freedom can finally arrive”.207
From one point of view, it appears that the legislator represents a tacit 
acknowledgment that the people are incapable of constituting themselves as a 
unified body. The consequent impossibility of explaining away the gulf between 
governors and governed means that the legislator -  so crucial to the coherence of the 
Rousseauist theory of the general will208 -  finishes by being “of all his images of 
authority, the least genuine, the most wooden, one-dimensional figure”.209 And so 
Rousseau’s figure effectively remains as an intellectual exercise, functioning only on 
a metaphysical level.210 The law-giver -  as Rousseau himself admits -  is undeniably 
a problematic figure in constitutional modernity because it is composed of two 
seemingly incompatible things: “a task beyond human capability and, to carry it out, 
an authority which amounts to nothing”.211
However, whilst Rousseau’s law-giver remains yet another product of his incoherent 
thinking,212 and wields an authority that amounts to nothing, Maistre’s own has “an
207 Ibid., p. 138.
208 Pranchere, L ’Autorite Contre les Lumieres, p. 205.
209 Judith N. Sklar, “Rousseau’s Images of Authority (Especially in La Nouvelle Heloise)” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, p. 178.
210 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 105.
211 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 80.
212 OC V 1 T 1, p. 333: “Rousseau wrote a chapter on the legislator in which all the ideas are 
confused in an intolerable way. In the first place, this word can have two different meanings: usage 
allows us to apply it to the extraordinary men who promulgate constitutive laws, and also to the less
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authority that amounts to everything”.213 Because Maistre does not need to use the 
figure in order to reconcile the paradoxes intrinsic to democratic modernity, his 
creation is far more decisive: the law-giver is a figure of constitutional decision who 
“communicates to a people a common soul”.214 Indeed, certain qualities and forces 
remain mere potential until they are developed by circumstances manipulated by the 
“skilful hand” of the legislator.215 It is he who “assembles elements which pre-exist 
in the customs and characters of the people”.216 He has “an extraordinary power”,217 
promulgates constitutional laws and “literally engenders a nation”.218 Whilst 
Rousseau’s law-giver remains ineffectually metaphysical, still tied to the emphasis 
on legislative function of the enlightenment stereotype, the distinctive quality of 
Maistre’s legislator is his practical good sense and his capacity to interact far more 
profoundly with the raw materials of the constitutional order.219
As well as being existentially decisive, the legislator also has a teleological role. He 
commences his task as a unified entity full of constitutional possibility; in Maistre’s 
words, “Every seed is necessarily one”.220 Thus it is always from a single law-giver
remarkable men who pass civil laws. It seems that Rousseau understood the word in the first sense, 
because he speaks of “he who dares to undertake to institute a people and who constitutes a republic”. 
But soon after that he says that “the legislator is in all respects an extraordinary man in the state”. 
Here there is already a state: the people is therefore constituted. It is no longer a question then of 
instituting the people, but more likely reforming it”.
213 Ibid., p. 340.
214 Ibid., p. 342. On this basis, Richard Lebrun, in Against Rousseau, p. xvii, has argued that 
Rousseau and Maistre’s lawgivers perform the same role, but it is difficult to see how this can be the 
case, given these fundamental differences of orientation; it is perhaps once again a question of 
mistaking shared terminology for shared function.
215 Ibid., pp. 343 - 344.
216 Ibid., p. 71.
217 Ibid., p. 345.
218 Ibid., p. 342.
219 Ibid., p. 339.
220 Ibid., p. 342.
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that each people receives its dominant trait and its distinctive character.221 The law­
giver has an, “extraordinary penetration”, but he is not all-knowing, and acts on 
instinct rather than reason.222 He “divines the forces and qualities of the nation”,223 
bringing them to life and setting them in motion.
Maistre’s legislator also speaks in the name of the Divinity -  who confers power on 
rare men -  as a true elect.224 This relationship demonstrates without question that 
the ultimate source of authority is most assuredly not the will of the governed. With 
the source placed unquestionably outside of the positivised system, there is no 
chance of the occurrence of the circularity which besets discussion of constituent 
and constituted power in liberal democratic thought. The assembling of the customs 
and character of the people in a constitutional form by the legislator is so closely 
linked with creation ab nihilo as to be almost indistinguishable from it, and 
belongs to the zone of indeterminacy between the theological and the political 
characteristic of his thought.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., p. 344.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 OC V 1 T 1, p.71 “...this assembly, this rapid formation , which is close to creation.’
226 Ibid.: “Politics and religion mix together”.
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The Legislator and Sovereignty
As noted above, a key quality of the law-giver is decisiveness, and it is this quality, 
perhaps above all others, that brings the constitutional structure into existence. The 
legislator’s style of action comes from inspiration and not from deliberation, Maistre 
notes;227 he acts with a moral force that bends the will.228 If he picks up his pen, “it 
is not to write essays, it is to command”.229 It is this quality of decisive command 
that exposes one of the essential distinctions between Rousseau’s facilitative 
legislator and Maistre’s figure of authority: their relationship to the concept of 
sovereignty, one of whose perennial characteristics is the power to command, to 
make a decision. Whilst for Rousseau, seeking to explain the existence of a new 
egalitarian political structure built upon an absence of traditional authority, the 
legislator cannot be a sovereign230, for Maistre the figure is entirely bound up with 
sovereignty. Indeed, Maistre goes so far as to state that almost all great legislators 
have been kings231 and that “the two most famous legislators [i.e. Moses and 
Mohamed] were more than kings”.232
This confluence of the law-giver and the sovereign has proved a powerful model for 
illiberal theorists of constitutional thought, and particularly for Carl Schmitt’s model
227 Ibid., p. 344; see also p. 72.
228 Ibid. p. 72.
229 Ibid. p. 344.
230 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 79.
231 OC V 1 T 1, p. 346.
232 Ibid.
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for the sovereign as founder.233 More recently, Andreas Kalyas defined sovereignty 
as the power to found a constitutional order, which coincides with the central 
characteristics of the Maistrian law-giver.234 Kalyas argues that it is possible to see 
sovereignty, not as the ultimate coercive power, but as the power to posit or 
constitute .235 In advancing this alternative model, he outlines certain fundamental 
traits that are worth examining in greater detail, because of the light it sheds on 
Maitre’s own conception of the legislator and because it demonstrates the continuing 
relevance of Maistre’s constitutional thought.
The first trait of the constituting sovereign is that the sovereign ‘posits’: he is the one 
who creates the constitution and establishes a new legal and political order.236 
Kalyas defines the sovereign as the one who “determines the constitutional form, the 
juridical and political identity and the governmental structure of a community in its 
entirety.”237 Rather than command or rule, as in the traditional model of 
sovereignty, Kalyas’s sovereign creates, and legislates rather than rules.238 The 
constituent legislator is not an absolute ruler but a founding figure.239
The second fundamental trait is defined by the nature of the founder’s relationship to 
the constitutional order that he founds.240 The constituent sovereign moves inside
233 Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Berlin: Dunker and Humbolt, 1989), p. 7.
234Andreas Kalyas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power”, in Constellations 
12, No. 2 (2005), pp. 224-244.
235 Ibid., p. 226.
236 Ibid., p. 227.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid., p. 229.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid., p. 228.
107
and outside of the constitution, and his actions cannot be traced back to any juridical 
norm.241 This, Kalyas states, allows the constitution to be understood in political 
terms and politics to be analysed in constitutional terms, thus bridging the distance 
between factual power and constitutional normativity.242
Kalyas goes on to identify the problem common to all theories of the legislator: how 
to deal with the potential for arbitrariness. Kalyas’ s solution seems to contradict his 
earlier assertions: he suggests that the power to found is an exclusively juridical 
power.243 In so doing, he appears to adopt a course of reasoning beset with the same 
circularity as those who equate the constituted with constituent power. If one wishes 
the constituent power to bear the epithet of sovereign, one must also accept that this 
concept operates on the line of demarcation between the political and the legal, and 
so remain open to the possibility that sovereign power may act in an arbitrary 
manner, and that events outside the gamut of positivised norms may have some 
impact upon them.
That said, Maistre’s own idea of the legislator avoids the charge of arbitrariness in a 
number of ways that differentiate it from the legislator of the Deists or from Kalyas’ 
notion of juridical power. First, Maistre’s legislator begins a teleological process 
whose ends are contained within its beginning; second, the legislator is grounded in
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., p. 231.
243 Ibid., p. 233: “Undoubtedly insightful, these claims do not strike at the core of constituent power. 
They expose the most serious difficulties with this notion of sovereignty. But the concept of the 
constituent power itself allows the possibility of three responses, all o f which are related to its 
juridical nature. Although associated with extra-legality, antecedent to any established legal form, the 
constituent power is a juridical category par excellence”.
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a moment of historical and political fact rather than existing as a theoretical 
archetype; third, the legislator performs a single act of constitutional decision, 
which, being drawn from pre-existing custom and tradition, is endowed with a 
stabilising contextualisation. And whereas Kalyas argues that this is a separate 
model of sovereignty, it would be more accurate to say that, at most, Maistre’s law­
giver is an attribute of the wider conception of sovereignty, to be regarded not as an 
alternative but as a different aspect of one unified concept.
It is because he founds the constitutional order through undeliberated decision that 
the law-giver (be it Numa, Solon, Draco, Lycurgus, Mohamed or Moses) is a perfect 
model for those constitutional structures which, by virtue of their teleological 
aspiration, do not easily fit into the deliberative model. Indeed, in his essay, “We 
Will Do and We Will Hearken”,244 J. H. Weiler uses the example of Moses (the non 
plus ultra of Maistre’s legislators) and his presentation of the covenant to the 
Israelites245 to address the question of why the commencement of the constitutional 
project of European unification was not preceded by deliberation.246 Weiler’s 
analysis coincides with Maistre’s model of the law-giver as authoritative institutor.
In his essay, Weiler asks a rhetorical question: who would be foolish enough to 
accept such a foundational arrangement without first deliberation? The answer is 
that ‘Who? is a difficult question, because one of the things that the covenant with
244 J. H. Weiler, “We Will Do and We Will Hearken”, in The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New 
Clothes Have an Emperor? ” And Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1999), pp. 3-9.
245 Exodus 24:7
246 Weiler, “We Will Do”, p. 4.
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the Israelites did was to constitute its subject in a new way.”247 Both for Weiler and 
for Maistre, the endowment made by the legislator is revolutionary not just in its 
substantive content, but in “the very ontological underpinning of its subject”.248 And 
Weiler echoes Maistre’s own language when he comments that the handing down of 
the covenant is an act of existential decisiveness, an act “of veritably taking one’s 
destiny in one’s hand of following an institution, an ideal, an aspiration”.249 “The 
sequence”, he comments, “is history: an inevitable dynamic of doing first and 
thinking later”.250 It is also undemocratic, for the transformation of the ‘We’ that 
Weiler speaks of “is the political class”.251
Weiler’s use of a Mosaic analogy to explain the origin of the constitutional 
trajectory of the European Union also effectively illustrates many of the key features 
of Maistre’s alternative to constituent power that emanates from the multitude. The 
legislator orientates constitutional values. He does not debate, he inspires. At the 
same time, the legislator stands for decision. There is, as Weiler notes, an existential 
quality to the founding moment,252 for whilst teleological development plays its part, 
will and decision are the core aspects of the foundational moment -  and it is upon 
these features that Maistre, in his exposition of the legislator, chooses to dwell. The 
combination of teleology and foundational decision which make up Maistre’s 
Legislator are well suited to describing the establishment of a constitutional form
247 Ibid., p. 5.
248 Ibid. p 6
249 Ibid., p. 7.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid., p. 8.
252 Ibid., p. 7.
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whose emphasis rests upon the unified pursuit of an aim, and whose view of political 
association might be defined by the term universitas.
Conclusion
In his theory of the foundation of political society, Maistre gives an account of the 
phenomenon of constituent power which is antithetical to most modem assumptions 
about the sources and functioning of political authority. His sharp critique of the 
creation myth of the modern state253 highlights the shift in focus in modem political 
philosophy, from the traditional aim of explaining the sequence of politically 
authoritative relations to the desire to justify the coercive powers of political
254institutions.
The tensions between these two conflicting ways of thinking about the constitutional 
order become apparent when considering constituent power; the tensions can be 
articulated in a series of antinomies: between the state of nature and natural society, 
between the social contract and the hierarchical order and between the sovereignty 
of the people and that of a single will. And these tensions are exemplified in the 
contrast between the democratic paradox of Rousseau’s will and the authoritarian 
consistency of Maistre’s model of the legislator.
253 See Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall, 1972).
254 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good”, in The MacIntyre Reader 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 235-252.
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It is important to note the use of the term ‘authoritarian’ in relation to Maistre’s 
views, because certainly one of the implications of Maistre’s constituent model is 
that it is, at the very least, undemocratic. Arguments that validate a teleological 
thesis based on the notion of the Law and not subject to any form of democratic 
check may trouble those familiar with the constitutional history of repressive 
regimes. After all, an irresolvable tension is perhaps what lies at the reasonable 
heart of modem conceptions of democratic society, and efforts to resolve it -  
although destined to fail in their stated aim of reconciling the governors with the 
governed -  bring into ever sharper focus all those political values that we consider 
desirable.
At the same time, it should also be recalled that Maistre’s state, built on imperfect 
foundations (which his belief in original sin entails), does not necessarily aspire to 
the all-encompassing salvational myth of totalitarianism. And in this respect, 
Rousseau’s belief in the perfectibility of man and the notion of the Ideal City has 
just as disturbing implications.255 In contrast to Rousseau’s figure, Maistre’s 
legislator is only part of a constitutional scheme which, in the main, remains deeply 
opposed to any belief that human accomplishment can lead to political perfection.
In the next chapter we will see how, by building on opposition to the constituent 
power of the multitude and the failure of the contract as a metaphor to explain
255 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 80: “It is necessary, in a word, to take from man his own qualities 
to give him powers foreign to him and which he can not use without the help of others. The more his 
natural qualities are either dead or extinguished, the more the acquired ones are strong and lasting, the 
more the also the institution [the State] is solid and perfect”.
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political relations, Maistre’s opposition to the Enlightenment’s accommodation of 
the contradictory values of individual will and rational abstraction is expressed in his 
conception of the constitution as unified Being rather than a positivised, self- 
contained juridical text. Studying this issue will further develop the context of the 
notion of sovereignty in Maistre’s work.
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CHAPTER THREE: MAISTRE AND CONSTITUTIONS
Introduction
The modem constitution is the product of radical early modem contractarian 
thought,1 which found tangible political expression in the form of the American and 
French Revolutions. The idea of the modem constitution positively expresses a 
number of values, amongst them abstraction, rationality, individual autonomy and 
universality. At the same time it suppresses other long-lived and important 
characteristics of the constitutional order: tradition, collectivity, shared identity and a 
sense of political unity. The modem conception embodies an understanding of the 
constitution in legalistic terms, which are isolated from wider political 
considerations.
The idealisation of these positivised principles of the modem constitution has led to 
the development of a one-sided account of the existence and functioning of 
constitutions that does not reflect reality. In one modem commentator’s words, 
“Today, when someone speaks of a nation’s “constitution”, Americans, at least, 
usually think of a written document. They also usually assume that the courts will
1 See Olivier Beaud, “Constitution et Constitutionalisme”, in Dictionnaire de Philosophic Politique, 
ed. Phillipe Raynaud and Stephane Rials (Paris: PUF, 1996), p. 133; G. Stourzh, “Constitution: 
Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early 17th to the late 18th century”, in Conceptual Change 
and the Constitution, ed. T. Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1988), p. 35.
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have the ultimate responsibility for enforcing the constitution”.2 And this view, it 
hardly need be said, is not limited solely to the Constitution of the United States, but 
is prevalent in all countries that possess constitutions written or inspired by the 
draftsmen of the Enlightenment.
Maistre’s view opposes this Enlightenment belief that constitutions are solely 
written documents. He advanced an alternative to what he saw as the pernicious 
nature of these artificial constitutional principles, which he considered incompatible 
with a true understanding of constitutional relations and ultimately destructive of the 
political community. Maistre offers a picture quite different to that painted by 
modem constitutionalism. His work shows up complexities that are an inherent 
part of the functioning of the constitutional regime, but which are all but ignored by 
a narrow mode of thinking which concentrates exclusively on a purely textual 
interpretation of the term ‘constitution’.
Although commentators have criticised Maistre’s writings for being theocratically 
propagandist and lacking in intellectual refinement, in fact his work contains 
complex tensions and irresolutions which allow him to develop his thought on
2 David Strauss, “Constitutions, Written and Otherwise”, in Law and Philosophy ,(2000), 119, No. 4, 
pp 451-464, p. 451.
3 C. H. Mcllwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1940), p. 
24: “In all its successive phases, constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government.. .The most persistent and the most lasting of the essentials of true constitutionalism still 
remains what it has been almost from the beginning, the limitation of government by law”. According 
to the O.E.D., the word constitutionalism was first used in 1832; Harold J. Berman, in Law and 
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1983), asserts that the word was used in the American Revolution; S. B. Chrimes, “The Constitutional 
Ideas of Dr. John Cowell”, in English Historical Review ,(1949),64, pp. 461-487, notes that the 
adjective ‘constitutional’ was a novelty even in the mid-eighteenth century, but that the noun 
‘constitution’, with a modem political connotation, came into use during the debates that led up to the 
English Civil War of 1642.
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constitutions -  a key component of his constitutional thought in general -  with real 
subtlety. Indeed, his entire corpus is suffused with his thinking on the notion of 
constitutions and his private and diplomatic correspondence is also testimony to this 
concern. But it is in the Considerations on France, the Study on Sovereignty and the 
later Generative Principle o f Political Constitutions that he focuses more closely on 
constitutional topics in the narrower, more technical sense of the term. These can be 
seen as the full expression of Maistre’s ideas on the subject: although these works 
were written over a number of years, the ideas they contain remain relatively 
consistent.4
The primary objective of this chapter is thus to explore what Maistre understood by 
the concept of the constitution and to examine some aspects of the modem, liberal 
notion of the term in this light. This will involve a comparative analysis of the 
traditional and modem constitutions, with reference to the work of Edmund Burke 
and the extent of his impact on Maistre. Maistre’s own understanding of the 
constitution will then be discussed in more detail, and two prominent features of this 
structure will be highlighted: first, Maistre’s insistence on the non-written nature of 
constitutions, and second, his emphasis on the impossibility of deliberation in the 
formation of constitutions. This further analysis will give greater insight into
4 For a further account of the historical context of Maistre’s writing on constitutions, see F. Bayle, Les 
Idees Politiques de Joseph de Maistre (Lyon: Imprimerie des Beaux Arts, 1944), p. 48: “The material 
of the Considerations on France is closely linked to the history of revolutionary France; it contains 
the essentials of Maistre’s ideas on constitutions which he will take up again from a more general 
point of view in the Essay on the Generative Principle of Constitutions and in his Study on 
Sovereignty”.
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Maistre’s model and provide a challenging critique of certain aspects of modem
constitutionalism.
Aside from deepening our understanding of the alternatives to understanding the 
constitution in a narrow, textual sense, there is another reason to describe and 
analyse Maistre’s constitutional thought. Vital to Maistre’s own view of the 
constitutional environment is an irresolvable tension between two conceptions of the 
constitution that he himself holds. An examination of this dialectic will develop a 
better understanding of Maistre’s constitutional thought, supporting the argument 
that understanding the issue rests upon accepting two competing constitutional 
considerations, with the effect that we gain a sophisticated and nuanced 
interpretation of the constitution, rather then one that is the product of a simplistic 
and absolutist point of view.5 In order to fulfil all of these related tasks, it is 
necessary to begin by examining the respective features of the textualised, modem 
constitution and the ancient, organic constitution, a task without which, the nature of 
the dispute regarding the essence of a constitution cannot be understood.
5 For a discussion of the dialectical nature of constitutional theory, see Martin Loughlin, 
“Constitutional Theory”, in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2005, 25 (2) pp. 183-202, at p. 194: 
“Underpinning this account will be the argument that these issues [i.e. liberalism and democracy, 
norm and exception, identity and difference, community and cosmopolis] can be adequately 
addressed only when the tensions between the two conceptions of a constitutions are acknowledged 
and constitutional discourse recognized as taking a dialectical form”.
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Two Differing Conceptions of the Constitution
The modem conception -  constitution as foundational text
The radical version of contractualism examined in the last chapter involved the idea 
that the construction of civil society and political power depended upon the will of 
individuals, and of there being free agreement between them.6 In this way, the 
classic doctrine of the social contract embodied the modern idea that political 
authority was immanent rather than transcendent, contingent rather than 
teleological. It considered humans to be a collection of individuals and believed 
that sovereign power must rest on their explicit, individual consent. The state, in a 
radical departure from previous conceptions, was now considered to be the 
expression of the independence and equality of individuals.8
Modern constitutionalism is intimately linked to this view, that political power 
comes from the people and that those who govern are not to be considered as distinct 
from those who are governed.9 From this view flows the need to ensure the 
accountability of the governors to that new political and constitutional entity, the 
people, which in turn inspires the idea that the constitution can take the form of a
6 See Chapter 2 above, p. 59
7 See Atila Ozer, L ’Etat (Paris: G. F. Flammarion, 1998), p. 17.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2001), p.56: “To find a form of association 
which, with all collective force, defends and protects the person and the goods of each associate and 
by which all unite together, only obeying however himself and remaining as free as before”.
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written text -  a logical way to deal with the notion of political authority in the 
absence of traditional and transcendental values.10 Both the American and French 
revolutions demonstrated in practical terms this shift in perceptions of governing 
authority; the concept of a written constitution as the legitimating foundation of state 
power is a modern idea of bourgeois revolutionary origins. And it assumes a highly 
instrumentalised character,11 because the constitution is a document that receives its 
authorisation from the people12 and is envisaged in a positivised legal form: the 
constitutional text itself is a source of fundamental law.13
In an intellectual volte-face, positive law now lays the foundation of the political 
order (rather than the traditional position in which the political grounds the legal) 
and thus the defining characteristic of the modem constitution involves 
understanding it as a supreme juridical norm.14 One result of this mode of 
understanding is that the constitution is envisaged as a juridical technique to limit 
power and guarantee the liberty of an individual.15 In the modem sense, the 
constitution has come to have a narrow meaning: that of a system based upon a
10 Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman, June 24, 1826, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew 
A Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington D.C.: The Memorial Edition, 1903-1904) XVI, 
181-182: “May it [i.e. the Declaration of Independence] be to the world, what I believe it will be...the 
signal of arousing men to burst the chains, under which monkish ignorance and superstition had 
persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessing and security of self government”.
1 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait o f Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), p. 
91.
12 Thomas Paine, “Rights of Man”, in Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Writings, ed. Mark 
Philip (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 122: “A constitution is a thing antecedent to a 
government.. .a government is only the creature of a constitution”.
13 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 49.
14 Beaud, “Constitution et Constitutionalisme”, p. 135: “The constitution is a juridical act superior to
all other edicts by those who govern. It is a ‘fundamental law’”.
15 Ibid.
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written document, enforced by the courts, that primarily works as a means of co- 
coordinating the legislature, executive and judicature.16
One of the problems raised by this conception of the constitution is that, once the 
modem constitutional text is treated as positive law, then the issue of the authority of 
governments becomes problematic, because the modem ideal of the constitution 
does not reflect the practical realities of governing or the political truth of 
constitutional relationships between governors and governed.17 Instead, the 
dominant image the modem constitution provides is one of both governors and 
governed being regulated by a juridical text. This image has generated a significant 
constitutional difficulty, namely, the belief that the solution to inherently political 
problems may be found solely by reference to that text. It is this culture of legalism 
which has made it increasingly difficult to identify and acknowledge the political 
aspects of constitutional arrangements.
The problem of modem constitutionalism is one of, in Oakeshott’s words,
“mistaking the part for the whole”:18 its intense focus on the exclusive validity of the 
norm results in the suppression of any political conception of the constitution. Yet 
to focus solely on the legal norms generated by a text is to treat an effect of 
constitutional discourse as its cause, a situation which has arisen due to the neglect
16 See Scott Gordon, Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 284ff.
17 See, for example, Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, Abeyances and Political 
Temperament in the Maintenance of Government (London: Routledge, 1989).
18 Michael Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), p. 16.
120
in much constitutional theorising since the 19th century of the existence of another 
constitutional model.
The old conception o f the constitution — constitution as political relation
The constitution was once defined very differently to the way it is understood in 
modem/liberal society, and was defined in terms that are specifically excluded by 
the modem juridical conception: as the political identity of a human community.19 
From this perspective, writes Campagna, “The constitution is... a political, concrete 
decision about the manner and form of political existence”.20 The constitution is 
much more than a written charter, and the etymological root of the term, the Latin 
word constitutio, bears this out. The term consitutio originally bore physiological as 
well as legal-political meaning:21 in the physiological sense, it conveyed the idea of 
a state of being, of an organism as a whole, whilst in the legal domain it referred to 
the commission of an authentic act. It is evident that rich conceptual possibilities 
flow from these overlapping meanings, because, in contrast to the modem
19 For examples of the old conception, see The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen 
Everson, trans. Benjamin Jowett and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); Plato, The Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992); 
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975); “James Harrington as Aristotelian”, in Political Theory 7 (1979), 
pp. 371-89; H. J. Bolingbroke, Political Writings, ed. I. Kramnick (Arlington Heights: Harlan 
Davidson, 1970); R. Nisbet, “De Bonald and “The Concept of the Social Group””, in Journal of the 
History of Ideas 5 (1944), pp. 315-31.
20 Norbert Campagna, “Le Droit”, in Le Politique et La Guerre: Deux Chapitres sur la Doctrine de 
Carl Schmitt (Quebec: Les Presses de l ’Universite Laval, 2004), p. 34.
21 See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederic Maitland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 24: “Mankind as a whole, not only the Universal Church and 
the Universal Empire but also every Particular Church and every Particular state and indeed every 
permanent human group is compared to a natural body (corpus naturale et organicum). It is thought 
of and spoken of as a Mystical Body”.
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understanding of constitution, they imbue the term with an organic, rather than 
simply institutional, meaning. In this sense, the constitution regulates the action and 
the life of the state, just as the constitution in a medical sense stands for the life and 
movement of the physical body. Taking the term in this sense, every state -  whether 
it possesses a written constitutional document or not - has a constitution, “because 
all that exists has a manner of existence, good or bad, conforming or not conforming 
with Reason”.22 The constitution in this sense corresponds to the real structure of 
the political organism and not to its idealised, normative pattern.
This way of thinking about constitutions has come to be associated with illiberal 
thought, because the way it privileges the political order and emphasizes the unity of 
a community tends to presuppose the existence of an authority capable of 
maintaining such an order. Far from guaranteeing individual liberties (which are 
upheld by those who propound the normative textual constitution), the old model 
represents the principle of the union of members of a social body, leading to the 
unity of State. The constitution is less a rule of law limiting the powers of governors 
than it is an expression of harmony between the State and members of the political 
community. It is this relation which permits the conservation of the unity of a 
people, and the constitution in this sense thus involves concepts of shared identity, 
collectivity and tradition -  all values which are anathema to those who seek an 
instrumentalised, universalised, textual understanding of the constitution.23
22 P. Rossi, quoted in Beaud, “Constitution et Constitutionalisme”, p. 133.
23 See, for example, Gordon, Controlling the State, p. 361: “The thesis argued in this book is that 
efficient government and constrained government are not incompatible and I have endeavoured to 
show that both objectives have been realised, in practice, in numerous states dating as far back as
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The old conception is nowhere better expressed than in the work of Edmund Burke, 
whose writings have set the tone for much conservative and traditionalist writing on 
the subject, including Maistre’s. For this reason it is worth pausing to examine 
Burke’s views on the constitution in order to assess its influence on traditionalist 
thought in general and on Maistre in particular, before going on to look in greater 
detail at Maistre’s own theories of the constitution.24
Burke's view o f the Constitution
A recurrent theme in Burke’s work on constitutions is an emphasis on the moral and 
political evils that flow from the intrusion of theory into political practice. Burke 
roundly rejects abstract theorisation,25 denouncing “the speculatists of our 
speculating age”.26 For Burke, settled, time honoured, tried-and-tested arrangements
Athens.. .all of them have been modelled on a pluralist distribution of power and the principle of 
countervailance”.
24 For the relationship between Burke and Maistre, see Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments: 
From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 48; Richard Lebrun, 
Joseph de Maistre: An Intellectual Militant (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1988), p. 102, p. 296 n. 143; Michael Fuchs, “Edmund Burke et Joseph de Maistre”, in Revue 
de I’Universite d ’Ottawa 54 (1984), pp. 49-58; Richard Lebrun, “Joseph de Maistre and Edmund 
Burke: A Comparison”, in Joseph de Maistre: Life, Thought and Influence: Selected Studies, ed. R. 
A. Lebrun (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), pp. 3-12; Jean-Pierre 
Cordelier, La Theorie Consitutionelle de Joseph de Maistre (Paris: These de la Faculte de Droit de 
Paris, 1961), p. 72; Jean-Louis Darcel, introduction to Considerations sur la France (Geneva: 
Slatkine, 1980), p. 23.
25 See, for example, Observations on a Late Publication Intituled the Present State of the nation 
(1769) and Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770).
26 The Works of Edmund Burke (hereafter 'Burke’s Works’), 8 Vols. (London: Bohn 1854-89), Vol. 
HI, p. 139.
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are preferable to the uncertainties of speculative projects.27 The constitution of a 
country is not the result of the choices of one generation of people, but is “made by 
the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, disposition and moral, civil and 
social habitudes of the people which disclose themselves only in a long space of 
time”.28 Prescriptive thought, therefore, rather than abstract philosophising is the 
way to establish the authority of the government and determine political obligation.
In place of theory, historical perspective informs Burke’s views of the constitution. 
The State is the result of historical, organic growth and thus is greater than the sum 
of its parts. The constitution -  the collection of relationships which make up society 
-  is made up of mores and customs and all the explicit and implicit rules which 
regulate our social activity.29 It is here, Burke believes, that politics and the 
constitution rest on what he calls opinions or prejudices, which contain the “latent 
wisdom” of “ready application in an emergency”.30
“The congruency of the ensemble” writes Ian Hampsher-Monk, “is for Burke a 
result of piecemeal accommodation by past generations melding the whole
27 David Boucher, “Edmund Burke”, in Political Thinkers from Socrates to the Present, ed. David 
Boucher and Paul Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 372.
28 Burke, Speech on the Reform of Representations, in Select Works of Edmund Burke (1974-8), ed.
E. J. Payne, 4 Vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), Vol. IV, p. 21.
29 “Custom is to be regarded with great deference especially if it be an universal custom; even popular 
notions are not always to be laughed at. There are some general principles operating to produce 
Customs, that is a more sure guide than our Theories. They are followed indeed often on odd 
motives, but that does not make them less reasonable or useful.” Cited in R. R. Fennessy, Burke, 
Paine and the Rights of Man (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 64-65.
30 Burke's Works, Vol. II, p. 359; Boucher, “Edmund Burke”, p. 376.
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together”.31 Although Burke’s conception of the constitution is bound to a 
historical perspective, however, he does not envisage an unchanging, monolithic, 
ancient constitution, but rather an entity which gradually and imperceptibly develops 
over tim e.32 Constitutions certainly must grow, but they are kept both from 
purposeless fluidity and the trauma of violent change by ‘establishments’.33 The 
‘establishments’ of the British constitution supply stability and security, so that, for 
Burke, “Establishment is a verbal noun whose substance is gathered from its 
processes”.34
One of the important constitutional consequences of this is that society is not 
properly subject to rational scrutiny, because the accommodation of practices, 
customs and institutions does not conform to the general laws35 -  rather, the 
direction of human affairs belongs to prudence. Instead of establishing what could 
be the best possible State, he celebrates the genius of a particular constitution -  that 
of Great Britain and it is perhaps fair to say that his political philosophy emerges as 
a conflation of these two vital elements -  the establishments of British constitution 
and the governing principle of prudence.37
31 Ian Hampsher-Monk, “Edmund Burke”, in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, ed. 
David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 51.
32 See J. G. A. Pocock, “Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas”, in 
Politics, Language and Time, Essays in Political Thought and History (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press), p. 202; Burke’s Works Vol. II, p. 435.
33 They are for example, the Church, the landed nobility, the military and the monarchy. See Burke’s 
Works Vol. II, pp. 106, 363, 434).
34 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., “Edmund Burke”, in A History of Political Philosophy, Third Edition, ed. 
Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 699.
35 “We must venerate where we are not presently able to comprehend”. Burke’s Works Vol. El, p 114.
36 Prudence is, “the god of this lower world....it has the entire dominion over every exercise of power 
committed to its hands. “ {Burke’s Works, Vol. n, p. 28), Prudence is “the first of al the virtues, as 
well as the supreme director of them all.” {Burke’s Works Vol. VE, p. 161).
37 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., ’’Edmund Burke”, p. 693.
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Burke’s influence on M aistre
There are several elements of Burke’s constitutional thought which are worth 
highlighting in any discussion of his and Maistre’s work. However, the first point of 
comparison is also one of difference: unlike Maistre, Burke is distinctly distrustful 
of anything overtly authoritarian, and so for Burke a constitution cannot be “the 
effect of a single instantaneous decision”.38 Furthermore, although Burke does not 
believe in democracy as a viable regime,39 he does believe that governing is not in 
essence about ruling; it is, rather, concerned with changing, reforming, balancing or 
adjusting the constitutional mechanism.40 And perhaps because of this aversion to 
constitutionally authoritarian, decisionistic structures, Burke has a dislike of 
theocratic, absolutist models of political thought.41 In order to consolidate his belief 
that a government has ambiguously human origins, he adopts the language of 
contract from modem theorists 42 But for Burke, this contract is one between the 
living, the dead and those still unborn.43 In Burke’s model, the past and future
38 Burke’s Works Vol. II, p. 554.
39 See Burke’s Works Vol. HI, p. 85; V, p. 227. “A perfect democracy is .. .the most shameless thing 
in the world” (Burke’s Works Vol. n, p. 365).
40 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., ’’Edmund Burke”, p. 696.
41 Ibid.
42 Burke’s Works Vol. E, pp. 177-178; VI, p. 21.
43 “Society is indeed a contract... .As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many 
generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who 
are living, those who are dead and those who are to be bom. Each contract of each particular state is 
but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher 
natures, connecting the visible and invisible world” Ibid., Vol E.
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substitute for the divine in order to ensure, “that present government governs with a 
sense of shame.”44
In light of this, it can certainly be seen why the question of Burke’s influence on 
Maistre, superficially so appealing, is a subject of some debate. Indeed, two of the 
most prominent contemporary Anglophone Maistrian scholars, Graeme Garrard and 
Richard Lebrun, have questioned the level of impact that the Anglo-Irishman had 
upon Maistre 45 Lebrun, for instance, points out that although Maistre wrote about 
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France in positive terms, saying “I was 
delighted and I can hardly find words to convey to you the extent to which it 
reinforced my anti-democratic, anti-Gallican ideas”,46 there are otherwise “very few 
references to Burke in Maistre’s published works”: Lebrun goes on to say that “in 
more than 5,000 pages of Maistre’s registers of lectures I have found only four brief 
references to the Reflections” 47 On this basis, Lebrun summarises the relationship 
between the two men in the following terms: “Maistre’s reaction to Burke’s 
reflections is an instinctive acclamation of an emotional revulsion similar to his
48own”, rather than an adoption of Burke’s work as the intellectual basis for his own 
theories -  Burke was a stimulus rather than an influence.
44 Ibid.
45Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments', Richard Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre.
46 OC V 5 T 9, p. 11; see also OC V 1 T 1, p. 321: “Mr Burke has said, with a profundity which it is 
difficult to admire enough, that art is the nature of man”; OC V 4 T 8, p. 71: “would it not be right to 
consider the act of the king as a voluntary abdication following the hypothesis that Mr Burke has so 
ingeniously developed in respect of James II”; OC V 4 T 8, p. 90: “Without doubt this grand patriot, 
this great writer, this famous prophet who foresaw the French Revolution”.
47 Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre, p. 296, n. 143.
48 Ibid., p. 102.
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And yet, Lebrun’s argument is in sharp contrast to Francophone scholarship on the 
same point. Jean-Louis Darcel comments that “it is no exaggeration to say that all 
Joseph de Maistre’s reflection on the revolution rests on the analysis of the great 
English politician”,49 whilst Cordelier devotes a whole section of his book to Burke, 
asking: “Burke first, Maistre afterwards. Do they not belong to the same current of 
ideas?” He goes on: “Burke published his Reflections in 1790 and Maistre his 
Considerations in 1796. Despite one being more political and the other more 
religious, the influence of the first on the second is undeniable”.50
Although Lebrun is correct in asserting that Maistre makes only a handful of 
references to Burke by name in his work, it is difficult not to view this as an overly 
literal, narrow way of assessing the influence of one writer’s work upon another. If 
Maistre’s writing on constitutional themes is taken as a whole, Burkean terms and 
ideas clearly emerge to the extent that it is difficult to deny the terminological 
similarity between the two writers.51 This is not to say that Maistre is merely 
repeating Burke’s theories verbatim, although it is hard not to see Burke’s influence 
at work (and in particular in his interpretation of the constitution as organism), albeit 
modified to fit Maistre’s distinctive cast of thought.
49 Jean-Louis Darcel, “Joseph de Maistre et la Revolution Francaise”, in Revue des Etudes 
Maistriennes 3 (1977), pp. 29-43.
50 Cordelier, La Theorie Consitutionelle, p. 72.
51 On Maistre’s use of the term ‘prejudice’ see below, pp. 137 - 140 On Maistre’s use of the term 
‘establishments’, see OC V 4 T 7, p. 423: “One will be astonished perhaps that a constituted nature 
has no juridical system, but it is necessary to distinguish in the French Republic between the 
establishment and the organisation. An establishment is the work of the constitution and the 
organisation is that of the constituents”.
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Isaiah Berlin adopts a less extreme view than Lebrun, suggesting that “there is little 
doubt that Maistre was in some degree influenced by Burke’s views”,52 but 
expressing the belief that Maistre was not a disciple of Burke, and like “Every 
opponent of the French Revolution drew weapons from that great armoury.”53 What 
they had in common was an opposition to liberation from the interwoven forces of 
tradition, social texture and the inner life of communities and states, “the impalpable 
strands which hold societies together and give them their character and strength”.54 
Berlin goes onto differentiate the two writers by saying that whilst Burke was 
cautious conservative, an advocate of compromise and adjustment, Maistre was 
“addicted to extremes”55 -  specifically, extremes of violence and irrationality.56 
Berlin quotes in full a passage from the Soirees de Saint Petersbourg which 
illustrates “Maistre’s famous, terrible, vision of life. His violent preoccupation with 
blood and death belongs to a world different from the rich and tranquil England of 
Burke’s imagination, from the slow, mature wisdom of the landed gentry”.57
Here Berlin reveals the most significant difference between the two. Maistre’s 
vocabulary -  which is only as extreme in one direction as the general abstract 
rationalism of Enlightenment vocabulary is in another -  confirms him as thinking in 
a different manner to Burke: Maistre was more existentially, more dialectically 
engaged with the discourse of the philosophes, and was thus more modem.
52 Isaiah Berlin, “Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism”, in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity, p. 128.
53 Ibid., p. 129.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 130.
57 Ibid., p. 112.
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Maistre’s talk of altars, of the sacred, and of the divinity of war and sacrifice are the 
necessary correlatives of concepts such as the Rights of Man, Egalite, Fratemite and
fO
Liberte. Maistre’s talk of altars and of the sacred is the antithesis of Paine’s 
pocket-sized constitution only because it is commensurable with it. Maistre clearly 
belongs to a very different world to Burke, as do the revolutionary and 
Enlightenment thinkers, in that their thought is of a programmatic, structured nature 
(of a cosmopolitan character on the part of the philosophes; of a providential 
character on Maistre’s).59 In criticising modernity, Maistre first must have had 
access to its terminology and seen the world through its lens, and because of this his 
work reflects far more readily than do Burke’s the core values of modernity.
Nevertheless, despite the differences between them it is clear that Burke did have an 
influence on Maistre’s work, as is attested by the majority of Maistrian 
commentators. This is particularly apparent in a theme that runs through a major 
strand of Maistre’s writing on constitutions -  that of a refusal to make an ultimate 
determination as to the origins of constitutions. As we move on to examine the 
structure of Maistre’s constitution, we will see how this particular theme is actually 
central to the functioning of the Maistrian constitutional project.
58 See M. Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1974), p. 18.
59 See Pranchere, “Ordre de la Raison, Deraison de l ’Histoire: L’historicisme de Maistre et ses 
Sources Classiques,” in Joseph de Maistre pp. 366-390, p 372: “The modernity of Maistre’s thought 
comes from the fact that it is the place of invention of an historicism which takes history for the 
declaration of the will of God and thus for the ultimate source of norms”.
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The Architecture of the Maistrian Constitution
From the outset it is evident that Maistre shared Burke’s belief that a constitution 
cannot be the product of universalised, abstract reason.60 Maistre consistently 
rejects the Enlightenment constitutional formulation on this basis, and eschews any 
attempt to impose an order on the State which is based solely on the criterion of 
universally applicable philosophical reason.61 He clearly feared that the 
constitutional text might become a global phenomenon (what David Armitage, 
writing of the written American Declaration of Independence, has termed “An event, 
a document, the beginning of a genre”)62 -  like the constitutional texts of the 
American Revolution, those of the French Revolution were are also documents “of 
state-making not of nation formation”.63
Both the American and French texts affirmed “the existence of a population...and 
implied a form of government but.. .did not define a territory”.64 These new 
constitutions were juridical texts capable of mass dissemination, and represented a 
new, instrumentalised conception of society -  of peoples, not territories detached 
from local particularities.65 Here were bold new values of abstraction,
60 OC V 4 T 7, p. 166: “Keep us from extremes, and especially from airy-fairy systems founded 
uniquely upon what is called reason and which is however nothing but reasoning”.
61 OC V 2 T 3, p. 394: “I would never counsel a nation to change its ancient institutions, which are 
always founded on profound reasons”.
62 David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence, A Global History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2007), p. 4.
63 Ibid., p. 17.
64 Ibid., p. 19.
65 Ibid., p. 145; for a list of Declarations of Independence during the period 1776-1993; see p. 4: “The 
authors of the declaration had claimed independence only for themselves and not for others. Their
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cosmopolitanism, replication and uniformity in place of those based on territory, 
unity and tradition, and it was these new formulations which Maistre was to attack in 
unequivocal terms: “A constitution made for all nations is made for no-one, it is a 
pure abstraction”.66
The correlative of this position, according to Maistre, is a firm belief that 
constitutions should be particularised to suit the circumstances of a nation: “It has 
already been seen that it should never be asked what the best type of government is 
in general because there is not one which will suit all of the people, each nation has 
its own”.67 This results in a theory which at times approaches the utilitarian: “What 
is the constitution?” Maistre asks, “Given the population, the morals, the religion, 
the geographical situation... [is it not] to find the laws which suit it?” There is no 
abstract political ideal to which a nation should aspire; instead, Maistre aims to 
identify and assess the character of actually existing constitutional arrangements, a 
feature of his thought which makes him much more a constitutional thinker than a 
political theorist.69
specific and particular idea of independence would nonetheless assume near- universal significance in 
the centuries after 1776 as the American example spread across the world”.
66 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 74-75: “But a constitution which is made for all nations is made for no-one: it is a 
pure abstraction, a work of scholarship done to exercise the mind according to a hypothetical ideal 
and which must be applied to man in the imaginary spaces which he inhabits.”
67 Ibid., p. 489: “One must never ask what is the best government in general because there is not one 
which suits all peoples. Each nation has its own as it has its language and its character and this 
government is the best for it”.
8 Ibid., p. 75. See also Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 351: “The people that is the best constituted is 
that which is best governed”
69 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 279-280: “May a formal abuse, a vice be constitutional? Yes, without doubt, for 
every political constitution has essential defaults which attach to its nature and which it is impossible 
to separate from it”.
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Maistre opposes the Enlightenment view of man as a generic category because 
‘man’ is a meaningless term outside of a specific context of tradition and history. A 
constitution made for all men is a pure abstraction”.70 In accordance with this fact, 
and emphasising his anti-instrumentalist stance, Maistre believes that it is impossible 
to create constitutions in an a priori manner: nothing made by humans can last, and 
so governments cannot construct a nation as if following a blueprint. “Will one say 
that the government makes the morals? I deny it. It is, on the contrary, morals 
which make the government...the first impulse; the generative impulse comes 
always from the morals and from the national character.”71
Maistre’s repudiation of Enlightenment a priori thinking is crystallised in his 
criticism of Thomas Paine, whose ‘evil book’ Maistre condemns. “There never has 
been, there never will be, and there cannot be a nation constituted a priori. Reason 
and experience unite to establish this real truth. What eye is capable of taking in at 
once the collection of circumstances which must give an individual such and such a 
constitution?”72 What Paine believes to be a fault is in fact a law of nature; the
70 O C V  l T l , p .  74.
71 Ibid., p. 205: “Does one say that the government makes the mores? I expressly deny it. It is the 
mores, on the contrary, that make governments...the first impulse, the generative principle, always 
comes from mores and from the national character”. See also Ibid., p. 344: “One of the greatest 
errors of this century is to believe that the political constitution of the people is a purely human work; 
that one may make a constitution as a watchmaker makes a watch”.
72 Ibid., p. 369. See also, OC V 6 T 11, p. 408: “The greatest folly of this century is that of 
constitutions. Men are not happy until they have been able to make a constitution as one makes a 
machine. The French, for their part, have made seven or eight in less than twenty years... but it has 
all ended up in an iron despotism in place of the admirable and gentle monarchy in which they used 
to rejoice”.
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natural constitution of a nation is always anterior to its written constitution and can 
dispense with it.73
Given this absolute rejection of the a priori position, the question arises as to how a 
constitution can be defined. Maistre actually gives several definitions of a 
constitution, at different times, in order to illustrate different facets of his 
argument.74 He also provides one or two keystone definitions upon which his theory 
rests. Chief amongst these is the following formulation, which encapsulates the 
essence of the Maistrian constitution:
A constitution in the philosophical sense is nothing other than the mode of 
political existence attributed to each nation by a power above it: and in an 
inferior sense, a constitution is nothing other than the collection of 
laws...which declare this mode of existence.75
A number of questions spring immediately from this statement, and particularly
7 f \from the idea that the constitution is a mode of political existence. What is meant 
by ‘political existence’, and what does the term ‘nation’ signify in his constitutional 
thought? How do the inferior and superior definitions relate to each other? In order
73 O C V  1 T 1, p. 373.
74 For example OC V 1 T 1, p. 81: “The constitution is the collection of fundamental laws which suit 
a nation and which should give it such and such a force of government”; ibid., p. 89: “What is the 
French constitution? It is that which you feel when you are in France, a mix of freedom and 
authority, laws and opinions”.
75 Ibid., p. 369.
76 Ibid., p. 216: “A political code is a whole, a general system of corresponding parts”; Ibid., p. 352: 
“From this it follows that a free constitution is only assured when the different pieces of the political 
edifice are bom together and next to one another”.
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to obtain answers to these questions it is necessary to explore the varied implications 
of the statement in greater detail.
One of the consequences of Maistre’s denial of the existence of a state of nature 
concerns the importance of the notion of community to his constitutional thinking.77 
According to Maistre, because man is never isolated he must always be in a 
community of one form or another; at all the different levels of human association,78 
and in terms of the constitutional structure of those associations, the most important 
unit is, first, that of the people and, second, that of the nation. “What is a people?” 
asks Maistre rhetorically -  “There is a people, a civilisation of some sort and a 
sovereign as soon as men meet”.79 The word ‘people’ is thus a relative term which
OA
can in no way be separated from the idea of sovereignty. The idea of a people 
contains the idea of “an aggregation around a common centre and without a
o 1
sovereign one may not be a community or a political unit”.
Crucial to any constitutional discussion, therefore, is the idea of communal unity, 
and the formation of the people is inextricably linked with political existence, one of
77 OCV 1 T 1, p. 317.
78 For Maistre, the family plays a significant proto-constitutional role. See OC V 1 T 1, p. 316: “Thus 
there were only families, and these families, disseminated in this way, were, individually or by their 
future reunion, still only embryos of peoples”. See also OC V 1 T 1, p. 323: “The first man was king 
of his children, each single family was governed in the same manner”. In this respect, note Maistre’s 
similarity with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church: see Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church, Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 1 lOff.
79 OCV IT  1, p. 324.
80 Ibid. It is interesting to note Christophe Boutin’s observation in “Le Caractere National chez Joseph 
de Maistre: Patriotisme Contre Identite Juridique” in Joseph de Maistre, ed. Barthelet, pp. 457-462 at 
p. 458 “One may ask if there is not, in Maistre’s work, a simple transfer of the notion of the contract, 
moving from a transition between equal individuals and society, to that existing between tribes and 
the State”.
81 OCV 1 T 1, p. 324.
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the requisites of Maistre’s definition of a constitution.82 The transformation that 
occurs as the people become a nation is the development of a national 
consciousness, which lends a degree of cohesion and distinctiveness to the people: in 
Maistre’s terms, this is the point at which the people acquire a soul. “Nations have a 
general soul and a true moral unity which makes them what they are”,83 he says, and 
although this national soul depends partly upon purely physical elements (i.e. the 
physical aggregation of the people into recognisable groups), it is not only of a 
material nature. The character, opinions and especially the language of the nation 
constitute its unity in the moral order.84
It is these physical and moral characteristics which help to form the identity of a 
nation, and which give birth to a particular form of the state -  a specific constitution, 
an organisation of powers which naturally suits a people. This supersedes the 
concept of sovereignty alone (which Maistre conceives as being the relationship 
between authority and obedience which necessarily exists in any state).85 It is this 
character of the nation which is the true constitution of the State, and it is this 
character which regulates the constitution.86 But how is this character, this national 
identity, expressed?
82 See Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 36: “From Schmitt’s perspective, it is only through the 
establishment of a state that a group of people within a certain territory becomes ‘a pacified unity 
encompassing the political’”.
83 O C V  l T l , p .  325.
84 Ibid.; see also p. 329, and see Boutin, in Joseph de Maistre, ed. Barthelet, p. 459: “We recall that, 
in effect, for our author, a nation’s worth on the international scene is that which its language is 
worth, and that the pre-eminent place of France in Europe is due to the French language more than to 
the French”.
85 OCV 1 T l ,p.  328.
86 Ibid., p. 351.
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For Maistre, it cannot occur as the result of rational human analysis, and it is not the
07
result of a single cause; neither can individual opinion define how it is constituted. 
As man cannot create anything, it must be brought into existence and administered 
by other means. It is here that Maistre uses the ostensibly Burkean device of 
prejudice in formulating the foundational idea that the constitution is an expression 
of the national soul. Prejudice , in the Burkean sense, did not have the pejorative 
connotation that it has today. If prejudices are formed as a result of familiarity with 
social practices over long periods of time, or an inherited tradition, they may be well 
founded. Individual reason is notoriously fallible and a very poor test against which 
to measure the efficacy of established institutions. We cherish that which we have 
inherited, and cherish it all the more the longer its lineage, knowing that it embodies 
the collective wisdom of the ages or nation. Prejudice is superior to individual
00
reason because it embraces not only reason, but also emotions and sentiment.
This is a view wholeheartedly adopted by Maistre. There are, he says, “nothing more 
important than prejudices”, which are “any opinion adopted before all 
examination.”89 The true character of a government is formed by these prejudices. 
They are the most sacred and ancient of laws.90 They are the constitutional antidote
87 Ibid., p. 375.
88 See Boucher, “Edmund Burke”, p. 376.
89 OCV l , T l , p .  375.
90 OC V 4 T 7, p. 154. Ibid., p. 154: “...all governments are the result of a tacit convention of united 
men, and the real expression of their assent is founded on their character and innumerable 
circumstances”. This is the nearest Maistre comes, in his discussion of prejudices, to using the 
metaphor of the contract in quasi-Burkean terms.
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to abstract rationality: “Man has need of prejudices or practical rules, of sensible 
ideas, material, palpable. One will go nowhere with syllogisms”.91
But there is an important difference in their application of the prejudice, for Maistre 
is more systematic than Burke in his treatment of the concept. His thought 
continually asserts the need for some form of hierarchic control:
Human reason reduced to its individual forces is useless, not only for 
creating but also for conserving all religious or political association, because 
it only produces disputes and man, to direct himself, has not need of 
problems but of beliefs. His cradle must be surrounded by dogma and when 
his reason wakes up, it is necessary that he find all his opinions already 
formed...there is nothing more important for him than prejudices.92
Maistre believes that religious and political dogma should be combined to form the 
faculty of national reason, a category of community-aligned thought, “strong enough 
to suppress the aberration of individual reason, which is by its nature the mortal 
enemy of any association because it produces nothing but divergent opinion” 93 For 
Maistre this is thus the pinnacle of constitutional achievement: to achieve unity, a 
communal measure that even encompasses thought. In Maistre’s view, correct 
constitutional relations are to be achieved through obedience to national reason,
91 OC V 4 T 7, p. 166.
92 OCV l T l , p p .  375-376.
93 Ibid., p. 376.
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through the denial of individual dogma and the acceptance of “the absolute reign of 
national dogma, which is to say prejudices”.94
In mixing the religious and the political, as he does, for example, in his formation of 
the national reason,95 Maistre generates an indeterminacy which makes it difficult to 
determine the limits or identity of ultimate authority in his constitutional order. 
“Government, “he comments, “is really a religion -  it has dogmas, mysteries. It is 
only this by national reason, which is to say by political faith, which is a symbol”.96 
Here, Maistre could not be further from Burke in portraying the constitutional 
community as commensurate with a religious one. But it is not necessary to take 
him literally: Maistre understands the power of analogy and metaphor, and the 
references to religion may be interpreted as a comment on the political, a fact which 
Maistre recognises when he states: “As in religion, where there is a point where faith
Q7
must be blind, there is likewise in politics a point where there must be obedience”. 
The importance of this remark for the continued existence of the constitution is 
picked up on by Philippe Benton, who comments that “in Maistre’s eyes a society 
which has lost that which is impenetrable is perpetually menaced with dissolution”.98
This adherence of the subject to national reason, this political faith, is evoked in 
Maistre’s use of the term patriotisme, which he defines as the national reason of 
which he has spoken. It is the abnegation of the individual. “Faith and patriotism
94 Ibid., p. 376.
95 Ibid., p. 356; p. 409.
96 Ibid., p. 376
97 Cited in Christophe Boutin, “Le caractere ‘nationale’ chez Joseph de Maistre”, p. 461.
98 Philippe Benton, cited in Christophe Boutin, ibid.
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are the two great thaumaturges of the world”, says Maistre: “both are divine; all their 
actions are prodigious”.99 Once again the ambiguity between sacredness and 
political authority becomes apparent, for Maistre goes on to say that any institution 
is a political edifice. Recalling Bodin,100 he comments that a great building cannot 
be set on narrow foundations. If, in the political order, one wishes to build 
something on a grand scale, something that will last for centuries, then one must 
rest one’s work on a great and profound belief, and if one searches for the bases of 
all possible institutions “of the first or second order” then one always finds religion 
and patriotism.101
Although Maistre’s conclusions are starkly radical, one of his traits as a thinker is 
his ability to weave strands of traditional and conservative thought into an altogether 
more modem and reactionary garment; here, in developing this model of the 
constitution -  one based upon prejudice, character and opinion, institutions and 
irrational, obscured bases -  Maistre clearly shows a Burkean influence. In 
particular, in a number of passages Maistre puts forward the view that, since the 
wisdom contained in institutions is not based on abstract reason, it cannot be reduced 
to first principles that can be clearly enunciated or shown to be the cause of a 
particular institution.
99 O C V  IT  l ,p.  377.
100Jean Bodin, The SixBookes of a Commonweale, trans. Richard Knowles, ed. Kenneth Douglas 
McRae (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 517: “Hard it is for high and stately 
buildings long to stand, except they be upholden and staid by most strong shores, and rest upon most 
sure foundations”.
101 O C V  1 T 1, pp. 408-409.
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This is highly reminiscent of Burke’s desire to encase the origins of the constitution 
in the immemorial mists of tradition and time. According to Maistre, the 
constitution “is the work of circumstance and the number of circumstances is
109infinite.” The true roots of government have always existed, and it is impossible 
to show their origins “for the simple reason that they are as old as the nations and, 
not being the result of an accord, there remains no trace of a convention”.103 No 
important and truly constitutional institution ever establishes anything new: it only 
defends and declares anterior rights,104 which are “good customs, good because they 
are not written and because one cannot assign to them neither commencement nor 
author”.105
Ernst Cassirer, quoting Maistre, sees in this imemorializing of the origins of the state 
two features of romantic thought which emerged in reaction to the Enlightenment.106 
The first was a new interest in history; the second was a new conception and 
valuation of myth.107 And yet Maistre did not intend to poeticise political 
experience in the way that, say, the archetypal romantic Schelling does.108 Instead, 
he sought to establish two principles of a primarily political nature:109 first, by 
ascribing immemoriality to the constitution Maistre believed that the constitutional
102 O C V  1 T 1, p. 246; see also Archives cote 2J 15-18 JP 159.
103 O C V  l T l , p .  347.
104 Ibid., pp. 347-348.
105 Ibid., pp. 373-374.
106 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 180.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 183.
109 An interesting perspective on this is given by Schmitt in Political Theology, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 37: “What we immediately recognise in them 
[i.e. Bonald, Maistre and Cortes] is a conceptually clear and systematic analogy and not merely that 
kind of playing with ideas, whether mystical, natural-philosophical or even romantic, which as with 
everything else yields colourful symbols and pictures”.
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community would be endowed with the facility to grow and adapt through of its 
various traditions and institutions; second, by reaffirming the conceit that the 
constitution had no ultimate origin he was able to deny that individual reason had 
any responsibility for the process. Ambiguity about origins prevents reason from 
claiming responsibility for the principles upon which the process is based.110 
Maistre’s denial of constitutional origins was thus a technique designed to assert the 
importance of tradition, in the interests of upholding a set of clearly defined 
hierarchical values.
Extra-legal governmental action
Understanding the constitution in this way -  i.e. in terms of institutions, nations, 
peoples, patriotism and all the components of immemorial tradition -  brings to the 
fore the fact that it is constructed of concrete (i.e. political) relations.111 This is a 
strong denial of the Enlightenment belief in the possibility of the existence of 
abstract textual constitutions that contain a number of norms uniformly applicable to 
mankind. For Maistre, the constitution has nothing to do with ideal forms that can 
fit every possible event or predicament perfectly and which can, if applied diligently, 
negate any need for the messy business of politics and the even more messy business 
of ruling.
110 J. G. A. Pocock, “Burke and the Ancient Constitution”, p. 203.
111 O C V l T l . p .  374.
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For Maistre, the constitution is vital and real, the very opposite of the Enlightenment 
process by which sovereign authority is decommissioned and the advent of the rule 
of rules is commenced.112 It is a place neither of perfection nor of uniformity: two 
elements which help constitute modem rationalism113. Maistre would concur with 
Michael Oakeshott that constitutions and constitutional theory cannot be “the 
diligent search...for an innocuous power which may safely be made so great as to be 
able to control all other powers in the human world.”114 For Maistre, the 
constitution is ambiguous, contentious and full of the possibility for discretionary 
action.
In his essay, Oakeshott identifies two types of knowledge -  the technical and the 
practical -  which then define two corresponding types of constitution. Technical 
knowledge involves the formulation of rules, principles and maxims. It gives the 
appearance of certainty and, significantly, can be learned from a book.115 Practical 
knowledge, on the other hand, cannot be formulated by rules: it exists only in use; it 
is not reflective. Its way is not that of formulated doctrine, and because of this 
Oakeshott calls it “traditional knowledge” -  i.e. knowledge without which the
112 Loughlin, “Constitutional Theory”, p. 14: “The liberal ideal is that of the institutionalisation and 
the realisation of ‘the normative state.’ This aims at the elimination of the figure of the sovereign so 
that there will be no ultimate law-giver, but only the rule of laws”.
113 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, p. 9.
114 Ibid., p. 11.
115 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, p. 12; also see OC V. 4 T 7, p. 38: “When a child is given 
one of its toys which has moving parts, something which it cannot explain, a set of internal workings, 
after playing with it for a moment, breaks it see what is inside. This is how the French have treated 
their government. They have wanted to look inside. They have decided to discover political 
principles, they have opened the eyes of the masses to objects which it is never advisable to examine 
without first reflecting that there are things that are destroyed when brought to light.
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mastery of any skill is impossible.116 Traditional knowledge leads to the true 
understanding of any activity, an understanding gained both from experience and 
from the subtle nuances of practice, and which imbues these activities with meaning. 
Both Maistre and Oakeshott share a language in identifying the importance of this 
type of knowledge to the activity of governing: “As there is always something in 
music which is not possible to write down, in the same way in all governments there 
is something which is not possible to write”.117
Enlightenment and revolutionary constitutions, in Maistre’s view, are devoid of this 
practical, traditional element; the seeming self-completedness of any written
110
constitution is illusory. Translated into specifically constitutional terms, Maistre 
believes that for practical, prudential reasons the juridified constitution cannot stand 
apart from the well-spring of tradition and political context that supports it and 
nurtures it. In illustrating this point, he begins by examining the constitution of 
Ancient Rome. ‘The compilers of the Roman Constitution have thrown, into the 
first chapter of their collection a fragment of really remarkable Greek jurisprudence. 
Among the laws which govern us, says the passage, some are written whilst others 
are not. Nothing simpler and nothing more profound”.119
The point is re-stated: “Does one know of any Turkish law which expressly allows a 
sovereign immediately to send a man to his death without the intermediary decision
116 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, p. 12.
117 O C V  4 T 7, p. 153.
118 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, p. 17.
119 O C V  1 T 1, p. 238.
144
of a tribunal? Does one know of any written law, including religious, which 
prevents the Christian sovereigns of Europe from doing so?”120 And yet, Maistre 
thinks, this is the case. Likewise, in examining the history of the Roman Senate, it is 
possible to believe that it would have been better if the powers of populace and 
senate had been written down, “but this would be very wrong, laws like this, forever 
endangered by unforeseen cases and unlikely exception would not have lasted six 
months or would have toppled the republic”.121 Here once more is an example of the 
impossibility of the technical being entirely self-sufficient.
Maistre goes on to give several examples “nearer to us”, i.e. from the constitution of 
England, to further develop this idea:122 “If it [i.e. the English constitution] is 
examined closely, it can be seen that it works only by not working (if this play on 
words is excused.”123 He uses the example of Habeas Corpus, which “has been 
suspended so often and for such long periods that it could be argued that the 
exception has become the rule.”124 If the authors of the act had attempted to lay 
down the circumstances in which it could have been suspended, they would have 
destroyed it.125 As for the Privy Council, it is “a body that the constitution does not
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. p. 240,
122 OC V 1 T 1, p. 246 -  Maistre considers the English Constitution in the following terms: “The 
Constitution is the work of circumstance and the number of circumstances is infinite. The Roman 
laws, the ecclesiastical laws, the feudal laws, Saxon, Norman and Danish customs, the privileges, 
prejudices and pretensions of all classes; wars, revolts, revolutions; the conquest; the crusades; all the 
virtues, all the vices, all the knowledge all the mistakes, all passions, all elements, finally acting 
together and forming by their mixture and the reciprocal action of the combinations multiplied by 
myriads of million has produced, finally, after several centuries, the most complicated unity and the 
most beautiful balance of forces that one has ever seen in the world”.
123 Ibid., p. 240.
124 Ibid.: “Habeas Corpus, for example, has been suspended so often and for such a long time that one 
must doubt if the exception had not become the rule”.
125 Ibid.
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know. I f , though, one were to make a law to give a constitutional existence to the 
Privy Council and to regulate and vigorously circumscribe its privileges and its 
attributes with precautions necessary to limits its influence and to prevent it from
10f\abuses, one would overthrow the state”.
In this, Maistre advances a clear understanding of the necessity for the practical as 
well as the technical in the functioning of the constitution and iterates a basic law of 
political necessity: rulers must be able to take action to ensure that dissension and 
conflict are managed effectively outside of the proceduralised, juridified sphere of 
the textual constitution. Maistre’s views on the constitution reflect a reality: “It is 
always necessary to leave something to the arbitrary...it is always necessary that 
there is, independent of legal force, an administrative power which is liberated from
127
the forms and which can act vigorously on a host of occasions”. These words are 
an acknowledgement that to act constitutionally is not necessarily to act legally. 
They contain an understanding that the constitution is not entirely constructed of 
positivised norms, and that political power cannot be entirely institutionalised. This 
is, in effect, an acknowledgment of the role of Reason of State, which has been 
defined by Carl Schmitt as the exception to normative constitutional rules.128 
Maistre is clear that there are certain problems for which no legal-institutional 
solution is available.129
126 Ibid., p. 241.
127 OCW  4 T  7, pp. 147-148.
128 See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, States of Exception, trans. Kevin Attel (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005).
129 OC V 1 T 1, p. 447: “That which is truly constitutional in government is absolutely not that which 
is written down on paper”.
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His insistence on the pre-eminence of the material and political over the normative is 
re-enforced throughout his writing by the extraordinary emphasis he places on the 
necessity of constitutionally significant institutions remaining unwritten: for Maistre, 
the positivised law pertaining to the State is completely dependent on the structure 
of the material, political constitution.130 Thus the most fertile constitutional 
concepts and institutions -  the constitution’s prejudices, fundamental laws and sense 
of national reason -  are unwritten. In view of this fact, the substance of Maistre’s 
dislike of the written word, which forms such a distinctive part of his constitutional 
thought, needs to be examined in further detail.
The unwritten nature o f the Maistrian constitution
For Maistre, the written text sums up the paradox of Enlightenment values: it is at 
once too vague and too individualistic. On the one hand, Maistre rejects the 
philosophic abstraction, whilst on the other he refutes the possibility that man’s puny 
individual reason can construct anything of worth. As constitutions represent rather 
than dictate the character of nations, he maintains, they are in no need of being 
written in order to be valid. This position is put forward with some forthrightness: 
“No truly fundamental and constitutional law may be written”.131 These fundamental
130 Archives CD 18 JP 330 / 331: “The fundamental laws are never written, however they are the 
basis of the written laws so that when one interferes with the first, the state falls like a building whose 
foundation has been destroyed”.
131 OCV 6 T 12, pp. 58-59.
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and constitutional laws have a character of “holiness and immutability”;132 there is 
no doubt that this understanding of a category of fundamental laws is of some 
importance to the Maistrian constitutional settlement and in particular to the 
prohibition on writing in the constitution.
What Maistre means by ‘fundamental law’ is more than merely a law or convention 
which appears to have particular political importance to certain individuals or 
groups.133 For Maistre, a fundamental law is an intangible norm from which it is not 
possible to derogate.134 It is also, in a more profound sense, a principle of political 
unity and order. It is an expression of the notion of the material constitution as Being
135in contrast to the instrumentalised Enlightenment view of the constitution. As an 
example, Maistre cites the Salic law, which, though unwritten, was nonetheless a 
constitutional law adopted by the French monarchy.136 That which applies to the 
Salic law applies to all fundamental laws: they are the “assembly of mother ideas 
and political axioms that the entire nation regards as incontestable truths”.137
Rousseau had commented that, like the Spartans under Lycurgus, “the true 
constitution of the state” was “engraved in the hearts of citizens”, and formed by
132 OCV 1 T l .p.  236
133 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, trans. into French as Theorie de la Constitution by Lilyane 
Deroche (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 173.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.; see also p. 174: ‘These different senses combine together most often in different ways and 
one may emphasise or privilege different aspects -  intangibility, unity, order, character of a principle, 
restrictive function, etc. In general, one may say that the notion becomes relativised and pluralistic 
from the point at which consciousness of political existence dissolves”.
136 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 235-236.: “ It has often been thought that one can play an excellent joke on the 
French by asking them in which book the Salic law was written, but Jerome Bignon answered 
strongly on this subejct.. .that it was written in the hearts of the French”.
137 Maistre, Cinquieme Lettre d ’un Royalist Savoisien, p. 67, ed. J. L. Darcel”, Revue des Etudes 
Maistriennes 4 (1978).
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“mores, customs and especially opinions”. Rousseau concluded that a state is more 
‘vicious’ when it has laws, because, “the multitude of the laws announce that they 
are without vigour”;138 Maistre joins in with this praise for the Spartan constitution 
and extends Rousseau’s argument, adding that it is not only the number of laws but 
the very fact of fixing them down in writing which is a sign of the ill-health of the 
political body.139
Fundamental laws should never be written, because when it has become necessary to 
articulate them in a text they are clearly no longer fully effective in themselves, and 
no longer sustain the “public spirit” which for Maistre is synonymous with the 
constitution140. The necessity of writing down the constitution only emerges when 
its existence is in danger and its precepts no longer internalised by members of the 
constitutional community; in other words, says Maistre, “The more that one writes, 
the more the constitution is weak”.141
What, then, would be the effect of a constitution in which all the laws were 
exhaustively written down? It would be moribund for two reasons. First, because a 
law needs to be written down only when it is no longer spontaneously respected, a 
completely written constitution would demonstrate, by the mere fact of its having 
been written down, its total lack of worth. It could and would be contested.142
138 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Bk. n, Ch. 12, p. 94. On Rousseau and Maistre’s praise of Sparta, 
see P. Vidal-Naquet, La Democratic Grecque vue d ’Ailleurs (Paris, Flammarion, 1990), p. 161 ff.
139 OCV 1 T l ,p.  370.
140 Ibid.
141 OCW  1 T 1, p. 69.
142 See Jean-Yves Pranchere, L ’Autorite Contre les Lumieres, p. 169.
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Second, an entirely written constitution would be one which was entirely fixed; it 
would thus be the opposite of a living constitution and so be incapable of following 
the changes of political circumstance. A legitimate constitution cannot be written 
because it must be able to evolve; given that the national constitution is equivalent to 
the character of the people, it is subject to change: “a thousand events may change 
the relationship of a people”.143 And the unforeseeability of these events means that 
it would be harmful to attempt to encapsulate the constitution in writing -  it would 
result in what Oakeshott has called the “orderliness of the graveyard”.144 As Maistre 
puts it, “No great and true institution should be founded on a written law, because 
men, themselves instruments of the establishment, do not know what they must 
become”.145
Stephen Holmes also draws attention to Maistre’s valorisation of verbal rather than 
written discourse, but does so as part of a wholesale disparagement of Maistre, who, 
according to Holmes, is “exceptionally fond of the argument advanced in Plato’s 
Phaedrus that speaking is superior to writing because speakers can be more selective 
than writers about the recipients of their communications”.146 This observation 
unfortunately seems to have more to do with Holmes’ desire to align Maistre with 
Leo Strauss rather than with any desire for interpretive accuracy.147 Maistre’s
143 O C V  1 T 1, p. 328.
144Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, ed. Timothy Fuller (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 94.
145 O C V  1 T l ,p.  259.
146 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 21.
147 Ibid.: “Indeed, Maistre makes it possible, for the first time, to see how Schmitt and Strauss, 
decisionism and esotericism, may be combined in a single theory”.
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argument is not, ultimately, an esoteric trifle, it is a serious intellectual position that 
continues to have relevance in the constitutional debate.
The first reason why Maistre prefers the spoken word is linked to one of the original 
meanings of consitutio -  speech, like the constitution, is an authentic act. For 
Maistre, the spoken word is fact and the written word only an approximation of 
reality, and is lacking in true authenticity. Referring to Plato, Maistre comments that:
Speech [...] is to writing as a man is to his portrait. The products of the 
painting appear alive to us, but if they are questioned they keep their silence 
with dignity. It is the same with writing, which knows not what must be 
revealed to a man nor what it must hide from another. If one goes to attack it 
without reason it cannot defend itself because its father is never there to help 
it. Thus, he who imagines that he can establish a clear and durable doctrine 
by writing alone is a great fool.148
According to Maistre, Christian tradition offers the same lesson as that of P lato .149 
It is a tradition in which the fundamental epistemological question concerns what 
something means rather than how it works, of Being rather than function, and this is 
reflected in the importance to Christian intellectual development of the spoken word. 
The Greek term logos, for example, which is critical to the central tenets of Christian
148 O C V  l T l , p .  255.
149 Ibid., pp. 248-249.
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dogma, can be translated most accurately as speech rather than word.150 From this it 
follows that speech has creative qualities; it possesses a social dimension and 
dynamism. For Maistre it is this combination of qualities -  its identification with 
Being, its centrality as a communication tool and its capacity to aid creativity -  that 
nourishes the constitutional environment. It is logos, the word, and not the text that 
can be transmitted through the generations and so has qualities of permanence and 
veracity. For Maistre, the power of the spoken word comes from the fact that things 
(including constitutions) exist and are known before they are written.151
It is a sign of the enduring conflict between Maistre’s position and that of liberal 
constitutionalists that a recent commentator, Jed Rubenfeld, writing in the late 20th
century,152 addresses the same concerns. He writes: “The capacity of humans to
1relate to themselves over time has a condition: the capacity to write”. This 
statement is emblematic of the text-focused instrumentalism of constitutionalism, 
which is unable to see beyond the positivised, and which demonstrates its lack of 
awareness of the verbal mode of self-relation within different cultures during 
different epochs -  a mode which has allowed texts as diverse as the Homeric epics, 
the Koran, or the oral histories of countless indigenous peoples to be transmitted, 
and thus allowed these cultures to sustain a cohesive societal self-awareness.154
150 Edward Norman, The Roman Catholic Church (London: Thames and Hudson, 2007), p. 35.
151 O C V  1 T 1, pp. 247-248:
152 Rubenfeld, “Legitimacy and Interpretation”, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. 
Larry Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 194-234.
153 Ibid., p. 214.
154 For a discussion of the contrast between American and European post-Enlightenment 
constitutionalism and other cultures see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an 
Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
152
This process of detaching constitutional issues from any cultural context exemplifies 
the imperialistic, machine-like characteristics of Enlightenment thought that Maistre 
detested.155 Rubenfeld goes on to say, “The first freedom of self-governing people 
is not.. .the freedom of speech. It is the freedom to write; to give oneself a text.” 
Maistre would undoubtedly have viewed the provision of a codified constitutional 
text less as source of liberation and more as a form of ideological imprisonment. For 
one consequence of narrowing the constitutional focus so that the text is the only 
object worthy of consideration is the avoidance of any discussion of the origins and 
legitimacy of the constitution as a non-juristic problem. Maistre’s view is that, far 
from being a hermetically sealed system of norms, the constitution is open to the 
inevitable conflicts and compromises that take place within a constitutional (which 
is to say national) community. He recognises that the interpretation of the 
fundamental provisions of a constitution involve inescapably political assumptions.
Any attempt to generate a pure theory of law based on text and eliminating politics 
is a meaningless exercise. This normative conception of the constitution is 
particularly erroneous if it fails to refer to an extra-legal political agent.156 The 
constitutionalist response to this is to ignore the crux of the debate and instead to 
transform the non-legal founding factual situation into a norm.157 But in this case,
155 Tully speaks of this phenomenon as the “empire of uniformity” (p. 58).
156 For a discussion of a similar point with reference to Carl Schmitt, see Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 
pp. 80-115.
7 See, for example, H. Kelsen, “Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law”, in Stanford Law 
Review 17 (1965), pp. 1128-1157. “In my essay “On the Basic Norm” I formulated the question 
which leads to the assumption of the basic norm as follows: “If we ask for the reason of the validity 
of a positive legal order, since it is a peculiarity of law that it regulates its own creation and a legal 
norm is valid if it is created in a way determined by another legal norm, the basic mom is the ultimate 
reason for the validity of the legal order because it authorises the historically first legislator”.
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the constitutional text cannot be authenticated by anything above or behind it, so the 
basic norm must remain hypothetical.158 The result is that hard questions of 
legitimacy, authority and the nature of the transformation of the political into the 
normative are simply ignored, a stance which Maistre’s work opposes: a constitution 
must have a foundation in a political will that precedes it.
This is not to say that Maistre does not see the uses of written constitutions. The act 
of defining the rules of political conduct establishes clear principles and focuses the 
nature of the relationship between subject, or citizen and the State, and can aid in 
controlling political practices. In this sense, the written constitution can be a useful 
aid to the “activity of statecraft”.159 As Maistre writes:
All these constitutions are vain attempts because it is a capital axiom . . .  that 
each nation has the government that it deserves, thus all that one can do for a 
nation... means nothing, has no effect, it only produces evil. But if one 
considers these constitutions as proper political measures to calm, to lead, to 
satisfy, to distract, even to mislead the imagination of the people (because 
this is often necessary) they merit all sorts of praise.160
158 Ibid.: “I have always...clearly distinguished between the basic norm presupposed in juristic 
thinking as the constitution in a legal-logical sense and the constitution in a positive legal sense, and I 
have always insisted that the basic norm as the constitution in a legal-logical sense -  not the 
constitution in a positive legal sense -  is not a norm of positive law, that it is not a norm ‘posited’ i.e. 
created by a real act of will of a legal organ, but a norm presupposed in juristic thinking”.
159 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 47.
160 O C V  7 T1 3 , p .  321.
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In Maistre’s view, there should be no confusion between a textual constitution -  
which is a technique of government -  and true constitutional authority. There is 
never a time when Maistre believes that a constitution receives its authorisation from 
the people as a consequence of democracy. It is this sentiment which informs the 
second feature of his approach to the subject of constitutions, his identification of an 
aporia at the heart of democratic-contractualist discourse.
Deliberation, Constitutional Pre-commitment and Self-binding
Maistre sustains a continual and absolute denial of the contractualist theory of state 
formation, a rebuttal which takes the form not only of a denial of the human origins 
(and therefore the textual basis) of the constitution, but also of a refusal to accept 
that constitutions can ever be created by deliberation. This is stressed in emphatic 
terms: “That which is sure is that the civil constitution of a people is never the result 
of a deliberation,161 comments Maistre. “The faults and inconveniences of a code 
made by an assembly would be incalculable”.162 Elsewhere he says: “An assembly 
may not make up a nation”.
These views not only reflect Maistre’s general anti-contractualist theory,164 they also 
express a particular concern of his regarding a fundamental aspect of the viability of
161 O C V  1 T 1, p. 346; ibid., p. 67.
162 Ibid., p. 217.
163 Ibid., p. 72.
164 See Chapter 2 above, page 67 ff.
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constitutions under a democratic regime, which became apparent to constitutional 
theorists of the immediate post-revolutionary era, particularly in America. Maistre’s 
thought once again provides a critique of a quintessential problem for constitutional 
modernity, this time the problem of constitutional pre-commitment and self-binding.
Soon after the emergence of a contractualist democracy characterised by the fact that 
it could not be bound by the edicts of previous generations, the full implications of 
the revolutionary textual constitution were also recognised: that certain 
constitutional laws were subject to entrenchment and could not be changed though 
normal law-making procedures in the popularly elected assembly. It became 
apparent that a profound opposition existed between these two conceptions: between 
the politics of the majority and the restraint on democracy inherent in the quest for 
constitutional stability. This conflict is one of the most glaring flaws of the liberal- 
democratic project, and one to which Maistre was very much alive. How is it 
possible to justify a democratic system which has at its heart the means of 
obstructing the will of the majority? Maistre identifies two different strands to this 
conundrum, which confronts all democratic thought that strives to be 
constitutionalist.
The first strand is the problem of inter-generational binding. Democracy promotes a 
tirelessly inventive system, and is oriented towards unceasing change and endless 
reform. This being so, how can the constitutional founders impose their will on
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successive generations?165 It is not only traditionalists that recognised this particular 
difficulty: Hamilton notes that the fundamental principle of republican government 
is “the right of people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they 
find it inconsistent with their happiness.”166 It seems, then, that if one accepts 
democracy, one must also accept that no generation has the right to bind the next.
The second, related, strand concerns whether an individual can make a binding 
promise to him or herself. In other words, “we the people” formulations, (although 
they confirm -  with admirable clarity the status of the new political values) present a 
constitutional problem, because an individual cannot legally or philosophically bind 
him or herself to any future course of conduct. Maistre identifies this difficulty 
when he comments: “Supposing that a law of this importance exists only because it 
is written, it is certain that whatever authority has written it will have the right to 
annul it; the law would not therefore have that aura of sanctity and immutability that 
distinguishes truly constitutional laws”. This follows on from his belief that the 
essence of a fundamental law is that no-one has the right to abolish it.167 From this 
perspective, constitutions which claim to be both binding and democratic are simply 
incoherent.
Rousseau comments that “it is self contradictory to sovereign authority to shackle 
itself.. .it runs against the nature of the body politics that the sovereign imposes on
165 OCV l T l , p .  237.
166 Quoted in Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 138.
167 OCV 1T1,  p. 236.
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itself a law that it cannot transgress.. .in the state there is no fundamental law that 
cannot be revoked, not even the social contract”.168 To which Maistre adds: “The 
agreement of a people is impossible, and even if it were possible, an agreement is 
not law and obliges no-one unless there is a superior authority guaranteeing it”.169 
On this basis, it is not possible for a sovereign people to keep a promise that it has 
made to itself, because, according to its own precepts, it cannot create a 
constitutional framework that cannot be altered at will at any time in the future.
Maistre addresses the question regarding whether it is possible constitutionally to 
self -  bind, in two ways. We have seen how Maistre first refers back to an 
understanding of fundamental laws as being immutable. He contrasts his own 
interpretation with the liberal, constitutionalist belief that fundamental laws are not 
substantively different from any other positivised norm. Maistre criticises the liberal 
constitutionalists for their failure to distinguish between material and formal laws, a 
failure that means that a law defining the state is of the same category as that which 
prohibits Sunday trading. Maistre’s second solution to the conundrum is more 
radical, and stems from his belief that there must be an external will in order to 
ground a constitution and imbue it with lasting effect. For Maistre, the basic 
premise of the liberal constitutionalist conundrum -  self-authorisation -  does not 
arise. For him, in order to provide a binding settlement it is necessary to have a 
higher, superior will that enforces obedience. Purely human constitutional 
deliberation is impossible.
168 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Bk I, Ch. 7 pp. 58-60 and Bk ID, Ch. 18, pp. 139-141.
169 OC V 1 T 1, p. 236; ibid., p 420.
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The conceptual device employed by Maistre to make a constitution binding is to be 
found in the generative principle of constitutions, which, “Presupposes a superior 
will enforcing obedience”.170 In the Hobbesian system:
the authority of civil laws derives solely from a contract; but if there is no 
natural law which obliges men to carry out the laws that have been made, for 
what are they? Promises, engagements, and oaths are mere words; it is as 
easy to break these weak links as to forge them. Without the dogma of a 
law-giving God, all moral obligation is chimerical. On the one hand power, 
on the other powerlessness, this is the only bond uniting human societies.171
Clearly Maistre believes this explanation regarding the source of constitutional 
authority to be of general applicability.
Whilst for Maistre the generative principle is thus, at least in some of its 
manifestations, divine, its importance for constitutional thought is to be found in 
Maistre’s statement that “It is always necessary for the origin of sovereignty to 
appear as being outside the sphere of human control”.172 In this respect, the vital 
aspect is the recognition that there must be an alterity, an externality from which 
authority emanates in order to provide binding constitutional durability, and it 
remains unclear as to whether Maistre intends the principle to be interpreted as
170 Ibid., p. 236.
171 Ibid., pp. 236- 237 -  Maistre, quoting Bergier.
172 Ibid., p. 265.
primarily political or religious, or whether the religious acts as a metaphor for the 
political (or vice versa).
Stephen Holmes specifically identifies this generative principle as being worthy of 
attack, for it does indeed seem to raise a valid and effective objection to liberal 
democratic theory,173 and it is thus worth examining Holmes’ criticisms of Maistre 
in order to understand the liberal constitutional position. Holmes specifically 
addresses the theological aspect of Maistre’s argument, and relies on an ad hominem 
critique of Maistre’s standing as an orthodox Christian thinker. Holmes essentially 
criticises Maistre for not being sufficiently Christian: “For one of the distinguishing 
features of Christianity, in contrast to pagan religions, is the idea of a God who can 
bind himself. This innovative conception fact seems to have been an important 
intellectual precondition for the emergence of constitutionalism in the West that is 
the improbable modem idea of a self-binding community”.174
Unfortunately, Holmes either misunderstands or deliberately misuses the dialectical 
subtleties of scholastic theology, and tells only half the story. What Holmes has 
done is to describe that which is known as God’s ordained power, which is to say the 
power that comes into force when He acts de jure in accordance with the rightful 
law He has established.175 Holmes has neglected to mention the co-existent 
Christian faith in God’s absolute power, by which He can, de facto, act apart from or
173 Holmes, Passions and Constraint, pp. 146-148.
174 Ibid., p. 151.
175 Francis Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics and Law”, in Journal of the History of Ideas 59, number 4 
(October 1998), pp. 669-690, p. 670.
160
against the very law that He has created.176 This belief was used alongside the other 
in political as well as theological matters. In constitutional terms, the existence of 
this absolute power means that, although the Prince ought to live and discharge his 
duties in accordance with the law, he is not bound to do so out of necessity. Instead, 
he does so out of benevolence -  that is, by freely choosing to bind himself in the 
normal exercise of his power whilst retaining the prerogative of being able to act 
above or aside from the law. Above all, the omnipotent God cannot be said to be 
bound by the nature or morality of the legal or salvific order that He has 
established.177
Whilst God is certainly capable of making a free decision to commit Himself 
through the covenant and promise to follow a certain pattern of dealings with 
creation, this is not at all the same type of stricture as Holmes identifies, and which 
has apparently so influenced Western constitutional practice. In fact, Maistre is heir 
to a long (and Christian) intellectual tradition which recognised and debated the 
relative pre-eminence of ordinary and absolute powers.178 Indeed, Bodin, who 
Holmes cites as proof that only the ordained type of power applied, properly 
speaking, in 16th century political thought,179 clearly spoke of his Prince as being 
able, by his “absolute power”, to derogate from the ordinary right.180
176 Ibid., p. 670.
177 See Francis Oakley, “Omnipotence and Presence: The Legacy of the Scholastic Distinction of 
Powers”, in Etienne Gilson Series 23 (March 2002), p. 7.
178 According to Oakley, in “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God”, this distinction “has taken 
us across no less than seven centuries of European intellectual history” (p. 686); it is a “phenomenon 
of very wide intellectual significance indeed.” (p. 690).
179 Holmes, Passions and Constraint, p. 151.
180 Francis Oakley, “Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the King”, in 
Journal of the History of Ideas (1968), pp. 329-31, notes 35, 39 and 41.
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Holmes is not alone in failing adequately to counter Maistre’s arguments; a number 
of other liberal commentators on constitutions also seem to endorse a need either for 
a concept approximating Burke’s entailed inheritance or for some form of external 
authority in order to create a binding, durable constitution. Rubenfeld, for example, 
comments that “A commitment [i.e. the necessary form of an act in order to ensure 
constitutional durability] is always an engagement not only with an uncertain future 
but with an object at least in part external to self’.181 Michelman also identifies this 
need for externality, and calls it the authority-authorship syndrome. He rejects the 
idea that we should grant binding force to any predecessor law-giver’s say-so just 
because it was theirs.182 We should, however, accept the decisions of an earlier 
generation, only if we can satisfy ourselves that, “they and we are relevantly the 
same people”.183 For his part, Elster comments that “our intuitive notion of what it 
is to bind oneself seems to require that we temporarily deposit our will in some 
external structure”.
It is initially quite difficult to see how these solutions do more than re-state Maistre’s 
own explanation for the need to have an entailed inheritance or an external source in 
a way that is politically and epistemologically more palatable to a modem, secular
]81 In fact, Rubenfeld appears to descend into incoherence: on the preceding page he comments that a 
“commitment is the normative operation a temporally extended subject engages in, when without 
entering into an agreement with another, he imposes temporally extended obligations on himself’.
182 Frank I. Michelman, “Constitutional Authorship”, in Constitutionalism..pp. 64-98.
183 Ibid., p 81.
184 Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge University 
Press 1984) p. 43.
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audience.185 Although at first sight Maistre could not be further from Rubenfeld, 
Michelman and Elster, what they have in common is a desire to identify the sources 
and meaning of authority, the fundamental issue of constitutional thought. However, 
one of the many differences between them comes from the fact that modem 
constitutionalists are impeded by their absolute commitment to normativity.186 For 
Maistre, a contrasting problem exists: that of retaining a constitutional identity 
separate from the political or the theological sphere. The answer to the problem of 
Maistre’s radical openness to other disciplinary spheres such as the political or 
theological lies perhaps in the fact that the generative principle is not in fact in 
harmony with that other conception of the constitution that he held, the one based on 
the Burkean-influenced indeterminacy of origins. The generative principle, in 
contrast, is based on a moment of decision, a definitive and creative external act.
The Maistrian constitutional model, far from being a simplistic apology for 
reactionary, Ultramontane Catholicism, is in fact creative and nuanced enough to be 
able to accommodate two competing conceptions of the constitution. The 
consequence of this disjuncture between a decisive foundation and an indeterminate 
origin, between tradition and revelation, needs to be explored in some detail, as it 
reveals a significant feature of Maistre’s understanding of the constitutional regime.
185 Indeed, in reviewing Michelman’s and Rubenfeld’s essays, Strauss concludes that “we still need 
some justification for why we accept the outcome of such an evolutionary process. A Burkean 
account is the obvious candidate” (Strauss, “Constitutions: Written or Otherwise”, p. 462).
186 Strauss, “Constitutions: Written or Otherwise”, p. 452: “If...the collection [of essays] is to be 
criticised, it is because the essays uniformly consider constitutionalism on a highly abstract level -  
essentially as a series of theoretical properties about the relationship between a written constitution 
and a democratic political system. What is perhaps missing.. .is a full recognition that the relationship 
is no longer just a theoretical one”.
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Maistre’s Two Constitutions
The dichotomy between the two ways of viewing the constitution is expressly noted 
by Maistre in a passage in which he discusses the origins of constitutions. It is 
worth considering in full:
The author of all things has only two ways of giving a government to a 
people: almost always he reserves the formation to himself, which is to say 
germinating insensibly like a plant by means of an infinity of circumstances 
that we call fortuitous, but when He wants to build the foundations of a 
political edifice immediately and show the universe a creation of this kind, it 
is to rare men, it is to the truly elect that he confers his powers.187
Here, Maistre entertains the possibility of there being two different modes of 
engendering constitutions, and in the Considerations on France he develops this 
basic idea outlined above by describing an environment in which the two 
conceptions of the constitution may exist at the same time, not as separate entities, 
but as different aspects relating to one another dialectically within the same over­
arching constitutional structure.
The relevant passage in Considerations begins with a discussion of the form of the 
French constitution before 1789, in which Maistre confirms his basic position that
187 O C N  1 T 1, p. 344.
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the constitution is the model of the political existence of a country. “Some have 
claimed that the nation did not have a constitution.. .this sentiment is 
unsustainable.. .The mistake which those who claimed France did not have a 
constitution derived from their great error regarding human powers, anterior 
deliberation and written laws”.188 But, if a “man of good faith” were to ask what the 
constitution was, the answer would be, “the mixture of liberty and authority, of laws 
and of opinions which would make a foreigner who was subject of a monarchy and 
travelling in France believe that he was living under another government than his 
own”.189
Having thus defined the constitution as material rather than normative, Maistre goes 
on to describe its bifurcation. In doing so, he quotes extensively from the 
Developpement des Principes Fondamentaux de la Monarchie Frangaise, adopting 
the arguments as his own.190 On the one hand, the constitution attributes legislative 
power to the king, so that all jurisdiction emanates from him. He has the right to 
render justice and to have it rendered by his officers. He may give grace and favours 
and may accord privileges and remuneration. The king may dispose of offices, raise 
people to nobility, convoke and dissolve national assemblies, make peace and war 
and raise armies.191 And yet, Maistre continues, “Let us see what the French
188 0 CV1Tl5p> 89.
189 Ibid.
190 Between summer 1791 and 1792, the magistrates of several of the Parlements met in Germany 
and Luxembourg to draft a Treaty on the fundamental principles of the French Monarchy. It was 
submitted to the Court in October 1792. Although they were advised not to make it generally 
available, it was published anonymously in Neuchatel in 1795. See Considerations Sur la France, 
ed. Jean-Louis Darcel (Geneva: Editions Slatkine, 1980) p. 137, n. 10.
191 OCV 1 T i p .  92.
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constitution puts in the other basin of the scales”.192 He goes on to consider the 
constraints on the King: “The king reigns only by the law and does not have the 
power to do everything according to his appetite”.193
Maistre advances two arguments as to why the King does not break these laws. The 
first is based on the ordained nature of his power: “It is the laws that the kings 
themselves have avowed...in happy powerlessness to break them, these are the laws 
of the kingdom”. These stand in contrast to the laws of circumstance or non­
constitutional laws, called the laws of the King.194 The second argument is more 
radical, and refers to the inviolability of fundamental laws, even by the monarch: 
“The constitution is nothing other than the collection of fundamental laws, and the 
king cannot touch these laws”.195 This is very different from a self-imposed 
ordinance to respect a covenant: the constitutional laws in this last sense stand apart 
even from the absolute sovereign.
There are thus two patterns of the constitution in Maistre’s thought. The first is that 
of the absolute monarchy, of absolute power, which develops naturally from that 
strain in Maistre’s work that is apparent also in his discussion of the legislator.196 
This conception involves notions of decision, will and command, it raises existential 
questions and it is closely connected with the Generative Principle. It is a 
constitution that is given, proceeding from an external source, and it defines political
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., p. 103.
196 See Chapter 2, p. 99 ff.
authority from a hierarchical perspective. Here legitimacy is subservient to authority. 
The second aspect of the constitution is influenced by Burkean notions, and is a 
model in which, in contrast to the legislator model, origins are deliberately obscured, 
theological sentiments are played down, and tradition, custom and prejudice are 
emphasised. It is the constitution of the people’s character and of immutable, 
ancient, fundamental laws; it explains political authority from a relational 
perspective; in it authority is subservient to legitimacy.
Each model involves two very different notions of law: the first involves a 
conception of law as hierarchy, proceeding from top to bottom;197 in the second, the 
law functions as droit politique, and represents a means of recognising the existence 
of the State.198 In Loughlin’s words, this latter type of law, which coincides with the 
more profound understanding of fundamental law discussed above, “is a set of 
practices embedded within and acquiring its identity from a wider body of political 
practices”.199 And yet this explanation, although helpful, does not strike at the heart 
of the distinction between the two competing aspects of the Maistrian constitution, 
which have to do with origin as well as function. To better grasp the critical 
differences between them, it may be more useful to again turn to Schmitt’s 
Verfassungslehre and his classification of the various types of constitution.
197 OC V 1 T 1, p. 420: “.. .for no power being able to possess a coercive force over itself, all 
amenable force beneath another power is necessarily subject to this power, because the latter makes 
the laws which dominate the former”.
198 OC V 4 T 7, p. 154; OC V 1 T 1, pp. 228-229: “.. .(3) The rights of peoples properly speaking 
come almost always from the concessions of sovereigns, and one can show this historically, but the 
rights of the sovereign and of the aristocracy have neither date nor known author. (4) Even these 
concessions have always been preceded by a state of things which necessitates them and which does 
not depend on the sovereign. (5) Whilst the written laws may only ever be declarations of anterior 
rights, it must be the case however that these rights may be written”.
199 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 43.
167
In the Verfassungslehre, Schmitt identifies three models of the constitution, one of 
which -  the relativist constitution -  is synonymous with the liberal-constitutionalist 
position that sees constitutional law merely as a collection of a discrete positive 
laws.200 The second, the absolute conception of the constitution, is the constitution 
conceived as a totality. It is the, “concrete mode of existence, self-given with all 
political entities” 201 The resonance with Maistre’s own views of the constitution is 
evident here. Schmitt then breaks down the existence of the absolute constitution 
into a number of sub-groups.
First, the constitution is the concrete, global structure of the political body and the 
social order of any given state -  the state, in this sense, does not have a constitution, 
it is the constitution: the constitution is its soul, its concrete life and existence.202 In 
the second sense, the constitution is a particular form of political and social order. 
The constitution here designates the concrete mode of the hierarchy and 
subordination; it represents the particular form of domination that is unique to each 
state and which one may not separate from its political existence. Here it is equal to 
the form of government that exists within a state 203 There is a third sense in which 
the constitution is absolute, and that is in its dynamism. Although this seems to 
contradict the other two definitions, whose distinctive characteristic is that they are
200 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 141.
201 Ibid., p. 132.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid., p. 133.
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status related, this third category shares with the others a notion of the constitution 
as Being and Existence.204
These, then, are the first two conceptions of the constitution; the third, represented in 
Maistre’s work by the generative principle and the figure of the legislator, is what 
Schmitt calls the positive constitution, i.e. the constitution bom out of an act of 
constituent power, 205 an act which determines by a single decision the totality of the 
political body from the point of view of its particular form of existence.206 Behind 
the constituent act there is always a subject who gives the constitution to this
2fY7political unit. In the constitution, before all norms, one encounters the
9flRfundamental political decision of the source of constituent power. Clearly, all of 
these constitutional models, although related (in that they are both types of material 
constitution), are not identical, and will irritate each other. Their co-existence 
generates different constitutional perspectives and explains the existence of 
ambiguities, indecisions and conflicts.
Ultimately it is the existence of these two different conceptions of the founding of 
constitutions in Maistre’s work -  the one self-given, the other given by an external 
source -  which marks his work as distinct from that of Burke or from romantic 
thinkers such as Herder,209 because it is much more attuned to the realities of post­
204 Ibid., p. 134.
205 Ibid.
206
207
Ibid.
Ibid.
208 Ibid., p. 154.
209 See Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamman, Herder (London: Pimlico,
2000), p. 168.
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revolutionary constitutional discourse than either traditional conservatism or 
romanticism. Although it is certainly conservative, it is not nostalgic, and confronts 
the developments of modernity head on, albeit in horror. Whilst it shares the 
vocabulary of romantic nationalism, it does not reduce the existential realties of the 
political to the level of the nebulously aesthetic. Maistre is alive to the significance 
of the concept of constituent power in the formation of the constitutional regime, 
although he refutes any of its democratic implications, and he presents us with an 
alternative to the revolutionary model. Maistre’s work is an attempt to provide an 
explanation for the mysterious transformation from political will to constitutional 
form; an explanation that does not suffer from the problems associated with theories 
of democratic self-authorisation. At the same time, the persistence of the absolute, 
material constitution in his thought anchors the constitution in political reality and 
provides a check on the absoluteness of power implied by the terms of the given, 
positive constitution.
Conclusion
This examination of Maistre’s thinking on the structure and nature of constitutions 
has revealed complexities frequently overlooked by those who seek to represent him 
as a theocratic reactionary lacking in any meaningful constitutional relevance. In 
fact, his work reveals a subtle and nuanced approach to the subject, which can be 
analysed in two distinct yet interlinked ways, both of which involve a consideration
170
of constitutional issues in dialectical form. The most important understanding of the 
constitution that Maistre’s work emphasises is that of the constitution as political 
existence, not as a synonym for the supreme juridical norm.
Maistre’s view of the constitution and its outstanding features acts as a 
counterweight to the overwhelming discourse of modem liberal constitutionalism. It 
stands against the abstract, rational, deliberative and instrumental; in place of the 
values of juridified constitutionalism it proposes a constitutional perspective based 
on collectivity, unity and particularity, a world-view that is bound up with tradition, 
custom and prejudice. The series of antinomies that are revealed by the 
juxtaposition of the two modes of thinking about constitutions provides a strong 
dialectic: text versus word; legal uniformity versus political unity; technical versus 
practical knowledge.
Schmitt’s Verfassungslehere assists us in understanding this distinction between the 
relativist and the absolute conceptions of the constitution; the Verfassungslehre also 
helps us also to distinguish between the two conceptions of the constitution that exist 
within Maistre’s work, and which provide different constitutional possibilities and 
perspectives. Their lack of exact coincidence -  their imperfect symmetry -  explains 
the existence of a series of tensions which run throughout Maistre’s thinking on the 
form and content of the constitution. This too may be expressed by a number of 
antinomies, the most basic being that between the given and the self-given views of 
the constitution; between law as command and law as a species of political,
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fundamental right; between prudential, temporally extended reason and decisive 
constitutional revelation. Conceptually distinct but dialectically related, each of 
these different facets helps to explain the shifting and indeterminate nature of 
constitutional discourse. They also demonstrate Maistre’s originality as a 
constitutional thinker, for it is possible to see in his work an attempt to accommodate 
the modem notion of constituent power into the traditional model of the material 
constitution.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MAISTRE AND SOVEREIGNTY
Introduction
The concept of sovereignty is vital to understanding the importance of Maistre’s 
constitutional thought, for in a sense it is threaded through all of his political and 
constitutional writing and is synonymous with some of the most fundamental 
constitutional questions that he considers. Through investigating such issues as the 
nature of power and authority, Maistre comes to address one of the most profound 
puzzles of the modem political milieu: the nature of the relationship between the 
individual and the State. As Francois Huguenin comments: “Maistre was closely 
concerned with the notion of sovereignty for a long period ...the theme is central to 
Maistre as a man of his time, the inheritor of a seventeenth century which saw the 
power of the state affirmed in a new and decisive way”.1
In his thought on sovereignty Maistre demonstrates a reliance on both tradition and 
innovation; far from being the esoteric maverick of liberal myth, Maistre clearly 
inherited many of the characteristics of his version of sovereignty from well- 
established forebears, including Bodin and Hobbes. But it is equally important to 
note that his views on the subject are by no means derivative or fixated on the past: 
his work has an originality which continues to inform more recent expositions of the
1 Francois Huguenin, “Souveraine Modemite de Joseph de Maistre”, in Joseph de Maistre, Dossiers 
I’Age d ’Homme (Lausanne, Switzerland: Editions L’Age d’Homme, 2005), p. 418.
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subject. As we shall see, one of the most contentious of all modern constitutional 
theorists, Carl Schmitt (whose definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the 
exception” has become infamous), was heavily influenced by the work of the 
Savoyard.2
All of these thinkers -  Bodin, Hobbes, Maistre and Schmitt -  have in common a 
particular approach to sovereignty. They all proffer solutions to the same political 
problem: the perceived fragmentation of both the institutions and the identity of the 
state. They also defend a notion of unity which they believe is in the process of 
being prised apart.3 For Bodin, the cause of disintegration was»the religious strife in 
France of the sixteenth century,4 whereas for Hobbes, the political mutations which 
inspired the English Civil War inspired him to write Leviathan.5 And for Schmitt, 
the dissolution of the bourgeois constitution itself, through the corrosive effects of 
mass politics, acted as the spur for his theoretical writings.6 In all of these cases, the 
promotion of an authoritarian model of sovereignty is the response to constitutional 
crisis. For Maistre, the threat comes from revolution and the political transformation
2 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 5.
3 Gerard Mairet, Le Principe de Souverainete: Histoires et Fondements du Pouvoir Moderne (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1997), p. 187.
4 See Olivier Nay, Histoire des Idees Politiques, (Paris: Armand Colin 2004) p. 159 : .
5 See, for example, Richard Tuck, in his introduction to Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. xi, says: “So when reading Leviathan we have to bear in mind Hobbes’s uncertainty 
about the result of the civil wars in both England and France, and his hope that the arguments in this 
book might have some effect upon the outcome”.
6 See Tracy B. Strong, in her forward to Carl Schmitt:The Concept of the Political (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. ix, says: “he probed the nature and sources of what he took to 
be the weakness of the modem liberal, parliamentary state, both in its embodiment of the Weimar 
constitution and more broadly as the modem form of political organisation”.
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that this entails.7 He sees his task as upholding the essential nature of sovereignty as 
a unified, ordering force in the face of the chaos brought about by an adherence to 
Enlightenment thought.8
In constructing his idea of sovereignty, Maistre continued to explore those themes 
and antinomies that have been introduced and examined in previous chapters, and 
his work on this subject reveals more of the relationship between, on the one hand, 
the decisive power of the legislator creating ex nihilo and, on the other, the authority 
generated by the institutions of immemorial constitutional tradition. This dynamic 
will find further expression in a series of oppositions -  norm versus fact, law versus 
legitimacy and, in particular, authority versus power -  relationships which are 
crucial to an understanding of the modem state.
This chapter certainly seeks to situate Maistre’s view of sovereignty within the 
absolutist constitutional tradition that encompasses the work of Bodin and Hobbes, 
but it will outline not only this continuity but also the innovations present in 
Maistre’s work, and consider its influence on contemporary views of sovereignty -  
in particular those of Carl Schmitt. In the course of this analysis, those themes that 
emerge in discussion of constituent power9 and constitutions10 will be re-addressed.
7 See Lucien Jaume, “Citizen and State Under the French Revolution”, in States and Citizens, eds. 
Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 132: “ The 
Revolution sought to fundamentally detach (sic) the individual from allegiances to all forms of social 
grouping and hierarchy in order to place him under the sole authority of the law; for a horizontal 
membership of traditional communities, the Revolution substituted a vertical allegiance to the law”.
8 OC V 1 T 2, p. 15: “.. .because the Church, like every moral being, cannot exist without unity”; see 
also p. 24: “Remove the queen of a swarm, you will have as many bees as you like, but a hive, 
never”.
9 See above, Chapter 2.
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Ultimately the chapter will address the question of whether Maistre’s conception of 
sovereignty offers any resolution to the tensions in his own thought or modem 
constitutional thought in general. The principal work consulted is Du Pape, but as 
sovereignty is a notion which exercised Maistre so much, references to it are to be 
found throughout Maistre’s other works, correspondence and private notes.
The Absolutist Tradition: Bodin, Hobbes, Maistre
Whilst the problem facing classical and medieval political philosophy was that of 
discerning the best possible regime, that facing modem politics is to determine the 
reasons for legitimate obedience.11 Sovereignty, which is one solution to this 
conundrum, is therefore a foundational concept of modem constitutional thought. 
The modem process of governing could not emerge as an autonomous activity until 
the materialisation of the modem state,12 and sovereignty forms part of this project, 
expressing the power to command which the state holds. In short, sovereignty is the
central criterion of the modem state, and Maistre unavoidably participates in
1 ^constitutional modernity by employing the term.
10 See above, Chapter 3.
11 Pierre Manent, Dictionaire des Oeuvres Politiques (Paris: PUF, 1986), p. 344.
12 See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 74.
13 See Dictionnaire de Philosophie Politique, ed. Philippe Raynaud and Stephane Rials (Paris: PUF,
1996), p. 735; see also Mairet, Le Principe de Souverainete, p. 189.
176
Nevertheless, modern attitudes towards sovereignty tend either to discredit it14 or to 
define it in ambivalent terms. Take, for example, the representative formulation 
tendered by Preston King, who defines it as “The power or authority which 
comprises the attributes of an ultimate arbitral agent entitled to make decisions 
within a political hierarchy with some degree of finality”.15 Because of this 
ambivalence, if we are to understand it fully (and so comprehend the foundations 
upon which Maistre’s version of sovereignty rests) it is necessary to return to the 
work of Jean Bodin {Les Six Livres de la Republique)16 and Thomas Hobbes 
(Leviathan) -  seminal texts on sovereignty whose modernising premises were so 
influential for Maistre’s own treatment of the concept as a unique and vital 
constitutional project.17
Bodin defines sovereignty as the highest power to command,18 stating that without 
such a power, a modem state could not really be held to exist. Although Bodin 
builds on the work of later medieval political theory,19 the Six Books o f the
14 See, for example, Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations of the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Canada and Belgium in a Post-Sovereign World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001); R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political 
Community (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Jean Picq, Histoire et Droit Des Etats; La 
Souverainete dans le Temps et VEspace Europeens (Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2005), p. 381; J. 
Chevallier, L ’Etat Postmoderne (Paris: LGDJ, 2004); Linda Basch, ed., Nations Unbound 
(Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1997); Timothy Brennan, At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism 
Now (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
15 See The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1987), p. 
492. And consider this, from Thomas Bems, Souverainete, Droit et Gouvernmentalite: Lectures du 
Politique Moderne a Partir de Bodin (Paris: Editions Leo Scheer, 2005), p. 7.
16 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la Republique: Un Abrege du Texte de VEdition de Paris de 1583 
(Paris: Librairie Generale Francaise, 1993).
17 See archival material -  Notebook, Cote 2J 15-18, p. 404, in which Bodin is cited in an index of 
references; Notebook Cote 2J 19, pp. 667-675, a detailed commentary on “Hobbes’s tripos in 3 
discourses, London 1684”.
18 Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 151.
19 See Jean-Fabien Spitz, Bodin et la Souverainete (Paris: PUF, 1998), p. 12. See also J. Moreau- 
Reibel, Bodin et le Droit Public Compare dans ses Rapports avec la Philosophic de I’Histoire (Paris:
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Commonwealth is the first constitutional text to explicitly exclude the Aristotelian 
notion of the mixed regime, and to discard the associated idea that the king is 
primarily an administrator of justice.20
9 1Bodin’s innovation, which came in response to the religious fragmentation (and 
consequent crisis of political allegiance) occurring in France at that time,22 is that he 
develops a theory of sovereignty which does not depend upon whether or not the 
laws of a king are just, in an Aristotelian sense, but on whether or not the sovereign
93has the requisite power to pass those laws. As Bodin’s model does not grant 
subjects the right to register either consent or dissent to the laws of the sovereign,24 
this theory thereby takes its place as one of the keystones of political absolutism.25
Vrin, 1933), p. 140, where Moreau-Reibel argues that Bodin condenses elements of the treatises De 
Imperio and the Juridictiones of the Digest of Bartolus. For an opposing view, see A. L. Fell, The 
Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State, Vol HI: Bodin’s Humanistic Legal 
System and the Rejection of “Medieval Political Theology” (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1987). See also Morgen Chroms Jacobsen, Jean Bodin et le Dilemme de la Philophosie Politique 
Moderne (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), p. 120. See also Bodin, Methode de 
I’Histoire.
20 See, for example, the work of Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G. E. 
Woodbine, rev. and trans. S. E. Thome, 4 Vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968- 
77); see also Michel Villey, Philosophie du Droit: Definitions et Fins du Droit/Les Moyens du Droit 
(Paris: Editions Dalloz, 2001), p. 103.
21 Bodin was certainly conscious that he was innovating; see Bodin Les Six Livres, p. I l l :  “Here it is 
necessary to define sovereignty because neither jurisconsults not political philosopher have defined 
it”.
22 See Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 176: “In a world where God is no longer capable of providing a consensual basis for 
political life, Bodin wanted to endow the sovereign with his qualities and put Him in His place”. For 
a biographical account, see Jacobsen, Jean Bodin et le Dilemme de la Philosophie Politique Moderne.
23 Bodin, Les Six Livres, pp. 156-157.
24 Ibid., p. 160.
25 See Julian H. Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Consitution: Bodin and his Critics, in The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. J. H. Bums (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 299.
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This notion of sovereignty had a profound effect on Maistre, especially Bodin’s 
understanding of sovereignty as something both absolute and perpetual.26
Bodin and Maistre -  sovereignty as absolute
The first characteristic of Bodinian sovereignty is unsurprisingly that it is absolute 
by nature,27 a trait which, for the purposes of closer analysis, may be sub-divided 
into two characteristics. The first of these is the quality of indivisibility, which is to 
say that sovereignty cannot be shared amongst several entities (as in the case of
98medieval feudal regimes and the polis of the ancient philosophers). Because, for 
Bodin, sovereignty is the principle by which the state establishes its constitutional 
unity, it must be concentrated in a single place.29 This also provides one of the 
foundational elements of Maistre’s understanding of the purpose of sovereignty: he 
declares that “The principle of monarchy, as in every form of command, is that there 
may only be one will”.30
This strong desire for unity on Bodin’s part has led to criticism by commentators 
such as Julian Franklin, who argues that, taken to its logical conclusion, the
26 Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 111. At least this is the definition that pertains in the Six Livres de la 
Republique. For a comparison between this and La Methode de VHistoire, see Jacobsen, Jean Bodin 
et le Dilemme and Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin et la Naissance de la Theorie Absolutiste, trans. 
Jean-Fabien Spitz (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 67.
27 See Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 118.
28 See Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1962), p. 101, p. 193.
29 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Les Principes Philosophiques du Droit Politique Moderne (Paris: PUF,
1997), p. 102.
30 OC V 5 T 10, p. 10. See also Diplomatic Correspondence p. 349: “Sovereignties may be differently 
constituted but all by their nature are absolute”.
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philosophy leads to a pure theory of ruler sovereignty.31 And Maistre does indeed 
appear to adopt this stark, monist position when he comments that: ‘This 
indispensable supremacy may only be exercised by a singe organ: to divide it is to 
destroy it”.32 But although he asserts sovereignty’s indivisibility here, Maistre 
nevertheless makes a clear distinction between the person of the sovereign and the 
office he holds, saying: “This is not a question of monarchy but of sovereignty, 
which is extremely different”.33 This point of view leads him to the conclusion that 
a division of power within the state is not necessarily in opposition to a modem, 
unified conception of sovereignty, and does not necessarily imply the existence of an 
Aristotelian or federal conception of state power.34 Instead, the division of power 
may well explicate and therefore reinforce a concept of unified sovereignty: “The 
fact is that without power in the state, without body, without society, without strong 
institutions, well organised...the sovereign cannot govern because he only has one 
head and two arms”.35
Importantly, the existence of these secondary institutions in no way implies a 
division of the one-ness of sovereignty. “Everywhere powers are divided”, Maistre 
notes; “the combat of these different powers may be considered as the deliberation 
of a unique sovereign, whose reason balances the advantages and disadvantages.
But when a side is taken, the effect is the same and the will of any sovereign is
31 See Julian H. Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution”, p. 307.
32OCV 1 T 2, p. 157.
33 Ibid., p. 178.
34 See Raynaud and Rials, Dictionnaire de Philosophie Politique, p. 738.
35 OC V 6 T 12, p. 127; see also OC V 7 T. 13, p. 51: “Legitimate sovereigns have publicly 
sanctioned the maxim of dividing, partitioning and adjudication of sovereignties for simple reasons of 
convenience”.
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always invincible”.36 Here Maistre shows a distinctly modem appreciation of the 
differences between the alienation and the delegation of sovereignty. The test of 
sovereignty remains the same -  one of unity -  even in those constitutional 
arrangements which admit a degree of complexity, and it is important to note that 
Maistre makes a strong conceptual distinction between sovereignty and government. 
“In considering governments where powers are divided, it is necessary to envisage 
them in their unity [....] and to ask oneself if the sovereign will which results from 
their united wills may be stopped, constrained or punished”.37
And this notion of invincibility -  the idea that the sovereign may not be “stopped, 
constrained or punished” -  leads into the second quality of sovereignty, which is that 
it is unlimited: it imposes itself in an incontestable manner on all, and, in particular, 
it does not require consent or legitimation from those upon whom it imposes itself. 
Furthermore, the sovereign may not be subject to the command of anyone else.38 
Maistre sets out this attribute of unlimited superiority in categorical terms: “I will 
never understand these words: the king cannot.” And, “always there must be one 
to whom one may not say: you have erred”.40 In his view, “Sovereign authority is as 
much incapable of modifying itself as alienating itself. To limit it is to destroy it. It 
is absurd and contradictory that the sovereign recognises a superior”.41
36OCV 1 T 1, pp. 417-418.
37 Ibid., pp. 422-423.
38 Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 112 : “If it were otherwise, and that absolute power conceded to a 
lieutenant of the prince were called sovereignty, he would be able to use it against his prince, who 
would then be no more than a cipher: the subject would then command his lord and the servant his 
master, which would be absurd”.
39 Diplomatic Correspondence Vol 2, page 303.
4O0 C V  IT  2, p. 3.
41 O C V  1 T 1, p. 418.
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Maistre emphasises one particular quality of this attribute, which also represents an 
expression of his concern with the individualism of the era of the philosophes and 
the defiance of sovereign authority (in the form of revolution) which is an 
expression of that individualism. The unlimited nature of sovereign power, he says, 
means that “The sovereign may not be judged: if it were to be so, the power which 
had this right would be the sovereign, and there would be two sovereigns, which 
implies contradiction”.42 This is a characteristic which resonates throughout the 
entirety of Maistre’s work on sovereignty and which, as will be seen later, he uses in 
an innovative way.
Bodin and and Maistre- the perpetual nature o f sovereignty
The second (and less commented upon) of Bodin’s characteristics of sovereignty is 
that it is perpetual,43 and, once again, this idea may be considered to have two 
aspects, the first of which is its public nature. To be perpetual means to resist the 
changes of time,44 and in Bodin’s model, sovereign power is not affected by the 
contingencies of history. As Maistre (echoing Bodin’s ideas) puts it: “the sovereign 
that never ages is, in consequence, never subject to losing its memory”.45 It
42 Ibid.
43 Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 111. See also Franklin,’’Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution” above p 
177: “To the extent that the problem of the perpetual is practically without influence in the 
constitutional controversies of the age, and to the extent that it is linked in quite a loose manner to the 
other elements of Bodin’s theory, there has hardly an appropriate place to discuss it in this text”.
44 Goyard-Fabre, Les Principes Philosophiques, p. 106.
45 Diplomatic Correspondence Vol. 2, p. 127.
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incarnates the principle of continuity which resides in all power. Bodin thus 
constructs a principle of sovereignty which distinguishes the crown, which is eternal 
and sacred, from the king, who is a physical being.
And it is this distinction that establishes the public character of sovereignty -  the 
sovereign power is not private property, the product of an exclusive relationship 
between one person and another with respect to an object,46 it is a public relationship 
between one person and a transcendent institution that governs all. Maistre then 
develops Bodin’s ideas into a theory which reflects his own concerns about the 
issues of popular sovereignty and representation that are the products of 
Enlightenment and revolutionary thought. Like Bodin, he is keen to point out that, 
as a consequence of its public nature, sovereignty cannot be intermittent: “A 
periodic and intermittent sovereign is a contradiction in terms. For sovereignty must 
always live, always guard. It makes no distinction between between sleep and 
death”.47
Here Maistre echoes Rousseau’s belief in the inefficacy of representation, and 
these lines are linked to an intense distrust of representation’s effect on the primacy 
of the sovereign: “I simply say that the intermittent representative body, if it is 
above all accidental and non-periodic, is by the very nature of things everywhere and
46 See Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 77.
47 O C V  1, T 2, p. 12.
48 Rousseau Du Contrat Social, p. 65.
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always incapable of governing; and that even during its sessions, it only has 
existence and legitimacy from its leader”.49
The second, closely connected, characteristic derived from the perpetual nature of 
sovereignty is its impersonal nature, which comes from the fact that it resides 
entirely in a representative office.50 Maistre thus reinforces the distinction between 
the entity of the state and the type of government in power, suggesting that the 
diversity of forms of government has no bearing on the existence and exercise of 
sovereign power, however much one might find a particular form more attractive 
than another.51 Sovereignties may be differently constituted, but all are absolute by 
their nature and may not be judged by any power, because this power would then 
become sovereign, a sequence which could continue ad infinitum .52
This recognition of the impersonality of sovereignty sets Maistre apart from 
traditional divine-right theorists. His understanding of sovereignty, based upon 
Bodin’s innovative definition in addition to establishing its fundamental 
characteristics of being absolute and perpetual, makes a distinction between the 
office and the person which is crucial for the maintenance of the modem concept of 
sovereignty.53
49 O C V  IT  2, p. 26.
50 See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 61.
51 See below, Chapter 5, p. 293
52OC V 1 T 2, p. 2: “Sovereignty has different forms, without doubt. It does not speak in 
Constantinople as it does in London: but when it speaks in one place or another, the Bill in its own 
way is as without the possibility of appeal as the Fatwah”.
53 Louis de Bonald, for example. For a commentary on his work, see Frederick Copleston, A History 
of Philosophy: 19th and 20th Century French Philosophy (London: Continuum, 1975), p. 5.
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H obbes and M aistre
Bodin’s work clearly had a direct influence on Maistre’s conception of sovereignty. 
In Bodin’s hands, the modem concept of sovereignty is still in a state of 
development, the disengagement from both Roman and Thomist traditions being a 
protracted process lasting into the sixteenth century and beyond.54 In Villey’s 
words: “The definitions of [sovereignty by] Doneau.. .remain uncertain; those of 
Bodin really hesitant, those of Althusius confused and those of Grotius not exempt 
from embarrassment and contradictions”.55 Of all the constitutional theorists of the 
early modern era it is Hobbes who, “resolutely anti-Aristotelian, renounced the 
cosmological horizons of the political world and refuses to place the microcosm of 
the State in the natural macrocosm willed by God and ruled by Him”.56 Whilst this 
view may underestimate the innovative contribution to constitutional thought of the 
early modern thinkers, it is right to say that Hobbes offers an undeniably modem 
sequencing of sovereignty: in doing so he reflects the advent of a de- 
transcendentalised world, an intellectual environment no longer based on the old 
Aristotelian assumptions.
54 Goyard-Fabre, Les Principes Philosophiques, p. 108.
55 Michel Villey, La Formation de la Pensee Juridique Moderne (Paris: PUF, 2003), p. 573 .
56 Goyard-Fabre, Les Principes Philosophiques, p. 124; see also Spitz, Bodin et la Souverainete, p. 
15.
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Consequently, the relationship between Hobbes’s work and that of Maistre is a 
difficult one. Indeed, at first glance it is difficult to find any similarity between the 
Catholic-hating57 Hobbes, who claimed that his theories had a rational, scientific 
basis and whose political model was predicated on the notion of individualistic free 
will,59 and the organicist, ultramontane Savoyard, one of whose principal aims was 
to assert the importance of collective prejudice over the primacy of purely human 
reason. It has, for example, already been noted how Maistre opposes contractarian 
thinking and rejects the possibility of man-made political institutions.60 
Nevertheless, despite a plethora of differences between the two, Hobbes’s thought 
did have an impact upon Maistre, and the content and aims of their thought are often 
more nuanced, less polarised than is commonly believed.
This is principally due to the fact that, despite the reactionary and conservative 
structure of his writings, Maistre’s constitutional and legal thought bears the 
unavoidable and indelible imprint of secularised modernity (the very fact that he 
uses the term ‘sovereignty’ is testament to this). It is also because Hobbes is not 
entirely free of an intellectual world-view imbued by religion in which Maistre also 
participates.61 In part this extends to their views on sovereignty, and whilst it is
57 See Chapter XLIV Of the Kingdome of Darknesse, in Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 417.
58 See Douglas Jesseph, “Hobbes and the Method of Natural Science”, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Hobbes, p. 86.
59 See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 117.
60 See Chapter 2.
61 See Michael Oakeshott’s introduction to Leviathan in his Hobbes on Civil Association 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975), pp. 50-58; see also Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure: Carl 
Schmitt in Weimar (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004): “The modem state 
emerged.. .on the foundation of a community endowed with a mystical character; from James’s claim 
to “be” England, it was not so far to Hobbes’s declaration in Leviathan that the sovereign is “the real 
unity of them all””. For French perspectives, see Lucien Jaume, Hobbes et I’Etat Representatif
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beyond the scope of this chapter to give a full account of Hobbes’s understanding of 
this notion, in order to understand Maistre’s own view it is necessary to examine 
what elements they held in common62. There is, in particular, one archetypal 
Hobbesian theme which contributes to the development of the notion of sovereignty 
and which also forms an integral part of the Maistrian view of the concept -  the so- 
called positivisation of the law.
Hobbes, Maistre and the positivisation o f the law
As we have seen, Bodin’s model of sovereignty had already begun to establish the 
idea that the Prince was “above the laws” -  indeed, for him it was a necessary 
concomitant of sovereignty.63 It was Bodin who specified the sovereign’s ability 
freely to break and to create juridical norms, but it was Hobbes who brought this 
new conception into a fully realised form and who therefore “expresses perfectly the
Moderne (Paris: PUF, 1986); F. Lessay, Souverainete et Legitimete chez Hobbes (Paris: PUF, 1988); 
M. Malherbe, Hobbes (Paris: Vrin, 1984); R. Polin, Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes 
(Paris: Vrin, 1977); Y. C. Zarka, La Decision Metaphysique de Hobbes (Paris: Vrin, 1987).
62 See Chapter 3; Their convergence on this matter is explained by a passage from Michael Oakeshott 
(Hobbes on Civil Association, p 63): “For Augustine, on the other hand, the predicament [i.e. of 
deducing civil society from “the very condition of human nature] arises from a defect in human 
nature, from sin. Where does Hobbes stand in this respect? The widely accepted interpretation of 
Hobbes’ view is that for him the predicament springs from the egoistical character of man and that 
therefore it is vice and depravity that create the chaos. Moreover it is a genuinely original depravity, 
for the fall of man (or anything to take its place) is no part of Hobbes’s theory.. .he appears to take 
his place on this question beside Plato and Spinoza, basing his theory on the “known natural 
inclinations of mankind. But not without difficulty. First, the striving after power which is 
characteristic of the human individual may in Hobbes’s view be evil; it is so when it is directed by 
Pride. And Pride is so universal a defect in human nature that it belongs to the constitutive cause of 
the predicament. And if, by interpreting it as illusion Hobbes deprives Pride of moral significance, it 
still remains a defect. And since Pride (it will be remembered) is the Augustinian interpretation of the 
original sin, this doctrine of Hobbes seems to approximate his view to the conception of the 
predicament as springing from, not nature, but defect in nature”.
63 Bodin, Les Six Livres, p. 11 and 12.
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spirit of modern law”,64 which is to say a regime in which sovereignty corresponds 
to the total mastery of the law. Thus, where law is an equivocal term for Bodin, for 
Hobbes it is categorically a commandment which emanates from an authority figure 
who is legally constituted: in Michel Villey’s words, “the law is posed no longer by 
God but solely by the will of man”.65 Hobbes’s originality lies in the reservation of 
the creation of the juridical order to the law of the state alone, completing the 
disassociation of God from the rule of law that was begun by Bodin.
It thus may seem odd to suggest that Hobbes, who aimed to end any connection 
between divine morality and the law and sever the meaning of the great Chain of 
Being, should exert such an influence on a writer who was apparently dedicated to 
sustaining the traditional modes of political understanding. Hobbes’s law no longer 
has the true God as author, a being who is too far away from our broken humanity, 
whereas for Maistre, God remains defined as the supreme authority over human 
affairs.66 However, on further examination the differences between the two men are 
not so marked. The Hobbesian author of the law is, after all, forged on the model of 
God. The author is personal like God (because all law is the expression of an 
individual will) and sovereign through His example (because every law is the 
command of an authority); the sovereign is therefore the “mortal God”.67 The fact 
that Hobbes uses this very image suggests that the separation between the
64 Olivier Beaud, in Dictionnaire de Philosophie Politique, eds. Philippe Raynaud and Stephane 
Rials, p.736.
65 Villey, La Formation, p. 597.
66 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 199: “In a Commonwealth, a subject that has on certain and assured 
Revelation, particularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of 
the Commonwealth”.
67 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120.
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theological and the secularised state, which he promoted, has not been entirely 
successful.68 Indeed, several commentators argue strongly that Hobbes’s work 
retains the imprint of the cosmological world view -  albeit in distorted form -  that 
he sought to reject.
Michel Villey writes that “the civil law is only the analogue of the divine law but 
transposed to the use of this broken world. It is like an imitation of it, a crude 
counterfeit... the civil law is not a recast form of the natural law...but remodelled in 
order to be used in this terrestrial world”.69 Bernard Manent believes that in 
Leviathan, obedience to God comes to be confused with obedience to the
70sovereign, and Michael Oakeshott advances a thesis that demonstrates the link 
between the Hobbesian and religious conceptions of the law.71 Indeed, the 
Hobbesian process of positivising the law has, in Marian H. Morales view, 
“demystified natural law at the expense of mystifying its positive content”.72
These commentators have sought to show that Hobbes’s system expresses more than 
just a detached, secular rationality; at the same time, if Maistre’s view of the law is 
analysed, we can see that it has qualities which are frequently attributed to the
68 See Luc Foisneau, Hobbes et la Toute-puissance de Dieu (Paris: PUF, 2000), p. 127.
69 Villey, La Formation, p. 607.
70 See Manent, Histoire Intellectuelle du Liberalisme (Paris: Hachette, 2004), pp. 52-53.
71 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association pp. 51-53: “The Europe of his day was aware of three 
positive religions: Christianity, the Jewish religion and the Moslem. These, in the language of the 
Middle ages, were leges, because what distinguished them was the fact that the believer was subject 
to a law.. ..The consequence in civil life of the existence of these laws was that every believer was 
subject to two laws...”
72 “Hobbes”, in The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopaedia, ed. Christopher B. Gray (New York 
Garland Publishing, 1999), p. 374.
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Hobbesian legal system.73 First, laws and authorities have a hierarchical relationship 
expressed in such a way that the validity of any law or authority must be derived 
from a superior law or authority.74 Second, the hierarchical system is closed by a 
final authority beyond which there is no right of appeal.75 When considered in this 
light, the Hobbesian and Maistrian conceptions of sovereign order are not so 
dissimilar: Hobbes undeniably retains traces of the traditionally theological in his 
work, and Maistre’s conception of the law is of a far more positivistic bent than one 
would expect from a scholar working within the Catholic-Aristotelian tradition.
In fact, Maistre seems to break with the Catholic natural law tradition in many other 
respects -  or, to put it more accurately, he simply ignores it.76 Nowhere, for 
example, does he attempt an examination of any of the different versions of the 
theory of natural law. Even though he cites Pufendorf77 and Aquinas,78 Maistre 
“seems not to be aware of either the diversity of natural law traditions nor of the 
central character of the notion of natural law and natural right in the Thomist
70tradition”. In Max Huber’s view, this abandonment of the vocabulary of the 
natural law is an indication that Maistre’s version of legal positivism is incompatible
73 For a general overview see M. M. Goldsmith, “Hobbes on Law”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 274-304.
74 OC V 1 T 1, p. 236: “The agreement of the people is impossible and, even if it were otherwise, an 
agreement is not law and obliges no-one, unless there is a superior authority which guarantees it”.
75 OC V 1 T 2, pp. 2-3: “In the judicial order, which is nothing but a part of government, can it not be 
seen that it is absolutely necessary to have a power which judges and is judged, precisely because it 
pronounces in the name of the supreme power”.
76 Jean-Yves Pranchere, L ’Autorite Contre les Lumieres (Geneva: Droz, 2004), p. 359.
77 OC V 4 T 7, pp. 525-7 is the section in Examen d ’un Ecrit de Rousseau where this most frequently 
occurs.
78 Archives, Cote 2J 15-18 (CD 18 nb p.404)
79 Pranchere, VAutorite Contre les Lumieres, p. 359.
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with a vision of the state based on natural law and the common good, which are 
essential doctrines of scholasticism.80
The position is complicated by the fact that whilst Maistre repeatedly describes the 
law in terms of command/authority, a secular concept, his formulation of it is 
irretrievably entwined with the symbols and imagery of religion, leading to a 
positivisation of the theological and a theologisation of the secular. There are in fact 
numerous examples, particularly in Du Pape, of this cross-fertilisation. Maistre uses 
ecclesiastical and political terminology interchangeably, which gives rise to a system 
of thought wherein the two spheres are perfect analogies for each other.81 This 
emphasis on a positivised law, crucial to an understanding of sovereignty, combined 
with Maistre’s detestation of revolution and the ensuing anarchy that revolution 
brings, inevitably leads him to understand sovereignty in terms of the imposition of 
order within the state. “Each sovereign is an ordering and regulating being: he is
80 Max Huber, Die Staatsphilosophie von Joseph de Maistre in lichte des Thomismus, (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, Basel/Stuttgart, 1985), p 10, 112, 186 cited in Pranchere n.76 above, p 359.
81 There are two points to note in this regard. First, Maistre undoubtedly intends this process to occur 
(OC V 1 T 2, p. 24: “politics will furnish us with new analogies”). Second, there is a distinct equality 
between the two spheres (OC V 1 T 2, p. 157: “The Church demands nothing more than other 
sovereignties”. Of the many examples of this cross-fertilisation, it is important to detail a number, in 
order to convey the extent to which Maistre’s work is permeated with the idea. See, for example: 
Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 351: “Councils are religious parliaments as parliaments are political 
councils44; OC V 4 T 8, p. 144: “A revolt is nothing but a political schism, just as a schism is only a 
religious revolt”; OC V 2 T 4, p. 203: “Do not have any repugnance in believing and saying that one 
beseeches God as one beseeches a sovereign”; OC V 1 T 2, p. 15: “Thus ecumenical councils are and 
may only be the parliament or the estates general of Christianity convened by the authority under the 
auspices of the Sovereign.”; OC V 1 T 2, p. 4: “What difference is there between the church of God, 
led solely by his word and the great one and indivisible republic, solely governed by the laws and 
delegates of the sovereign people? None”; OC V 1 T 2, p. 6: “If someone proposed a kingdom of 
France without a king of France, one would with justification believe him to have lost his mind: this 
would be the same idea as a church without its head”; OC V 1 T 2, p. 188: “There is much analogy, 
much fraternity, much dependence between pontifical power and that of kings -  never can one shake 
up the first without touching the second”; OC V 1 T 2, p. 4: “In the 16th century the rebels attributed 
sovereignty to the church...the 18th century just transposed these maxims to politics”.
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born to order and he only understands order”.82 This sense of order is in some 
respects the prime characteristic of a sovereign figure, who must withstand the chaos 
of revolution: “Happy the man who could make himself understand how much the 
talent of the sovereign, which employs men and puts them in their place, is enough 
in itself and independent of all other quality”.83 This line of thought leads Maistre to 
exhort subjects to “Love the sovereign as you must love order: with all the might of 
your intelligence”.
Oakeshott comments that Hobbes’s civil philosophy is a composite of two themes, 
Will and Artifice.85 It could be said that Maistre’s civil philosophy follows 
Hobbes’s in embracing Will, but departs from it in entirely rejecting Artifice.86 
Maistre’s dismissal of the early modem and Enlightenment faith in the idea that 
consent might form a viable basis of the state marks a deliberate excising from his 
political model of any concept of active participation by the people in the political 
sphere. When this rejection of consent is combined with the intensity of Maistre’s 
emphasis on command, the result is to create an effect of extreme positivisation, of a 
system of a hierarchical and hermetically sealed system of law . This strain of 
thought, combined with an absence of natural-law theorising, creates a God-like
82 O C V  6 T 11, p. 517.
83 O C V  6T  12, p. 214.
84 OC V 4 T 7, p.157.
85 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 60.
86 Meinecke viewed the existence of the element of artifice as a distinct failing of the Hobbesian state, 
it being merely an instrument to promote “the welfare, the security and the comfort of individual 
men” In Meinecke’s view there was no place in Hobbes’s state for “the devotion founded on faith 
and the attachment to the State” that Meinecke viewed as essential “for the truly living and personal 
State”. See Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d ’Etat and its Place in 
Modern History (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 215.
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mortal (rather than a mortal God); and the implications of this conceptual inversion 
are significant.
There is the danger that, in Maistre’s model, Salus populi suprema lex may become 
voluntas suprema lex}7 His brand of Divine positivism does not collapse the 
spiritual into the temporal, an effect of which Hobbes was well aware (‘Temporal 
and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world, to make men see 
double, and mistake their lawful sovereign”, he said88). Instead, it makes possible a 
species of sovereignty which is both spiritual and temporal,89 an all-encompassing 
understanding of the notion with truly totalitarian dimensions. But to suggest that 
Maistre’s interpretation of sovereignty is purely based on Will is to neglect the 
triangulation between the command, sovereignty and the law which informs his 
work. This interplay leads to an understanding of sovereignty as power and as a 
juridical form.
87 Heinrich A Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (New York: Greenwood Press, 1945), p. 393.
88 Hobbes, Leviathan, quoted in Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p.55 and see Leviathan, p. 
311: “Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of scripture.. .that the 
Kingdom of God is a Civil Common -  wealth, where God himself is Sovereign...)
89 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p. 55: “And the recipient of the transferred right [ in 
Hobbes’s system] is the artifical, sovereign authority, an authority which is not temporal and 
spiritual....but single and supreme”.
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The Juridical View: Sovereignty as Power, Sovereignty as Law
An intimate link between sovereignty, power and law began to be forged in the early 
modem era.90 As Michel Villey comments, “the meaning of potestas begins to be 
mentioned and all juridical science is ordered around it. These doctrines accord with 
the individualist tendencies of a bourgeois, Christian world”.91 To have power is to 
be the cause of a certain number of actions;92 it represents the ability to bring about 
intended effects.93 In this formulation, the notion of power thus finds its expression 
in the political domain, through sovereignty, and is an “essentially empirical 
phenomenon”.94
For sovereignty is the supreme power -  that which is exercised over citizens and 
subjects and is unrestrained by law. Sovereign power itself, however, is essentially 
ambivalent: he who has the power to heal also has the power to kill; he who has the 
power to do good for his country also has the power to lead it to its destruction.95
90 It is interesting to note the etymological closeness of sovereignty and power. Robert Derathe, in 
Rousseau et la Science Politique de Son Temps, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1988), p. 385, notes that “in the 
juridical language of the 18th century, public power, empire, sovereign authority, sovereignty are 
synonymous terms”. French jurists used the terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘power’ as pertaining to the 
state from the time of Bodin onwards. In German, the term ‘sovereignty’ can be translated both 
literally (Souveranitat) and conceptually (Staatsgewalt). The also holds true for terms denoting 
power: Herrschaft means domination, Macht means force and power and Gewalt means either power 
or violence, and when combined with the term for the state refers to public power (Staatsgewalt).
91 Villey, La Formation, p. 573.
92 Celine Spector, Le Pouvoir (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1997), p. 9.
93 Martin Loughlin, Sword and Sales; An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 125.
94 Ibid.
95 Spector, Le Pouvoir, p. 10.
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Crucially, sovereign power belongs in the domain of means rather than ends, and 
Maistre understands it in the sense of an empirical ability to make things conform to 
its will: “Both [i.e. sovereignty and infallibility] express this high power which 
dominates all, from which all others derive, which governs and is not governed, 
which judges and which is not judged”.96 His formulation almost equates 
sovereignty with the domination of the strongest over all others: “Sovereignty is 
before everything and everything must give way to it”.97
Maistre believes that force may preside over the installation of a new power or may 
maintain it as it is exercised98. This is an acknowledgment that violence plays both a 
foundational and a permanent role in the history of sovereign power, but violence, in 
the hands of the state, founded on the law, becomes a juridical phenomenon of 
organisation and regulation. “The juridicisation of sovereignty is”, in Olivier 
Beaud’s words, “ testament to a revolution in the history of law, which is the 
emergence of legal positivity: that is to say of a new way of representing 
law...which accompanies an essential change in the relation between spiritual and 
temporal power”.99 The figure of the sovereign as an ordering power is crucial in
96 O C V  1T 2 , p. 2.
97 OC V 7 T. 14, p. 76. See also p. 164: “It is necessary that major principles fall on the people from 
high to low, like the rain”; OC V 1 T 1, p. 423: “One will find that every sovereign is despotic and 
that there are only two paths to take in this respect: obedience or insurrection”; OC V 7 T. 13, p. 51: 
“Sovereignty must be assessed not by its essential character, but by its physical power set against the 
ancient definition, universal, invariable, which always asked of each Prince: Who are you and not 
what can you do?”
98 OC V 5 T 9, p. 188: “Everyone knows that there are fortunate revolutions and usurpations which 
are truly criminal in their principles, to which however it pleases providence to fix the seal of 
legitimacy by long possession”.
99 Olivier Beaud, La Puissance de I’Etat (Paris: PUF. 1994), p. 55.
195
explaining the potential that power has to be expressed through violence, but for that 
violence to be legitimised by the law .100
The intimate connection made here by Beaud between sovereignty and the law 
describes Maistre’s own predicament, meaning that Maistre must consider the issue 
of legitimacy, the law’s dialectically related conceptual quality. Does the sovereign 
power that is underpinned by force need to create conditions for voluntary 
submission based upon sentiments other than fear? Treating sovereignty as a legal 
concept, Maistre’s response is categorical: “I believe that I read somewhere that 
there are very few sovereigns able to justify the legitimacy of their origins”,101 he 
comments. The sovereign is able to say, “I possess because I possess”.102 If it is to 
be a panacea for disorder and conflict, then sovereignty must operate as a function of 
power and be founded by the person who commands: “Never is a sovereign obliged 
to give reasons to his subjects or the whole of society will disintegrate”,103 Maistre 
insists: to take into consideration the views of his subjects would be to invert the 
principle of order that establishes legal sovereignty and through which it functions.
This view of sovereignty as forming part of a conceptual trinity along with power 
and law is based on principles espoused by Bodin and Hobbes, and represents a 
strong strategy for stabilising the state by means of imposing order and unity. By 
rejecting the notion of legitimacy, Maistre emphasises both the unchallengeability of
100 Pranchere, VAutorite contre les Lumieres, p. 132.
101 O C Y  1 T 1, p. 264.
102 O C Y  7 T 13, p. 124.
103 O C Y  4 T  8, p. 145.
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the source of law -  he is unconcerned with the justness or otherwise of its content -  
and the gulf that exists between governors and the governed. He essentially 
develops the conceptual schema that he created in his discussion of the constitution 
as promulgated by the legislator. Yet whilst his notion of power as an expression of 
sovereignty is crucial to his thinking, it does not fully define his understanding of the 
concept and Maistre’s model of sovereignty goes much further in describing and 
analysing the complex forces and relations that make up the modem understanding 
of the term
The Structural Ambiguity of Sovereignty
During his discussion of the legalistic, command-orientated characteristics of 
sovereignty, Maistre continually stresses another related aspect: that of its 
inviolability,104 a characteristic which results from Maistre’s specific concerns about 
the effects of revolution on the political order. It is a concern which is voiced 
throughout his work: ‘The king is sovereign. His person is inviolable...”105 he says, 
and “Sovereigns are inviolable and may not be judged”.106 Initially it might seem 
that inviolability is another straightforward juridical proposition, which merely gives 
another shade of meaning to the absolute nature of sovereignty in the Bodinian
104 OC V 1 T 1, p. 418: “However one defines and places the Sovereign, it is always one, inviolable 
and absolute”.
105 Ibid., p. 445.
106 O C Y  4 T 8, p. 318.
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juridical sense. However, Maistre further elucidates the concept, incorporating 
subtleties which render this initial assessment inadequate.
First, inviolability has to be understood in a relational sense. It depends upon a very 
modem acceptance that there exists a separate political entity, ‘the people’, which 
must be considered in any account of the term; as he says, “It would be easy to prove 
to you that everything they have done against the sovereign tends to render 
sovereignty more inviolable for the people”.107 Moreover, Maistre acknowledges 
that the people are capable of acting, although they should not do so, against 
sovereignty: according to Maistre, the people must accept that “Royal authority 
categorically does not come from men, that God is the author of it, that the sovereign 
is inviolable, that no-one may judge him for any reason and that all men who harm it 
are despicable”.108 Here, then, Maistre posits the existence of some form of actual 
relationship between sovereign and subjects. He admits the existence of a body or 
force capable of unsettling or deposing the sovereign, accepting that an agency not 
included in the realm of juridical sovereignty might nevertheless impinge upon it. 
From a purely legalistic viewpoint, one that understands sovereignty to be a 
disposition dependent solely on the dissemination of command, Maistre’s theory 
seems incomprehensible. How can the contradiction be resolved?
Before we can answer that question, we must consider a second difficulty posed by 
Maistre’s view of the sovereign as a product both of power and of the law. An
107 0 C V 6 T  12, p. 429.
108 Ibid., p. 48.
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essential element of Maistre’s discourse on the matter is that of the possibility of the 
limitation of sovereignty, which derives from his desire to distinguish between an 
absolute sovereign and a tyrant:109 “How can one restrain the sovereign power 
without destroying it?”110 Maistre asks. It is impossible to address this issue using 
only the concept of power for, as we have seen, power is a concept concerned only 
with factual dominance and not with the manner in which (or to what end) that 
dominance should be exercised.
In order to arrive at a solution we need to turn once more to Bodin, who frames the 
dilemma and provides some answers to it. Although Bodin insists that sovereignty 
“is the most, high, absolute and perpetual power over citizens in a commonwealth” 
and represents “the greatest power to command”,111 he also asserts that there are a 
number of restraints on the sovereign, arguing that “All princes of the earth are 
subject unto the laws of god, of nature and of nations”.112 In short, there is a 
paradox. How can one have an absolute sovereign if one is also forced to accept 
“division, constraint, the partition, the equal or, of course, “superior” of the
109 OC V 1 T 1, p. 422: “The great problem would not therefore be to prevent the sovereign from 
having an invincible will, that which implies contradiction, but to prevent him from having an unjust 
will”.
110 OC V 1 T 2, p. 171; see also pp. 27-28: “If the king found that several things were to be done 
parliamentarily, that is to say following the true principle of constitutions, he could give royal 
sanction to these different dispositions which would become binding laws even for the king, who is, 
in this especially, the image of God on earth: for following the beautiful words of Seneca, God obeys 
the laws, but it is He who has made them”
111 Bodin, Les Six Livres , p. I l l
1,2 Ibid.
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1 1-1
sovereign”? In this case one would have a sovereign who was both limited and 
absolute.114
Of course, the possibility must not be ignored that Bodin may be using the word 
‘law’ equivocally; as a transitional thinker the categories to which he refers are fluid 
and often paradigmatically incompatible with one another. Even so, there is a 
contradiction here which does not reflect a theoretical impasse, but instead provides 
an extremely fruitful basis for conceptualising sovereignty as a unifying 
commanding force that has no equal, but which is nevertheless prevented from 
exceeding the limits of its power. Stephen Holmes writes of Bodin’s paradox that, 
“we must not erase the verbal contradiction too hastily, the drama of Bodin’s 
position lies precisely here, in this systematic oscillation between two, not quite 
compatible claims”.115 It is fair to say that this oscillation between asymmetric 
conceptions of the same notion also drives Maistre’s theory of sovereignty, which 
both establishes the law and is governed by it.
Now we can attempt an answer to both conundrums that seem to face Maistre’s 
theory of sovereignty: i.e. the questions surrounding the inviolability of the 
sovereign and the limitlessness of his power. The answer to both conundrums lies in 
the fact that sovereignty possesses a structural ambiguity. To understand 
sovereignty fully, one must accept that it has more than one trajectory. Adopting a
113 Spitz, Bodin et la Souverainete, p. 9.
] 14 Ibid.
115 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 105.
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solely juridified, unilateral understanding of the term will lead to an impasse.116 To 
reduce it purely to dimensions of power and law is to cut oneself off from another 
meaning, a truth which is exposed when questions such as the nature of the relation 
between sovereign and subject or the limitation of the unlimited sovereign are posed.
The Political View: Sovereignty as Authority, Sovereignty as Relation
For Maistre, sovereignty is also an expression of the basic political relationship
117between the people and the institutional framework of state power. Certainly, law 
represents the command of the sovereign, but since the sovereign is an office-holder 
who exercises official power, the will of the sovereign must be promulgated through
1 1 0
institutional forms: only in this way can a governing order be established. 
Furthermore, the existence of a governing order necessarily gives rise to questions 
concerning its source and the ends to which it is directed. Power may be described 
as the means by which sovereignty operates, but, taken by itself, the notion cannot 
fully explain sovereignty in its entirety. Maistre’s emphasis on the command-driven 
aspects of sovereignty is tempered with the recognition that effective command also 
depends upon the ability of the sovereign to establish authority, a constitutional 
phenomenon which must be distinguished from unadulterated power. This notion of 
authority is inherently political; it is “a complex phenomenon. It is rooted in the
116 Beaud,Constitutions et Constitutionalisme, p. 20.
117 OC V 1 T 2, p. 443: “In ending this discussion, I declare that I am protesting equally against all 
types of exaggeration: that pontifical power be retained in its correct limits”.
OC V 1 T 1, p. 408: “Any institution whatsoever is nothing but a political edifice”.
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division between governors and governed and it underpins the concept of 
sovereignty”.119
Authority, so important to a full appreciation of sovereignty, forms a significant 
theme in Maistre’s writing. We have seen how one aspect of the Maistrian 
constitution is predicated on the existence of a particular type of authority, which is 
composed of a sense of antiquity in terms of well-established belief patterns and 
immemorial traditions. This vision of authority, which underlies the material 
constitution of the nation, is connected with conformity of usage: in other words, 
ways of doing, being or feeling. It involves acknowledging a heritage to which one 
belongs and which one cannot ignore without denying and losing one’s identity.120
It is the guardianship of the eternal yesterday, “of customs sanctified by their
12.1immemorial validity and by habit rooted in man to respect them”. Commentators 
agree that the structure of Maistre’s thought outlined here is generally permeated 
with references to authority, but to unravel some of the intricacies of the term as 
applied specifically to sovereignty it is helpful to turn to Hannah Arendt’s celebrated 
analysis of the notion of authority.122
Arendt’s argument is that in modem times the historic underpinnings of political
/
systems have disappeared, a development that has coincided with the decline of the
119 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 63.
120 Jean-Yves Baziou, Les Fondements de VAutorite (Paris: Les Editions de l ’Atelier, 2005), p. 48.
121 Max Weber, Le Savant et le Politique (Paris: Union Generale d’Edition, 1974), p. 102.
122 Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in. Authority, ed. C. Friedrich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), repr. in The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (London, Penguin, 
2003) pp. 462-507.
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‘Roman trinity’ of religion, tradition and authority.123 This has resulted in the 
modem realisation that we must once more resolve the elementary problems of how 
to live together. Maistre also has a strong image of authority in this Arendtian sense, 
and so analysing this major element from their writings will enable us to grasp the 
conceptual shape of Maistre’s view of sovereign authority.
For Arendt, authority demands obedience.124 Maistre also sees obedience as an 
essential component of sovereignty: “The sovereign acts, obedience is general, quiet 
and constant. The opposition is there is any in particular, turbulent, transient”.125 
Moreover, obedience is necessary for an understanding the political meaning of 
sovereignty: “Respect for authority, for example, is found everywhere, because it is 
necessary, obligatory and fundamental, and without it the political world would not 
be able to turn”.126 Arendt also argues that, unlike power, authority is a phenomenon 
which is more than persuasion and less than force, a quality that follows on from its 
political nature.127 Maistre concurs, saying: “Sovereigns move forward as 
themselves, without violence on the one hand, without marked deliberation on the 
other. It is a species of magnificent tranquillity”.128 In this sense, authority should
123 Ibid., p. 464.
124 Ibid., p 463. See also Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Enquiry Into the Political Good, 
trans. J. F. Huntingdon (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), p. 35: “By authority I mean the faculty of 
gaining another man’s assent”.
125 OCW  7 T 13, p. 124.
126 OCW 6 T 12, p. 180.
127 Arendt, “What Is Authority?” p. 463: “Yet authority precludes the use of external means of 
coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed”.
128 O C V  1 T 1, p. 232; see also Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 37: “What I mean by authority is the ability 
of the man to get his own proposals accepted”.
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not be considered as antonymous with liberty. The distinguishing mark of authority 
is that it is exercises power only over those who voluntarily accept it.129
Proceeding on the belief that persuasion, which is “in the egalitarian order”,130 is not 
part of authority, Arendt argues that we can deduce that what he who commands and 
he who obeys have in common is the hierarchy, in which both have a pre-determined 
place.131 In Maistre’s terms, “If I may be permitted to establish the degrees of 
importance among the things of a divine institution, I would place hierarchy above 
dogma”.132 Maistre is also adamant that political authority does not rest on a notion 
of equality: “In a sense...one could say that all men were the same; but in another 
just as correct, one could say that they were all different”.133
For both Arendt and Maistre, sovereign power, as an absolute (i.e. in the Bodinian 
sense of pure power), is perpetual and therefore out of time.134 Authority, on the 
other hand, is intimately related to tradition. It has its roots in the past; rather than 
creating from nothing, it augments that which already exists.135 For Maistre: “the 
forms of sovereignty are not the same all over: they are fixed by fundamental laws
129 Jouvenal, Sovereignty, p. 39.
130 Arendt, “What Is Authority”, p. 463.
131 Ibid.: “The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests 
neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is 
the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their 
predetermined stable place”.
132 O C V  4 T 8, p. 142.
133 O C V  6T  12, p. 180.
134 Diplomatic Correspondence Vol. 2, p. 291: “Sovereignties have more to do with the future than 
with the present”.
135 Arendt, “What Is Authority”, p. 465: “Authority, resting on a foundation in the past as its 
unshaken cornerstone, gave the world the permanence and durability which human beings need 
precisely because they are mortals -  the most unstable and futile beings we know of. Its loss is 
tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world”.
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whose true bases are never written. This is not a question of monarchy but of 
sovereignty, which is entirely different”.136 Running throughout both Arendt’s and 
Maistre’s accounts is the overriding proviso that authority is not to be confused with 
power. In Maistre’s words, political (as opposed to juridical) sovereignty is by 
nature “neither universal, nor indivisible, nor perpetual”.137
This distinction between authority and juridical power is explored still further in 
Maistre’s writings. Although authority demands obedience, unlike pure power it 
does not do so by threatening force, but by engendering loyalty to the state. Maistre 
believes that the state’s authority -  its political capacity -  is enhanced by the 
strengthening of the bonds of allegiance between the governors and the governed. It 
is clear now why this aspect of sovereignty was impossible to conceptualise using 
juridical notions, for it is an achievement which clearly belongs in the political 
realm. It departs from considerations of normativity and instead expresses itself as 
fact; it is capacity not competence. For Maistre, authority -  being a device that is 
less than force but more than persuasion -  operates by means of political 
relationships and institutions in order to build up its capacity and reinforce 
sovereignty.
Sustaining his belief that authority is relational, not absolute, Maistre suggested that 
public power, a key requisite of sovereignty, is formed through the 
institutionalisation of political authority: “No-one could reasonably doubt that the
136 O C V  1 T2,pp. 177-178.
137 Ibid., p. 19.
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particular and distinctive characters of these diverse sovereignties were very 
profound, if often invisible, causes. The people adhere to the national forms to the 
point where they are unhappy or even insulted when they see them destroyed or 
contradicted”.138 Using constitutional institutions, sovereignty generates political 
authority by way of the relationship between the state and the people.139 It is a 
deeply complex relationship, being based not only on the connections but also on the 
fissures which exist between governors and governed.140
The power generated is the result of the attachment of the state’s subjects to the 
constitutional system. In this way, public power in the Maistrian system may be 
said, in part, to rest on opinion and belief.141 Authority rests upon the allegiance of 
the people, and once support is withdrawn, then the authority -  as distinct from the 
power -  of those who govern is dissipated.142 Maistre’s technique for the generation 
of the constitutional enthusiasm necessary for the proper functioning of sovereignty 
consequently rests upon two pillars. First, Maistre advocates the use of civil 
religion; second (and more surprisingly given his reputation), he asserts the need for 
a positive constitutionalism based upon a limitation of the sovereign. These two
138 OCW  6 T 12, pp. 408-409.
139 Baziou , Les Fondements de I’Autorite, p. 49.
140 OC V. I, T. 1, p. 354: “The masses have nothing to do with political creations. They only respect 
the government because it is not their work”. See also Diplomatic Correspondence Vol. 1, p. 350, on 
the constructive use of this divide: “That a good adviser must always speak to the people of the rights 
of the sovereign and to the sovereign of the force of the people: in other words, he must ceaselessly 
preach the benefits of authority to the people and the benefits of liberty to kings”.
41 OC V 1 T 1, p. 375: “Now these kinds of opinions are essential to man; they are the real basis of 
his happiness and the palladium of empires. Without them, there can be neither religion, nor morality, 
nor government”.
142 Ibid., p. 408: “You cannot build a great edifice on narrow foundations or a durable one on a 
moving or transient base. Likewise, in the political order, in order to build high and to build for 
centuries it is necessary to rely on an opinion or a belief which is broad and deep: for if the opinion 
does not hold the majority of minds, nor is it deeply rooted, it will only provide a narrow and 
transient base”.
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devices, whilst directed towards the same aim, highlight the different aspects of 
Maistre’s thought in respect of political authority -  civil religion emphasises the 
relational aspects and positive constitutionalism emphasises the institutional aspects.
Maistre’s understanding of the relation between religion and the state is an 
ambiguous one. It is frequently unclear whether state practice is subservient to 
religion or if religion is to be considered as a function of the state. It is, in part, this 
imprecision which gives his constitutional thought its power, and it is used to good 
advantage in the inculcation of civil religion in the Maistrian state: Maistre argues 
that “There should be a state religion just as there is a state political system; or rather 
religion and political dogmas, mingled and merged together, would together form a 
general or national mind”.143 The strength of political institutions is dependent upon 
the development of a relationship of this nature;144 indeed, Maistre comes to the 
conclusion that sovereignty is only respected when it is sacred. He identifies the 
intense loyalty engendered “when citizens are believers and government is a true 
religion”145 -  thus, he concludes, political belief should be a creed, a faith146 through 
which relations could be intensified between subjects and institutions, which is to 
say the sovereign power of the State.147
143 Ibid., p. 375.
144 Ibid., p. 361: “Great political institutions are perfect and durable to the extent that the union of 
politics and religion within them is all the more perfect.”
145 Ibid., p. 376.
146 Ibid., p. 363: “Numa had given to Roman politics this religious character which was the heart, the 
soul and the life of the republic. It is a constant fact.. .that the oath was the true cement of the 
Roman constitution. It is by the oath that the most turbulent plebeian, lowering his head before the 
council which asked his name, bore under the flags the docility of a child”.
147 Ibid., pp. 408-409: “Now if you seek the great and solid bases of all possible institutions of the 
first and second order, you will always find religion and patriotism”.
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14.8His treatment of civil religion has obvious similarities with Rousseau, who also 
recognised the importance of religion’s ability to sustain and even promote civil 
order.149 Religious sentiments invest civil obedience with a deeper significance, he 
believed, so that citizens are more likely to embrace it fully.150 And yet the species 
of authority which encourages obedience, and which is in turn nurtured by the 
deeper understanding of obedience promoted by religion, makes heavy demands on 
the subject of the State. There is first a development and then a manipulation of 
constitutional emotion: the concentration on patriotism and national dogma involved 
in civil religion leads to an intense level of attachment between citizens and the 
sovereign.151 The species of authority generated through the establishment of a civil 
religion is profound and intense, justifying the etymology of the word ‘authority’ 
itself, which suggests something that has divine, mystical or even magical origins.152
148 See also Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Chapter 8 (“De la Religion Civile”), pp. 169-180. For more 
on Rousseau’s views, see P. P. Masson, “Le Probleme de la Religion Civile”, in La Religion de Jean 
Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Hachette, 1916); B. Griethuysen, Jean Jacques Rousseau (Paris: 
Gallimard,1949), pp. 269-281; R. Derathe, “La Religion Civile Selon Rousseau”, in Entretiens de 
Geneve (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), pp. 161-180. Rousseau was also conscious of Hobbes’s crucial 
work in reconciling the tensions between the theological and the political; see Rousseau, Du Contrat 
Social, p. 172 : “Of all Christian authors, the philopher Hobbes is the only one who saw clearly both 
the evil and the remedy, and who dared to propose reuniting the two heads of the eagle [i.e. Church 
and state] and fully restoring that political unity without which neither the state nor the government 
will ever be well constituted”.
149 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 178: “There is, then, a purely civil profession of faith of which it 
concerns the Sovereign to decide the articles, not exactly as religious dogma but as sentiments of 
sociability without which it is impossible to be either a good Citizen or a faithful subject”.
150 Ibid.: “Now it is very important to the state that each citizen should have a religion which makes 
him love his duty”. The difference between the two men is that for Rousseau, Catholicism had a 
corrosive effect on the relation between citizen and state -  he averred that it was so manifestly bad 
that the pleasure of demonstrating its badness would be a waste of time, whereas Maistre saw 
Catholicism as the perfect vehicle for encouraging loyalty to the state.
151 A technique found frequently but not exclusively in totalitarian regimes. Consider, for example, 
pledging allegiance to the flag in the USA or the now defunct practice of standing for the national 
anthem at the end of cinema performances in the UK.
152 See E. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire des Institutions Indo-europeenes, Vol. H, (Paris: Editions de 
Minuity, 1969), p 149, and G. Dumezil, Idees Romaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), pp 83-84.
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In contrast to the quasi-mystical nature of civil religion, Maistre’s second means of 
inculcating political authority -  positive constitutionalism -  is a moderate one.
Where civil religion uses intense pressure to extract sentiments from the subject, 
positive constitutionalism deepens the citizen’s attachment to the state by ensuring 
the moderation and regularity of the sovereign. For positive constitutionalism, 
authority rests on the belief in the validity of defined laws, and of a positive 
competence founded on established, rational rules. It is an authority engendered by 
obedience, “which fulfils its obligation in accordance with established statutes” -  
which is to say, in conformity with procedures and rules which can be explained.153
In contrast to the Enlightenment’s view of the constitution as being purely a check 
on those in power, then, Maistre believed that it creates institutions, assigns 
responsibilities and inculcates aims. In short, it makes a country governable.154 
With this in mind, Maistre promulgated a constitution which is expressly designed to 
strengthen the state, in the belief that, in Holmes’s words, “state capacities can be 
sharply increased by strategic limitations on state power”.155
Maistre begins his exposition of positive constitutionalism by explaining its effect as 
a uniquely Western phenomenon. Whilst oriental potentates possess total 
unmediated power over their subjects, they are liable to assassination by them at any
153 Bayziou, Les Fondements de VAutorite, p. 48.
154 Holmes, Passions and Constraints, p. 101.
155 Ibid., p. 109; see also Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 160.
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time;156 in the West, on the other hand, “Kings surrender the power to judge by 
themselves, and people in return declare the kings infallible and inviolable. Such is 
the fundamental law of the European Monarchy”.157 From this proceeds a crucial 
formula: as power is sacrificed, authority is augmented.
This arrangement, “a miraculous equilibrium”, gives the Prince “all the power which 
does not amount to tyranny, properly speaking, and to the people all the freedom 
which does not exclude indispensable obedience”.158 In other words, positive 
constitutionalism is based on the idea that there are limits which impinge upon the 
sovereign’s freedoms. The absolute sovereign knows a host of restraints: “the 
canons, laws, national customs, sovereignties, great tribunals, national assemblies, 
prescriptions, representations and negations, and the insistence of the call of duty, 
fear, prudence and, above all...opinion, queen of the world”.159
These influences are strong and would have had a part to play even in the most 
severe acts of the old government, when (Maistre argues) the sovereign actually 
acted in moderation: “The most absolutist prince knew a multitude of restraints: he 
was restrained by his own character, by his religion, by shame, by politics, by 
salutary counsel, by public opinion”.160 The curious result of this is a recognition
156 OC V 1 T 2, p. 170: “The immense posterity of Shem and Ham, took another direction. Since 
primitive times until those that we see today, it has always said to man: Do all that you wish and 
when we are ready, we will slaughter you. For the rest, it has never been able or wanted to understand 
that which is a republic, it understands nothing by the balance of powers, nothing of all its privileges, 
of all its fundamental laws of which we are so proud”.
157 Ibid., p. 412.
158 Ibid., p. 414.
159 Ibid., p. 153.
160 OC V 4 T 7, p. 100.
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that limited power is more powerful than that which is unlimited; as Holmes 
comments, “restraints strengthen”.161 A king cannot rule effectively without devices 
to retard his actions; and so, Maistre states: “I confirm to myself every day that it is a 
fact of absolute monarchy, and I tend to believe that the monarch who wants to keep 
his power will do well to sacrifice a portion: or to put it better to legally constrain 
the abuse”.162 There is a world of difference between the absolute monarch and the 
tyrant: “Be persuaded that to strengthen the monarchy it must be seated on laws and 
evade the arbitrary”.163
Maistre builds on Bodin’s attempt to re-conceptualise traditional restraints as 
instruments of princely authority. Institutional arrangements, which are based upon 
a series of forms found in the traditional constitution, make it difficult for the all- 
powerful (from a legal perspective) sovereign to misuse his position. Just as Bodin’s 
treatment of sovereignty transforms the management of conflict within the state,164 
Maistre’s own understanding of public law as ‘political jurisprudence’165 presents a 
model within which the interaction between the sovereign and his subjects is defined 
by relation.
161 Holmes Passions and Constraints, p. 109.
162 O C V  5 T 9, p. 74.
163 Ibid., p. 80.
164 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 137: “Bodin’s treatment of sovereignty builds on a 
distinction between public and private, between the state and the economy, between the sphere of the 
power and that of domination. It recognises the ‘brokenness of the political domain’ as the gulf 
existing between governors and governed that turns politics into conflict management and which 
gives shape to the representative form of the public sphere”.
165 OC V 1 T 2, p. 154: “The essential is for each nation to keep its particular discipline, that it to say 
the sort of usages which, without being dogmatic, nevertheless constitute a part of its public law, and 
these have been amalgamated for a long time with the character of the nation, so that one may not 
touch it without disturbing it or materially displeasing it”.
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Viewing sovereignty in this way -  as something political and factual, but also as 
containing a relational element which is expressed institutionally -  leads Maistre 
once again to consider the question of legitimacy, although this time viewed from 
the perspective of authority rather than power. Where power is “ultimately nothing 
but a blind affirmation of will”, authority “responds to a principle of legitimacy”,166 
he argues. In the political sphere, legitimacy constitutes a barrier against caprice or 
anarchy, the arbitrary or the insensible. The earlier comparison between Maistre’s 
and Arendt’s theories of legitimacy showed that political authority must not be 
confused with domination, nor absorbed into the fact of government. Instead, it 
must correspond to the right to govern: that is, to be licit and well-founded. In 
which case, something other than power must ground and justify it. Legitimacy, an 
expression of political authority, fulfils this task.
The Circle of Legitimacy
According to Loughlin, relationality precedes authority and authority precedes
1 / i n
legitimacy. Certainly this sequence correlates with Maistre’s own understanding 
of the structure of legitimacy, which for him is the cumulative effect of authority (a 
tradition-enhancing concept) and relationality (here, the strengthening of the 
allegiance of subjects to sovereign though the use of constitutional institutions).
The admission of legitimacy as a viable concept by Maistre leads him to develop his
166 See Raynaud and Rials, Dictionnaire de la Philosophie Politique, p. 47.
167 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 81.
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perspective on the Bodinian paradox still further: “When I say that no sovereignty is 
limited”, he comments, “I mean in its legitimate exercise, and it is this that one must 
carefully note”.168
In order to explore the relationship between these concepts in greater detail, Maistre 
introduces the notion of the ‘circle of legitimacy’, a view which is different from 
rational, contractualist ideas of legitimacy which has its democratic roots in civil 
authority. In differing from the contractarians’ understanding of legitimacy, Maistre 
is close to Hume’s conception of the term: Hume, like Maistre, denounced the 
procedural errors of abstract and theoretical rationality in constitutionalist 
doctrines.169 Hume’s belief that reasoning can never provide a basis or guarantee for 
the authority of governments is also clear in Maistre’s work. Power is never 
legitimised though abstract postulation or speculative reason with scientific 
pretensions, it is the very customs, traditions, opinions and habits of the people
170which found political authority. Sovereignty is judged to be legitimate only when 
it coincides with the institutional structure of the country.
According to Maistre, one may, with equal validity, either say that all sovereignty is 
limited or that sovereignty is never limited. It is limited in that no sovereign may do 
all things; equally, it is not limited because, “in its circle of legitimacy, traced by the
168 O C V  IT  2, p. 178.
169 David Hume, David Hume’s Political Essays, ed. Charles W. Hendel (New York: Liberal Arts 
Press, 1953), especially “Of the Original Contract”, “Of Passive Obedience” and “Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth”.
170 David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government”, “Of the Original Contract”, “Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth”, “Of the Coalition of Parties” and “Of the Rise and Regress of the Arts and 
Sciences”.
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fundamental laws of each country, it is always and everywhere absolute, so that no 
person has the right to say that it is unjust or mistaken”. For Maistre, legitimacy 
does not consist of sovereignty conducting itself in a certain manner within its circle 
but in never transgressing the circumeference, defined by the fundamental 
consitutional laws.171 These fundamental laws to which Maistre refers are the wider 
political practices which form a part of and at the same time contextualise 
sovereignty;172 they do not modify its nature but guarantee and reinforce its
1 n o
majesty. In other words, “the maintenance of forms following the fundamental 
laws alters neither the essence nor the rights of sovereignty”.174
Sovereignty does not lose its dignity when it is restrained by a natural constitution 
regulated by fundamental laws. The legitimacy of power, prescribed by the limits of 
the circle, the fundamental laws, permits a determinate exercise of sovereignty, 
whilst at the same time preserving its prerogatives. The circle which Maistre 
describes allows sovereign power to be contained but not judged.175 Furthermore, 
the constraints imposed upon it by legitimacy do not weaken sovereignty, but 
strengthen it, and its juridical absoluteness is kept intact even as its factual exercise 
is restrained. The circle formed by the fundamental laws allows the attributes of
171 O C V  1 T2,p .  178.
172 For a discussion of fundamental laws in general, see Chapter 3.
173 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, pp. 156-157: “The [durable legal] framework [of government] 
must be conceived as a set of formal practices rooted within, and acquiring identity from, a wider 
body of political practices. The expression ‘fundamental law’ is a reference to these wider political 
practices”.
174 O C V  1 T 2, p. 179.
175 See Michael Rabier, “La Couronne et la Tiare: Joseph de Maistre, Philosophe de 
L’ultramontanisme”, in Joseph de Maistre: Dossiers H (Lausanne: Editions de l’Age d’Homme, 
2005), p. 436ff.
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sovereignty to be politically contextualised, but the manner in which these attributes 
are used may not be judged. Maistre reaffirms this point at some length:
And when I speak of the legitimate exercise of sovereignty, I do not intend or 
I do not speak of its just exercise... one does not wish to say that all that it 
does in its circle is just or held to be so: that which is the truth. It is thus that 
a superior court, provided that it does not exceed its functions, is always 
right; for it is the same thing in the practice of being infallible or of being 
mistaken without possibility of appeal.176
The clear distinction between legitimacy and justice that Maistre makes here is an 
attempt to retain the absolute character of sovereignty even while accepting its 
political qualities. Questions of justice may not be considered, so that the stability 
and thus the unity of the political environment may be preserved. This is, however, 
to assume that sovereignty remains within its prescribed boundaries. What, though, 
is the situation if this circle of legitimacy is breached and the limits of legitimate 
sovereign power exceeded? Maistre’s response to this question is complex and is in 
two parts. The first consists of an exploration of the possibility of the right of 
resistance; the second, which is an analysis of the figure of the Pope as sovereign, is 
the key to some of the more profound questions thrown up by the relationship 
between sovereignty as power and as authority in Maistre’s work.
176 OC V 1 T 2, pp. 274-275.
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The first response: The abuse o f power and the right o f resistance
Maistre’s views on the question of whether resistance to the sovereign is ever 
permissible can be seen in some respects as a direct response to -  and even a rebuttal 
of -  the work of John Locke, with which Maistre was familiar.177 In the Two 
Treatises,178 Locke discusses in some detail the conditions under which subjects may 
rightfully employ forcible resistance against the government. He believes that 
resorting to such force is warranted when the abuse of governmental power is so 
manifest and widespread that the government has lost all claim to legitimacy, and 
when every other avenue of lawful redress has been closed.179
Locke’s view is that forcible resistance to government cannot legitimately be 
undertaken by an individual subject simply on his own account, but should be 
motivated only by the collective oppression of the people. Furthermore, such 
resistance is admissible only when “The Legislative acts against the Trust reposed in 
them, when they endeavour to invade the Property of the Subject, and to make 
themselves, or any part of the Community, Masters, or arbitrary Disposers of the 
Lives, Liberties or Fortunes of the People”.180
177 Examples of Maistre mentioning Locke: OC V 1 T 1, p. 236; Archives Cote 2 J 15-18 CD 18 nb. 
p. 99 and nb. p. 403.
178 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960).
179 Ibid., pp. 414—415.
180 Ibid., p. 412.
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Of intrinsic importance here is Locke’s belief that a government may cease to be 
legitimate by abusing the trust of the people, whereupon the state of nature is 
restored through the intervention of the people (via rebellion or revolution), who 
then “have a Right to resume their original Liberty and establish a new 
Legislative”.181 But who is to be the judge as to whether or not the government 
really has abused their trust? Ultimately, it must be the people themselves: “Who 
shall be Judge whether the Prince or legislative act contrary to their Trust?...I reply: 
The People shall be Judge...but if the Prince declines that way of Determination, the 
appeal then lies nowhere but Heaven”.182
Maistre attacks Locke for reasons common to all the philosopher’s detractors, who 
criticise him for the vagueness and imprecision of his arguments.183 Maistre’s own 
critique begins, unsurprisingly, with a bold statement of belief that rebellion in any 
form is unacceptable. “The moment that one can resist it [i.e. the government] under 
the pretext of error or injustice, it no longer exists”,184 he argues, but Maistre cannot 
ignore the actual existence of revolution; after all, he admits, “One can deprive a 
nation, despite itself, of a legitimate sovereign”;185 elsewhere he says: “When
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., p. 427.
183 See, for example, E. J. Lowe, Locke (London: Routledge, 2005): “Locke is rather vague 
concerning the means by which the people’s judgement is supposed to emerge”; see also Peter Laslett 
in his Introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, p.l 15: “The trend of Locke’s statements about the 
ultimate right of the people to revolt is quite unmistakeable. But close examination shows that it was 
not formulated with much precision, and its connection with the concept of trust has to be filled in for 
him. In the chapter of the dissolution of government he is not at all explicit about what actually 
happens when people find themselves at liberty to entrust new hands with the government”.
184 O C V  IT  2, p. 2.
185 O C V 7 T 1 3 ,p p .  51-52.
217
authority commands, there are only three paths to take -  obedience, representation 
and revolt”.186
However, for Maistre, even if one were to concede the right to resistance from a 
theoretical or moral perspective, problems would remain in terms of the practical 
application of that right. “I strongly admire these beautiful maxims [i.e. 
philosophes’ theories on the right to resist],” writes Maistre, “but they possess the 
fault of not shedding any light on the question of deciding on hard cases, where 
theories are useless. When one decides ...that one has the right to resist the 
sovereign power and to make it re-enter its limits, one has not yet done anything 
because it remains to know when one may exercise this right and which men have 
that [right] of exercising it”.187 The right of resistance may thus be justified when the 
abuse of power -  in the form of tyranny -  arises.
But how are we to agree on what tyranny is? There is always someone for whom 
any constraint will appear tyrannical. At what point does an abuse of power 
begin?188 Indeed, Maistre tacitly acknowledges this problem: “We believe that 
perfection does not belong to humanity. Every sovereign...necessarily abuses his 
power more or less in such a way that if all abuse of power is called tyranny and if
186 O C V  1 T2,p .  89.
187 Ibid., p. 174.
188 Ibid., ‘The most ardent promoters of the right of resistance agree (and who could doubt them?) 
that it should only be justified by tyranny. But what is tyranny? A single act, if it is atrocious, may it 
bear the name? If there must be more than one, how many must there be, and of what type?”
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every tyranny legitimates insurrection, all the people would be all the time in a state 
of insurrection”.189
Nor do the problems end there, for when a case that fits the definition of tyranny has 
been found, the question remains as to who will make the decision to initiate 
revolution: “What power in the state has the right to decide that the case for 
resistance has arrived? If the tribunal [making the decision] already exists it would 
already form a part of [the existing]sovereignty, and in acting against the other 
portion would cancel it out; if it did not already exist, by which tribunal is this [new] 
tribunal established?”190 Clearly, there could be infinite regression in this process. 
Maistre also believed that the act of resistance could degenerate into something 
worse than the original wrong: a precedent for revolution. In essence, it would 
justify a priori all revolt against sovereignty: “A fine experience has taught us that 
the worst evils that come from obedience do not equal the smallest part of that which 
results from revolt”.191
Maistre’s dismantling of Locke’s arguments shows that he does not accept a role for 
the people in the determination of sovereignty. He does, however, believe in a form 
of constituent power; the political does ground the legal in Maistrian constitutional 
thought. For Maistre, then, sovereignty is based upon political relations and
I8y O C V  4 T 7, p. 60.
190 O C V  IT  2, p. 174.
191 Ibid., p. 89; see also pp. 174-175: “History has only one cry, to teach us that revolutions started by 
the wisest men are always finished by fools; that their authors are always victims of them, and that 
the efforts of the people to create or increase their liberty almost always finish with them being 
clapped in irons. One can see the abyss on both sides”.
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constitutional institutions. We have, however, also seen in his work a command- 
oriented, juridical view of the sovereign who wields power without the consent of 
his subjects, and who imposes a regime based upon the source rather than the 
content of the laws.
These two opposing aspects of sovereignty -  of power and authority -  are a further 
development of two strains of Maistre’s constitutional thought that have also been 
identified in his work on constituent power and consitutions: on the one hand 
notions such as law, normativity, command and decision can be grouped together 
(along with power). On the other (along with authority) are grouped the 
constitutional values of legitimacy, fact, relation, politics and tradition.
What has not yet been considered in this thesis is whether a connection between 
these elements exists. On the one hand, if sovereignty is understood only in the 
juridical sense it may lead to tyranny; on the other hand, if sovereignty is only 
considered from the political perspective, it might be identified solely with pure 
popular legitimacy. How, then, do these two opposing vews of sovereignty relate to 
each other, if at all? This question is examined in Du Pape, in which Maistre’s 
defence of infallibility and the primacy of the Pope is a task that is carried out with 
reference to the secular notion of sovereignty. Indeed, Du Pape is an exposition of 
the core components of sovereignty in the modem age, and it is to this work that we 
now turn.
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The second response: The significance o f Du Pape and the notion o f infallibility
In the previous section we learnt that Maistre denied the possibility that the people 
could wield any constituent power, but at the same time he acknowledged that an 
energy equivalent to this revolutionary urge exists within the constitution.192 
Consequently, Maistre needed to find an alternative receptacle in which to contain 
this energy, and this takes the form of an authoritarian figure: for Maistre, this is the 
legislator, but it can also be the Pope.193
Just as the legislator is the factual instigator of constitutional order in Maistre’s 
work, so the Pope acts as a factual limit on the juridical power of the temporal 
sovereign, should he seek to transgress the limits of the circle of legitimacy 
surrounding him.194 In order to avoid the charge that he has, despite his best 
intentions, described a force capable of overthrowing the sovereign, Maistre argues 
that the Papacy is no actual challenge to the temporal sovereign because its power 
belongs to the sphere of the spiritual, saying: “They have only ever claimed the
192 See Chapter 3.
193 Indeed, Maistre sees the functions of sovereign and legislator coalsecing in the same figure -  see 
OC V 1 T 1, pp. 346-347: “Almost all the great legislators were kings...thus the greatest legislators 
were sovereigns”.
194 OC V 1 T 2, p. 182: “But if it is absolutely necessary to arrive at positing legal limits for the 
sovereign power, I would hope with all my heart that the interests of humanity were confided in the 
Holy Father”.
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right to judge princes which was granted to them in the spiritual order, when these 
princes were made themselves guilty of certain crimes”.195
Whilst superficially this may appear as a return to the medieval order of things,196 
the true significance of Maistre’s argument is intimately connected to the intellectual 
currents of his era concerning the right of resistance. In fact, Maistre’s profile of the 
Pope, in this interpretation, is an exploration of how to limit the possibility of abuse 
by the sovereign without granting the people the right to undertake such a task. In 
this sense, it is a restatement of his argument for an authoritarian constituent power 
separated from any notion of democratic participation.197 Maistre both concedes the 
need for constituent power and acknowledges its force, but, not wishing to accept its 
populist implications, he seeks to retain its effect but change the nature of its cause. 
He does so by contrasting the nuanced skill of the Pope with the crude ineffectuality 
of the people.198
Maistre’s attempt to accept that legal sovereignty suffers intrusion from the political 
domain without making any concessions to democracy is not overly successful. In 
Francis Bayle’s words, “In Our own age, when political questions are more and more
195 Ibid., p. 248; see also OC V 1 T 2, p. 250: “What is then this temporal all powerfulness which has 
no temporal force, which ask for nothing temporal or territorial.. .which anathematises all attacks on 
the temporal power and whose temporal power is so weak that the bourgeois of Rome often mock it?”
196 Ibid., p. 257. People in the Middle Ages only had useless laws and corrupt morals.. It was thus 
necessary to look for this indispensable restraint from elsewehre. This restraint was found and could 
only be found in the authority of the popes.
197 Ibid., p. 182: “But if the right to resist changed into the right to prevent and instead of it residing in 
the subject, it belonged to a power of another order, the problems would not be the same because this 
hypothesis allows for ressitance without revolution and without any violation of sovereignty”.
198 Ibid., pp. 182-183: “Moreover, this right to oppose, resting on one known and unique head, would 
be subject to rules and exerised with all imaginable prudence and with all imaginable subtlety: 
whereas internal resistance may only be exercised by subjects, by the masses, by th epeople and a 
waord and consequently only by the way of inusrection.”
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of laicised character and when the temporal sovereignty of the papacy is no more 
than a necessary symbol which assures the free exercise of the spiritual power of the 
sovereign Pontiff, [the argument in Du Pape] seems to us a utopia which parts from 
the generally realist tenor of Maistre’s arguments.”199 The problem is one that 
relentlessly plagues his constitutional thought: Maistre struggles to reconcile three 
conflicting factors, these being his recognition of modern constitutional concepts, a 
desire to show orthodoxy in matters of faith and his wish to defend the authoritarian, 
conservative political order.
It is in his attempt to explain the Pope’s ability to control modem sovereignty that 
the fragility of a position based on this triad of irreconcilable aims is most harshly 
exposed. Nevertheless, at the very least, the use of the figure of the Pope in this way 
is a further acknowledgment of the impossibility of sealing sovereignty into the 
sphere of the juridical. Bayle comments that, “the excesses of the French 
Revolution had reinforced Maistre’s profound hostility to disorder. He did not wish 
to leave to the people the right of deciding to themselves and sought to confer the 
duty to a superior power”.200 The Pope is an exterior force that might legitimately 
break through to disturb the enclosed normative sphere if abuses occur. It is a 
reminder of the proximity of fact to norm and of politics to law in discussions of 
sovereign power.
199 Francis Bayle, Les Idees Politiques de Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1988), p. 
107.
200 Bayle, Les Idees, p. 108.
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The possibility that there might be an alternative interpretation of Du Pape is 
provided by the ambiguous vocabulary Maistre uses to express the respective duties, 
rights and status of the temporal monarch and the Pope.201 In this reading, the Pope 
is not viewed as a species of factual limit on juridical sovereignty -  a force which 
may interject into sovereignty’s sphere -  but instead is seen as the epitome of the 
command-oriented sovereign. This reading is reinforced by the ambiguity between 
the political and the theological that Maistre encourages throughout the book,202 an 
ambiguity specifically engaged by his use of the notion of infallibility. For Maistre: 
“Infallibility in the spiritual order and sovereignty in the temporal order are two 
perfect synonyms”.203
This ambivalence regarding the institutional identity of the holder of the supreme 
power (king or pope), and the associated confusion regarding the sphere in which 
discourse is conducted (theology or politics), means that in a number of places 
Maistre’s work does not emphasise the importance of who the holder of the power 
is, but instead stresses the qualities of the characteristic itself. As a result, in places
201 It is also based upon the evidence of Maistre’s dealings with the Vatican regarding publication of 
the work. Maistre desired an official endorsement of his work from the Holy See, and there ensued a 
lengthy correspondence between him and the Curia, after which the theologian charged with 
reviewing Maistre’s work reported: “The author recognised that he was censured by me with reason 
for having founded the infallibility of the church and the Pope on the fact that their judgments were 
without appeal.. .for having spoken with, at the very least, a great deal of exaggeration againt the 
authority of the general councils; for having desgnated as common to all Catholics, the view that 
lends to the Church a monarchic form, tempered by aristocracy.. .in disavowing these passages, he 
[Maistre] still retains a certain attachment to opinions which he puts forward, and one may fear, 
correctly, that the modifications [he has made] are not sufficient to change their meaning”, (from the 
Introduction to Du Pape: Edition Critique, ed. Jacques Lovie et Joannes Chetail (Geneva: Droz, 
1966), p. xxxi. Maistre’s refusal to change these views on the cross-pollination between the political 
and the religious realms -  a refusal which came at the expense of papal endorsement -  demonstrates 
the strength of his commitment to his point of view.
202 See above, p. 191, footnote 81.
203 O C V  1 T2,p .  2.
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it is infallibility itself that determines whether or not an institution is sovereign: “The 
only, but certainly important difference that exists between civil and religious 
society is that, in the first, the sovereign may fool himself so that the infallibility 
which is accorded to him is only a supposition (which has however all the force of 
reality) whilst spiritual government is necessarily infallible, literally speaking”.204
By conceiving of sovereignty as an act in this way, Maistre provided intellectual fuel 
for future commentators: this significant innovation has had an impact on 
contemporary conceptions of sovereignty, and in particular on the work of that 
paradigmatic theorist of sovereignty in the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt. His 
1922 work, Political Theology,205 drew heavily on Maistre in its attempts to re­
define the concept of sovereignty by exploring how largely undefined emergency 
powers play a role in the interpretive “gaps” of a constitutional order. Schmitt 
was keen to emphasise that, for Maistre, infallibility was the attribute which 
predominantly defines sovereignty, saying: “De Maistre spoke with particular 
fondness of sovereignty which essentially meant decision...infallibility was for him 
the essence of decision.. .”207 Schmitt rightly suggests that this moment of supreme 
decision-making is based on the sovereign capacity to judge without possibility of
204 OC V 4 T 8, p. 145: “Because sovereignty is infallible by its nature, God first divinised this law”; 
OC V 1 T 2, p. 2: “When we say that the church is infallible...we demand only that she enjoys the 
right common to all sovereigns, who all act necessarily as if they were infallible because all 
government is absolute, and the moment that one may resist under pretext of error or injustice, it no 
longer exists”; ibid.: “The government is thus by its nature infallible, which is to say absolute, 
otherwise it would no longer govern”.
205 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985)
206 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000),
p. 45.
7 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 55.
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appeal, arguing that “what characterised [Maistre’s and Donoso Cortes’] 
counterrevolutionary political philosophy was the recognition that their times needed 
a decision. And with an energy that rose to an extreme .. .they thrust the notion of 
decision to the centre of their thinking”.208 Certainly Maistre did interpret 
infallibility by repeatedly emphasising the importance of making a judgment or 
reaching a judicial decision when carrying out of the work of sovereignty. 209
Building upon his interpretation, Schmitt identifies the object of the sovereign 
decision as being a component of the process which is as important as the act itself. 
In asserting that the “sovereign is he who decides upon the exception”, Schmitt 
identifies the sovereign decision as a limit concept which can only be understood in 
the light of an emergency situation occurring when the very existence of the political
o 1 ncommunity is at stake. Schmitt’s theory of a sovereign decision is a decision 
taken to determine what constitutes a threat to public safety in situations where the 
meaning of public safety has become an object for endless argument,211 and here 
too, his argument finds its roots in Maistre’s discussion of the nature of sovereignty:
It is not possible for man to create a law which has no need of an exception. 
The impossibility on this point results equally from human weakness which
209 O C V  1 T 2, p. 2: “Infallibility ... and sovereignty express this high power... which judges and is 
not judged”.
210 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6.
211 Ibid.: “From a practical or a theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract 
scheme advanced to define sovereignty (namely that sovereignty is the highest power not a derived 
power) is acceptable....What is argued about is the concrete application and that means who decides 
in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and 
order, le salut public and so on”.
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cannot foresee all and from the nature of things, some of which vary to the 
power of leaving the circle., .with the result that in all legislation, it is 
necessary to have a dispensing power. For wherever there is no dispensation, 
there is violation.
But every violation of the law is dangerous or fatal for it, whilst all 
dispensation strengthens it because one cannot demand to have dispensation
from something without paying homage to it and without admitting that has
. 212no power against it.
According to this complex interpretation, in extreme cases, sovereignty effectively 
decides what is and what is not constitutional, and by performing this feat it shows 
itself to be sovereign. An act may, according to the sovereign’s decision, remain 
constitutional whilst breaching the bounds of what is strictly normative,213 and in 
Schmitt’s eyes the situations in which this event is likely to occur are like “x-ray 
flashes which suddenly reveal the antinomies of legal reason”.214 Maistre, though 
not specifying the specific circumstances in which this power is to be used, is once 
again clearly a strong influence on Schmitt.
212 OC V 1 T 2, p. 176; see also OC V 2 T 3, p. 341: “Man only knows how to make general laws, 
and by the same token they are by their nature unjust in part because they can never cover all cases. 
The exception to the rule is equally as just as the rule itself, and wherever there is no means of 
dispensation, exception or mitigation there will necessarily be violation.
213 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12: “In such a situation it remains clear that the state remains, 
whereas law recedes. Because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic 
sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind”.
214 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, p. 45.
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According to Maistre, this faculty is only to be used in times of “extraordinary 
circumstance” or in case of “necessity”.215 The basis for a decision of this type is to 
be found in the sovereign’s right to give grace,a transportation of the miracle into the 
realm of the secular. This is a phenomenon that Maistre refers to in his writing,216 
and of which Schmitt too is fully aware.217 To perform this task, the sovereign must 
sit on the border between the normative and the factual because his dispensation 
involves reaching out into realms beyond the limits of the positivised law. In this 
way, sovereignty expresses both the closing and the opening of the political-juridical 
system. Maistre’s sovereign, here embodied in the figure of the Pope, sits on a 
demarcation line which divides not only the profane from the sacred but also the 
juridical from the political.
For Schmitt, the Maistrian sovereign is important because it stands in contrast to 
modem, liberal positivist theories which seek to eliminate sovereignty as a political 
force.218 In Maistre’s model the state can never be a fully impersonalised, neutral 
system of norms because it also involves a political relationship between real,
215 OC V 1 T 2, pp. 99-100: “Ask the Pope if he intends to govern and to scoff at the Canons, you 
would horrify him. Ask all the bishops of the catholic world if they understand that extraordinary 
circumstances may not legitimate abrogations, exceptions, derogations and sovereignty, in the church 
would become sterile like an old woman, so that it would lose the right, inherent in all power to 
produce new laws in the measure that new situations demand them. They would think that you are 
joking”.
216 OC V 1 T 1, p. 2: “In the political and moral world, as in the physical world, there is an habitual 
order and there are exceptions to this order. Commonly we see a sequence of facts produced by the 
same cause, but at certain times we see actions suspended, causes paralysed and new effects... the 
miracle is an effect produced by a divine or supernatural cause which suspends or contradicts an 
ordinary cause. The French Revolution ... is as marvellous in its domain as a tree spontaneously 
bearing fruit in the month of January”.
217 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 36.
218 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 7: “All tendencies of modem constitutional development point 
towards eliminating the sovereign in this sense”.
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concrete actors and a sovereign whose decisions have ramifications in both the
219juridical and political spheres.
Conclusion
There are a number of constitutional antinomies which find their most acute 
expression in Maistre’s conception of sovereignty. However, there is none more 
important than the dialectic between authority and power, and this dialectic is as 
complex as the notion of sovereignty which the two values define. Schmitt, who 
does not grasp this complexity, reduces Maistre’s concept of sovereignty to the 
moment of decision, an act in which the state shrinks to an instant of existential 
intensity. Whilst Schmitt acknowledges that authority and power are both critical to 
the early development of Maistre’s concept of sovereignty, he misinterprets their 
subsequent intellectual trajectory. In his book The Leviathan in the State Theory o f 
Thomas Hobbes, Schmitt considers Hobbes’s famous dictum, auctoritas non veritas 
facit legem, the apogee of a positivised understanding of sovereignty:
Auctoritas (in the sense summa potestas), non veritas. This sentence, often 
cited since 1922 as expressed by Hobbes, is anything but a slogan of 
irrational despotism. Nor should the expression be regarded as a kind of 
credo quia absurdum [impossible belief] as it has so often been
219 OC V 1 T 2, p. 7: “It is not only a question of knowing whether a sovereign pontiff is, but if he 
must be infallible”.
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misunderstood. What is significant in the statement is Hobbes’ conclusion
that it is no longer valid to distinguish between auctoritas and potestas,
2,2,0making the summa potestas into summa auctoritas.
This conclusion, written against the bleak constitutional backdrop of Nazi Germany, 
focuses the whole weight of sovereignty onto command and will, and leads quite 
evidently to a totalitarian conclusion. However, a crucial component of Maistre’s 
notion of sovereignty is the distinction that is maintained in his work between 
potestas and auctoritas, a dialectic which is clearly expressed in his theory of 
sovereignty. It is by no means an easy relationship to comprehend. Rudolph Smend 
comments that: “the norm receives the grounds of validity, the quality of its validity 
and the content of its validity from life and the sense attributed to it, just as inversely 
life must be understood only in relation to is assigned and regulated vital sense”.
Similarly, Giorgio Agamben believes that the dialectic of authority and power means 
that “The norm can be applied to the normal situation and can be suspended without 
totally annulling the juridical order, because in the form of auctoritas, or sovereign 
decision, it refers immediately to life, it springs from life”.222 These are ways of 
attempting to comprehend the creative mutuality of power and authority in 
sovereignty, a relation that certainly exists in Maistre’s thought on the matter.
220 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure o f a 
Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab and Ema Hilfstein (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 
44-45.
221 Rudolph Smend, “Intergrationslehre”, in Handworterbuch der Sozzialwissenschaft, Vol. 5. 
(Stuttgart: Fisher, 1956), p 300, cited in Georgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), p. 85.
222 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 85.
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Certainly they describe the morphology of Maistre’s idea of sovereignty; it is a 
composite structure formed by two heterogeneous yet co-ordinated elements (power 
and authority) which are accommodated in, but not unified by, the figure/function of 
the sovereign. This is the asymmetric oscillation about which Holmes has 
commented.223 The normative element of sovereignty requires the factual / political 
so that it may be explicated institutionally, whilst that aspect of sovereignty which 
comprises authority “can assert itself only in the validation or suspension of
0 0  Apotestas”. An emphasis on sovereign power would result in sovereignty 
becoming confused with the notion of pure domination, whilst an exclusive focus on 
sovereign authority would lead to sovereignty’s total identification with 
legitimacy.225
In Agamben’s view, the danger lies not so much in the merging of power and 
authority into a single concept but in their coincidence in a single person. When this 
happens “.. .then the juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing
0 0  f\machine”. This is a portentous conclusion, which highlights only the extreme 
pathological case. As long as the two elements remain conceptually, temporally and 
subjectively distinct, the dialectic between them can function without such an 
apocalyptic conclusion -  and unlike Schmitt’s model, Maistre’s conception of 
sovereignty allows for this necessary articulation.
223 See above, p.201
224 Agamben State of Exception, p 86.
225 Raynaud and Rials Dictionnaire de la Philosophic Politique, p. 735
226Agamben, State of Exception, p. 86
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The consideration of power and authority in Maistre’s view of sovereignty can also 
help us to carry out a more prosaic, constitutional task: the continued management of 
tensions in the modem state. The sovereign may decide, in moments of extreme 
threat to the consitution, on the exception. This is necessary for any constitution to 
function227 -  Maistre’s is, after all, a government of men and not an administration 
of things -  but this power is not performed in existential solitude. Instead, that part 
of sovereignty which is formed by tradition, political relation and political 
institutions by the very fact of their being contextualises, enriches and controls the 
sovereign power’s actions.
Maistre’s work demonstrates that the modem idea of sovereignty is the most 
appropriate framework for grappling with the tensions between authority and power 
in the modem constitutional environment. His notion of sovereignty has a super­
structure of power, and has foundations that are built upon the nourishment of 
political authority. Profoundly undemocratic, it nonetheless expresses perfectly the
99Rfact that “sovereignty inheres in the authority/power relationship”, and helps 
further to elucidate the fact that the modem state exists as an unresolved tension 
between two irreconcilable dispositions. His view of sovereignty describes the warp 
and woof of these two elements; it brings out the complex and creative potential of
227 Martin Loughlin, “Constitutional Theory”, in The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25 
(2005), pp. 183-202: “The issue of the exception is of pivotal importance inconsitutional thoery, and it 
is one for which there can be no legal-institutional solution”.
228 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 160.
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the notion of modem sovereignty and show us how competing juridical and political 
tensions in the modern consitution may be both envisaged and accommodated.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAISTRE AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
Introduction
This chapter deals with Maistre’s examination of the act of governing as it is 
expressed in different constitutional forms. Through these forms, Maistre explores 
the different modes of association which exist within the modem European state1 
and addresses other, associated questions: how is the character of the act of 
governing to be conceptualised? What is the nature of the office of government and 
the object or objects that are governed? How is the authority of the sovereign to be 
imposed? Is there a ‘best’ form of government? These questions strike at the heart 
of one of Maistre’s fundamental constitutional concerns -  the relationship between 
the individual and the State.
Maistre describes and analyses a complex relationship between those who govern 
and those who are governed. In dealing with the relationship between these two 
groups, Maistre is mindful that, to be effective, sovereignty (in its modem iteration) 
must be conducted through the use of impersonal forms,2 and he recognises the vital
1 But note also the influence of Aristotle on Maistre,see The Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: 
Penguin, 1962).
2 See Chapter 4.
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importance of the relationship between command and obedience for the coherence 
of the constitutional order;3 and the maintenance of a sense of constitutional unity.4
One of the most striking aspects of Maistre’s methodology,5 is its similarity to the 
work of Montesquieu, in particular as it is presented in De I’Esprit des Lois {Of the 
Spirit o f the Laws).6 Given Montesquieu’s reputation as one of the founding fathers 
of the Enlightenment, and thus of modern democratic liberalism,7 the suggestion of a 
connection between him and the traditionalist Savoyard must come as a surprise. 
Nonetheless, a number of similarities exist between them which need to be drawn 
out in order to establish the nature of the influences acting upon Maistre’s views on 
governing.
In fact, reading Maistre’s work on the forms of government in the light of the De 
VEsprit des Lois presents a challenge to the modem view that there exists a stark 
Manichean division between the dark (the receding paradigm of the counter-
3 Perhaps the first explicit modern statement of this predicament is to be found in the work of 
Machiavelli: see, for example, The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1961), pp. 3-4; see 
also Simone Goyard-Fabre, Les Principes Philosophiques du Droit Politique Modeme (Paris: PUF, 
1997), pp. 49-58.
4 See Chapter 1, p.51 ff.
5 See O C V l T l , p p .  311-553.
6 Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu, De VEsprit des Lois, ed. Laurent 
Versisni, 2 Vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995).
7 See, for example, Jean Picq, Historie et Droit des Etats: La Souverainete dans le Temps et I’Espace 
Europeens (Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses, 2005), p. 265. See also Yoshie Kawade, “Montesquieu”, 
in Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 232: “We are now in a position to assess his contribution to the 
development of modem political liberalism. In the first instance Montesquieu’s contribution to the 
development of liberalism is through his formulation of some of the essential principles and 
commitments of liberal politics”. See also Maurice Cranston, “French Enlightenment”, in The 
Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1987), p. 166: “The 
political theorists of the French Enlightenment may be divided into three main competing
schools.. ..the parliamentarians led by Montesquieu”.
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Enlightenment)8 and the light (the emerging values of the Enlightenment).9 It 
demonstrates that a range of thinkers -  including those considered enemies of 
progress -  drew inspiration from the same sources as those identified with the 
worldview of the philosophes. Consequently, the influence of Montesquieu on 
Maistre’s work should lead to a recognition that Maistre’s thought is nuanced and 
complex and -  in his recognition of the subtle dynamics of power and authority 
reflected in the forms of government -  thoroughly modem.
Maistre and Montesquieu
Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois
De VEsprit des Lois is one of the most brilliant and intellectually challenging 
contributions to political theory in the eighteenth century.10 Setting the tone for 
modem social and political thought by linking history and law, Montesquieu 
conducts an examination of a range of political structures, often in a startlingly 
original manner. Instead of enquiring into the foundations of power in terms of God, 
nature or the social contract, for example, Montesquieu aimed to explore the 
concrete principles which determine how political societies function. He thus sought
8 For an account of the relationship between the concepts of the counter-Enlightenment and those of 
the Enlightenment, see Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to 
the Present (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-15.
9 As is proposed by Ernst Cassirer in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 209: “Within the era of enlightenment the first decisive attempt at the 
foundation of a philosophy of history is made by Montesquieu in De I’Esprit des Lois. This work 
ushers in a new epoch”.
10See Olivier Nay, Histoire des Idees Politiques (Paris: Armand Collin, 2007), p. 207.
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to identify the profound causes which explain the diversity of laws, customs, mores 
and ideas which distinguish one nation from another.11
Montesquieu thus wished to explain the esprit general of the people as being the 
result of a combination of juridical, political, geographical, climatic, social, 
economic and religious conditions. To this end, in books I-XII of De I’Esprit des 
Lois, Montesquieu embarks upon a detailed description of the main forms of 
government, arguing that every form of government -  be it monarchy, aristocracy, 
republic or despotism -  has both a nature12 and a principle. Its nature -  what makes 
a government what it is and gives it its structure -  is determined by who rules and 
the manner in which they rule. Its principle is the motivation by which that 
government is driven -  it is that which makes it act.13 In monarchies, says 
Montesquieu, the principle is that of honour.14 In democracies and aristocracies the
11 Consider certain chapter headings in De I’Esprit des Lois: Livre quatorzieme -  “Des Lois dans le 
Rapport qu’elles ont avec la Nature du Climat”; Livre dix-huitieme -  “Des Lois dans le Rapport 
qu’elles ont avec la Nature de Terrain; Livre dix-neuvieme -  “Des Lois dans le Rapport qu’elles ont 
avec les Principes qui Forment l ’Esprit General, les Moeurs et les Manieres d’une Nation”.
12 Montesquieu, De VEsprit des Lois, p. 97: “There are three forms of government: the republican, the 
monarchic and the despotic. To discover the nature of each it is enough to use an idea which even the 
least educated man understands. I maintain three definitions, or rather three facts: the republican 
government is one where the people as a body, or only a part of the people, has sovereign power; the 
monarchical, that in which one alone governs but by fixed and established laws; whereas in the 
despotic one alone without law and without regulations dominates all by his will and his whims.
This is what I call the nature of each government. It is necessary to see the laws which directly follow 
from this nature”.
13 Ibid., p. 114: “There is this difference between the nature of a government and its principle, its 
nature is that which makes it what it is and its principle is that which makes it act. One is its particular 
structure and the other the human passions which move it”.
14 Montesquieu, De VEsprit des Lois, p. 123.
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relevant principle is that of virtue,15 whilst in the case of despotism the motivating 
principle is fear.16
Experience and history have demonstrated that the categories of republic, monarchy 
and despotism either exist now or have existed in the past; Montesquieu 
acknowledges this fact, but distances himself from the traditional Aristotelian 
threefold classification of governments in two ways. First, whereas monarchy is an 
easy constitutional concept to define -  it is essentially “government by one alone” -  
republican government is complex: it can either be democratic or aristocratic. And 
despotism, far from being a degenerate species of monarchy, constitutes its own 
category.17 Second, Montesquieu makes the bipartite distinction between 
governments which are moderate and those -  the despotic -  which are not. This 
structural overlay sheds new light on the first typology, between the monarchical 
and the republican.18
This means that, in contrast to the straightforward uniformity of despotism, 
moderate governments are complex: “to form a moderate government it is necessary 
to combine the powers, regulate them, temper them, to make them act, to put one so
15 Political virtue is distinct from moral and Christian virtue; it is synonymous with love of the 
republic. See Montesquieu, De L'Esprit des Lois, p. 148.
16 Fear of punishment is the principle of despotism, where obedience to orders will suffer neither 
delay nor discussion (ibid,, p. 125). In such states, submission is obtained by the fact that the least 
refusal to obey is punished without mercy. Only iron discipline can keep order, which is not a true 
peace but the silence of captive spirits. The apprehension of immediate punishment inhibits all 
spontaneous activity, and blind obedience can only be passive. Coercion is incapable of encouraging 
individual initiative, and so is very beneficial to the state. The despot himself cannot escape fear, 
because violent insurrection is the only possible solution to effect change in a despotic state (ibid., p. 
175).
17 Montesquieu, De I’Esprit des Lois, p. 124: “Honour is absolutely not the principle of despotic 
states”.
18 Celine Spector, Le Vocabularie de Montesquieu (Paris: Ellipses 2001), p. 45.
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to speak one against the other so that they resist each other”.19 Moderate regimes are 
those in which individuals are protected from arbitrary cruelty, because restraint 
reigns in moderate governments. However, moderation is not to be equated with 
liberty, it only facilitates liberty -  every state is not free by its nature.20 Moreover, 
the concept of moderation involves the notion of some form of distribution of power 
in order to prevent abuse.21
It is easy to see that the direct contrast that Montesquieu draws between moderate 
and despotic government is a criticism of absolutists such as Hobbes, thinkers with 
whom Maistre has a certain affinity. Montesquieu’s view is that the state which 
concentrates its powers and functions into one place, and where the law is only a 
command founded upon public force, is not an all-powerful state but is, in all 
respects, miserable.22 This seems to go against Maistre’s natural inclination to 
clearly define a Bodinian style of sovereign relation, with power concentrated 
entirely in the hands of the sovereign. How is it possible to imagine a relationship 
between these two constitutional thinkers that is not simply one of direct contrast? 
Unravelling this question reveals a layer of complexity in Maistre’s thought which is 
frequently ignored.
19 Montesquieu, De L ’Esprit des Lois, p. 181.
20 Ibid., p. 323 (Book XI: On the laws that form political liberty in its relationship with the 
consitution)
21 Montesquieu, De I’Esprit des Lois, p. 181.
22 See Spector, Le Vocabularie de Montesquieu, p. 15.
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M aistre and Montesquieu  -  Enlightenment problem atised
Records of Maistre’s reading habits reveal notes taken on Montesquieu’s work over 
a period of several decades.23 Amongst the books in his library were found De 
VEsprit des Lois and the Lettres Persanes. If Maistre explicitly cites Montesquieu 
less than he does either classical sources or his arch-enemy Rousseau, it is 
nonetheless quite clear that, throughout his writing on forms of governments and 
different types of states, Montesquieu’s ideas exerted a strong influence upon him.
Among certain contemporary Maistrian commentators, there is a view that 
Montesquieu’s influence on Maistre should not be over-emphasised, and that 
Maistre’s enthusiasm for Montesquieu declined as the effects of the French 
Revolution came more sharply into focus.24 These commentators point out that 
Maistre passed from calling Montesquieu “wise” and someone of a “superior talent” 
to commenting that “he does nothing but evil and does an immense amount of it”.25 
In Jean-Louis Darcel’s view, Maistre’s reconsideration of Montesquieu’s work 
occurred for two crucial reasons. First, because the authors of the revolutionary 
constitutions looked to Montesquieu’s analysis of the English government for their 
model, and so his work became tainted in Maistre’s eyes. Second, Maistre became 
ever-more conscious that Montesquieu had a heavy responsibility for (in Gauchet’s
23 There are in his register of reading, notes taken in 1800, 1806 and 1817 -  see Archives Cote 2J 22 
BIS (CD 19; CD47/NB 121)
24 See, for example, Jean-Louis Darcel, in Joseph de Maistre: Oeuvres, ed. Pierre Glaudes (Paris: 
Robert Laffont, 2007), p. 1228; see also Pranchere, L ’Autorite contre les Lumieres, p. 49.
25 Pranchere, L ’Autorite contre les Lumieres, Ibid.
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words) “the disenchantment of the world”,26 which is to say the de-sacralisation of 
the concept of monarchy and its related institutions. According to Darcel, Maistre 
believed that Montesquieu created a culture of contempt for traditional institutions, 
customs and observances. Moreover, because in Montesquieu’s work there was a 
subtle confusion between oriental despotism and absolute monarchy, this gave rise 
to a situation where, though he seemed to be providing examples of tyranny from the 
Orient, Montesquieu was in fact criticising the monarchy of the ancien regime in 
France.
But these arguments seem to have been made without due regard to the substance of 
Maistre’s work. The Etude sur la Souverainete, although a relatively early work, is 
still a post-revolutionary one, and is steeped in Montesquieu’s vocabulary and 
themes to such an extent that it is difficult not to agree with Robert Triomphe when 
he says that “Maistre owes infinitely more to Montesquieu than he confesses”.27 It 
is possible that the perspective of these commentators has been limited by a 
tendency -  in the French academy at least -  to see Montesquieu purely as the 
purveyor of explicitly Enlightenment revolutionary ideals.
In any event, the case is not nearly so clear cut, and the gap between Maistre and 
Montesquieu not nearly as distinct, as Darcel and others might have us believe. In
26 See Marcel Gauchet, Le Disenchantment du Monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1985); see also Charles 
Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Belknap Harvard, 2007), pp. 25-27.
27 Robert Triomphe, Joseph de Maistre, Etudes sur la Vie et sur la Doctrine d ’un Materialiste 
Mystique (Geneva: Droz, 1968), p. 625.
28 Olivier Nay, Histoire des Idees Politiques, p. 207; see also Simone Goyard-Fabre, Philosophie 
Politique XV-XX Siecle (Paris: PUF, 1987), p. 318.
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terms of intellectual substance as well as pure semantics, the two thinkers are closer 
together than those who participate in the discourse of revolutionary republicanism 
maintain. Enlightenment influenced post-revolutionary discourse ignores that strong 
aspect of Montesquieu’s work which accommodates and promotes the corporatist 
and hierarchical in government. This is a register in which “A division of functions 
of government is thus characteristic of Montesquieu: it is only a secondary
OQconsideration that the division is many different classes”. This viewpoint ignores 
different readings of De I ’Esprit des Lois, such as that expressed by Emile Faguet: 
“The central point and vital knot of Montesquieu’s political conception is his idea of 
hierarchical corporatist society made up of corps intermediaires”.30
It has already been noted that the originality of Montesquieu’s constitutional theory 
lies in his abandonment of the language of the unlimited right of the sovereign 
advanced by early modern theorists such as Hobbes. Certainly, Montesquieu 
pursues the same political objective as Hobbes -  that is, the salus or well-being of 
the population -  but in his work the need for security no longer constitutes the
o i
foundation of political legitimacy. Whilst Hobbes and Locke speak of absolute 
rights, Montesquieu abandons this language and re-establishes the flexibility of 
classical politics on new foundations, using the language of comparison.32 For
29 E. Barker, Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 484.
30 Faguet, La Politique Comparee de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire (Geneva : Slatkine 
(reprint), 1970), p. 46.
31 Pierre Manent, Histoire Intellectuelle du Liberalisme (Paris: Hachette, 1997), p. 119.
32 See Melvin Richter, ‘The Comparative Study of Regimes and Societies”, in The Cambridge 
History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 151-159, p. 158: “What is remarkable is the way in which he ranged freely through space and 
time in search of evidence for his comparative analysis. He contrasted the polities of classical
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Montesquieu, the doctrine of sovereignty was both the mainstay and the failing of 
early modern political philosophy. It was its mainstay because it allowed the 
conception of a neutral power superior to all political and religious interests, which 
divide men and lead them to wage war amongst themselves.33 Yet it was a failing 
because although it is capable of imposing a permanent peace, it is also capable of 
making war on its own subjects.
Crucially, Montesquieu’s doctrine is not founded upon an analysis of man’s original 
condition, but on an interpretation of a political experience, and yet this does not 
prevent him from reaching traditionalist conclusions -  indeed, it enables him to 
reach them.34 Whereas Locke, for example, considered absolute monarchy to be not 
just a bad regime, politically speaking, but no regime at all, because it left men in a 
state of nature worse than their original state,35 Montesquieu considers with 
equanimity the faults and qualities of the French monarchy, believing that although 
its principle of legitimacy is illiberal, its effective functioning assures a reasonable 
standard of liberty.36
Clearly, this analysis emphasises a particular aspect of his thought -  an aspect that 
deals in very different values to those which constitute the revolutionary narrative. 
Nevertheless, these ideas represent values fundamental to a full understanding of
antiquity with the altogether novel type of society subsequently created by developments in 
commerce, government and society”.
33 Manent, Histoire Intellectuelle, p. 120.
34 Ibid., p. 122; see also Richter, “The Comparative Study of Regimes and Societies”, p. 152: “On 
occasion he discovered the hidden wisdom of custom and could refer to the generally beneficent, if 
unintended consequences of religious faith”.
35 John Locke, “Second Treatise on Government” in Two Treatises of Government, p. 326.
36 Montesquieu, De TEsprit des Lois, p. 342-343.
243
Montesquieu’s relationship not only with Enlightenment thought but also with more 
traditional conceptions, and this latter relationship has for the most part been 
suppressed in modem liberal readings of his work. And it is precisely this 
‘alternative set’ of values that contain a large number of similarities with Maistre’s 
understanding of the political world. If Raymond Aron sees only the modern 
democratic values of tolerance and pluralism at work in Montesquieue’s political 
philosophy,37 we must also recognise Althusser’s belief that Montesquieu’s project
38was a conservative one.
It is in this very ambivalence that we can begin to see the significance of 
Montesquieu’s influence upon Maistre. According to Michael A. Mosher, 
Montesquieu, like Maistre, sought to describe a polity suitable to the circumstances 
of complex and highly differentiated societies. Maistre enquires, like Montesquieu 
before him, into the nature of governance and the political system in its plurality, 
according to the individual characteristics of each polis or political organisation.
The duality of Montesquieu’s distinction between nature and principle is then taken 
up by Maistre, and it allows him to characterise the way in which each type of 
government constitutes its own distinctive unity.
Montesquieu’s thought possesses a quality of moral and social relativism in which 
he is concerned with determining the causes and motives of particular developments,
37 See Raymond Aron, Les Etapes de la Pensee Sociologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1967).
38 See Louis Althusser, Montesquieu, la Politique e t l ’Histoire (Paris: Quadridge, 2003).
39 Michael A. Mosher, “The Particulars of a Universal Politics: Hegel’s Adaptation of Montesquieu’s 
Typology”, in American Political Science Review Vol. 78 no.l (March 1984), pp. 179-188, p. 179.
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and assessing what adjustments might be more or less suitable to particular 
constitutional forms, rather than on deciding what is best in general. Such an 
approach contradicts the uniform and universalising tendency of both Enlightenment 
and revolutionary thought: neither movement could ever accept Montesquieu’s 
claim that every state is better off adhering to forms, traditions and attitudes for 
which it is suited by climate, geography and history. This factor alone is decisive in 
ensuring that “Montesquieu’s relationship to radical and republican thought 
remained...complex and deeply ambivalent”.40 And yet for Maistre, this aspect of 
Montesquieu’s thought provided a distinctly serviceable basis upon which to 
propound a thesis.41
Montesquieu’s view was that constitutions are the outcome of a complex 
arrangement of diverse factors ranging from climate and religion to social hierarchy 
and judicial practices. In these circumstances, any change in a constitution would 
necessarily be difficult, dangerous and generally unadvisable. This makes a striking 
parallel with Maistre’s own thought on the constitutional environment. In fact, it 
becomes evident on reading the De VEsprit des Lois that, like Maistre, Montesquieu 
disliked the values of democracy and equality.42 His preference was for hierarchy -  
in particular, for mixed monarchy and nobility -  and this led him to promote honour 
as something morally and philosophically commensurate with virtue. This
40 Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 288.
41 See OC V 1 T 1, p. 329, in which he argues that there are as many different governments as there 
are peoples; see also Ibid., which contains the argument that despotism for one nation is as natural 
and as legitimate as democracy for another.
42 Montesquieu, Esprit de Lois, pp. 154: the quest for equality in a republic “creates such striking 
differences between citizens that they hate this equality that one is attempting to introduce”.
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juxtaposition created a systemic conflict between different orders of value, the 
absolute of virtue (as an end in itself) and the instrumental value of honour, which 
upholds a particular hierarchical, social and political system.43 The 
incommensurability of these two concepts has the effect of restricting questions of 
morality to particular contexts rather than relating them to any wider moral or 
political theoretical framework.44
To further reinforce the difference between Montesquieu and the stereotype of 
Enlightenment thinkers, Jonathan Israel argues that the particularist quality 
manifested in his work subverts Montesquieu’s ‘key concept’ of liberty. The 
relativism of the De VEsprit des Lois actually renders a stable, universal concept of 
liberty impossible to attain. Thus liberty, for Montesquieu,
is not freedom to do what one wants in some generalised sense but a 
tranquillity of spirit resulting from confidence that everyone is safe in his 
own possessions and security under the law in a particular polity. The 
difficulty for his later republican and revolutionary interpreters was that this 
precluded any absolute standard of liberty or justice and indeed, any 
possibility of revolution. For Montesquieu, liberty is to be found within the 
law, not in its absence.45
43 See Israel, Enlightenment Contested, p. 291.
44 Ibid., p. 293.
45 See Nay, Histoire des Idees Politiques, p. 208.
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Montesquieu’s comparative methodology is mirrored in Maistre’s balanced 
treatment of the different types of governmental form.46 Maistre’s aim, particularly 
in Etude sur la Souverainete, is to show that all governments possess advantages as 
well as disadvantages. For Maistre, the best regime for a country is not the product 
of a system imposed on ideological grounds,47 but one that emerges through gradual 
evolution over an extended period of time 48 So Maistre does not seek to hide the 
benefits of democracy and aristocracy as forms of government.49 On the other hand, 
it cannot be denied that the qualities of a certain type of government -  monarchy -  
do appear more attractive to him. Francis Bayle’s view is that this bias is the result 
of Maistre’s desire to re-balance the debate after the excess of propaganda in favour 
of revolutionary republican and democratic regimes.50 It is in reaction to this that 
Maistre wishes to demonstrate “the excellence of this government” to those who 
belong to surviving monarchical regimes, illustrating that the subjects of a monarchy 
“have nothing to envy other governments”.51
46 OC V 1 T 1, pp. 45-46: “It must be said that men in general are governed by kings. However we 
see nations where sovereignty belongs to several persons and such governments can be called 
aristocracy or democracy according to the number of persons who form the sovereign”.
47 OC V 1 T 1, p. 423: “One will find that it is just the same to be subject to one sovereign as to 
another”.
48 Ibid., p. 547: “No nation owes its character to its government...”; ibid.: “the character of nations has 
deeper roots”.
490n aristocracy, see OC V 1 T 1, p. 463: “It is proven by theory and even more by experience that 
hereditary aristocratic government is the most favourable to the people, that it has much consistency, 
wisdom stability and that it adapts itself to countries of very different sizes”. On democracy, see 
Ibid., p. 485: “It is certain that, in the times of its vigour, it must by the very nature of things breed an 
impressive group of great men whose high achievements give to history an inexpressible charm and 
interest. There are besides, in popular governments, more activity, more movement and movement is 
the life of history”.
50 Francis Bayle, Les Idees Politiques de Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Domat Montchrestien, 1945).
51 OC V 1 T 1, p. 427: “But the subjects of monarchies are by no means reduced to saving themselves 
from despair by philosophical meditations; they have something better to do, which is to impress on 
their minds the excellence of their government and to learn to envy nothing of others”.
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His endorsement of monarchical government leads him to embrace a variation of the 
strict Aristotelian differentiation between three types of government. That tripartite 
division, believes Maistre, was the result of an historical anomaly, because although 
these three forms of government were known of and represented in Ancient Greece, 
constitutionally speaking this was highly unusual:52 in fact, Maistre suggests, other 
than the classical Hellenes nearly all pre-revolutionary states had been governed 
monarchically.53 And within this typology Maistre then seeks to draw another 
conceptual distinction, this time between monarchy on the one hand and aristocracy 
and democracy on the other (both of which are really aristocratic regimes). For 
Maistre, monarchy is the rule and aristocracy the exception, and this being so, it is 
quite natural that the Etude sur la Souverainete, Maistre’s most complete analysis of 
the different forms, should begin with a study of the characteristics of this form of 
government.
Monarchy
In contrast to Rousseau, who believed that, “the first societies governed themselves 
autocratically”,54 Maistre believed that monarchy is the oldest and most frequently
52 OC V 1 T 1, p. 425: “On this subject, I will observe that the common division of government into 
three kinds, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy rests entirely upon a Greek prejudice that took 
hold of the schools during the Renaissance and which we do not know how to undo”.
53 Ibid.,: ‘The Greeks always saw the whole world in Greece; and as the three kinds of government 
were well enough balanced in that small country, the statesmen of that nation imagined the general 
division I have just mentioned. However, if we want to be accurate, logical rigour will not permit us 
to establish a genre on an exception and, to be accurate, we must say “men in general are governed by 
kings””.
54 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Bk. Ill, Chap. V, quoted in Maistre, OC V 1 T 1, p. 452.
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encountered form of government and the one most natural to man.55 The inhabitants 
of a country have a psychological need to see a physical representation of sovereign 
authority, and monarchy is the perfect embodiment of this unificatory idea: 
“Undoubtedly, the king is there, in the middle of all the powers, like the sun in the 
middle of planets; he rules and he animates”.56 It is difficult to overstate the 
importance of unity as a political and constitutional theme throughout Maistre’s 
oeuvre, and it runs through his work on forms of government: “In the government 
of several, the sovereign is not at all A UNITY, and although the parts that make it 
up form a theoretical UNITY, they are far from making the same impression on the 
mind” (emphasis in the original).57 The human imagination is not impressed by a 
collectivity which,when taken together, constitutes the sovereign. This type of 
sovereignty is ultimately “Nothing but a metaphysical being”58 and so does not 
match the intensity or moral force of a sole unitary sovereign.59
Unitary sovereignty alone permits the most vigorous governmental activity.60 
Quoting Rousseau, who likens the monarch governing his state to Archimedes lifting 
Herion’s galley with ease, Maistre argues that the monarchy is composed of a 
political apparatus which is a simple as that of a republic is complicated.61
55 OC V 1 T 1, p. 426: “If one asks what is the government the most natural to man, history is there to 
respond: it is monarchy”.
56 Ibid., p. 430.
57 Ibid., p 435.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 436.
60 Ibid., p. 438: “This word KING is a talisman, a magical power that gives central direction to all 
forces and talents” (emphasis in the original).
61 Ibid., p. 437, quoting Du Contrat Social, Bk m , Chap VI: ““All respond to the same motivation”, 
he says, “all the mechanisms of the machine are in the same hands; everything moves towards the 
same goal; there are no opposing movements that are mutually destructive and there is no constitution
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Nonetheless, when using Rousseau’s analogy Maistre is careful not to confuse the 
person of the monarch with the office of the sovereign, saying: “ It is a good thing
69without doubt but in place of the person, his name will suffice”. Because of the 
de-personalisation of the office of sovereign, even a mediocre administrator is 
capable of performing great tasks under the monarchical system. “The word skilful 
is superfluous in this piece”, Maistre states, “Monarchical government is precisely 
the one that best does without the skill of the sovereign”.63 The unified vigour of 
monarchical government is necessary, particularly (Maistre believed) in the case of 
large states. For once, history is in accord with theory: history provides no evidence 
for the existence of great republics.
From this identification of the monarch with strong and vigorous government flow 
two further consequences, which reflect Maistre’s concerns with the actual processes 
of governing and the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state. 
The first is the fact that the respect and admiration in which the monarch is held is 
transposed to his agents and functionaries.64 The second is that the attachment of the
imaginable in which a lesser effort produces a greater action. Archimedes sitting tranquilly on the 
shore and effortlessly pulling a huge Vessel over the waves is my image of a skillful monarch 
governing his vast States from his study and setting everything in motion whilst appearing immobile 
himself’”.
62 Ibid., p. 438.
63 Ibid., p. 437.
64 Ibid., p. 436: “Power delegated by the sovereign gives the government of one an extraordinary 
consideration that is quite specific to monarchies. In a government of several persons, the offices 
occupied by the members of the sovereign enjoy the consideration attached to this quality. It is the 
man who honours the office; but among the subjects of these governments, offices elevate those who 
occupy them very little above their fellows.. .in monarchy offices reflecting a brighter light on the 
people are more dazzling; they furnish an immense career open to all kinds of talents and fill up the 
void that without them would be opened between the nobility and the people in general”.
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people to the person of the sovereign creates a strong base upon which constitutional 
institutions can rest and function.65
To reinforce the value and efficacy of the monarchical principle, Maistre calls on the 
philosophical and political observations that have already been discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 2, regarding the origins of society and sovereignty. As we have 
seen, the morally perfect man of Rousseau’s imagination is not compatible with 
belief in original sin and Maistre’s consequent views of humanity as being “right in 
its intelligence and perverse in its will”. However, Maistre argues that this capacity 
for perversity may be ameliorated or even avoided in situations where personal 
interests are not affected. In the case of the sovereign who is physically, as well as 
politically, unitary, those occasions when the personal interests of he who governs 
are affected are significantly reduced.66 Only in a monarchy may governors avoid a 
situation in which the general interest of the country is sacrificed to the personal 
interest of the governors. This is because, even if they are not endowed with 
exceptional qualities, kings will naturally be led to act for the common good, 
because their personal interest will only very rarely be in conflict with the general 
interest.
Maistre’s insistence on the necessity to avoid reliance on moral qualities as a 
criterion for good government is emphasised in his citation of a speech given on 31
65 See above Chapter 4, p. 201.
66 OC V 1 T 1, p. 431: “One can be certain that the government of a single person is that in which the 
vices of the sovereign have the least influence on the governed peoples”.
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December, 1794 by La Harpe, on the occasion of the opening of one of the new 
Republican Lycees:
In absolute governments the faults of the master can scarcely ruin everything 
at once, because his single will cannot do everything; but a republican 
government is obliged to be essentially reasonable and just, because once it
fngoes astray the general will carry everything away with it.
Typically, Maistre interprets a panegyric on the virtues of republican solidarity as an 
exposition of its worst failing. A reliance on the underlying principle of republican 
government -  virtue -  is, given man’s nature, an unsustainable ideal which will lead 
to mismanagement, corruption and worse. Moreover, the general will sweeps all 
before it, irrespective of good sense or true virtue. In contrast, the king can certainly 
not exercise his personal will to do whatever he pleases.
Indeed, in a monarchy -  and Maistre is always careful to make the distinction 
between monarchy and despotism68 -  the king is prevented from doing everything he 
wishes; this, for Maistre, is the great advantage of this type of government. In stark 
contrast to the need for overwhelmingly virtuous behaviour in the republic, there 
exists a long list of constraints on the king’s behaviour that prevent him from 
abusing his power. “It is far from true that the king’s will does everything in a
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 417 Maistre believed that all governments are despotic in some way: “there will always be 
in the last analysis an absolute power which will be able to do wrong with impunity, which will thus 
be despotic according to this point of view, in the whole force of the term and against which there 
will be no other protection than that of insurrection”.
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monarchy”, Maistre says, “It is supposed to do everything, and this is the great 
advantage of this government; but in fact it only serves to centralise counsel and 
enlightenment”.69 Maistre here shows a nuanced perception of the sophisticated 
interplay between authority and consent vital to conceptions of sovereignty. 
Religion, laws, customs, opinion and class and corporate privileges all “restrain the
70sovereign and prevent him from abusing his power”.
The difference between a republic and a monarchy is that governors in the latter are 
bound by some form of fundamental normative standard, however it is expressed. 
These limitations permit the monarchical state to accommodate the inefficient and 
possibly even unvirtuous king, whereas the proper functioning of the republic 
demands total competence and propriety from its omniscient governors. Democracy 
demands governors who are virtuous and competent because it vastly increases the 
cases where the interests of the governors are implicated -  and man by his nature is 
never virtuous and rarely entirely competent.
The Maistrian monarchical state contains a second important constitutional feature, 
one which further distinguishes it from its despotic caricature. This is the notion of 
hierarchy which is an essential feature of all monarchical governments. Maistre
71understands its shape to be pyramidal, an image which Hannah Arendt also 
employs in making a distinction between despotic (or tyrannical) regimes and those
69 Ibid., p. 432.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 432: “But the pyramidal aristocracy that administers the state in monarchies has particular 
characteristics that deserve our attention”.
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which are authoritarian; her analysis seems close to the Maistrian model: “As an 
image for authoritarian government, I propose the shape of the pyramid, which is 
well known in traditional political thought. The pyramid is indeed a particularly 
fitting image for a governmental structure whose source of authority lies outside 
itself, but whose seat of power is located at the top, from which authority and power 
is filtered down to the base in such a way that each successive layer possesses some 
authority”.72
For Maistre, hierarchy is vital to the functioning of the monarchical form, and to 
facilitate the maintenance of this structure (which is situated between monarch and 
people) there is the aristocracy, a corps which performs a role of the utmost 
constitutional importance.73 Their task is so important that Maistre goes so far as to 
say that monarchy is only really a species of “centralised aristocracy”.74 In every 
country and in every type of government the most important role will be taken by
Hanah Arendt, What is Authority? in The Portable Hannah Arendt, pp. 467-468.
73 The destinies of monarchy and aristocracy are closely interwoven in Maistre’s work, and it is 
perhaps because of this that, although he devotes a separate chapter to it as a distinct form of 
government, his treatment of aristocracy in this sense involves a considerably shorter analysis. It is 
also the case that Maistre believes that the aristocratic form of government has historically been of 
less importance
(see OC V 1 T 1, p.452 “Antiquity has not left us with a model for this type of govememnt. In Rome 
and Sparta aristocracy played -  without doubt -  a very big role in all govemements, but it never 
reigned alone”)- There are, however, a number of features of aristocratic regimes which Maistre 
believes are relevant both to the subject of governing and the relationship of the individual to the 
state. Compared to a monarchy, an aristocracy has less need of splendour and ostentation. In 
Maistre’s view, an aristocracy is numerically concentrated enough to impose itself upon the people, 
but it demands less of them than does a monarchy. However, although it lacks something in vigour, it 
is never imprudent (OC V 1 T 1, p. 456). Maistre refutes Rousseau’s suggestion that the aristocratic 
republics of Venice and Berne were “the worst of all” (“la pire de toutes”) -  in fact, aristocracy is 
possibly the most favourable form of government to the people (OC V 1 T 1, p. 456.)
74 Ibid., p. 430.
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the aristocrat, who acts as a conduit of constitutional authority.75 For its part, the 
existence of the monarchy makes the institution of the aristocracy more palatable to 
the masses,76 lessening the impact upon the people of the essential gap that must be 
maintained between the people and their rulers, because, in comparison with the 
grandeur of the monarch, both classes seem insignificant.77 It is Maistre’s view that 
the monarch’s presence allays any resentful feelings of inequality or injustice. In 
republics, on the other hand, where the distinction between aristocrats and people 
still exist, the people will develop a sense of grievance against the nobility.78
Thus under a monarchy the aristocracy has ‘legal status’: it is an integral part of
70government. By introducing the notion of law, Maistre wishes to express the 
existence of a fundamental normative underpinning to his hierarchical structure. A 
monarchy that is “seated on good laws” is one in which the aristocracy does not 
become an entirely closed caste. Instead it is ever-revolving, always being renewed,
75 Ibid., p. 431: “In a monarchy the king is the centre of this aristocracy...it rules in the king’s name, 
or, if you will, the king is guided by the knowledge of the aristocracy”.
76 Ibid., p. 433: “Now it is one of the great advantages of monarchical government that in it the 
aristocracy loses, as much as the nature of things permits, all that can be offensive to the lower 
classes”.
77 Ibid., p. 435: “The man of the people, who feels insignificant when he measures himself against a 
great Lord, measures himself against the sovereign, and the title of subject, which submits both to the 
same power and the same justice, is a kind of equality that quiets the inevitable pangs of self-esteem”.
78 Ibid., p. 434: “The best thing to deprive this influence of whatever makes it too tiresome for the 
pride of the lower classes is to remove all insurmountable barriers between families in the state, and 
to allow none to be humiliated by a distinction they can never enjoy”. And again at p.435: 
“Aristocratic government cedes to monarchy. In the latter a unique family is separated from all 
others by opinion, and is considered, or can be so considered, as belonging to another nature. The 
greatness of this family humiliates no-one because none can be compared to it. In the first case, on 
the contrary, sovereignty residing on the heads of several men does not make the same impression on 
minds, and individuals that chance has made members of the sovereignty are great enough to excite 
envy, but not great enough to stifle it”.
79 Ibid., p. 433: “This kind of aristocracy is legal; it is an integral part of the government -  everyone 
knows this and it does not awaken in anyone’s mind the idea of usurpation and injustice. In 
republics, on the other hand, distinctions between persons exist, as in monarchies, but they are 
harsher and more insulting because they are not the work of law, and because popular opinion regards 
them as a habitual insurrection against the principle of equality recognised by the Constitution”.
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always remaining open to new entrants.80 In this way it encourages the principle of 
honour, and at the same time “drives all individual ambitions towards the good of 
the state”.81
Thus Maistre’s monarch performs a range of crucial constitutional functions. The 
regime effectively and naturally maintains the vital gap between the notion of 
governors and the governed; in doing so, it relies on the values of honour and 
brilliance rather than virtue. But honour and brilliance are not to be confused with 
the inconsistency or arbitrariness that are characteristics of despotism. In fact, 
honour and brilliance position the Maistrian monarchical model between the 
extremes of democracy and despotism. Maistre’s notion of monarchy is bound up 
with that of normativity -  of regulation and of fundamental law. Consequently, 
Maistre propounds a juridical basis of governance that is necessary within a 
monarchical schema: in other words, a system of public law. Ultimately, the idea of 
monarchy for Maistre is bound up with unity, which perfects hierarchy and presents 
a strong and vigorous expression of a nation’s sovereignty.
80 Ibid., p. 434: “Now this is precisely the case in a monarchy founded on good laws. There is no 
family whose head’s merit cannot raise it from the second to the first rank and even independently of 
this flattering achievement, and before the family acquires through time the influence that is its due, 
all the posts in the state, or at least many of them, are open to merit”.
81 Ibid.: “This movement of general ascension that pushes all families towards the sovereign, and 
which constantly replenishes all the voids that are left by those that die out -  this movement, I say, 
involves a salutary emulation, animates the flame of honour and turns all individual ambitions toward 
the good of the State”.
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Democracy
Maistre begins his examination of democracy by adopting Rousseau’s view that, “in 
the strict sense of the term, a genuine Democracy has never existed and never will 
exist. It is contrary to the natural order that the majority govern and the minority be 
governed”82 -  and he develops this theme with some force. The idea of a people 
being at the same time sovereign and legislator, he believed, “so strongly shocks 
good sense that Greek political writers, who must have understood something about
O'!
freedom, never spoke of democracy as a legitimate form of government”.
Aristotle, says Maistre, defined democracy as the excess of republicanism, just as he 
defined despotism as the excess of monarchy.84 Just as it is impossible to conceive 
of an individual possessing coercive power over him or her self, so, by analogy, it is 
impossible to envisage a people who are at the same time both subject and 
sovereign.85 From this Maistre deduces that sovereignty necessarily presupposes an 
exterior governing power, and thus cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled 
with a theory of pure democracy. For Maistre, to speak of pure democracy is to
07
speak of an association of men without sovereignty.
82 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Bk HI, Chap. IV.
83 OC V 1 T 1, p. 464.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. 466: “Since no nation, any more than any individual, can possess a coercive power over 
itself, if there exists a democracy in theoretical purity clearly there would be no sovereignty at all in 
this state”.
86 Ibid.: “It is impossible to understand this word [i.e. sovereignty] in any other sense than of a 
restraining power that acts on the subject and that is placed outside the subject”.
87 Ibid., pp. 465-466: “I believe that I can define democracy in the strict sense as an association of 
men without sovereignty...”
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And it is here that Maistre reiterates the central importance of normativity in the 
construction of a truly constitutional environment -  a notion which we saw explored 
in his treatment of monarchy -  and applies it to his understanding of the purely 
democratic state, comparing it to a figure from private law, the unincorporated 
voluntary society.88 In such societies, men agree to abide by statutes whose 
enforcement relies on nothing but the will of those who have drafted and accepted 
them.89 Maistre does not recognise these ordinances as law in any way at all,90 
reserving the term ‘law’ for those ordinances which are the product of a superior and 
unitary w ill.91 If an ordinance is the work of all, or the result of an agreement of
Q2
individual wills -  m other words, the will of all -  then “the less it is the law”.
Lacking the guiding structure of normativity democracy, unlike monarchy, must 
operate according to the shared goals of the members of the association;93 there can 
be no deviation from the agreed purpose.94 And also unlike monarchy, which 
benefits from inherent regulating norms which allow for behaviour to deviate from 
acceptable civic standards without a collapse of regime, democracy must stand or
88 Ibid., p. 467: “In all the countries of the world there are voluntary associations of men who come 
together because of common interests or through benevolence”.
89 Ibid.: “These men voluntarily submit themselves to certain rules that they observe in so far as they 
find them good; they even submit themselves to certain rules that they observe in so far as they find 
them good -  they even submit themselves to certain penalties that they incur when they have 
contravened the statutes of the association”.
90 Ibid.: “However, these statutes have no other sanction than the will of those who adopted them, and 
once they find themselves in disagreement, no one among them has coercive force to constrain them”.
91 Ibid.: ‘The ordinances that emanate from the people constituted in this way are regulations and not 
laws”.
92 Ibid.,: “The law is so little the will of all that the more it is the will of all, the less it is the law, so 
that it would cease to be the law if it was without exception the work of all those who would have to 
obey it”.
93 Ibid. “This spirit of voluntary association is the constitutive principle of republics”.
94 Ibid., p. 468: “Order and agreement are apparent everywhere; communal property is respected even 
by the poor and everything -  even the general propriety -  gives the observer food for thought”.
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fall by its commitment to the common purpose.95 Furthermore, the reality of all 
government is that the state-making project is imposed from above, by the 
governors, and this is as true for a republic as for a democracy: the revolutionary 
discourse of consensual, popular constitution-making is just that: a rhetorical 
device.96
And yet, even as Maistre dismisses pure democracy as a merely hypothetical 
construct, something which only exists as a definition for an excess of republic, he 
nevertheless has to admit that in practice certain states do function in a way which, 
no matter how imperfect and crude, implement seemingly democratic tenets, and 
these are of two sorts: direct democracy, which exists only in the case of small 
states, and representative democracy, which functions as an attempt to reconcile the 
practice of democracy with the governance of large states.
Concerning the direct democracy of small states, Maistre sees an inherent 
contradiction in the way that the democratic association functions, a contradiction 
which he identifies as being a consequence of two conflicting principles -  the 
principle of sovereignty, which is the shared basis of all governments: an institution
Q7which judges and is not judged, and which acts as a strong, uniting force; and the 
spirit of community, which is necessary because law and democracy are mutually
95 Ibid.: “Because a republican people is therefore a people less governed than any other, we can see 
that the activity of sovereignty must be supplemented by public spirit”.
96 See, for example, Roger M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political 
Membership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
97 OC V 1 T 1, p. 467: “Just as pure democracy does not exist, neither does a purely voluntary state of 
association. One starts from this theoretical power only for the sake of understanding; and it is in this 
sense that one can affirm that sovereignty is bom at the moment it begins not to be the whole people, 
that it strengthens itself to the degree that it becomes less the whole people”.
259
exclusive concepts, and so the democratic state must possess a form of voluntary 
association as part of its physiognomy.98 Because of this latter characteristic, 
republics are always states which are less governed than others,99 and public power 
acts less and shows itself less than in a monarchy.100 Maistre ascribes this to, “a 
certain family spirit which is easier to sense than to describe”.101 It is a feature 
which prevents sovereignty from acting in a number of circumstances in which it 
would ‘otherwise’ intervene.102
This lack of recourse to sovereignty in the full sense of the term means that the 
democratic nation must demonstrate distinctive qualities. The missing, normative, 
unificatory aspect of the sovereign “must be supplied by the public spirit”.103 For a 
democracy to function, the members of the association must have both wisdom and 
that Montesquian requirement of virtue. The less they have of these characteristics, 
the less suited they are to form a republic104. The functioning of such a form of 
government implies an intensity of community spirit and a commonality of purpose 
that this exists only in very small states.105 As Maistre comments: “in its great days 
it eclipses all, and the marvels which it produces seduce everyone, including the
98 Ibid., pp. 467-468 [Talking of the spirit of voluntary association]: “Mixed in more-or-less with 
sovereignty, the common base of all governments, its greater or lesser presence forms the different 
physiognomies of non- monarchical governments”.
9 Ibid., p. 468: “The observer...can distinguish the effects of these two principles very well. 
Sometimes he senses sovereignty and sometimes the community spirit that serves to supplement it”ooIbid.
01 Ibid.
02 Ibid.
03 Ibid.
04 Ibid.: “The less a people has wisdom to perceive what is good and the virtue to hold themselves to 
t, the less they are suited for a republic”.
05 Ibid.: “But, firstly, it is suitable only for very small peoples”.
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cold-blooded observer”.106 But he notes that the formation and duration of this type 
of association becomes more and more difficult to inculcate as the size of the state
107increases.
The second type of democratic model that functions in practice, and which is 
designed to be used in the case of larger countries, is representative democracy, a
1 0 Rconcept which attracts the full force of Maistre’s opprobrium. Representative 
democracy was essentially proposed by Enlightenment and revolutionary theorists as 
a way of surmounting the problem of instituting a direct democracy in a complex 
and geographically and demographically large state, and it was anathema to 
Maistre.109
To set Maistre’s opposition to representative democracy in context, it is worth 
recalling that the concept was, at the time when he was writing, a distinctly 
innovatory phenomenon.110 And it remains, as Loughlin remarks, “a thoroughly 
ambiguous, incoherent notion”.111 To Maistre, the effort to render the political
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., pp. 468-469: “The formation and maintenance of the spirit of association becomes more 
difficult in direct proportion to the number of associates, something which needs not be proved”.
108 For an overview of representative government, see Bernard Manin, Principes du Gouvemement 
Representatif (Paris: Flammarion, 1995); see also Lucien Jaume, “Representation”, in Dictionaire de 
Philosophie Politique (Paris: PUF, 1996), pp. 651-657.
109 OC V 1 T 1, p. 41: “It would be better to pose another question: Can the Republic exist? One 
supposes so. But this is accepted too quickly and the initial question seems a well-founded one, for 
nature and history unite to establish that a great and indivisible republic is an impossible thing”.
110 See John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 
p. 179: “You can track the progress of representative democracy as a form of government from the 
1780s until today, sticking pins into the map to record its advance and noting not merely the growing 
homogenization of its institutional formats as the decades go by but also the cumulative discrediting 
of the rich variety of other state forms which have competed against it throughout...” See also Jean- 
Marc Piotte, Les NeufCles de la Modernite (Quebec: Quebec Amerique, 2007), pp. 153-167.
111 See Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 53.
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system subject to representation has been achieved at the expense of clarity and 
internal coherence, but his analysis of it occured during a period in history when 
representation was becoming democracy’s dominant form; his work provides a clear 
critique of the efficacy of this crucial modem constitutional concept, in part because 
it had become such an integral part of the republican project.
For Maistre, the difficulty with the notion of representation, briefly put, is that if the 
government is held to be representing the people then its actions must be considered 
to be authorised by those very same people. Consequently, when the government 
orders a citizen to obey it is because that citizen has authorised the government to 
issue that command -  the citizen has ordered himself to obey through the 
intermediary of the government. Thus, he obeys himself. The distinction made 
between represented and representative is one way in which the European polity, 
having rejected all notions of transcendental authority, attempts to escape having to 
confront the existence of the essential political relation of command and 
obedience.112 It is a denial of the essential nature of governing, as Maistre sees it -  
representation is thus a mask hiding the true nature of the relationship between 
govemer and governed.
The ambiguous nature of the concept is demonstrated by the fact that representation 
has justified some of the worst political oppression and violence in history. 
According to Pierre Manent, it was because they were convinced that they were 
representing the people that the Jacobins conducted their campaign of terror on those
112 Pierre Manent, Cours Familierde Philosophie Politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), p. 29.
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whom they represented.113 It was with such events in mind that Maistre examined 
the subject of representation, structuring his analysis into two strands. First, he took 
an historical, contextual view; second (and more significantly for the development of 
constitutional thought), he engaged in a discussion of its political attributes and 
implications.
Maistre searched first of all for the origin of representative government, believing 
that it was by no means a new concept,114 but acknowledging that it only recently 
began to operate naturally as part of the English political settlement.115 For Maistre, 
then, representation was first and foremost a particularised concept. The system of 
representation which existed in England at the time was not the result of the people 
discovering their universal rights, but the result of the monarch conceding certain 
rights as a consequence of a number of historical circumstances116 Thus, says 
Maistre, if by national representation one means “ certain number of representatives 
sent by certain men taken from certain towns or boroughs by virtue of old
113 Ibid., p. 30.
114 OC V 1 T 1, p. 44: “We begin by remarking that this system is not at all a modem discovery, but a 
product, or -  to put it better -  a piece of feudal government”.
15 Ibid., p. 45: “Representation... is found in all European monarchies but it lives in Great Britain; 
elsewhere it is dead or it sleeps”.
116 Ibid., pp. 45-46: “It is sufficient to point out from history (1) that in England, where national 
representation has gained and retained more power that anywhere else, there is no mention of it 
before the middle of the thirteenth century; (2) that it was not an invention or the product of 
deliberation or the result of the action of the people making use of its ancient rights, but that in reality 
an ambitious soldier, to satisfy his own designs, created the balance of the three powers after the 
Battle of Lewes without knowing what he was doing, as always happens; (3) that not only was the 
calling of the commons to the national council a concession of the monarch, but that in the beginning 
the king names the representatives of the counties, cities and boroughs; (4) that even after the local 
communities had assumed the right of naming their reprentatives in parliament during Edward I’s 
journey to Palestine, they had there only a consultative voice -  that they presented their grievances 
like the estates-general in France and that concessions by the Crown following from their petitions 
were always Granted by the king and his spiritual and temporal Lords on the humble prayers of the 
Commons; finally, that the co-legislative power attributed to the House of Commons is still very new, 
since it goes back at most to the mid-fifteenth century”.
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concession by sovereign”, then one cannot dispute that “this government exists and 
it is that of England”.117 However, if one means that all the people can be 
represented by virtue of a mandate and that, in combination with this, there can be 
an abolition of all hereditary function and distinction, then this type of representation 
“is something that has never been seen and that will never be successful”.118 For 
Maistre, the representative system “is a piece of feudal government”119 that is solely 
appropriate to the English context, and which is incapable of being transposed 
elsewhere in order to serve as an effective political system. It is categorically not 
the cosmopolitan panacea of the revolutionary imagination.120
This leads him to a more abstract consideration of the problem. The “heart of the 
problem”121 for the revolutionaries was not, Maistre believed, the need to prove that 
a perfect system of representation is possible, but rather to decide whether the people 
can by such means retain their sovereignty and form as a whole, i.e. remain defined 
as a republic. For if the republic resides in the capital, and the rest of France is 
subject to it, it [the republic] is not accountable to the sovereign people.122 And here 
Maistre asserts his great objection to representative democracy -  that what is
123purportedly representation is in fact the monopolisation of sovereignty by a few:
“A small number of republicans enclosed within the walls of a town may, without
117 Ibid., p. 46.
118 Ibid., p. 47: Maistre continues by commenting on the situation in the USA: “America is often cited 
to us: I know nothing so provoking as the praise showered on this babe-in-arms: let it grow”.
119 Ibid., p. 44.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., p. 47.
122 Ibid.
123 Jaume, “Representation”, p. 652.
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doubt, rule millions of subjects -  this was the case with Rome, after all -  but there 
cannot exist a great free nation under a republican government.”124
For Maistre, the representative system quite simply excludes the exercise of 
sovereignty by the people, and this is particularly the case in the French system in 
which the rights of the people are limited to nominating those who actually take part 
in the process of choosing the sovereign.125 This is a situation in which the new 
constitutional laws are careful to break all relations between representatives and 
those whom they represent, telling them that, “they [i.e. the representatives] are not 
sent by those who sent them [i.e. their constituents] but by the nation”.126 In short, 
Maistre believed that it is not possible to imagine a system better calculated to deny 
the rights of the people than a representative government, nor one that it better able 
to alienate them from the structure of the state.127
But, Maistre continues, “it has been said in response, what does it matter to the 
nation that representation is a vain honour, if this system establishes public
i o o
liberty?” The question, Maistre insists, cannot be side-stepped by introducing the 
concept of liberty into the argument. The question should remain focussed not on
124 OCW  1 T 1, p. 41.
125 Ibid., p. 48: “What is certain is that the representative system is completely incompatible with the 
exercise of sovereignty, particularly under the French system, in which popular rights are limited to 
electing electors”.
126 Ibid.: “Not only can the people not impose special mandates on their representatives, but also the 
law takes care to break any relationship between representatives and their respective constituencies 
by warning them that they are by no means representatives of those who have elected them, but of the 
nation, a splendid and extremely convenient word since one can make of it whatever one wishes”.
127 Ibid., p. 49.: “What does this empty benefit of representation mean for the nation when it is 
involved so indirectly and when million of individual will never participate in it? Are sovereignty and 
government any less alien to them?”
128 Ibid.
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knowing whether the French people may be free because of the constitution, but on 
knowing whether they may be sovereign in themselves.129 Within the system of 
representation people remain “perfectly estranged” from government. They are 
more subject than in a monarchy.130 Maistre believes that the question is reduced 
“to deciding if it is in the interest of the French people to be subject to an executive 
directory and two councils instituted according to the 1795 constitution, rather than 
to a king ruling according to the ancient forms”.131 Democratic representation is 
nothing but an illusion, an ideology. In reality, the post-revolutionary French citizen 
obeys a despotic government, and the charade of representation merely masks its 
true extremism.132 In order to support this proposition, Maistre cites, with relish, an 
extract from Babeuf s interrogation:133
I believe the present government to be a usurper of authority and violator of 
all the rights of the people, whom it has reduced to the most deplorable 
slavery. It is an awful system aimed at the happiness of the few and founded 
upon the oppression of the masses. The people are surrounded by the chains 
of this aristocratic government so that it is becoming ever more difficult to 
break them.134
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
131 Ibid., p. 50
132 Ibid.: “What distinguishes the French Revolution, and what makes it an event unique in history, is 
that it is radically evil; no element of good relieves the picture it presents; it reaches the highest point 
of corruption ever known; it is pure impurity”.
133 Francois Noel Babeuf, known as ‘Gracchus’; bom 1760, guillotined in 1797.
134 OC V 1 T l ,p.  49.
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As Babeuf points out, then, far from enhancing democracy, the constitutional
principles of 1791 turn the French representative system into an aristocratic regime.
Post-revolutionary suffrage does not aim to represent of the will of the people, but is
1used as a form of selection through which to choose an elite of governors. By the 
very nature of the election, the deputies are independent: they do not govern as 
representatives of the electors but as individuals invested with a public function but 
who are acting in their own interest. Maistre then moves from questioning whether 
or not representation allows people to retain sovereignty (which it does not) to 
considering whether or not representative elections provide an effective form of 
selection for an elite class that is fit to rule a nation. “Some political writers have 
claimed that one of the positive aspects of republican government is the wisdom the 
people possess in confiding the exercise of authority only to worthy people”,136 he 
notes; according to this view, no one chooses better than the people when it is a 
question of their own interests -  in this case nothing can seduce them, and merit 
alone decides the issue.137
Maistre’s response is to emphasise the importance of aristocracy to the act of 
governing. For Maistre, democracy could not exist for an instant if it were not 
tempered by aristocracy,138 because the masses influence elections very little: it is 
really the aristocracy which chooses, and chooses well.139 Maistre comments that the 
only time the multitude usefully become involved in political affairs is through a
135 See Pierre Manent, Cours Familier, p. 29.
136 O C V  1 T 1, p. 472.
137 Ibid., pp. 472-473.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., p. 474.
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“form” of insurrection which is sometimes necessary to stop the “too rapid” activity 
of aristocracy.140 But this is always extremely dangerous and produces the most 
terrible side- effects.141 He refuses to accept that the people are able to make an 
informed and appropriate choice regarding the political system in which they live. 
Decisions regarding the state and its formation are made by the governors, and the 
governors are always distinct from the people.
Democracy and Justice
The theme of the oppressive nature of democratic governments raised in Maistre’s 
examination of the representative system is pursued in more depth in his analysis of 
a different but equally flawed aspect of all democratic states: the administration of 
justice.142 In criticising this facet of post-revolutionary democracies, Maistre raises 
a profound objection to a general implication of the Enlightenment project,143 a 
critique which centres on a paradox: that the Enlightenment’s promotion of the idea 
of universal reason in practice creates a parochial exclusivity, in which those who do 
not conform to the standard of reason are treated differently and to their own
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.: ““Yet the difficulties sometimes caused by the multitude”, Rousseau says, “can be judged by 
what happened in the time of the Gracchi, when part of the citizenry voted from the rooftops”. He 
ought also to have noted that when they voted from the rooftops they also slaughtered in the streets”.
142 Ibid., p. 469: “Justice here does not have that calm and undistrubed activity that we commonly see 
in monarchies”.
143 For a full discussion of this, see Anne Barron, “Legal Reason and its Others: Recent 
Developments in Legal Theory”, in Jursiprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary and Materials, 
eds. Penner, Schiff and Nobles, pp. 1072-1075 (London: Butterworths, 2002).
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detriment.144 And this is demonstrated, according to Maistre, by the exercising of 
the magistrate’s function in a democracy.
According to Maistre, the magistrate in a democracy is not at sufficient remove from 
his fellow citizens145 because there is no true sovereign power to enforce his 
decisions, given that democracy is effectively an association that lacks a truly 
normative basis. Consequently, the magistrate’s function is more akin to that of a 
referee or arbitrator than to a judge146 and his power depends upon the voluntary 
adhesion of his co-citizens in the communal project of democratic justice.147 Thus: 
“In republics nothing equals the inequity, or if you wish, the powerlessness, of 
courts when it is a question of deciding between the stranger and the citizen” .148 
And the more democratic the republic, the more striking is this inequality in the 
administration of justice,149 because the less that sovereignty is separated from the 
people, the less it exists as an independent arbiter.150
144 See Douzinas and Warrington, Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law (London: 
Harvester, 1995), pp. 149-150: “In the universal community of reason, which acts as the horizon for 
the realisation of the law, the other.. .is turned into the same, the critical distance between self and 
other is reduced and the experience or value of moral consicence is grouned solely on the 
representation of the other by the knowing and willing ego. The alternative is the other’s exclusion, 
banning or forgetting. But the other who approaches me is singular and unique; she cannot be reduced 
to being solely an instance of the universal concept of the ego, nor can she be subsumed as a case or 
example under a general rule or norm. The law of modernity based on the self’s right and the 
subject’s empire is strangely impartial as it tries either to assimilate or to exclude the other.
145 O C V  1 T 1, p. 471: “The magistrate is not sufficently superior to the citizen”.
146 Ibid.: “He has the air of being an arbitrator rather than a judge”.
147 Ibid.: “We see that he does not believe in his own power; his strength comes only from the 
adhesion of his equals because there is no sovereign or the sovereign is insufficiently so”.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
1 5 0  TU i A
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The more that people identify with democracy, the more they are keen to be defined
as citizens and so demonstrate that they exercise the faculty of a fully
cosmopolitanised reason. But this sense of impartial, abstract justice does not
extend to those who do not belong to the political community: the foreigner cannot
demand justice from the sovereign who does not exist.151 In contrast with this,
Monarchy is the only government under which a person who does not belong to the
democratic polity, is the equal of the citizens in the courts -  republics cannot be this
even-handed because there is too little distinction beween the governors and the
governed.152 Cosmopolitan, universalising values, combined with the lack of a deep,
structured legal foundation, lead to discrimination: “In general, justice is always
weak in a democracy when it acts alone, and always cruel and thoughtless when it 
1relies on the people”.
The lack of any sense of true normativity -  a consequence of their being no real 
sovereign set apart from the people -  gives rise to a second failing in the democratic 
administration of justice. A magistrate who is not a representative of a sovereign 
cannot demonstrate justice, but only arbitrariness. The strength of popular opinion -  
that public spirit which is necessary to bind the associates in a democracy -  will 
influence his decisions, and he will favour the masses rather than the elites.154 This, 
Maistre argues, has the effect of granting a form of immunity to a large number of
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., p. 472.
154 Ibid., p. 469: “In democracies justice is sometimes weak and sometimes impassioned; it is said in 
these governments no one can brave the power of the law. This means that the punishment of famous 
guilty persons or accused men of power will be a veritable entertainment for the common people”
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people, whereas in a monarchy immunity is differently graduated for a small 
number.155
The injustices of democracy are frequently obscured by the fact that the science of 
police is mistaken for the administration of justice. “One must not be the dupe of a 
certain rule-bound pedantry with which the people is obsessed just because it seems 
to disrupt the rich”,156 Maistre states, and, in a pithy comment on the discrepancy 
between pettifogging bureaucracy of the post-revolutionary republic and true justice, 
he notes: “In a city where one is fined for having led a horse at the trot, one can kill
1 5 7a man with impunity provided the murderer was bom in a shop”.
Whilst monarchs have strong normative limits imposed upon their course of action, 
Maistre asserts that the governing elite in a republic is all-powerful. The adoption of 
a system of democracy, and the distortion of the concept of representation, ensures 
that the liberty of the few is founded upon the enslavement of the many.158 
Republics have really only ever been sovereignties comprising “several heads”, 
whose despotism is always harder and more capricious than the single rule of 
monarchies.159 And this despotism increases in intensity as the number of subjects
155 Ibid., p. 470: In a monarchy, immunity, differently graduated, is for the few; in a democracy it is 
for a large number.
156 Ibid., p. 471.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., p. 502: “History testifies to this great truth, that the liberty of the minorty is founded only on 
the slavery of the multitude”.
159 Ibid.
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multiplies. “Of all the monarchs”, concludes Maistre, “the most despotic is the 
monarch people” .160
Maistre, Montesquieu, Oakeshott and Moderation
Michael Oakeshott maintains that the central themes of De VEsprit des Lois are the 
character of the modem European state and the office of government, which 
constitute two of the most important issues for all constitutional theory.161 
Oakeshott argues that we can see that Montesquieu’s work concerns these factors 
because of his concentration on the principe and but of the respective forms of
1 ftOgovernment. These ideal figures are, in Oakeshott’s words, “offered as aids to 
reflection” in the investigation of the identity of a modem European state:163 this 
may be true of Montesquieu’s work; it is certainly true of Maistre’s writing on the 
subject.
The significance to Maistre of the republic’s reliance on virtue and monarchy’s on 
honour now becomes apparent. The process of attaining Republican virtue involves 
the renouncement of self and a commitment to the public good.164 It is a substantive 
condition in which the associates must learn to “gouter les memes plaisirs et former
160 Ibid.
161 Michael Oakeshott, “On the Character of the Modem European State”, in On Human Conduct 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 245-251.
162 Ibid., p. 246.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., p. 247.
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les memes esperances”.165 According to Oakeshott, this amounts to their lacking 
private personae: they are bound in devotion to a common purpose. Laws may exist, 
Oakeshott continues, but they will be “prudential contrivances for promoting the 
common substantive interest”,166 a sentiment which is closely aligned with Maistre’s 
understanding of democracy as something lacking fundamental normativity, a lack 
compensated for by a sense of directed collectivity. The republic is managed by an 
elite, and the act of ruling is “authoritative tutoring” .167
As for monarchy, Oakeshott suggests that its defining characteristic as a mode of 
association is that its members are formed in terms of conduct -  i.e. in adherence to 
the law, saying that: “The associates here are not related to one another as seekers of 
the satisfaction of individual wants or in terms of the common want, but in respect of 
a system of law” .168 The republican system is not free of laws, but these laws are 
only really collective -  and ultimately unenforceable -  agreements, “instruments 
designed for promoting the pursuit of a common purpose of conduct” .169 The 
monarchical system, on the other hand, is seated upon normative foundations, and 
law here is “a system of conditions, indifferent to the satisfaction of wants and 
reflecting no common purpose” .170 In place of a common substantive interest, the 
subjects of a monarchy have a common concern that the obligations as prescribed in 
the law should be respected. Even the principle of honour, the motivating principle
165 Ibid. (“taste the same pleasures and desire the same things”).
166 Ibid., p. 248.
of monarchy, means that it is an association “in respect of fidelity to one another in 
terms of a system of rules of conduct” .171
In Maistre’s models of monarchy and democracy we find a clear indication of these 
impulses that exist within the modem European state. Maistre’s models are more 
pertinent to Oakeshott’s argument than are Montesquieu’s,172 assisting us to see 
more clearly the nature of government in the modern constitutional environment, not 
least because Maistre is writing in post-revolutionary conditions. His comparative 
study of forms of government highlights the importance of a number of factors to do 
with government, public law and sovereignty, which together represent a normative 
basis for all constitutional settlements. But Maistre explores the internal workings 
of government still further, and examines the fundamental relationship of the 
individual to the state. To do this he turns away from classically inspired 
distinctions in order to embrace the modem, Montesquiean examination of the 
concept of moderation in government and answer a series of questions: admitting 
the gap between governors and governed, how do the two effectively communicate? 
What is the nature of this relationship?
171 Ibid., p. 250.
172 OC V 1 T 1, p. 438: “Tacitus said in speaking of republican governments: “A few 
communities.. .after a surfeit of kings, decided for government by laws”. He thus opposed the rule of 
laws to the rule of a man, as if the one excluded the other”. See also p. 422: ‘The Roman jurisconsuls 
have been greatly criticised for saying that the prince is above the laws (princeps solutus est legibus). 
The critics would have been much more indulgent towards them if they had observed that the 
jurisconsults only meant to speak of civil laws or, to put it better, of the formalities that they 
established for different civil acts”.
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M oderate government
The question of how to reconcile a system of order with the retention of liberty 
(where appropriate) is an abiding concern of Maistre’s, because of his urge to
17^demonstrate that traditionalist monarchy does not mean despotic government.
Whilst in a technical sense he could claim that “we are all bom despots, from the 
most absolute monarch in Asia to the child who suffocates a bird in his hand for the 
pleasure of seeing if there exists in the universe a being weaker than he” ,174 he also 
understood perfectly well that in its practical application, through the process of 
governing, this assertion of despotism is unsustainable.175 He is in effect, concerned 
with that quintessential Enlightenment concept of moderation176 and how it is to be 
applied to government, and the practical implications of this notion for constitutional 
thought are explored in two ways: first, by considering the efficacy of the separation
173 See Cara Camcastle, The More Moderate Side of Joseph de Maistre: Views on Political Liberty 
and Political Economy (Montreal: McGill/Queens University Press, 2005), p. 40.
174 OC V 1 T 1, p. 449.
175 OC V 1 T 2, p. 139. “It is in vain that one complains of despotism. Despotism and moderate 
monarchy -  are they really the same thing?”
176 It is interesting to note that moderation is an archetypal Enlightenment value: See Walter Kuhfuss, 
“Moderation”, in Dictionaire Europeen des Lumieres (Paris: PUF, 2007), pp. 823-826, where he 
argues that: “Montesquieu.. .makes the notion a key of his political theory and of his historical 
conception of the world.. .moderation passes to the level of a distinctive characteristic of a certain 
form of government marked by the liberal idea”. Maistre’s discourse on moderation also seems to be 
inspired by Newtonian- flavoured ideals of general scientific laws -  see, for example, OC V 1 T 1, p. 
450: “But the author of nature has put limits to the abuse of power; he has willed that it destroys itelf 
once it exceeds its natural limits. He has engraved this law everywhere and in the physical world, as 
in the moral world, it surrounds us and speaks to us at every moment. Look at this firearm: up to a 
certain point, the more you lengthen it, the more you will increase its effect. But if you pass a certain 
limit, you will see the effect diminish. Look at this telescope: up to a certain point, the more you 
increase its dimensions the more it will produce its effect, but beyond that invincible nature will turn 
against the efforts you made to improve the instrument. This is a natural image of power. To 
conserve itself it must restrain itself, and it must always avoid the point where its ultimate effort leads 
to its last moment”.
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of powers,177 and second, by examining the less heralded but equally 
Montesquieuian notion of corps intermediares.m
The separation o f powers
Whilst Maistre does not make a lengthy study of the separation of powers in his 
work, he does devote several significant passages to exploring the idea. Clearly 
uncomfortable with the potential for the fragmentation of sovereignty implied by 
this idea, Maistre is careful to circumscribe its ambit in a number of ways. First, he 
grounds it in tradition. Drawing the sting of Enlightenment innovation, he states that 
the essences of institutions are always the same, even if the forms change, and that
17Qthis also goes for the separation of powers; in support of this contention he cites 
the example of the British constitution, whose three powers had a precedent that 
went back as far as the Spartan constitution.180 “The three powers, considered in an 
abstract manner, are founded everywhere where wise and durable liberty is to be 
found” ,181 he suggests. According to Plutarch, Lycurgus created a senate which on 
occasion supported the king and on occasion the people, according to prevailing 
political circumstances.182 The division of the powers of sovereignty into parts, is 
certainly not an idea thought up by the philosophes.
177 See Montesquieu De VEsprit des Lois, p. 327.
178 See Montesquieu, De TEsprit des Lois, p. 108.
179 O C V  1 T 1, p. 42.
180 Ibid., p. 43.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.:“The government before Lycurges was unstable, at one moment inclining towards the king 
and virtual tyranny when the kings had too much power, and at another surrendering to popular
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Second, Maistre emphasises that the process is a balanced division of power rather 
than a dispersal of power. His analysis of the apportioning of power in the Roman 
constitution confirm this belief that the Roman constitution would have endured for 
far longer after the expulsion of the Tarquins if the Tarquins had been replaced, not 
by annual consuls, but by a hereditary monarch.183 In pursuing this argument, 
Maistre insists upon the necessity for a power strong enough to judge conflicts
1 R ibetween the senate and people in a Lycurgan fashion, and in so doing he comes
i oc
close to formulating a conception of what Constant terms “neutral power”.
Third, what Maistre sees occurring in the British constitution, far from being a 
disassociation of powers, is in fact an expression of unity: “The powers which seem 
to possess a portion of sovereignty are only really counter-balances which regulate 
and slow up the march of the true sovereign. Perhaps one would not inaccurately 
define the English parliament as the necessary counsel to the king, Perhaps it is 
something more, perhaps it is enough that one believes it” .186 Maistre has grasped, 
rather more successfully than Montesquieu, the essentially unitary nature of the
confusion, when the common people came to usurp too much authority. But Lycurgus put between 
them the senate, “which was”, said Plato, “a salutary counter-balance...and a strong barricade, 
striking a balance between the two extremes””.
183 Ibid., p. 511.
184 Ibid. -  Maistre notes that the emperor’s power was one of fact more than law: see also p. 422: “In 
certain aristocratic governments or mixtures of aristocracy and democracy, the nature of these 
governments is such that sovereignty belongs by right to a certain body and by fact to another; and 
the equilibirum consists in the fear or the habitual uneasiness that the first inspires in the second”.
185 Benjamin Constant, Political Writings trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1988), p.184.: “Royal power (I mean the power of the head of state, whatever title he 
happens to have) is a neutral power.. .Constituional monarchy creates this neutral power in the person 
of the head of state. The true interest of the head of state is not that nay of these powers shuld 
overthrow the others, but that all of them should support and understand one another and act in 
concert.”
186 O C V  1 T l,p . 421.
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British system: “Let us take the English government, for example. The type of
1 0*7
political trinity that makes it up does not prevent the sovereignty from being one”.
Having outlined this conception of the separation, or rather the balance, of powers, 
Maistre assesses these powers. At first glance, his judgement appears self- 
contradictory. First he writes in almost identical fashion about the constitutions of 
Sparta and royal Rome, saying that “There are three powers which are found where 
there is wise and lasting liberty” ;188 in the same way he refers to the English 
constitution as “what appears to be and what can be imagined to be the most perfect 
[constitution], at least for a great people” .189 Yet he also puts great store on a 
comment made by Tacitus, to the effect that “The best of all governments would be 
the one which would result in a mix of three powers balanced reciprocally. But this 
government will never exist. Wherever it appears, it never lasts” .190 And so, 
Maistre admits, the British have paid for their constitution with “torrents of 
blood” ;191 furthermore, “we have strong reasons to fear that “this beautiful creation 
is not durable” .192 After all, it had only been in existence since 1688.193
This apparent contradiction in Maistre’s thought -  imagining the perfect state on the 
one hand and then accepting its limitations on the other -  can be explained by
187 Ibid., p. 418.
188 Ibid., p. 43.
189 Ibid., p. 497.
190 Ibid., pp.497-498: ““Every nation or city”, says Tacitus, “is governed by the people, by the 
nobility or by individuals: a constitution selected and blended from these types is easier to commend 
than to create, or, if created, its tenure of life is brief’ (Annals 4.33). Here is the English constitution 
condemned in advance, in express terms and by an excellent judge”.
191 Ibid., p. 500.
]92 Ibid., p. 497.
193 Ibid.
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considering the issue in the light of a more general principle of Maistre’s 
philosophy: Maistre’s interpretation of Montesquieu’s mechanism of moderate 
government. A moderate government arises in suitable conditions: when a balance 
of powers effects a limitation on government, but only on the condition that this 
balance is the product of history, tradition and culture, as is the case with Sparta, 
Rome and England. Such a government is decidedly not a man-made model to be 
imposed upon other states in a uniform manner.194
Particularised unity, rather than universalised uniformity, is essential to this 
constitutional view, and Maistre’s opinion in respect of the 1791 Constitution 
particularly emphasises this aspect of his thinking.195 The constitutional texts 
composed by the constituent assembly took English principles and transformed them 
from cohesive and unificatory living conventions into dry, inflexible codified tenets 
all done in a quasi-scientific attempt to isolate each organ of government and its 
function. In Britain, Maistre insists, the balance of power works because there is 
mutual resistance between each power.196 In contrast, the texts of 1791 confirm the 
inferiority of royal power. They give the assembly the right to decree the situation 
in which the king is supposed to abdicate, but they refuse the king the same right in 
relation to his representatives. “All the work of the legislators only really ends up 
creating a unique power without counterbalance, which is to say a tyranny” .197
194 Ibid., p. 421: “What is, is good, what is believed, is good, except the supposed creations of man”.
195 Ibid., p. 420: “This famous division of powers, which has so greatly agitated French heads, does 
not really exist in the French Consitution of 1791”.
196 Ibid.: “In order for there to be a real division of powers, the king would have had to be invested 
with a power capable of balancing that of the Assembly and even of judging the representatives in 
certain cases”.
197 Ibid., pp. 420-421.
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In his observations on the English constitution, Maistre identifies a constitutional 
trinity in which is grouped the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. But a 
second trinity also exists, and one that is more vital to his constitutional thought: that 
of king, intermediaries and people. Whilst the first allows Maistre to express that 
aspect of his constitutional thought which is most closely aligned with more 
contemporary conceptions of liberty and reciprocal limitation, the second allows him 
to explore the notion of moderation within a far more traditional, hierarchical 
context. For countries such as France and Russia -  countries that he styles 
‘European monarchies’, and which he believes to be eminently unsuited to the 
English model of the separation of powers -  Maistre advances a solution that 
encourages moderation in a way that is in keeping with their constitutional 
traditions, one which is a guarantee against arbitrariness and which is more 
appropriate to the natural conditions and temperament of these countries.
The European Monarchy
By European monarchies Maistre means those that were formed in Europe after the 
fall of the Roman Empire,198 and, following Montesquieu, he contrasts their 
temperament with those of Asiatic or Oriental monarchies. According to Maistre,
198 See Montesquieu, De VEsprit des Lois, p. 343. Maistre, OC V 1 T 1, p. 439: “All monarchies 
formed in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire have a particular character that distinguishes 
them from the monarchies outside of Europe”.
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the subjects of Oriental rulers are excluded from the business of governing.199 And 
in a striking image, Maistre demonstrates that his conception of the state is not a 
theocratic one, unlike the relation between the Oriental subject and his ruler: “His 
master is a god to him and he has no other relation with this superior being than that 
of prayer”,200 Maistre asserts. On the other hand, the right to depose the sovereign in 
a violent manner is regarded as an acceptable corollary to the power of life and death 
that the monarch exercises directly over his people.201
European regimes, in contrast, fell under the influence of Christianity and, as a result 
of the Germanic invasions, came to dispense with the servile habits which were the 
result of Roman despotism.202 In their place, the peoples of Europe acquired the 
taste for liberty, an aspiration common to all countries on the continent of Europe.203 
This aspiration has given European monarchies two characteristics which stand in 
direct opposition to those possessed by Oriental potentates and, by implication, 
despotic revolutionary governments.
199 Ibid., p. 442: “The inhabitant of Asia does not seek to penetrate the dark cloud that envelopes or 
forms the majesty of the monarch. His master is a god to him and he has no other relation with this 
superior being than that of prayer”.
200 Ibid., pp. 442-443: the passage continues: “The laws of the monarch are oracles. His graces are 
celestial gifts, and his anger is a calamity of invincible nature. The subject who prides himself in 
being called a slave receives benefit from him like dew and the whip like a thunder clap”.
201 Ibid., p. 443: “This absolute monarch can be deposed; his right to demand the head of anyone who 
displeases him is not disputed, but often his own is demanded. Sometimes the laws deprive him of the 
sceptre and of his life; sometimes sedition comes to seize him on his elevated throne and throw him 
into the dust”.
202 Maistre quotes Hume to this effect at OC V 1 T 1, p. 440-441: ““The government of the 
Germans”, Hume has rightly said, “and that of all the northern nations who established themselves on 
the ruins of Rome was always extremely free””.
203 Ibid., p. 441: “These reflections contain a striking truth. It is in the midsts of the forests and the 
ice of the north that our governments were bom ... we are still all brothers, durum genus”.
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First, European public opinion refuses to accept the personal right of the sovereign 
to exercise judicial power,204 and in exchange it recognises the inviolability of the 
Sovereign.205 Second, it demands that intermediary bodies form a link between the 
people and the sovereign because, unlike the subjects of Oriental despots, Europeans 
will not accept their total exclusion from the process of government. In these 
traditional principles, rooted in the public spirit and opinion of Europe, European 
governments discovered a way of limiting both arbitrary government and the 
destructive egotistical individualism of the philosophes.
In accordance with the fact that Europeans will not accept the direct intervention of 
the sovereign in matters of justice, Maistre enunciates a principle of delegated 
justice according to which there should be specialist and permanent functionaries 
invested with judicial power by the king.207 David Lieberman identifies this ‘power 
of judging’ in relation to Montesquieu’s work, and notes that its existence allows a 
level of constitutional freedom unknown in despotisms, where the three powers are 
united in the actual person of a single prince.208
204 Ibid., p. 443: “Providence has said to all the sovereigns of Europe: You will not be judged, but it 
immediately adds: You will not judge. That is the price of this inestimable privilege”.
205 Ibid.: “The wisest of the nations of Europe, in making the inviolability of sovereigns a 
fundamental law, have only sanctioned general opinion in this part of the world. We do not want 
sovereigns to be judged. We do not want to judge them”.
206 Ibid., p. 444: “Always uneasy, always alarmed, the veil that hids them the activities of 
governments vexes them. Submissive subjects, rebel slaves, they want to ennobel obedience and, as 
the price of their submission, they ask the right to complain and to enlighten power”.
207 Ibid., p. 445: “He does not have the right to condemn to death, nor even to sentence any corporal 
punishment. The power that punishes derives from him and that is enough”. The same applies to civil 
matters -  see OC V 1 T 1, p. 446: “The king cannot judge in civil cases; the magistrates alone, in the 
name of the sovereign, can pronounce on property and contracts”.
208 David Lieberman, ‘The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law”, in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 332.
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But once again, Maistre’s insistence on unity as an overriding constitutional concern 
leads him to imagine the creation of an independent judiciary in terms of 
specialisation rather than a separation of function. However, this is a specialisation 
that brings more than just a guarantee of correctly administered justice: it is also a 
guarantee against political arbitrariness. Rather than simply outline the separation of 
powers, this first principle also emphasises the importance of mediation in a 
constitutional structure, as a means of emphasising the necessary distinctions 
between person and office so vital to modem conceptions of sovereignty.
The second defining principle of European monarchy develops the mediatory aspect 
of moderate government, but also emphasises a distinctive feature of Maistre’s 
notion of governing. Maistre calls this “The paternal way of communicating 
between a prince and his subjects” .209 and to this end he enshrines the idea that 
people’s voices should be heard as a fundamental dogma of European monarchy. 
“What generally displeases us, what does not accord with our character and our
ancient, incontestable, and universal usages, is a ministerial government or
210vizierate”, Maistre suggests, stating his belief in the principle of relation.
Inevitably, then, communication between governors and governed is vital to the 
constitutional order. If no structures for national communication exist, the 
consequences will be dire: “Once the nation is condemned to silence, once only 
single individuals can speak, it is clear that each individual by himself is weaker
209 OCW  1 T 1, p. 446.
210 Ibid., p. 447.
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than those in power”. And as the prime ambition of man is to obtain power, and his 
great fault is to abuse it, it follows that all those who enjoy some measure of 
delegated power, but who are not constrained by anything and do not react directly 
to opinion, “seize the sceptre for themselves and divide it into small fragments 
proportional to the importance of their offices so that everyone is king except the 
king” .211 When subjects complain of their sovereign’s despotism, Maistre argues 
that they are in reality complaining of his weakness, and in particular they are
misinterpreting the lack of communication between the sovereign and the people, a
2 1 2lack which permits local agents to exercise their power arbitrarily.
The remedy is thus -  seemingly paradoxically -  to reinforce the authority of the king 
and so restore to him his quality as a father, by re-establishing the old and legitimate 
communications between him and the large family of the nation.213 Maistre here 
recalls that all European peoples have always been able to inform the king of their 
grievances through the intermediary of different assemblies or bodies, be they 
parliaments, cortes, diets, senates or councils:214 “By means of differently composed 
bodies, councils or assemblies subjects have the right to instruct the king about their 
needs, to denounce abuses to him and legally to communicate to him their
21 Sgrievances and their very humble remonstrances”. Crucial to this principle is 
Maistre’s view of the divergence of customs between different nations and the
211 Ibid., p. 448.
212 Ibid.
2,3 Ibid.
214 Ibid., p. 444: “Under the names of the Fields of March or of May, of Parliaments, of Estates, of 
Cortes, of establishments, of diets, of Senates, of Councils ets all the peoples of modem Europe have 
involved themselves more or less in administration under the rule of their kings”.
215 Ibid., p. 446.
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evolution of institutions themselves. The way in which participants are recruited, 
the ways in which assemblies are organised and the conditions of representation, all 
depend on the evolutionary stage reached by each nation in its political history. 216
Whilst his theory of the formation of constitutions, entrenched as it is in 
particularism, prevents him from determining general rules regarding the precise 
role, power or method of recruitment of these assemblies, Maistre remains closed to 
one thing: the possibility of them having the ultimate power to decide. His theory is, 
therefore -  in a liberal, democratic sense -  a narrow conception of national 
representation. Assemblies may deliberate and submit ideas, but they may never 
deliver definitive decisions.
An aid to understanding Maistre’s view of the relationship between governors and 
governed may be found in an image which he uses to express the unique quality of 
the constitutional bond between sovereign and subjects. In his criticism of the 
French monarchy’s failure to convene the Estates General from 1614 to 1789, he 
makes two clear pronouncements. First, it is necessary to inculcate customs and 
traditions before any attempt to re-establish “the ancient relationship between the 
king and the great family”.217 Second, opportunities for the people to petition the 
king by way of intermediary assemblies (and the delegation of justice) are,
216 Ibid.: “One understands, for example, that the men charged with carrying the representations or the 
grievances of subjects to the foot of the throne can form bodies or assemblies, and that the members 
who compose these assemblies can vary in number and rank as well as in the nature and extent of 
their powers, so that the method of election and the frequency and duration of sessions etc. also vary 
in the number of the combinations facies non omnibus una,\
217 Ibid., p. 448: “It is only a question of reinforcing the authority of the king and recognising in him 
his role of father in reestablishing the ancient and legitimate relationship between him and the 
extended family”.
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according to Maistre, “Sacred laws more truly constitutional in the measure that they
918are written down nowhere except in the heart”.
The key to this conception thus lies in these two elements -  a perception of the 
fundamental law which underlies the practice of governing, and a constitutional 
intimacy that goes beyond the legal sphere. This is expressed by Maistre when he 
says that the council consists of “chosen men always legally carrying to the father 
the complaints and wishes of the family” . 219 Assemblies are the means by which 
members of the national family can bring their grievances to the paterfamilias. 
Maistre, steeped in classical learning, was surely also aware of the conceptual 
ambiguity of this structure, for the Roman family was not only an organisational and 
social entity, but also a legal unit where sons could vote and hold public office, and 
yet, at least technically, remained indistinguishable from slaves.220 It is this image 
of the paterfamilias which unifies the disparate elements of normativity on the one 
hand and national and constitutional emotion on the others, all of which needed to be 
present in order to govern succesfully.
Montesquieu’s political theory is bound up with the idea of a hierarchical society 
made up of corps intermediaries and this also applies to Maistre. In the face of 
revolutionary demands for a levelling of society, Maistre maintained a belief in the 
necessity of a hierarchal structure and the need for intermediaries to come between
218 Ibid., p. 446.
219 Ibid., p. 447.
220See Barry Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 65- 
68 .
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monarch and people -  this is the pyramidal structure of the traditionalist 
authoritarian state that we have noted above; the subordinate, intermediate power 
which is most natural to it is that of aristocracy,221 which opens channels of 
communication between people and ruler whilst at the same time maintaining the 
necessary division between them.
The link between the monarchy and aristocracy is emphasised in Maistre’s 
description of a governing aristocracy as being “a monarchy whose throne is 
vacant”.222 They also share the characteristic of being apart from the people -  there 
is no question of self-authorisation taking place.223 Their task being so vital, Maistre 
demands much of the nobility, and he confers upon them an eminent role in the 
state. For him, aristocracy acts as the “conscience of the nation” -  they are not 
simply governors, but almost also represent a form of civic priesthood, a vital 
species of constitutional intermediary. They must remain faithful to the national 
dogma, the figure of the king must be sacred for them and they must passionately 
love royalty. If these circumstances are fulfilled, the state will remain inviolable.224
221 OC V 1 T 1, p. 432: “In all countries, and under all possible governments, the highest posts will 
always (with certain exceptions) belong to the aristocracy -  that is to say to nobility and wealth, most 
often united”.
222 Ibid., p 452: “Aristocratic government is a monarchy whose throne is vacant. Sovereignty there is 
in regency”.
223 Ibid.: “The regents who administer sovereignty are supplied entirely by the people, because the 
post is hereditary, and in this aristocratic government approaches monarchy”.
24 Ibid., p. 438: “As long as the name of the sovereign is sacred to it [ the aristocracy] and it loves the 
monarchy passionately, the state is unshakeable, whatever the qualities of the king. But once it loses 
its greatness, its pride, its energy and its faith, the spirit withdraws, the monarchy is dead and its 
cadaver is left to the worms”.
287
A System of Public Law
Maistre believes that by destroying all notion of corporatist group life -  that is, the 
sense of nation as family and the mediated normative relationship between a 
sovereign and his people -  then a revolution such as the French Revolution will 
produce isolated individuals who strive after unattainable equality. It also produces 
a tendency on the part of those who govern to gravitate to despotism. The Maistrian 
constitutional regime, in contrast to despotism or tyranny (whether revolutionary or 
otherwise), produces no such extremism: in his constitution, sovereign power is not 
applied immediately but is tempered in its application. Communication between 
sovereign and people is effected through the use of fundamental constitutional laws. 
Seated on a fundamental normativity which goes beyond the merely positivist, 
sovereign authority is generated and established through custom and practice. This 
both produces and is the product of moderate government, and is, in effect, the 
outline of a structure of public law -  the juridical expression of the process of 
governing.
The issue is one of moderation and balance: for Maistre, the fundamental cause of 
the rise of the all-powerful, despotic-democratic government is the imbalances 
caused by revolution, which create a pulverised society in which individuals, herded 
into inhuman structures, abdicate their responsibilities or are cut off from them and
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leave all to the state, which, in time, becomes an oppressive administrative 
bureaucracy.225 In these circumstances, the aristocracy and other secondary bodies 
wither, and along with them withers the possibility of creating an effective system of 
public law (understood in its fullest sense). In their place the uniform, ideological 
values of the Enlightenment are imposed. Modern democratic states allow no 
intermediaries between themselves and their subjects, but instead rely on the 
mechanism of representation, and in this way the state wishes to be both unique
99 f\agent and sole arbiter.
Maistre’s cure for these ills was to acknowledge and encourage the existence of 
social forms capable of resisting this form of despotism. He believed that it is 
impossible to reconcile any form of political liberty with a revolutionary society, 
because the constitutional good of moderation cannot be found within a society 
polarised around the individual and the state. There must therefore be ‘pouvoirs 
secondaires’ -  in other words, deliberative assemblies -  along with local and 
secondary powers which can provide a mode of mediation for the sovereign power 
whilst allowing the constitutional system to retain its unity. Here, the analogy with 
the paterfamilias and the family is particularly appropriate, as the constitution is 
made up of relations between different members which together form an identifiable 
legal entity.
225 See William Henry George, “Montesquieu, De Tocqueville and Corporative Individualism”, in 
The American Political Science Review Vol 16, No. 1 (Feb 1922), pp 10-21.
226 Ibid.
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Maistre’s constitution thus demonstrates the fundamental traits of a constitutional 
order, whereas despotism is -  using Alan Brudner’s definition -  an unmediated 
relation between ruler and ruled.227 Maistre understood the contrast between the two 
types of rule as being between a ruler who directs everything by personal will and 
one who governs according to fixed and established laws, a distinction also made by 
other constitutional thinkers.228 Maistre understood and emphasised the necessity 
for rule through law, which contains important implications for the practice of 
governing.
The moment that the one who governs places a layer of legality between his will and 
those of his subjects, that governor “acknowledges an independent agency in the 
subject from which the confirmation of his claim [to rule] can issue”. No longer 
are commands a peremptory fiat, followed by immediate implementation. Instead, 
the constitutional order makes room for the involvement of the citizenry in the 
execution of a command: “It is they who must decide in the first instance whether 
the law applies in a particular situation and what they must do to comply with it”.230 
In this way Maistre understood that the subject participates in the act of ruling: “not 
in rule making but in rule executing” .231 This in turn reinforces the rulership of the 
sovereign: “in yielding space for self-application to the subject, the ruler attains a 
more satisfying confirmation of his claim to rule than was possible of a self-directed
227 See Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 38.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid., p. 40.
230 Ibid.231Ibid.
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agent, rather than the mechanical one of a cipher whose actions are validated solely 
by the ruler” .232
In Brudner’s analysis, Maistre’s state is neither a despotic one in which the power of 
the sovereign has no limit, nor is it the absolute regime of Bossuet’s imagination, in 
which the power of the king is unlimited save for the restrictions imposed by 
theological and religious boundaries.233 Maistre’s state is in fact more accurately 
expressed as one in which the people do not have a purely passive role, but in which 
their participation does not extend to the actual exercise of power. The same could 
also be said of the system of representation, when stripped bare of its ideological 
rhetoric, the difference being that Maistre’s system can, without obfuscation or 
illogicality, explain the gap between those who govern and those who are governed, 
whilst at the same time allowing for a measure of participation in the process of 
ruling.
The Best Form of Government?
At the conclusion of his analysis of the various forms of government detailed in 
L ’Etude sur la Souverainete, Maistre considers Rousseau’s question as to which 
form of government is the best, and provides two diametrically opposed answers. 
How this ambivalence might be resolved, and what the implications are for the
232 Ibid.
233 Jean-Yves Pranchere, Qu’est-ce que la Royaute? (Paris: Vrin 1992), p. 11.
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resolution of this dialectic, are vitally important to Maistre’s -  and indeed modem 
public law’s -  understanding of the objectives of government. Maistre’s 
examination of this topic leads him to a draw together the themes explored in the 
Etude, and leaves us with a final picture of the practice of government in Maistre’s 
work.
His first answer begins with a quotation from the Du Contrat Social: “When one 
asks which is the best government, one poses a question as unsolvable as it is 
indeterminate...there are as many good solutions as there are possible combinations 
in the absolute and relative situations of peoples” .234 In other words, Maistre’s view 
is that one cannot answer the general question as to which is the best type of 
government, because the government which suits all people does not exist. “Each 
nation has its own government, just as it has its own language and character, and this 
government is the best for it” 236 Consequently, “the whole theory of the social 
contract -  of a universalised ideal “is a schoolboy’s dream” .237 There are as many 
good governments as there are possible combinations of the absolute and relative 
positions of peoples.238
This is a clear, relativistic, historicist position, and is in accord with Maistre’s views 
on constitutions in general. For Maistre, the political structure is not the cause of the
234 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Bk. HI, Chap. IX.
235 OC V 1 T 1, p. 489. “He saw very well that it is never necessary to ask what is the best 
government in general, since there is none that is suited to all peoples”.
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid., p. 490: “And since none of these combinations depend on men, it follows that the consent of 
peoples counts for nothing in the formation of governments”.
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nation’s history, but is only one consequence among many physical and moral 
characteristics: “No nation owes its character to its government, any more than to its 
language; on the contrary it owes its government to its character, which in truth is 
always subsequently reinforced and perfected by its political institutions”.239 If a 
nation languishes, it is not because of bad government, it is because this government 
has fallen into decline like everything human”.240
Constitutions are the work of history, and this slow evolution adapts institutions to 
the specific character of nations. From this basic principle flows a series of 
consequences which, in effect, build upon Montesquieu’s observations regarding the 
adaptation of laws to the character of nations. But this is combined with a uniquely 
authoritarian constitutional perceptive, allowing Maistre to write: “All governments 
are good”.241 This affirmation seems to negate any attempt at qualitative analysis, 
and is a reinforcement of his view that constitutions are absolutely not the work of
949man and cannot therefore be changed by him.
However, having stated the impossibility of choosing a best form of government 
outright, Maistre considers another question: how one can tell whether a people are 
governed well or badly.243 Which are the best governed, in terms of the principles 
of their government?244 In order to provide a structure for his answer, Maistre first
239 Ibid., p. 547.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., p. 553.
242 Ibid., p. 550: “It would be the height of folly to maintain that the character of peoples is their own 
work: but when we say that they have made their government, this is the same folly in other terms”.
243 Ibid., p. 490, quoting Du Contrat Social, Bk. HI, Ch. IX.
244 Ibid.
293
of all analyses the one given by Rousseau in the Du Contrat Social, and immediately 
dismisses Rousseau’s argument that a flourishing demographic245 proves that a 
country is well governed, and that this is characteristic of a republican regime.246 
Likewise, Maistre refutes -  using historical examples -  the argument that the ability 
to wage war or sustain a flourishing cultural life are evidence that one form of
247regime is pre-eminent.
Just as Maistre believed that we cannot ask what is the best form of government, he 
also believed that there was no answer to the question: “What government creates 
the most populous, the strongest, and the happiest people, and for the longest period 
of time?”248 To answer this question at all would first involve finding a 
commensurable value, but Maistre has already rejected cultural, martial or 
demographic achievement as a means of determination. He turns instead to a 
concept used in the new Enlightenment subject of science, a term used in the study 
of variable forces -  the mean. It is necessary to judge a government not by the 
consequences that it may bring about at any given moment, but by those which 
accrue during the total course of its existence.249
245 Du Contrat Social, Bk. ID, Ch. IX: “What is the surest sign that they -  the members of the body 
politic -are preserved and prosperous? It is their number and their population.. .the government under 
which.. .the citizens increase and multiply most is infallibly the best”.
246 OC V 1 T 1, p. 533: “Let us again consider governments with respect to population. “The best”, 
Rousseau says, “is that which peoples the most.”. . ..However the highest point possible depends in no 
way on such and such a form of government”.
247 Ibid., p. 528: “The most beautiful monuments of Athens belong to the century of Pericles. In 
Rome, what writers were produced under the Republic? Only Plautus and Terence. Lucretius, Sallust 
and Cicero saw it die. Then came the century of Augustus where the nation was all that it could be in 
the way of talents. The arts in general need a king: they only shine under the influence of the 
sceptre”.
248 Ibid., p. 494.
249 Ibid., pp.494-495: “How peculiar that in the study of politics we do not want to use the same 
method of reasoning and the same general analogies that guide us in our study of other sciences. In
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Thus Maistre formulates his answer in the following manner: “The best government 
for each nation is that which in the territory allotted to it.. .is capable of procuring 
the greatest sum of happiness and strength possible for the greatest number of men 
possible, during the longest period of time possible”.250 This utilitarian-sounding 
formula is Maistre’s attempt to address that crucial constitutional issue, and one that 
is central to his thinking on government: how the State is to ensure the salus of the 
people,251 where the salus has a dual meaning, referring both to the people’s 
happiness and to the stability that a certain form of State can provide.252 With regard 
to people’s happiness, Maistre believes that democracy only ensures the well-being 
of a minority. In democracies over a certain size, “that which one calls liberty is only 
the absolute sacrifice of the many made for the independence and the pride of the 
few.253 The larger the state, the more despotic it becomes, and only the modern 
European monarchical principle is capable of giving liberty to the whole of the 
nation.254
As we have seen, Maistre attaches great significance to the question of longevity and 
stability in his understanding of the objectives of government. “As all political
physical research, every time that it is a question of estimating variable force, we take the average 
quantity. In astronomy in particular we always speak of average distance and of average time. To 
judge the merit of a government we must use the same method”.
250 Ibid., p.494.
251 See Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthome (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), Bk. II. 11.3; see also Cicero, De Legibus, trans. Niall Rudd 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
252 OC V 1 T 1, p. 490, quoting Rousseau: “What is”, he [Rousseau] says, “the goal of political 
association? -  It is the preservation and prosperity of its members -  up until that point -  very good.”.
253 Ibid., p. 501.
254 Ibid., p. 437: “All things considered, it can be said without exaggeration that monarchy allows as 
much and perhaps more equality and freedom than any other government”.
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revolutions necessarily involve very great evil, the great interest of the people is the 
stability of governments”,255 he says; democracy has one brilliant moment, “But it is 
one moment and it is necessary to pay dear for it”.256 Democratic government are 
“only passing meteors whose brilliance excludes duration”.257 Aristocratic 
governments have more consistency, but this is because they are similar to
2co
monarchy, and because the gap between governors and governed is maintained.
But it is monarchy that provides the most stable government, and is the type of 
regime most capable of assuring liberty for the greatest number of people.
According to Maistre, strictly speaking all governments are effectively monarchies 
that differ “only in whether the monarch is for life or for a term, hereditary or
9 S Qelective, individual or corporate”. To put it another way, all government is 
aristocratic, and composed of “more or fewer ruling heads”. The model of the 
pyramid is useful again here: a structure with democracy at its base and where the 
aristocracy is “composed of as many heads as the nature of things permits”, with 
monarchy at its apex, so that the aristocracy (which is “inevitable in every 
government”) is dominated by “a single head topping the pyramid”, and 
undoubtedly “forms the government most natural to man”.260
255 Ibid., p. 501.
256 Ibid., p. 495.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., p. 501.
260 Ibid., pp. 501-502.
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Conclusions
If we agree that modem constitutional government has a normative basis, and accept 
that it is founded upon the existence of a separation between governors and the 
governed; likewise, if we accept that sovereignty is based upon self-limitation and 
the presence of communication between those who govern and those who are 
governed; and finally, if we understand that representative democracy still entails 
government by an elite -  all tenets of political belief that can easily be held in the 
contemporary European political environment -  then Maistre’s understanding of 
monarchy need not seem so very strange to us.
These answers leave us with a difficulty. It is clear that, as in Montesquieu, there is 
a tension between Maistre’s concept of public law and his constitutional thought, 
built around a question as to how it is possible to hold a relativist position in relation 
to the merits of the various governmental forms whilst at the same time drawing out 
absolute judgments in relation to them -  a position that seems to be incoherent. It is 
only when Maistre’s position is viewed from the overall perspective of his 
constitutional thought, and in particular its juridical expression as droit publique, 
that this juxtaposition can be understood as nuanced and sustainable.
Just as Montesquieu’s skill was to combine the idea of a collective logic of societies 
and institutions with the notion of divergent variants, each with it own distinct spirit,
297
so Maistre’s approach to the subject of governing enables him to mix an overall 
unity of approach with respect for tradition, diversity and difference. Whilst Maistre 
is extremely concerned that the citizens of a state should recognise the great value of 
unity and order, he was equally of the view that the constitutional structure of a 
country cannot be immutable.261 But any changes in constitutional practice should 
be made with real prudence, not as sweeping ideological denials of the past. For 
Maistre, the process of governing is a complex practice that has gradually evolved, 
and continues to exist as a living tradition in European thought.262
It is the fact that it is prudential, a practice distinct from other intellectual 
endeavours, which gives governing its unique and complex quality. Although it is 
certainly suffused with religiosity, Maistre’s work distances the conception of the 
state in the modem age from the conceptions held by theocratic thinkers such as 
Bossuet. It is not possible, once one has considered Maistre’s constitutional thought, 
to claim that he is an absolutist in the sense of Bossuet or de Bonald. Neither though 
does he see man-made perfection as either possible or desirable. The state is not a 
scientific construction, nor an end in itself. Because he does not identify the state 
with the divine order or see it as the ultimate triumph of man’s subjectivity, Maistre 
understands that its governance is not ordained by God, nor is it an exercise in 
human rationality. Whilst his conception of order and authority presumes a 
relationship between command and obedience, his conception of governing eschews 
totalitarianism.
261 See above, Chapter 3, p. 150.
262 See Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 29.
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Assisted by the ambiguity in his work between that which is positivist and that 
which is natural or supernatural in origin in the constitutional order, Maistre’s 
understanding of the realm of politics -  and of droit publique, its juridical expression 
-  is a modem one, which approaches an understanding of the constitution as an 
autonomous zone of endeavour. Comprehending that government is neither fixed 
nor ever completed,263 Maistre sees the process of governing, and the function of 
public law, as “an assemblage of rules, principles, canons, maxims, customs and 
usages that condition and sustain the activity of governing”.264
Marked by the imperfection attributable to human constructs, this is a position in 
which, whilst certain standards are expected and norms of right conduct exist, there 
is no ultimate, uniform standard by which to measure the art of governing. The 
tensions which exist in the state must be dealt with, not according to some 
universally applicable blueprint, but with reference to the traditions, customs and 
nuances which exist and which have developed in the fullness of time, forming the 
unique character of each constitutional arrangement.
264 Ibid., p. 130, and see Michael Oakeshott, “On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct”, 
in On Human Conduct, p. 56.
265 See Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, p. 29.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
This object of this thesis has been to examine central elements of Joseph de 
Maistre’s constitutional thought. Maistre’s work emphasises a core set of values 
that stand in opposition to those of the Enlightenment. But his work is not merely a 
negative critique of modernity: it is a positive demonstration of his commitment to a 
set of values that he believed to be a condition of effective government. In 
particular, Maistre emphasizes the importance of unity in the constitutional order, 
and promotes its associated qualities of hierarchy, authority and communality. 
Having described and analysed constituent power, constitutions, sovereignty and 
forms of government in turn, it is necessary to conclude by examining what 
underlying, unifying themes emerge from this analysis and what Maistre’s impact on 
constitutional thought has been.
Unity in opposition to the Enlightenment
This concept of unity is the driving theme of Maistre’s constitutional thought. In 
Chapter 2, which dealt with Maistre’s concept of constituent power, it was explained 
how he provides a trenchant critique of the Enlightenment theories of the state of 
nature and of the social contract, and in their place puts forward an Aristotelian- 
influenced conception of the composition of political society, one which is highly 
critical of Rousseau’s theories on this matter. Chapter 3 contains an analysis of 
Maistre’s understanding of the constitution, a formulation that is contrary to the
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constitutional theories of Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Paine, who view 
the constitution as a text capable of being written by men. Instead, Maistre espouses 
a Burkean conception of the constitutional order: a theory which suggests that the 
origins of the constitution are lost in the mists of time, and that consequently the 
constitutional order depends upon tradition and authority. In Chapter 4 1 examined 
Maistre’s views on sovereignty, demonstrating that Maistre privileges traditionalist 
values of unity, absoluteness and authority and follows the Bodinian model of 
sovereignty as command. And in the discussion of different forms of government in 
Chapter 5, it was seen that Maistre upholds monarchy as being the most 
advantageous form of government, and rejects both the democratic form in general 
and representative democracy in particular. Above all, Maistre contends that 
adopting the democratic system will inevitability lead to despotism -  in contrast to 
the old hierarchical ways of governing, which have an inherent legality about them.
The traditionalism of Maistre’s thought gives a distinctive cast to his constitutional 
ideas, which stand in opposition to the Enlightenment ideals of abstraction, reason 
and uniformity: these latter ideals -  in Maistre’s view -  have the double effect of 
de-contextualizing, and therefore de-humanising, the person, and, in the process 
damaging the State. Throughout this thesis it has been seen how Maistre argues that 
the Enlightenment introduced a spirit of insurrection which attacked foundational 
constitutional values, and so it must be opposed by rehabilitating the principle of 
authority in all its different guises: hierarchy, unity, tradition.
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Traditionalism and the rejection of new ideas: this summary analysis of Maistre’s 
constitutional thought would seem to confirm the opinion of those scholars who 
regard Maistre as a doctrinaire promoter of theocracy and repressive 
authoritarianism. But this dissertation has also revealed other important facets to 
Maistre’s work -  facets which must not be ignored and which run alongside his 
strong criticisms of Enlightenment thinking.
The re-expression o f anti-Enlightenment values for a modem age
The introduction to this thesis raised the question of how successful Maistre was in 
advancing anti-Enlightenment ideas and re-conceptualising them for a modem age. 
The answer to this must be a qualified one. This thesis has shown Maistre’s work to 
be of its time, which is to say that it is the work of a jurist and a political thinker 
writing on the cusp of the nineteenth century. Despite Maistre’s opposition to 
Enlightenment and revolutionary thought, it has been argued that he was part of the 
same modem impulse to which the philosophes and the revolutionaries belonged.
When Maistre criticises democracy, liberalism or any of the other values that he 
despises so much, he does so using the terminology that his contemporary enemies 
used to promote them. In basing his philosophy on notions of authority, Maistre 
uses the same vocabulary as his adversaries. The fact that Maistre could engage at 
all with Paine, Locke and Rousseau, and the very acuity of his critique of the
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negative possibilities of Enlightenment thought (namely alienation, fragmentation, 
despotism and machine-like uniformity) emphasises his own modernity. Maistre 
had no choice but to frame his ideas using the newly developed language of secular 
rationalism. This sense of modem relevance is reinforced by the fact that, in this 
thesis, Maistre’s arguments have been used to examine, analyse and criticise a 
number of contemporary attitudes towards constitutionalism, sovereignty and the 
democratic form. But what are the constituent elements of this modem way of 
thinking? What is it in Maistre’s writing that gives him this relevance?
Maistre’s political modernity shows itself in two defining features of his 
constitutional thought: ambiguity and the use of the dialectic. So in Chapter 2 we 
saw how Maistre’s relationship with Enlightenment thought is not straightforwardly 
antagonistic, but remains delicately ambiguous. The interaction of his thought with 
that of Rousseau shows us that, as although he disparages the philosophes, he both 
drew upon and was influenced by at least some of their work. Chapter 2 also 
revealed a fundamental ambiguity in Maistre’s writing, between the relative roles of 
the divine and the human in the formation of constitutions -  as embodied in his 
treatment of the figure of the legislator, a potent constituent force in his work. And a 
series of conceptual tensions in his thought were also examined in this chapter -  
democracy versus the law, the divine against the human, the sovereignty of the 
people versus the will of the legislator.
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These themes -  and these tensions -  are further examined in Chapter 3, on 
constitutions. Whilst a superficial reading of Maistre’s views on constitutions might 
lead us to believe that he adopted a simplistic, unequivocal opposition to all modern 
conceptions of the constitution, in fact his work brings out the interplay between a 
number of tensions, the main one being the irresolvable conflict between the 
Burkean view of constitutions as lacking an ultimate origin, swathed in tradition, and 
the creator-centred belief that the constitution must have a distinct and decisive 
commencement brought about by a source external to the constitutional order. Once 
again, Maistre treats the tension between the two models of the constitution as 
dialectical, seeking to explore the relationship between them rather than establish 
which one is right.
In Chapter 4, the ambiguity between the divine and the political, which can be 
applied to certain similarities that exist between Hobbes and Maistre in their view of 
constitutional order, is made very clear; whilst the implications of considering the 
sovereignty as a function of power on the one hand, and authority on the other, is 
explored in some detail. The discussion of potestas and auctoritas in Chapter 4 
draws out the constitutional tensions developed in the previous chapters of the thesis 
and identifies them as belonging to one of two antithetical strains: norm, power, law, 
decision and command on the one hand and fact, authority, tradition and relation on 
the other. The existence of, and interplay between, these two sets of values informs 
not only Maistre’s view of sovereignty, but also the notion of modem sovereignty in 
general.
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Finally, Chapter 5, which examined Maistre’s thought regarding the forms of 
government, highlights yet another aspect of the complex relationship that exists 
between Maistre and Enlightenment thought: for Maistre draws deeply upon the 
insights provided by Montesquieu in De I’Esprit des Lois, one of the classic texts of 
liberal political and constitutional thought. The ‘prophet of the past’ advocates 
moderate government: constitutional self-limitation in order to increase governing 
authority and the mediation of sovereign powers through the impersonal structures 
of the State to avoid the arbitrariness of despotism. The discussion of the 
similarities between Maistre’s and Montesquieu’s work in Chapter 5 showed Maistre 
adopting a comparative methodology regarding the forms of government, even as he 
privileged monarchy above all other forms. The resolution to this apparent paradox 
lies in understanding Maistre primarily as a constitutional thinker and a public 
lawyer in the wide sense of the term, and it highlights once more his subtlety and 
creativity as a constitutional thinker. His use of ambiguity and the juxtaposition of 
irresolvable tensions for a creative purpose add to our understanding of the 
complexities of the activity of governing in the modem European state.
Theology and politics
One particular strain of thought runs through all of Maistre’s work, which is 
perhaps the most difficult for modern audiences to comprehend: the complex
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relationship between the political and the divine in Maistre’s constitutional thought. 
As we have seen, Maistre attacks liberal constitutionalism in general and the 
philosophes in particular for the circularity of their argument in insisting upon the 
sovereignty of the people -  circular because of the impossibility of generating true 
constitutional authority without an external guarantor of that authority. He asserts 
the need for a transcendental origin for authority in the constitutional order, in order 
to break that circularity and ensure that a gap between governor and governed can be 
maintained, and guarantee that the endless cycle of self-authorisation is avoided. As 
we have seen, from this argument flow important consequences for constituent 
power, sovereignty and authority; and from it emerge his arguments about the 
legislator, the figure of the Pope and of the need for Divine influence in the 
generative principle of constitutions.
Whilst this appears to be a standard, traditionalist point of view, we should not 
ignore the fact that, throughout this thesis, there are also numerous examples of 
Maistre’s non-conformity with the orthodox, theologically oriented perspective. For 
one of the interesting features of Maistre’s constitutional thought is his capacity to 
understand political authority as being conceptually distinct from theological 
considerations; it operates on a number of occasions without reference to the 
transcendent, and establishes an autonomous system whose origins, whilst never 
democratic, are either man-made or obscured in the mists of time. On the one hand, 
then, Maistre’s work presents us with a set of values that are resolutely in the 
tradition of French Orthodox Catholic political thought, based on tradition, unity and
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a radical openness to transcendent influence. But on the other he exhibits the 
influences of modern and early modem secular political thought in his understanding 
of a politics marked by brokenness and systemic closure.
This dualism is so prevalent in his thought, and occurs so often at the most critical of 
junctures in his writing that it is unclear which -  the political or the religious -  is the 
most significant for him. The dilemma with which the reader of Maistre is left is to 
decide whether religious concepts are being used merely to reinforce a political 
message, or whether Maistre is employing political terminology to emphasise the 
applicability of genuine theological concerns to the constitutional order.
One possible answer is, of course, that there is simply incoherence: that Maistre’s 
love of the polemical has led him into stylistic flourishes which cannot be reconciled 
in any meaningful way. Certainly commentators such as Stephen Holmes believe 
this to be the case.1 But it is the argument of this thesis that there is far more to 
Maistre’s work than mere propagandist rhetoric, and that he was consciously using 
this conceptual ambiguity as an intellectual technique. One example is provided by 
his letter to the Vatican regarding the possible papal endorsement of Du Pape. Even 
after trenchant demands for clarification, Maistre refused to amend the ambiguity of 
his language,2 and this suggests both his awareness of that ambiguity and his desire 
to preserve it for philosophical, rather than merely rhetorical, ends. Thus, it can be 
argued that this use of an ambiguous vocabulary is an astute manoeuvre by a public
1 See e.g. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, pp 13- 36
2 See above, Chapter 4, p. 224, footnote 201.
307
lawyer writing within a particular intellectual tradition, but for a post-revolutionary 
age, and it is with reference to this tradition that the full import of this ambiguity 
must be understood.
Maistre and public law
Maistre’s work, then, may be compared with those archetypes of eighteenth century 
traditionalist orthodoxy, Bossuet and Bonald. But in terms of constitutional thought 
it is argued that it resonates more deeply with political and constitutional thinkers of 
modernity such as Bodin, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Montesquieu and Rousseau. The 
conceptual focus of these thinkers is, in varying degrees, the autonomous practice of 
governing, the matter of sovereignty and the State. They were all public lawyers in 
the sense that they constantly explored the relationship between juridical form and 
political substance, and Maistre’s writing forms a bridge over which this notion of 
public law enters post-revolutionary constitutional thought.
Maistre’s achievement was to develop the notions of philosophers such as Pufendorf 
and Hobbes, who, although they did seek to autonomise the political, still belonged 
to an intellectual climate in which the reality of transcendental externalities was 
accepted. In contrast, although Maistre frequently employed transcendental images, 
the effect of the lack of distinction between religious and political concepts in his 
work was to detach the language of the transcendental from its original meaning and
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situate it within the political milieu of the post-revolutionary age, an age that would 
no longer support any form of political theorising that referred to truly cosmological 
concerns.
Speaking of this political technique of linguistic ambiguity (although not in relation 
to Maistre), Michael Oakeshott comments that, “the political vocabulary in which 
we speak of the activity of government and make it intelligible to ourselves is 
hybrid. It is a modem language and like all modem languages, it is an amalgam of 
words and expressions.. .each of which is in turn a complex world of diverse 
meanings”. Politics, unlike science, has no language in which each expression has a 
fixed, simple and universally recognised meaning. Rather, in political language each 
expression is susceptible to many interpretations, none of which is without force and 
significance. The mixtures which constitute our political habits and our political 
language are saved from disintegration by the tensions and stresses which have 
established themselves between their parts.
The result of this ambiguity of language in Maistre’s work is to endow public and 
constitutional law with a measure of autonomy, because neither politics nor theology 
can fully explain the effects created by this imprecision: the mix of fact and law, of 
the normative and the political, the theological and the temporal creates, by not 
being fully attributable to either of the traditional disciplines, its own unique 
disciplinary space. And by exploiting this imprecision in the meanings of concepts
3 Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996).
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and terms (by destabilising, for example, the relative meanings of Pontiff and 
Sovereign, ecclesiastical canons and secular law) Maistre continues, by a different 
route, a process begun by Bodin and Pufendorf of making the norms of natural law 
as much a part of the civil relationship as they are products of theology. This is an 
understanding of the state, government and constitutional order which rests upon 
foundations that, whilst not entirely transcendent, are nevertheless to be found to be 
beyond the merely positivist.
Viewed from a juridical perspective, the creation of this zone of indistinction is 
enabled by the existence of fundamental laws and norms which have a complex 
constitutional status. In effect, the fundamental laws create an autonomous arena of 
complexity, subtlety and interaction, whilst at the same time demarcating the 
boundaries between the constitutional, the political and the theological: they are the 
juridical expression of a delicately balanced arrangement. It is Maistre’s 
achievement to have used this conception of public law alongside his understanding 
of the post-revolutionary state as an increasingly self-referential entity. For 
throughout Maistre’s work it is possible to see not only brutal criticism of the post­
revolutionary regime, but also an explication of the idea that the growth of 
constitutionalism comes from an increase in the authority of the State.
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Reason o f  State
This ambiguous understanding of the constitutional provides the context for an 
aspect of Maistre’s thought which, in the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt has made 
infamous4. This is the idea that sovereignty has the ability to make a decision with 
finality: to go beyond the positive, textualised law and act in accordance with more 
deeply embedded norms in order to preserve the integrity of the constitution in a 
more profound sense. The argument is a continuation, in secular terms, of the debate 
concerning God’s ability to bind Himself with his own laws, and can only be fully 
appreciated by having an understanding of the conceptual creativity created by the 
confusion of terminology and concept discussed above. The ability of the Sovereign 
to act in defence of the constitution but against positive laws is a feature which 
occurs several times in Maistre’s constitutional thought.5 Often identified in 
constitutional and political theory as the doctrine of Reason of State, it is an aspect 
of Maistre’s work that assists us in understanding the irrational and anti-democratic 
tendencies that are present even in the apparently rational, rule-of-law oriented, 
modern democratic state.
In the most general sense, Reason of State denotes the abstract principle by which, in 
exceptional situations, power authorises itself in the name of superior ends and takes 
measures contrary to morality and law. The concept is invoked when either the
4 See Schmitt, Political Theology.
5 OC V 6 T 11, p. 329: “In politics as elsewhere, and more than elsewhere, necessity has no law”.
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public good or the interest of the state are threatened. The overturning of laws is 
then doubly justified. First of all there is urgency: the situation demands that 
exceptional measures be adopted quickly. Second, there is the existence of ethically 
superior ends: it is in the name of elevated moral imperatives (generally the defence 
of the public interest) that power authorises itself to turn away from the values which 
should guide its actions in ordinary times. If Reason of State permits wrongdoing, 
this is only to avoid an even greater evil.
This doctrine is typically associated with those seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
writers who were proponents of power, autonomy and absolutism; modem liberal 
democracies, it is thought, do not use or have need for Reason of State. Yet political 
experience clearly demonstrates that democracies are no strangers to this type of 
thinking, and that the problem of security faces the government of the rule of law 
just as much as it does an autocratic government. It is one of the enduring themes of 
European constitutional history, and one which has been stated and re-stated in 
various guises -  indeed, the very existence of the Latin term for the concept, ratio 
statis, reminds us that to employ this terminology is to move within a great tradition 
of Western rationality.
Maistre’s work is important because it argues that there is more to the business of 
governing than the following of a text, and that there are substantive elements to the 
constitution that cannot be supplied by textual interpretation, no matter how rigorous 
it may be. In arguing this, his work encompasses both the Schmittian extremes of the
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final decision and the Oakeshottian recognition of the existence of a constitution 
outside of the black letter law. Maistre’s belief in the inadequacy of the written 
constitution, his faith in the importance of maintaining a gap between governors and 
governed and his conviction that the sovereign must be able to make a final, 
infallible decision -  all these themes (and others) are expressions of Reason of the 
State thinking.
Intimately connected to this idea, Maistre’s work often draws attention to that part of 
government which does not give reasons for its decision and actions -  the part of 
political power which must remain unanalysed and obscure.6 This aspect is 
fundamentally linked not only to an authoritarian understanding of tradition and 
hierarchy, but also to the ‘art of governing’, a process of political decision making in 
certain political situations.7 Whilst on the one hand this art of governing may be 
considered simply as a technique only open to the few -  the secret {arcanum 
imperii) as it was known in the purest form of the doctrine of Reason of State -  its 
existence is also evidence of something more profound, a prudential element in 
Maistre’s thought on constitutions and on governing -  an understanding that 
surpasses mere governmental technique. It is an understanding of the constitution 
and the activity of governing based on tradition, nuance and practical wisdom. Like 
Reason of State, these are all elements of the constitution and of governing that
6 OC V. 1 T. 1 p.264 “I believe that I have read somewhere that there are very few sovereignties 
which are in a state to justify the legitimacy of their origins.. .the cloud which more or less envelops 
the origin of their authority...are an inconvenient and necessary result of a law of the moral world”.
7 OC V 6 T 12, p. 303: “Just as politics does not hate anyone, neither does it love anyone.”
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cannot be understood by reading a text: rather they have deeper origins: those of 
experience, intuition and a sense of shared history.
Maistre understands that the modem in both politics and in constitutional matters -  
for example the theory of representative democracy -  must, by its very construction, 
contradict itself. Nevertheless, the practice of governing in reality continues. 
Reason of State marks his attempt to address, by the use of prudential methods, the 
deficit between the reality and the ideal of governing.8 Maistre’s understanding of 
Reason of State is that of a collection of politico-juridical practices by which the 
newly self-conscious European state ensures its realisation. As such, when he 
applies this mode of thinking he does not intend it to mean an entry by the State into 
a zone of non-law, but rather to function as an elaboration of his understanding of 
the public law, the system of fundamental, ‘truly constitutional’ laws which express 
the competing claims of politics and normativity. Reason of State, in Maistre’s 
constitutional thought, functions as a creative agency that can bridge the gap 
between the various constitutional and political tensions which exist. And it is in 
this spirit that Loughlin, echoing Hobbes, identifies Reason of State as public 
reason.9 It is a prudential requirement in order to maintain the safety and 
functioning of the State; it is a “rationality of expedience, of prudence”.10
Hannah Arendt’s description of the Roman conception of lex enables us to 
understand the broader implications of this interpretation of Maistrian public law,
8 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 3-6.
9 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law. p. 163.
10 Ibid.
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which fills the space between the various competing dialectical tensions that exist 
within the modem European constitutional arrangement. According to Arendt, the 
original meaning of the word reflects an intimate relationship, something which 
connects two things or two partners whom external circumstances have brought 
together: the function of lex is thus to unite “two altogether different entities”.
Lex, in this sense at least, functions as the limit, the line of demarcation between the 
two sides of the debate whilst at the same time allowing for the possibility of co­
ordination. Its agency allows for “A new unity.. .the unity of two altogether 
different entities.. .which now entered into a partnership”.11 And this formulation 
furthers our understanding of the creative nature of public law as something dynamic 
and fruitful, a zone in which the juridical and the political come together and 
influence one another, rather than the static system that it would at first seem to be.
Accepting that public law is ultimately a constitutional accommodation of 
contrasting forces also helps to explain the co-existence (and yet continued 
separation) of a number of the different dialectical elements, all of which exist in 
Maistre’s work, and all of which constitute vital elements of the modem European 
State. Amongst these dialectical oppositions are the traditional versus the divinely 
given constitution and the contrasting notions of potestas and auctoritas in 
sovereignty; law versus fact and relation versus command.
11 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution , (London: Penguin, 1990), p.187
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The dialectic which exists in Maistre’s work is not synonymous with the Hegelian 
conception of the term; there is, in the Maistrian model, no question of a resolution 
of the two opposing tensions. Instead, Maistre juxtaposes constitutional concepts 
that have a distinct polarity in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of their 
nature, but this understanding comes not from synthesis but from the creative 
interplay of oppositions. The existence of these permanently arrested tensions also 
expresses the fact that the constitution is not a perfectly formed and co-ordinated, 
self-contained unit, but is something that constantly shifts, showing different aspects 
of itself in response to the various questions asked of it: a constitution is the product 
of tradition, history and the very fact of political existence with all its messy, 
irresolvable human dilemmas.
Telos and Nomos, throne and altar
It has so far been argued in this conclusion that Maistre’s work challenges the 
assumptions underpinning both traditionally held concepts and those with purely 
rationalist, positivist foundations. In so doing, Maistre both feeds from and adds to 
the idea of public law that had been developed by a number of thinkers from early 
modem times. One of the consequences of the development of this concept was that 
it enabled the translation of transcendental values into the language of civic 
relationships. Maistre’s view of public law is intimately connected with politics, and 
it explains and provides a foundation for the growing authority of the state. We have
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seen how this aspect of his thought can be interpreted quite narrowly and 
technically, in terms of the Reason of the State, but it can also be interpreted more 
generally, as a creative agency, and one that bridges the gap between a range of 
constitutional tensions -  this is a notion encapsulated by Arendt’s definition of Lex.
However, even this only gives us a partial picture, albeit an important one. A 
significant feature of Maistre’s constitutional thought is certainly his understanding 
of public law and the way he accommodates constitutional tensions, but Maistre’s 
view of the tensions themselves, the dialectical stresses that form the substantive 
image of the modem European state, must also be examined, because, in Maistre’s 
eyes, “nations are, like individuals, an assemblage of contradictions”.12 And 
although all of these contradictions have constitutional significance, perhaps the 
most important that exists is the one between the different notions of the state itself.
We saw in Chapter 4 how Oakeshott believes Maistre’s work to be an example of 
universitas, that term being defined as “an association of intelligent agents who 
recognise themselves to be engaged upon the joint enterprise of seeking the 
satisfaction of some common substantive want”.13 For Oakeshott, Maistre provides 
“perhaps the only genuinely theoretical treatment of the idea of a modern European 
state as a religious corporation in the Catholic idiom”.14 It is certainly the case that 
the elements which lead Oakeshott to this conclusion do exist in Maistre’s writing,
12 OCW  6T  l l , p .  322.
13 Michael Oakeshott, “On the Character of a Modern European State”, in On Human Conduct, p. 
205.
14 Ibid., p. 281.
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but Oakeshott either misses or chooses to ignore some of the crucial nuances that are 
also present in Maistre’s political work -  nuances that this thesis has, hopefully, 
revealed.15
For one thing, Maistre’s work also shows us elements of that other strain in 
constitutional thinking, and one which is opposed to universitas, that of societas, 
which Oakeshott defines in the following manner: “the tie which joins [members of 
the association known as societas]...is not that of an engagement in an enterprise to 
pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest, but that of 
loyalty to one another, the conditions of which may achieve the formality denoted by 
the kindred word ‘legality’”.16 Societas was understood to be the product of pact or 
agreement, not to act in concert, but to acknowledge the authority of certain 
conditions governing their behaviour. We have seen in Chapter 5 how Maistre’s 
view of moderate aristocratic government is presented precisely upon this basis, 
whilst representative government is presented by him as a form of universitas.
More light is shed on the composition of these two notions by examining two other 
concepts used by Oakeshott, that of teleocratic and nomocratic government.17 Telos 
is movement directed towards an end or a state of fulfilment which is potential 
within the thing that moves, as distinct from an end or a fulfilment imposed upon it
15 Oakeshott does identify one of the crucial issues in Maistre’s work -  the ruler (who is both priest 
and king) -  but he chooses to interpret this as an indication of the monolithic simplicity, rather than 
the complex ambiguity, of Maistre’s thought. See Oakeshott, “On the Character of a Modem 
European State”, p. 282.
16 Oakeshott, “On the Character of a Modem European State”, p. 201
17 Michael Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, ed. Terry Nardin and Luke 
O’Sullivan (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2006).
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from outside.18 In this regard, the cosmos is seen as being in a continuous process of 
teleological change, and the notion itself is therefore connected with the idea of 
cosmological unity: the immemorial constitution belongs to the sphere of Telos. 
Nomos, on the other hand, is essentially man-made and the product of a legislative 
process. It is a decision about what shall be required and expected from citizens, 
and it is made by the making of rules:19 the legislator belongs to the sphere of 
Nomos.
These two terms expose still further the essence of the irresolvable flux at the heart 
of the state which is present in Maistre’s constitutional thought. At the meeting 
place between Telos and Nomos, a dialectical drama is played out: ought meets is; 
fact meets value; the natural meets the positivist; unity meets dialectic. This last 
opposition is a central paradox in the Maistrian oeuvre: the desire to express 
constitutional unity is matched by the impossibility of doing so in the post-Cartesian, 
dualist world. Maistre’s work is complex because, rather than represent either of the 
two trends identified by Oakeshott, it accommodates them both. This assertion of 
the nature of the state gives Maistre’s work its modem character, despite the 
traditionalist elements that exist within it.
More precisely, his work highlights the moment at which the paradigm of religious 
justification for governing is being superseded by the paradigm of the 
autonomisation of state sovereignty, and Maistre belongs not to the old paradigm,
18 Ibid., p. 102.
19 Ibid., p. 80.
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but to the new. He instinctively recognises the post-revolutionary constitutional 
setting and its flaws and contradictions, and his work acts as a recognisably modern 
critique of received liberal notions about the pre-eminence of rationalist 
constitutionalism. Indeed, the very existence of his writings illustrates the fact that 
an illiberal, authoritarian intellectualism continued to exist in European thought 
alongside the talk of the rights of man and the possibility of putting a constitution in 
one’s pocket.
Maistre’s work reveals the dark heart of the modem European state, its potential for 
authoritarianism and coerciveness on both sides of the political spectrum. Viewed 
either approvingly or with horror, Maistre’s work is certainly a potent antidote to the 
liberal ideology that holds that the state is a neutral framework, in which rational 
discourse unfolds in an orderly manner without reference to powerful political and 
moral undercurrents.
But Maistre’s thought also provides positive guidelines for modem constitutional 
practice, and offers a profound analysis of the essence of the constitutional 
relationship between the individual and the State, between governors and the 
governed and between authority and power. The array of topics that Maistre 
addresses, and the seams of contentious material that he mines in his work, remain 
relevant to our understanding of issues such as legitimacy, authority and sovereignty 
in a Europe, in which the position of many of the participant states is finely balanced 
between a range of competing political values. Perhaps the lasting importance of
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Maistre’s constitutional thought is that it leaves us with a series of irreconcilable 
oppositions and unsolvable ambiguities, expressed at a transitional moment in the 
development of European constitutional jurisprudence. To continue the task of 
exploring them will be to elucidate some of the most profound issues that exist in 
respect of the contemporary constitution.
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APPENDIX: FRENCH TEXT OF MAISTRE QUOTATIONS
Introduction
Note 2 -  Mais la revolution frangaise, et tout ce qui passe en Europe dans ce 
moment, est tout aussi merveilleux dans son genre que la fructification 
instantanee d’un arbre au mois de janvier...
Note 4 -  Chaque goutte du sang de Louis XVI en coutera des torrents a la 
France; quatre millions de Frangais, peut-etre, payeront de leurs tetes le grand 
crime national d’une insurrection anti-religieuse et anti-sociale, couronnee par un 
regicide.
Note 5 -  Me permettez-vous, Monsieur, de vous faire une petite chicane 
grammaticale? La particule de, en frangais, ne peut se joindre a un nom propre 
commengant par une consonne, a moins qu’elle ne suive un titre: ainsi vous 
pouvez fort bien dire le Viscomte de Bonald a dit, mais non pas De Bonald a dit; 
il faut dire Bonald a dit et cependant on disait D ’Alembert a dit: ainsi l’ordonne 
la grammaire. Vous etes done oblige, Monsieur de dire “Enfin, Maistre a paru 
e tc ...”
Note 65 -  Ce qu’il y a de plus admirable dans l ’ordre universel des choses, e’est 
1’action des etres libres sous la main divine. Librement esclaves, ils operent tout
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a la fois volontairement et necessairement: ils font reellement ce qu’ils veulent, 
mais sans pouvoir deranger les plans generaux.
Note 103 -  Le peche original, qui explique tout, et sans lequel on n’explique 
rien.
Note 104 -  D ne sait ce qu’il veut; il veut ce qu’il ne veut pas; il ne veut pas ce 
qu’il veut; il voudrait vouloir. II voit dans lui quelque chose qui n ’est pas lui est 
qui est plus fort que lui. Le sage resiste et s’ecrie: Qui me delivrera? L ’insense 
obeit, et il appelle sa lachete bonheur...
Note 105 -  Hobbes a parfaitement raison, pourvu qu’on ne donne point trop 
d’extension a ses principes. La societe est reellement un etat de guerre: nous 
trouvons done ici la necessite du gouvemement; car puisque l’homme est 
mauvais, il faut qu’il soit gouveme [....] Le gouvemement n ’est done point une 
affaire de choix; il resulte de la nature meme des choses.
Note 107 -  Or, cette incapacite de jouir du SOLEIL est, si je ne me trompe, 
l’unique suite du peche originel....La raison peut, ce me semble, s’elever jusque 
la; et je  crois qu’elle a droit de s’en applaudir sans cesser d’etre docile.
Note 109 -  a) ...hors de cette supposition [i.e. of innate ideas] il devient 
impossible de concevoir Vhomme, e ’est a dire Vunite ou Vespece humaine.
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b) Toute doctrine rationelle est fondee sur une connaissance antecedente, car 
l ’homme ne peut rien apprendre que par ce qu’il sait. Le syllogisme et 
l ’induction partant done toujours de principes poses comme deja connus, il faut 
avouer qu’avant de parvenir a une verite particuliere nous la connaissons deja en 
partie.
c) En effet, 1’essence des principes est qu’ils soient anterieurs, evidents, non 
derives, indemonstrables, et causes par rapport a la conclusion, autrement ils 
auraient besoin eux-memes d’etre demontres; e ’est a dire qu’ils cesseraient d’etre 
principes.
Note 110 -  Oui, Platon, tu dis vrai! Toutes les verites sont dans nous; elles sont 
NOUS, et lorsque l’homme croit les decouvrir, il ne fait que regarder dans lui et 
dire OUI.
Note 111 -  ...la revelation, dans le vrai, n’ayant fait que tirer le voile fatal qui ne 
permettait pas a l ’homme de lire dans l ’homme.
Note 114 -  La raison humaine est manifestement convaincue d’impuissance pour 
conduire les hommes; car peu sont en etat de bien raisonner, et nul ne l ’est de 
bien raisonner sur tout; en sort qu’en general il est bon, quoi qu’on dise, de 
commencer par 1’autorite.
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Note 120 -  H faut partir d’ailleurs d’un principe general et incontestable: savoir, 
que tout gouvemement est bon lorsqu ’il est etabli et qu ’il subsiste depuis 
longtemps sans contestation.
Note 121 -  Or, il ne faut jamais oublier que les traditions des peuples, et sourtout 
les traditions generates, sont necessairement vraies dans un sens, c’est a dire 
qu’elles admettent l’alteration, l ’exageration et autres ingredients de la faiblesse 
humaine, mais que leur caractere general est inalterable et necessairement fonde 
sur la verite. En effet, une tradition dont l’objet n ’est pas un fait particulier ne 
peut pas commencer contre la verite: il n’y a aucun moyen de faire cette 
hypothese.
Note 122 -  ...plus l’institution est divine dans ses bases, et plus elle est durable. 
II est bon meme d’observer, pour plus de clarte, que le principe religieux est, par 
essence, createur et conservateur, de deux manieres. En premier lieu, comme il 
agit plus fortement que tout autre sur 1’esprit humain, il en obtient des efforts 
prodigieux. ...En second lieu, le principe religieux deja si fort par ce qu’il opere, 
l ’est encore infiniment par ce qu’il empeche, a raison du respect dont il entoure 
tout ce qu’il prend sous sa protection.. . .Voulez vous conserver tout, dediez tout.
Note 123 -  .. .les dogmes et meme les maximes de haute discipline catholique ne 
sont, en grand partie, que des lois du monde divinisees, et quelquefois aussi, des 
notions innees ou des traditions venerables sanctionnees par la revelation.
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Note 124 -  Chaque siecle a ses prejuges et sa maniere de voir apres laquelle il 
doit etre juge. C’est un insupportable sophisme du notre, de supposer 
constamment que ce qui serait condamnable de nos jours, l ’etait de meme dans 
les temps passes...
Note 125 -  ...il faut que les dogmes religieux et politiques meles et confondus 
forment ensemble une raison universelle ou nationale assez forte pour reprimer 
les aberrations de la raison individuelle qui est, de sa nature, l’ennemie mortelle 
de toute association quelconque, parce qu’elle ne produit que des opinions 
divergentes.
Note 126 -  J’ai souvent attire l ’attention en exposant l ’analogie surprenante de la 
revolution du XVIe siecle et celle que nous voyons, qui n ’est qu’un calvinisme 
politique.
Note 127 -  Or ces novateurs [du xvie siecle] ...ils substituerent le jugement 
particulier au jugement catholique\ ils substituerent follement 1’autorite exclusive 
d’un livre a celle du ministere enseignant, plus ancient que le livre et charge de 
nous l’expliquer.
Note 128 -  De la vient le caractere particulier de l ’heresie du xvie siecle. Elle 
n ’est point seulement une heresie religieuse, mais une heresie civile, parce qu’en 
affranchissant le peuple du joug de l’obeissance...elle dechaine l ’orgueil general 
contre 1’autorite, et met la discussion a la place de l ’obeissance.
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Note 129 -  Le protestant est un homme qui n ’est pas catholique: en sort que le 
protestantisme n’est qu’une negation. Ce qu’il a de reel est catholique.
Note 130 -  Le grand ennemi de l ’Europe qu’il importe d’etouffer par tous les 
moyens qui ne sont pas des crimes, 1’ulcere funeste qui s’attache a toutes les 
souverainetes et qui les ronge sans releche, le fils de l ’orgueil, le pere de 
l ’anarchie, le dissolvent universel, c ’est le protestantisme.
Note 131 -  Qu’est -  ce que le protestantisme? C ’est l ’insurrection de la raison 
individuelle contre la raison generale.
Chapter Two
Note 7 -  Le principe de la Souverainete du peuple est si dangereux que, dans le 
cas meme ou il serait vrai, il ne faudrait pas lui permettre de se montrer.
Note 31 -  On peut observer, dans tous ses ouvrages, qu’il prend tous les mots 
abstraits dans leur acception populaire...
Note 33 -  Au fond, la gloire d’avoir fait la Revolution n’appartient 
exclusivement ni a Voltaire ni a Rousseau.. .l’un a sape la politique en 
corrompant la morale, et 1’autre a sape la morale en corrompant la politique.
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Note 36 -  H a souffle de toute part le mepris de 1’autorite et l ’esprit 
d ’insurrection. C’est luiqui a trace le code de l’anarchie, et qu i.. .a pose les 
principes desastreux dont les horreurs que nous avons vues ne sont que les 
consequences immediates.
Note 37-11 existe un livre intitule: De Jean-Jacques Rousseau considere comme 
auteur de la Revolution.. .Ce livre et la statue de bronze que la Convention 
nationale a decemee a Rousseau sont peut-etre le plus grand opprobre qui ait 
jamais fletri la memoire d’aucun ecrivain.
Note 49 -  a) Quelle analyse! Quelle profondeur! Quelle clarte
b) Rousseau, qui abuse de tous les mots, abuse, plus que de tout autre de celui de 
nature. H l ’emploie, sans le definir, a chaque page du discours sur l’inegalite des 
conditions; il en fait tout ce qu’il veut; il impatiente le bon sens.
Note 50 -  a) On peut invoquer ici un principe generale, dont l ’illustre Newton a 
fait une des bases de sa philosophic: c’est qu’ “on ne doit point admettre en 
philosophic plus de causes qu’il n’est necessaire pour expliquer les phenomenes 
de la nature.”
b) Et Linee, appliquant cette maxime incontestable a l ’objet qui nous occupe 
dans ce chapitre...
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Note 52 -  On ne peut imaginer que deux manieres de connaitre la destination de 
l’homme: l’histoire et l ’anatomie. La premiere montre ce qu’il a toujours ete; la 
seconde montre comment ses organes repondent a sa destination, et la certifient.
Note 53 -  en general, ce n ’est pas une si mauvaise methode que celle d’etablir le 
droit par 1 cfait: pour connaitre la nature de l’homme, le moyen le plus court et le 
plus sage est incontestablement de savoir ce qu’il a toujours ete. Depuis quand 
les theories peuvent-elles etre oposees aux faits?
Note 55 -  L ’homme imaginaire des philosophes est etranger a la politique, qui ne 
travaille que sur ce qui existe.
Note 56 -  L’histoire est la politique experimentale...
Note 58 -  Ici Rousseau pousse la distraction au point de confondre le progres du 
genre humain en general, avec le progres des nations particulieres.
Note 59 -  Partout ou l’homme a pu observer l ’homme, il l ’a toujours trouve en 
societe: cet etat est done pour lui Vetat de nature.
Note 60 -  Ovide, en decrivant les froids atroces qu’il eprouvait dans son exil, 
presente des objets de comparaison tres -  piquants, et il est aussi bon a citer 
qu’un historien.
329
Note 61 -  Homere, au deuxieme livre de / ’Made, decrit une sedition qui s’eleva 
parmi les Grecs fatigues du long siege de Troie....Ce n’est point du tout une 
chose indifferente pour moi de savoir ce que le bon sens antique pensait de la 
souverainete...
Note 62 -  J ’aime entendre cet oracle de Delphes...; oracle que Plutarque nous a 
transmis d’apres le vieux Tyrtee et qui appelle les rois des hommes divinement 
revetus de majeste.
Note 63-11 faut savoir gre aux ecrivains qui nous aprennent ce que les hommes 
ont fait et pense dans tous les tem ps.. .Or, si nous demandons a l’histoire ce que 
c ’est quel’homme, l’histoire nous repond que l ’homme est un etre social, et que 
toujours on l’a observe en societe.
Note 64 -  Si des Egyptiens nous passons aux Orientaux bien plus anciens 
qu’eux.. .nous trouverons encore des myriades de siecles, et toujours le regne des 
dieux precedant celui des hommes.
Note 65 -  Or, il ne faut jamais oublier que les traditions des peuples, et surtout 
les traditions generates, sont necessairement vraies dans un sens, c ’est a dire 
qu’elles admettent l ’alteration, l ’exageration, et autres ingredients de la faiblesse 
humaine, mais que leur caractere general est inalterable et necessairement fonde 
sur la verite.
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Note 66 -  Je cite ce jurisconsulte celebre, quoiqu’il n ‘est plus a la mode, parce 
qu’il exprime des idees qui sont a peu pres dans toutes les tetes, et qu’il s’agit 
seulement de developper.
Note 67 -  a) “L’etat de nature pur et simple.. ..n’est pas un etat auquel la nature 
ait destine l’homme”.
b) “C ’est celui ou l’on congoit que chacun se trouve par la naissance, en faisant 
abstraction de toutes les inventions et de tous les etablissements purement 
humains ou inspires a l’homme par la divinite,.. .et sous lesquels nous 
comprenons non-seulement les diverses sortes d ’arts avec toutes les commodites 
de la vie en general, mais encore les societes civiles, dont la formation est la 
principale source du bel ordre qui se voit parmi les hommes”.
c) En un mot, l ’homme dans l’etat de nature “est un homme tombe des nues”.
Note 68 -  C’est a dire que l’etat de nature est contre nature, ou en d’autres 
termes, que la nature ne veut pas que l’homme vive dans l’etat de nature.
Note 69 -  ...il est clair que l’homme dans le premier etat n’est que l’homme 
moins tout ce qu’il tient des institutions qui l ’environnent dans le second etat, 
c’est-a-dire un homme qui n’est pas homme
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Note 70 -  En effet, lorsqu’on dit que la nature destine ou ne destine pas un tel 
etre a un tel etat, ce mot de nature reveille necessairement 1’idee d’une 
intelligence et d’une volonte.
Note 71 -  ...1’homme etant un agent dont l ’action s’etend sur tout ce qu’il peut 
atteindre, il a le pouvoir de modifier une foule d’etres et de se modifier lui- 
meme: il a done fallu exprimer 1’etat de ces etres, avant et apres qu’ils ont subi 
faction humaine; et sous ce point de vue on oppose, en general, la nature a l’art 
(qui est la puissance humaine)...
Note 72 - “Ce n’est pas une legere enterprise”... de demeler ce qu’il y a d’originel 
et d’artificiel dans la nature actuelle de 1’homme, et de bien connaitre un etat qui 
n ’existe plus, qui peut-etre n’a jamais existe”.
Note 73 -  M. Burke a dit, avec une profondeur qu’il est impossible d’admirer 
assez, que “fa r t  est la nature de f  homme”: voila le grand mot qui renferme plus 
de verite et plus de sagesse que les ouvrages de vingt philosophes de ma 
connaissance.
Note 74 -  a) Des qu’on oppose fa r t humain a la nature, on ne sait plus ou 
s’arreter: il y a peut -  etre aussi loin de la caveme a la cabane, que de la cabane a 
la colonne Corinthienne, et comme tout est artificel dans 1’homme en sa qualite 
d’etre intelligent et perfectible, il ensuit qu’en lui otant tout ce qui tient a f  art, on 
lui ote tout.
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b) Je suppose done que cet homme, souffrant de l’intemperie de l ’air, s’ abrite 
dans une caveme: jusque-la il est encore homme naturel; mais si, la trouvant trop 
etroite, il s’avise d’en prolonger l ’abri en tressant a 1*entree quelques branches 
soutenues par des pieux, voila de l’art incontestablement. Cessa t-il alors d’etre 
homme naturel, et ce toit de feuillage, appartient -  il a la volonte divine ou a 
Vart humain?
Note 76 -  La perfectibilite n’est point une qualite particuliere de l’homme; elle 
est, s’il est permis de s’exprimer ainsi, la qualite de toutes ses qualites.
Note 78 -  a) D est absurde d’imaginer que le Createur ait donne a un etre des 
facultes qu’il ne doit jamais developper, et encore plus absurde de supposer 
qu’un etre quelconque puisse se donner des facultes, ou se servir de celles qu’il a 
re£ues pour etablir un ordre de choses contraire a la volonte du Createur.
Note 79 -  La parole d’ailleurs prouverait seule que l’homme est un etre social 
par essence.. ..si l’homme est fait pour parler, c ’est apparemment pour parler a 
quelqu’un;....
Note 81 -  C ’est-a-dire que Dieu avait donne a Vhomme des facultes qui devaient 
demeurer en puissance, mais que des evenements fortuits qui pouvaient ne pas 
arriver les ont fait passer a l’acte. Je doute qu’on ait jamais dit une betise de cette 
force.
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Note 82 -  Concluons done toujours, comme Marc -  Aurele: L ’homme est social 
parce qu’il est raisonnable. Ajoutons encore: mais il est corrompu dans son 
essence, et par consequent il lui fau t un gouvemement.
Note 85 -  Un de ses [i.e. Socrates’] plus illustres disciples nous a transmis les 
idees de son maitre sur cette ettonante contradiction qui est dans 1’homme. La 
nature, disait Socrate, a reuni dans cet etre les principes de la sociabilite et de la 
dissension...
Note 86 -  .. .comment un tel etre pourra -  t-il vivre avec ses semblables?
Note 87 -  . . .car puisque l ’homme est mauvais, il faut qu’il soit gouveme;....
Note 88 -  il faut que, lorsque plusieurs veulent la meme chose, un pouvoir 
superieur a tous les pretendants adjuge la chose et les empeche de se battre...
Note 89 -  Le gouvemement n’est done point une affaire de choix; il resulte de la 
nature meme de choses.
Note 91 -  H est impossible que 1’homme soit ce qu’il est et qu’il ne soit pas 
gouveme, car un etre social et mauvais doit etre sous le joug.
Note 92 -  Hobbes a parfaitement raison, pourvu qu’on ne donne point trop 
d’extension a ses principes.
334
Note 93 -  La societe est reellement un etat de guerre.. ..il faut un souverain et des 
lois; et, sous leur empire meme, la societe n ’est -  elle pas encore un champ de 
bataille en puissancel
Note 95 -  Ne voyons -  nous pas que, lorsque des revolutions politiques 
suspendent cette puissance divine, les nations malheureuses qui subissent ces 
commotions tombent brusquement dans cet etat de guerre, que la force s’empare 
du sceptre, et que cette nation est tourmentee par un deluge de crimes.
Note 110 -  Le principe de la Souverainete du peuple est si dangereux que, dans 
le cas meme ou il serait vrai, il ne faudrait pas lui permettre de se montrer.
Note 111 -  C’est la manie etemelle de Rousseau de se moquer des philopsophes, 
sans se douter qu’il etait aussi un philosophe dans toute la force du sens qu’il 
attribuait a ce mot: ainsi par exemple le Contrat social nie d’un bout a 1’autre la 
nature de l ’homme, qui est -  pour expliquer le pacte social, qui n ’existe pas. 
C’est ainsi qu’on raisonne quand on separe l’homme de la Divinite.
Note 112 -  Tout le monde connait ce vers fameux: le premier qu ifu t ro ifu t un 
soldat heureux. On n ’a peut etre jamais rien dit de plus faux; il faut dire, au 
contraire que: le premier soldat fu t solde par un roi.
Note 113 -  Le mot de peuple est une terme relatif qui n’a point de sens separe de 
l ’idee de la souverainete.
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Note 115 -  ...la question se reduit done a savoir si l ’homme est devenu animal 
politique, comme disait Aristote, par ou contre la volonte divine.
Note 116 -  ...au lieu de la supposition toute simple qui se presente naturellement 
a 1* esprit, on a prodigue la metaphysique pour batir des hypotheses aeriennes 
reprouvees par le bon sens et par l’experience.
Note 117 -  On a dit que le consentement de tous les hommes demontre preuve de 
la verite! Quelle preuve! Tous les peuples ont cru a la magie, a l’astrologie, aux 
influences de la Lune!
Note 118 -  II est tres-vrai, dans un sens inferieur et grossier, que la souverainete 
est fonde sur le consentement humain: car si un peuple quelconque s’accordait 
tout a coup pour ne pas obeir, la souverainete disparaitrait, et il est impossible 
d’imaginer l ’etablissement d ’une souverainete sans imaginer un peuple qui 
consent a obeir.
Note 121 -  Les dogmes et memes les maximes de haute discipline catholique ne 
sont, en grande partie, que des lois du monde divinisees.
Note 122 -  Dieu n’ayant pas juge a propos d’employer des instruments 
sumaturels pour l’etablissement des empires, il est sur que tout a du se faire par 
des hommes.
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Note 123 -  les lois viennent done de Dieu De meme la souverainete vient de
Dieu.
Note 124 la souverainete vient de Dieu, puisqu’il est l ’auteur de tout, excepte 
du mal, et qu’il est en particulier 1’auteur de la societe qui ne peut subsister sans 
la souverainete. Et cependant cette meme souverainete vient aussi des hommes 
dans un certain sens, e’est-a-dire en tant que tel ou tel mode de gouvemement est 
etabli et declare par le consentement humain.
Note 125 -  “Je ne viens point pour vous dire que la souverainete vient de Dieu 
ou des hommes; examinons seulement ensemble ce qu’il y a de divin et ce qu’il y 
a d’humain dans la souverainete.”
Note 127 -  Mais dire que la souverainete ne vient pas de Dieu parce qu’il se sert 
des hommes pour l’etablir, c’est dire qu’il n ’est pas le createur de 1’homme parce 
que nous avons tous un pere et une mere.
Note 128 -11 faut toujours que l’origine de la souverainete se montre hors de la 
sphere du pouvoir humain, de maniere que les hommes memes qui paraissent 
s’en meler directement ne soient neanmoins que des circonstances.
Note 129 -  La societe et la souverainete naquirent done ensemble; il est 
impossible de separer ces deux idees.
Note 130 -  ..des que les families se toucherent, il leur fallut un souverain.
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Note 131 -  ,.1’idee de peuple reveille celle d ’une agregation autour d’un centre
commun...
Note 132 -  sans la souverainete il ne peut y avoir d’ensemble ni d’unite 
politique.
Note 133 -  En observant qu’il ne peut exister d’association humaine sans une 
domination quelconque, je  n’entends point etablir de parite exacte entre 1’autorite 
patemelle et 1’autorite souveraine...
Note 134 -  ...des que les families se toucherent, il leur fallut un souverain, et ce 
souverain en fit un peuple en leur donnant des lois, puisqu’il n’y a de societe que 
par le souverain.
Note 136 -  II y a surement ici quelque equivoque s’il n ’ya pas une erreur, car le 
peuple qui commande n’est pas le peuple qui obeit.
Note 142 -  De ces differents caracteres des nations naissent les differentes 
modifications des gouvemements. On peut dire que chacun a son caractere...
Note 143 -  Les objets generaux de toute bonne institution doivent etre modifies 
en chaque pays par les rapports qui naissent tant de la situation locale, que du 
caractere des habitants; et c’est sur ces rapports qu’il faut assigner a chaque 
peuple un systeme particulier d’institutions qui soit le meilleur, non peut -  etre 
en lui -  meme, mais pour l ’Etat auquel il est destine.
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Note 146 -  a) Rejetez loin de vous ces theories absurdes qu’on vous envoie de 
France comme des verites etemelles, et qui ne sont que les reves funestes d ’une 
vanite immorale. Quoi! tous les hommes sont faits pour le meme gouvemement, 
et ce gouvemement est la democratic pure! Quoi! la royaute est une tyrannie, un 
gouvemement proscrit par la loi naturelle, et tous les hommes doivent se revolter 
contre cette espece de souverainete! Quoi tous les politiques se sont trompes 
depuis Aristote jusqu’a Montesquieu!
b) U ne faut done pas croire que “toute form e de gouvemement soit propre a tout 
pays: la liberte, par exemple, n ’etant pas un fru it de tous les climats, n ’est pas a 
la portee de tous les peuples”. Plus on medite ce principe etabli par Montequieu, 
plus on en sent la verite.
Note 148 -  ...le contrat sociale est une chimere.
Note 149 -  ...si il y a autant de differents gouvemements qu’il y a de differents 
peuples; si les formes de ces gouvemements sont prescrites imperieusement par 
la puissance qui a donne a chaque nation telle position morale, physique, 
geographique, commerciale etc. il n ’est plus permis de parler de pacte.
Note 150 -  a) Le despotisme, pour telle nation, est aussi naturel, aussi legitime 
que la democratic pour telle autre.
b) Dira-t-on que, meme dans cette hypothese, il y a toujours un pacte en virtue 
duquel chaque partie contractante est tenue de maintenir le gouvemement tel
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qu’il est? Dans ce cas pour le despotisme ou la monarchic absolue, le pacte sera 
precisement celui que Rousseau toume en ridicule a la fin de son pitoyable 
chapitre de l ’esclavage. “Je fais avec toi une convention toute a ta charge et toute 
a mon profit, que j ’observerai tant qu’il me plaira et que tu observeras tant qu’il 
me plaira”.
Note 151 -  La democratic pure n’existe pas plus que le despotisme absolu.... 
L ’idee d’un peuple entier souverain et legislateur choque si fort le bon sens, que 
les politiques grecs..n’ont jamais parle de la democratic comme d’un 
gouvemement legitime...Aristotle surtout defini la democratic Yexces de la 
republique....
Note 153 -  Dans ce sens strict, je  crois pouvoir definir la democratic: une 
association d ’hommes sans souverainete.
Note 154 -  ...on peut appeler democratic le gouvemement ou la masse exerce la 
souveraienete...
Note 155 -  ..je ne saurais vous exprimer, combien il a renforce mes idees anti- 
democrates... je  comprends tres bien comment les systemes, en fermentant dans 
les tetes humaines, se toument en passions; croyez que l’on ne saurait trop 
abhorrer cette abominable assemblee
Note 156 -  ..un accord n’est point une loi, et n ’oblige personnel moins qu’il n ’y 
ait une autorite superieure qui le garantisse.
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Note 157 -  la loi...suppose necessairement et manifestement une volonte 
superieure qui se fait obeir.
Note 159 -  La loi n’est proprement loi, et ne possede une veritable sanction 
qu’en la supposant emanee d’une volonte superieure; en sorte que son caractere 
essentiel est de n 'etre pas la volonte de tous. Autrement les lois ne seront, 
comme on vient de le dire, que des reglements; et comme le dit encore 1’auteur 
cite tout a l’heure “ceux qui ont eu la liberte de faire ces conventions, ne se sont 
pas ote le pouvoir de les revoquer; et leurs descendants, qui n’y ont eu aucune 
part, sont encore moins tenus de les observer”.
Note 160 -  ..qu’il y a d’excellentes prejuges, qui sont les plus anciennes et les 
plus saintes des lois.
Note 163 -  L ’accord du peuple est impossible; et, quand il en serait autrement, 
un accord n’est point une loi, et n’oblige personne.
Note 164 -  Car la loi n’est qu’une regie generate, etablie sans passion, pour 
reprimer les passions.
Note 167 -  ..Vhomme en general...est trop mechantpour etre libre.
Note 168 -  Le contraire de cette folle assertion, Vhomme est ne libre, est la 
verite.
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Note 169 -  Si un individu, si un corps reclame ou vante sourtout sa liberte, il faut 
qu’il nous indique le joug qui pesait sur lui ou qui pesait sur d’autres, et dont il 
est exempt.
Note 170 -  D n ’y a pas deux mots qui se combattent et s’excluent plus 
visiblement que ceux de liberte et de droit commun\ car si vous demandez de 
vivre comme tous les autres, vous ne voulez done point de libertes', et si au 
contraire vous en demandez, vous s’excluez ouvertement le droit commun.
Note 173 -  ...elle [la philosophic] a fort bien compris que les plus fortes 
inclinations de 1’homme etant vicieuses au point qu’elles tendent evidemment a 
la destruction de la societe, il n’avait pas de plus grand ennemi que lui meme, et 
que lorsqu’il avait appris a se vaincre, il savait tout.
Note 174 -  a) ...les efforts des peuples pour creer ou accroitre leur liberte, 
finissent presque toujours par leur donner des fers.
b) C ’est la servitude d’une partie du peuple qui rend cet Etat paisible; si chaque 
individu y etait, maitre de ses actions, je  ne crois pas que la tranquilite fut 
possible a l ’epoque actuelle.
Note 175 - La liberte consiste a n’obeir qu’aux Loix et la souvereainete consiste 
a pouvoir faire des loix, et a pouvoir les faire observer. II y a liberte quand on 
peut n ’obeir qu’a la loi;
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Note 176 -  Ce mot de liberte.. .ne sera jamais qu’une expression negative qui 
signifie absence d ’un obstacle.
Note 177 -  a) Les droits du peuple proprement dit partent assez souvent de la 
concession des souverains.
b) Que toute liberte legitime, parmi nous du moins, est un don de Rois.
Note 178 a) Ne croyons point que les hommes, en general, soient faits pour la 
liberte, ou pour le meme degre de liberte, ou qu’ils doivent jouir, par les memes 
moyens, du degre de liberte qui leur convient.
b) ...parmi les innombrables follies du moment et tous les moments.. .c’est de 
croire que la liberte est quelque chose d ’absolu...
Note 179 -  La liberte et Yegalite sont venues se presenter a vous sous les habits 
de deux divinites; mais bientot jetant ces habits trompeurs, et deployant leurs 
ailes funebres, elles ont plane sur notre malheureuse terre et montre les haillons 
sanglants et les serpents des furies.
Note 180 -  Qu’est ce que le peuple dans une democratic? Un nom, un etre moral; 
si vous obtenez de lui une faveur, la reconnaissance se divise; et ce sentiment, 
comme tous les autres, s’affaiblit en se divisant.
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Note 181 -  ...elles [i.e. democracies] ne peuvent se soutenir que par 
1’exaltation...
Note 182 -  .. .l’exaltation est un etat force qui n’est pas naturel a l’homme.
Note 183 -  Des que la ferveur democratique est tombee, le gouvemement n ’a 
plus de centre, plus d’unite: le peuple ne sait plus que faire de son pouvoir, il ne 
sait plus meme ou reside se pouvoir.
Page 40, note 184 -  ...et notre principe a nous, c’est l’unite.
Note 185 -  ...la democratic ne pourrait subsister un instant si elle n ’etait 
temperee par l ’aristocratie...
Note 186 -  a) Un leger exces de severite, introduit par une terreur legitime vous 
revoltait il y a quelques mois: comparez maintenant, et jugez. Dans les actes les 
plus severes de l ’ancien gouvemement, vous avez toujours aper$u une 
moderation marquee [...]. Le Prince le plus absolu connait une multitude de 
freins; il est retenu par son caractere particulier, par la religion, par la honte, par 
la politique , par les conseils salutaires, par l ’opinion publique: mais la tyrannie 
populaire n’a point de pudeur.
b) ...un sourire, un geste innocent peuvent passer pour une conjuration.... Les 
pensees sont des crimes [...] il faut demeurer et souffrir, c’est la Loi. Les villes 
ne sont que des grandes prisons dont tous les fonctionnaires publics sont des
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geoliers. [...]Et ne croyez pas que ces malheurs ne soient que des souffrances 
passageres, et, comme l’ignorance l ’a repete trop souvent, une espece de defile 
par lequel il faut necessairement passer pour arriver au bonheur et a la liberte.
Les principes de la Legislation qu’on vous preche sont essentiellement vicieux.
c) ...lorsqu’on opine sur les toits on s’egorge dans les rues.
Note 188 -  ...en affranchissant le peuple du joug de l’obeissance et lui accordant 
la souverainete religieuse, elle dechaine l ’orgueil general contre 1’autorite et met 
la discussion a la place de l’obeissance.
Note 190 -  On trouve dans tous les pays du monde des associations volontaires 
d’hommes qui se sont reunis pour quelques vues d’interet ou de bienfaisance.
Ces hommes se sont soumis volontairement a certaines regies qu’ils observant 
tant qu’ils le trouvent bon: ils se sont meme soumis a certaines peines qu’ils 
subissent lorsqu’ils ont contrevenu aux statuts de 1’association: mais ces statuts 
n’ont d’autre sanction que la volonte meme de ceux qui les ont forme; et des 
qu’il se trouve des dissidents, il n’y a point parmi eux de force coercitive pour les 
contraindre.
Note 191 -  On voit d’un coup d’oeil tous les avantages et les desavantages de ce 
gouvemement; dans ses beaux jours, il eclipse tout, et les merveilles qu’il enfante 
seduisent jusqu’a l ’observateur de sang -  froid qui pese tout. Mais, d’abord, il 
n’est fait que pour de tres- petits peoples, car la formation et la duree de l’esprit 
d’association sont difficiles....
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Note 192 -  La democratic pure n’existe pas plus que le despotisme absolu.
Note 193 -  La constitution de 1795, tout comme ses ainees, est faite pour 
Yhomme. Or, il n’y a point d’homme dans le monde. J ’ai vu, dans ma vie, des 
Franqais, des Italiens, des Russes, etc., je  sais meme, grace a Montesquieu, 
q u ’onpeut etre Person', mais quant a Vhomme, je  declare ne l’avoir rencontrer de 
ma vie; s’il existe, c ’est bien a mon insu. [...]Mais une constitution qui est faite 
pour toutes les nations, n’est faite pour aucune: c ’est une pure abstraction, une 
oeuvre scholastique faite pour exercer 1’esprit d’apres une hypothese ideale, et 
qu’il faut adresser a Yhomme dans les espaces imaginaires ou il habite.
Note 202 -  Les legislateurs proprement dit sont des hommes extraordinaires qui 
n ’appartiennent peut -etre qu’au monde antique et a la jeunesse des nations.
Note 212 -  Rousseau a fait un chapitre du legislateur ou toutes les idees sont 
confondues de la maniere la plus intolerable. D ’abord ce mot de legislateur peut 
avoir deux significations differentes: 1’usage permet de donner ce nom a 
1’homme extraordinaire qui promolgue des lois constitutives, et a l’homme 
beaucoup moins admirable qui publie des lois civiles. D parait que Rousseau 
entend le mot dans le premier sens, puisqu’il parle de celui “qui ose entreprendre 
d’instituer un peuple et qui constitue la Republique.” Mais, bientot apres, il dit 
que “le legislateur est a tous egards un homme extraordinaire, DANS L ’ETAT”. 
Ici il y a deja un Etat; le peuple est done constitue: il ne s’agit done plus 
d’instituer un peuple mais, tout au plus, de le reformer.
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Note 213 -  ...une entreprise au dessus de la force humaine, et, pour l ’executer, 
une autorite qui n’est rien. Au contraire l ’instituteur d’une nation a, pour 
1’execution de son entreprise, une autorite qui est tout.
Note 214 -  ... il lui communique ce temperament moral, ce caractere, cette ame 
generale qui doit, a travers les siecles et un nombre infini de generations, 
subsister d’une maniere sensible et distinguer un people de tous les autres...
Note 215 -  L ’institueur d’un peuple est precisment cette main habile.
Note 216 -  Ces legislateurs meme avec leur puissance extraordinaire ne font 
jamais que rassembler des elements preexistants dans les coutumes et le caractere 
des peuples...
Note 217 -  Pour les rendre propres a ces oeuvres extraordinaires, Dieu les 
investit d’une puissance extraordinaire...
Note 218 -  De savoir ensuite pourquoi et comment un homme engendre, au pied 
de la lettre, une nation...
Note 219 -  Uinstituteur d ’un peuple est un homme dont la qualite distinctive est 
un certain bon sens practicien brouille a mort avec les subtilites metaphysiques.
Note 220 - ...tout germe est necessairement un....
347
Note 221 -  ...c’est toujours d’un seul homme que chaque peuple tient son trait 
dominant et son caractere distinctif.
Note 222 -  ...doue d’une penetration extraordinaire...
Note 223 -  ...il devine ces forces et ces qualities occultes qui forment le caractere 
de sa nation, les moyens de les feconder, de les mettre en action et d’en tirer le 
plus grand parti possible.
Note 224 -  [ils sont] sou vent inconnue de leurs contemporains, et peut-etre 
d’eux me me s.
Note 225 -  ...mais ce rassemblement, cette formation rapide, qui tiennent de la 
creation...
Note 226 -  La politique et la religion se fondent ensemble...
Note 227 -  a) ...sa maniere tient de 1’inspiration...
b) ...ils agissent par instinct et par impulsion, plus que par raisonnement...
Note 228 -  ...qu’ils n’ont d’autre instrument pour agir qu’une certaine force 
morale qui plie les volontes comme le vent courbe une moisson.
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Note 229 -  ...et si quelquefois il prend la plume, ce n’est pas pour disserter, c ’est 
pour ordonner.
Note 231 -  Presque tous les grands legislateurs ont ete rois et les nations meme 
nees pour la republique ont ete constitutes par des rois...
Note 232 -  Le plus fameux legislateur de l ’univers, Moi'se, fut plus qu’un roi... 
Chapter 3
Note 46 -  a) Pour moi j ’en ai ete ravi, je ne saurais vous exprimer, combine il a 
renforce mes idees anti -  democrats et anti -  gallicanes.
b) M. Burke a dit, avec une profondeur qu’il est impossible d’admirer assez que 
l ’art est la nature de l’homme...
c) .. .ne seraient-ils point en droit de considerer l’acte du roi comme une 
abdication volontaire, suivant l ’hypothese que M Burke a si ingenieusement 
developpe a l’egard de Jacques II
d) Sans doute, ce grand patriot, ce grand ecrivain, ce prophete celebre qui devina 
la Revolution fran^aise...
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Note 51 -  On s’etonnera peut-etre qu’une nation constitutee n ’ait point de 
systeme judiciaire; mais il faut bien distinguer dans la Republique franqaise 
Y etablissement de Yorganisation. L ’etablissement est 1’oeuvre de la Constitution, 
et Yorganisation est celui de Constituants.
Note 60 -  ...gardons-nous des extremes, et surtout des systemes aeriens fondes 
uniquement sur ce qu’on appelle la raison, et qui n’est cependant que le 
raisonnement.
Note 61 -  ...je ne conseillerais jamais a une nation, de changer ses institutions 
antiques, qui sont toujours fondees sur de profondes raisons...
Note 66 -  Mais une constitution qui est faite pour toutes les nations, n’est faite 
pour aucune: c’est une pure abstraction, une oeuvre scolastique faite pour exercer 
1’esprit d’apres une hypothese ideale, et qu’il faut addresser a Yhomme dans les 
espaces imaginaires ou il habite.
Note 67 -  ...il ne fallait jamais demander quel est le meilleur gouvemement en 
general, puisqu’ il n’y en a pas qui convienne a tous les peuples. Chaque nation 
a le sien, comme elle a sa langue et son caractere, et ce gouvemement est le 
meilleur pour elle.
Note 68 -  a) Etant donnees la population, les moeurs, la religion, la situation 
geographique, les relations politiques, les richesses, les bonnes et les mauvaises 
qualities d ’une certaine nation, trouver les lois qui lui conviennent.
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b)La peuple qui est la meilleure constitute est ce qui est la meilleure gouvernee.
Note 69 -  ...or, un abusformel, un vice peut-il etre constitutionnel? Oui, sans 
doute, il peut l ’etre; car toute constitution politique a des defauts essentiels qui 
tiennent a sa nature et qu’il est impossible d ’en separer ...
Note 70 -  “La constitution de 1795, tout comme ses ainees, est faite pour 
Yhomme. Or il n’y a point d’homme dans le monde.
Note 71 -  a) Dira-t-on que le gouvemement fait les moeurs? Je le nie 
expressement. Ce sont les moeurs, au contraire, qui font les gouvemements...la 
premier impulsion, le principe generateur part toujours des moeurs et du 
caractere national.
b) Une des grandes erreurs de ce siecle est de croire que la constitution politique 
des peuples est une oeuvre purement humaine; qu’on peut faire une constitution 
comme un horloger fait un montre.
Note 72 -  a) D n’y a jamais eu, il n’y aura jamais, il ne peut y avoir de nation 
consitutuee a p r io ri. Le raisonnement et 1’experience se reunissent pour etablir 
cette grande verite. Quel oeil est capable d ’embrasser d’un seul coup l ’ensemble 
des circonstances qui doivent rendre une nation propre a telle ou telle 
constitution?
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b) La plus grande folie de ce siecle est celle des constitutions. Les homines se 
sont mis en tete qu’ils peuvent faire une constitution comme on fait une machine. 
Les Fran9ais pour leur compte en ont fait sept ou huit en moins de vingt 
ans.. . .mais tout a fini par un despotisme de fer, a la place de 1’admirable et douce 
monarchic dontils jouissaient.
Note 73 -  Ce que Payne et tant d’autres regardent comme un defaut est done une 
loi de la Nature. La constitution naturelle des nations est toujours anterieure a la 
constitution ecrite et peut s’en passer...
Note 74 -  a) ...qu’une constitution, e ’est-a-dire, l ’ensemble des lois 
fondamentales qui conviennent a une nation, et qui doivent lui donner telle ou 
telle forme de gouvemement...
b) Si un homme de bon fo i.. .demande ce que e’etait que l ’ancienne constitution 
fransaise, on peut lui repondre hardiment: “C’est ce que vous sentiez, lorsque 
vous etiez en France; c’est ce melange de liberte et d’autorite, des lois et 
d’opinions..
Note 75 -  Une constitution dans le sens philosophique n’est done que le mode 
d’existence politique attribue a chaque nation par une puissance au dessus d’elle; 
et, dans un sens inferieur, une constitution n’est que l ’ensemble des lois plus ou 
moins nombreuses qui declarent ce mode d ’existence.
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Note 76 -  a) ...un code politique est un tout, un systeme generate de parties 
correspondantes...
b) De la vient qu’une constitution libre n ’est assuree que lorsque les differentes 
pieces de l ’edifice politique sont nees ensemble e t.. .a cote l ’une de l ’autre.
Note 77 -  L ’histoire nous montre constamment les hommes reunis en societes 
plus ou moins nombreuses, regies par differentes souverainetes.
Note 78 -  a) Alors, il n ‘y avait que des families, et ces families ainsi 
disseminees n’etaient encore, individuellement ou par leur reunion future, que 
des embryons de peuples.
b) Le premier homme fut roi de ses enfants; chaque famille isolee fut gouvemee 
de la meme maniere.
Note 79 -  II y a eu un peuple, une civilisation quelconque et un souverain 
aussitot que les hommes se sont touches.
Note 80 -  Le mot de peuple est un terme relatif qui n’a point de sens separe de 
l ’idee de la souverainete...
Note 81 - ...une aggregation autour d’un centre commun, et sans la souverainete 
il ne peut y avoir d’ensemble ni d’unite politique.
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Note 83 -  Les nations ont une ame generate et une veritable unite morale qui les 
constitue ce qu’elles sont.
Note 84 -  a) Cette unite est surtout annoncee par la langue.
b) ...les formes de ces gouvemements sont prescrites, imperieusement par la 
puissance qui a donne a chaque nation telle position morale, physique, 
geographique, commercial etc...
Note 85 -  De ces differents caracteres des nations naissent les differentes 
modifications des gouvemements. On peut dire que chacun a son caractere, car 
ceux -  memes qui appartiennent a la meme classe et qui portent le meme nom 
presentent des nuances differentes a l ’oeil de l ’observateur.
Note 86 -  ...comme les nations naissent, au pied de la lettre, les gouvemements 
naissent aussi avec elles. Quand on dit qu’un peuple s’est donne un 
gouvemement, c ’est tout comme si l ’on disait qu’il s’est donne un caractere et 
une couleur.
Note 87 -  La raison humaine reduite a ses forces individuelles est parfaitement 
nulle, non - seulement pour la creation, mais encore pour la conservation de 
toute association religieuse ou politique.
Note 89 -  H n’y a de si important pour lui que les prejuges... des opinions 
quelconques adoptees avant tout examen.
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Note 90 -  a ).. .qui sont les plus anciennes et les plus saintes des lois.
b)...que tous les gouvemements sont le resultat de la convention tacite des 
hommes reunis, et l ’expression reelle de leur assentiment, fonde sur leur 
caractere, et sur des circonstances sans nombre qu’il est impossible de connaitre 
toutes...
Note 91 -  ...l’homme a besoin de prejuges, de regies pratiques, d’idees sensibles, 
materielles, palpables. Vous ne le menerez point avec des syllogismes...
Note 92 -  La raison humaine reduite a ses forces individuelles est parfaitement 
nulle, non- seulement pour la creation, mais encore pour la conservation de 
toute association religieuse ou politique, parce qu’elle ne produit que des 
disputes, et que l’homme pour se conduire n’a pas besoin de problemes, mais de 
croyances. Son berceau doit etre environne de dogmes; et, lorsque sa raison se 
reveille, il faut qu’il trouve toutes ses opinions faites, du moins sur tout ce qui a 
rapport a sa conduite. II n ’y a rien de si important pour lui que les prejuges.
Note 93 -  ...assez forte pour reprimer les aberrations de la raison individuelle qui 
est, de sa nature, l’ennemi mortelle de toute association quelconque, parce- ce 
qu’elle ne produit que des opinions divergents.
Note 94 -  Tous les peuples connus ont ete heureux et puissants a mesure qu’ils 
ont obei plus fidelement a cette raison nationale qui n ’est autre chose que
355
l ’aneantissement des dogmes individuels et le regne absolu et general des 
dogmes nationaux, c’est-a-dire des prejuges utiles.
Note 95 -  a) Dans toutes les creations politiques ou religieuses, quels que soient 
leur objet et leur importance, c’est une regie generale qu’il n’y a jamais de 
proportion entre l ’effet et la cause.
b)...car il n’y a pas de veritable patriotisme sans religion...
Note 96 -  Le gouvemement est une veritable religion: il a ses dogmes, ses 
mysteres, ses ministres;l’aneantir ou le soumettre a la discussion de chaque 
individu, c ’est la meme chose; il ne vit que par la raison nationale, c ’est-a-dire 
par la foi politique, qui est un symbole.
Note 97 -  Comme dans la religion, il y a un point ou la foi doit etre aveugle, il a 
de meme dans la politique, un point ou l’obeissance doit l ’etre
Note 99 -  La foi et le patriotisme sont les deux grands thaumaturges de ce 
monde. L’un et 1’autre sont divins.. .ils ne savent que deux mots: soumission et 
croyance..
Note 101 -  Or, si l ’on recherche quelles sont les grandes et solides bases de 
toutes les institutions possibles du premier ou du second ordre, on trouve 
toujours la religion et le patriotisme.
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Note 102 -  La constitution est l’ouvrage de circonstance, et le nombre de ces 
circonstances est infini.
Note 103 -  ...mais vous remarquez que les veritables racines du gouvemement 
ont toujours existe et qu’il est impossible d’en montrer l’origine, par la rasion 
toute simple qu’elles sont aussi ancienne que les nations, et que, n ’etant point le 
resultat d’un accord, il ne peut rester de trace d’une convention qui n’exista 
jamais.
Note 104 -  Toute institution importante et reellement constitutionelle n ’etablit 
jamais rien de nouveau...
Note 105 -  ...ces droits sont les bonnes coutumes, bonnes parce qu’elles ne sont 
pas ecrites, et parce qu’on ne peut en assigner ni le commencement, ni 1’auteur.
Note 111 -  Toute loi constitutionnelle n’est qu’une declaration d’un droit 
anterieur ou d’un dogme politique.
Note 115 -  Lorsque on donne a un enfant un de ses jouets qui executent des 
mouvements, inexplicables pour lui, un moyen d ’un mechanisme interieur, apres 
s’en etre amuser un moment, il le brise, pour voir dedans. C ’est ainsi que les 
Fran£ais ont traite le gouvemement. Ils ont voulu voir dedans: ils ont mis a 
decouvert les principes politiques, ils ont ouverts l ’oeil de la foule sur des objets 
qu’elle ne c ’etait jamais avisee d’examiner, sans reflechir qu’il y a de choses 
qu’on detruit en les montrant...
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Note 117 -  Comme il y a toujours dans la musique quelque chose qu’il n’est pas 
possible de noter, il y a de meme dans tous le gouvemements quelque chose qu’il 
n ’est pas possible d’ecrire.
Note 119 -  Les redacteurs des lois romaines ont jete, sans pretention, dans le 
premier chapitre de leur collection, un fragment de jurisprudence grecque bien 
remarquable. Parmi les lois qui nous gouvement, dit ce passage, les unes sont 
ecrites et les autres ne le sont pas. Rien de plus simple et rien de plus profond.
Note 120 -  Connait -  on quelque loi turque qui permette expressement au 
souverain d’envoyer immediatement un homme a la mort, sans la decision 
interm ediate d’un tribunal? Connait -  on quelque loi ecrite, meme religieuse, 
qui le defende aux souverains de 1’Europe chretienne?
Note 121 -  ...mais ce serait une grande erreur: de pareilles lois, toujours 
compromises par des cas inattendus et des exceptions forcees, n’auraient pas 
dure six mois, ou elles auraient renverse la republique.
Note 122 -  La constitution est l ’ouvrage des circonstances, et le nombre de ces 
circonstances est infini. Les lois romains, les lois ecclesiastiques, les lois 
feodales; les coutumes saxonnes, normandes et danoises; les privileges, les 
prejuges et les pretentions de tous les ordres; les guerres, les revoltes, les 
revolutions, la conquete, les croisades; toutes les vertus, tous les vices, toutes les 
connaissances, toutes les erreurs, toutes les passions; tous ces elements, enfin, 
agissant ensemble et formant par leur melange et leur action reciproque des
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combinaisons m ultip lies par myriades de millions, ont produit enfin, apres 
plusieurs siecles, l’unite la plus compliquee et le plus bel equilibre de forces 
politiques qu’on ait jamais vu dans le monde.
Note 123 -  Qu’on l’examine avec attention: on verra q u ’elle ne va q u ’en n ’allant 
pas (si ce jeu de mots est permis). Elle ne se soutient que par les exceptions.
Note 124 -  L ’habeas corpus par example a ete si souvent et si longtemps 
suspendu, qu’on a pu douter si l ’exception n’etait pas devenu regie.
Note 125 -  Supposons un instant que les auteurs de ce fameux acte eussent eu la 
pretention de fixer le cas ou il pourrait etre suspendu, ils l ’auraient aneanti par le 
fait.
Note 126 -  Si l ’on s’avisait de faire une loi en Angleterre pour donner une 
existence constitutionelle au conseil prive, et pour regler ensuite et circonscrire 
rigoureusement ses privileges et ses attributions, avec les precautions necessaires 
pour limiter son influence et l ’empecher d’en abuser, on renverserait l’Etat.
Note 127 -  ...il faudra toujours laisser quelque chose a l’arbitraire; il faudra 
toujours qu’il ait, independamment de la force legale, une force administrative 
qui soit affranchie des formes et qui puisse agir brusquement dans une foule 
d’occasions.
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Note 129 -  Or ce qui est vraiment constitutionnel dans tout gouvemement, ce 
n ’est point ce qui est ecrit sur le papier....
Note 130 -  les lois fondamentales sont jamais ecrites et cependant elles sont le 
fondement des lois ecrites de maniere que lorsqu’on touche aux premiers, l ’etat 
croule comme un edifice dont on aurait mine les fondements.
Note 131 -  ...qu’aucune loi veritablement fondamentale et constitutionelle ne 
peut etre ecrite, et que si elle est ecrite, elle est nulle. [...]Je me defie done de 
toute loi constitutionelle ecrite.
Note 132 -  ...ce caractere de saintete et d’immutabilite qui distinguee les lois 
veritablement constitutionnelle.
Note 136 -  On a cm souvent faire une excellente plaisanterie aux Frangais en 
leur demandant dans quel livre etait ecrite la loi salique? mais Jerome Bignon 
repondait fort a propos... .qu 'elle etait ecrite aux coeurs des Frangais.
Note 139 -  ...plus les nations ont de sagesse,...plus leur constitution politique est 
parfaite, et moins elles ont des lois consitutionelles ecrites, car ces lois ne sont 
que des etais, et un edifice n’a besoin d ’etais que lorsqu’il a perdu son aplomb ou 
qu’il est violemment ebranle par une force exterieure.
Note 141 -  Plus on ecrit, et plus l’institution est faible.
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Note 143 -  ...et comme mille evenements peuvent changer les rapports d’un 
peuple...
Note 145 -  ...que nulle institution grande et reelle ne saurait etre fondee sur une 
loi ecrite, puisque les hommes memes, instruments successifs de 1’etablissement, 
ignorent ce qu’il doit devenir.
Note 148 -  La parole [...] est a l’ecriture ce qu’un homme est a son portrait. Les 
productions de la peinture se presentent a nos yeux comme vivantes; mais si on 
les interroge, elles gardent le silence avec dignite. II en est de meme de 
l ’ecriture, qui ne sait ce q u ’il faut dire a un homme, ni ce q u ’il fau t cacher a un 
autre. Si l ’on vient a l’attaquer ou a l’insulter sans raison, elle ne peut se 
defendre; car son pere n ’est jamais la pour la soutenir. De maniere que celui qui 
s’imagine pouvoir etablir par l’ecriture seule une doctrine claire et durable, EST 
UN GRAND SOT.
Note 151 -  La plus grand folie, peut-etre, du siecle des folies, fut de croire que 
des lois fondamentales pouvaient etre ecrites a priori; tandis qu’elles sont 
evidemment l’ouvrage d’une force superieure a l’homme; et que l ’ecriture meme, 
tres- posterieure, est pour elle le plus grand signe de nullite.
Note 160 -  .. .toutes ces Constitutions, considerees en elles -  memes et dans leur 
but avoue, ne sont que de vains essais, car c’est un axiome capital.. .que toute 
nation a le gouvemement qu’elle merite: ainsi tout ce qu’on fait pour une 
nation,.. .ne signifie rien, et n ’a point d’effet ou ne produit que du mal. Mais si
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l ’on considere ces Constitutions comme des mesures politiques propres a calmer, 
a diriger, a satisfaire, a distraire, atromper meme (car souvent il le faut),
1’imagination des peuples, ce sont des pieces qui peuvent meriter toute sorte de 
louanges.
Note 161 -  a) Ce qu’il y a de sur, c ’est que la constitution civile des peuples n ’est 
jamais le resultat d ’une deliberation.
b) Aucune constitution ne resulte d’une deliberation...
Note 162 -Les defauts et les inconvenients d’un code fait par une assemblee 
deviendront incalculables si la vanite des legislateurs excite chaque individu a 
prendre une part active dans la confection des lois...
Note 163 -  Une assemblee quelconque d’hommes ne peut constituer une nation...
Note 165 -  Les promesses, les engagements, les serments ne sont que des 
paroles: il est aussi aise de rompre ce lien frivole, que de le former..
Note 167 -  En effet, supposons qu’une loi de cette importance n’existe que parce 
qu’elle est ecrite, il est certain que l ’autorite quelconque qui l ’aura ecrite, aura le 
droit de l’effacer; la loi n ’aura done pas ce caractere de saintete et d’immutabilite 
qui distingue les lois veritablement constitutionelles.
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Note 169 -  a) L’accord du peuple est impossible; .et quand il en serait autrement, 
un accord n’est point une loi, et n’oblige personne, a moins qu’il n’y ait une 
autorite superieure qui le garantisse.
b) Plus on examinera cette question, et plus on se convaincra que la souverainete, 
meme partielle, ne peut etre jugee, deplacee ni punie, en vertu d ’une loi: car nul 
pouvoir ne pouvant posseder une force coercitive sur lui-meme, toute puisssance 
amenable devant un autre pouvoir est necessairement sujette de cette pouvoir, 
puis qu’il fait des lois qui la dominent.
Note 170 -  ...laquelle suppose necessairement et manifestement une volonte 
superieure qui se fait obeir.
Note 171 -  Dans le systeme de Hobbes.. .la force des lois civiles ne porte que sur 
une convention; mais s’il n ’y a point de loi naturelle qui ordonne d’executer les 
lois qu’on a faites, de quoi servent-elles? Les promesses, les engagements, les 
serments ne sont que des paroles: il est aussi aise de rompre ce lien frivole, que 
de le former. Sans le dogme d’un Dieu legislateur, toute obligation morale est 
chimerique. Force d’un cote, impuissance de 1’autre, voila tout le lien des 
societes humaines.
Note 172 -  II faut toujours que l’origine de la souverainete se montre hors de la 
sphere du pouvoir humain...
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Note 187 -  L ’auteur de toutes choses n ’a que deux manieres de donner un 
Gouvemement a un peuple: presque toujours il s’en reserve plus immediatement 
la formation en le faisant, pour ainsi dire, germer insensiblement comme une 
plante, par le concours d ’une 1’infinite de circonstances que nous nommons 
fortuites; mais lorsqu’il veut jeter tout a la fois les fondements d’un edifice 
politique et montrer a l’univers une creation de ce genre, c ’est a des hommes 
rares, c ’est a de [sic] veritables elus, qu’il confie ces pouvoirs...
Note 188 -  L’erreur de ceux qui ont pretendu que la France n ’avait point de 
constitution, tenait a la grande erreur sur le pouvoir humain, la deliberation 
anterieure et les lois ecrites.
Note 189 -  Si un homme de bonne foi, n’ayant pour lui que le bon sens et la 
droiture, demande ce que c ’etait que l’ancienne constitution frangaise, on peut lui 
repondre hardiment: “C’est ce que vous sentiez, lorsque vous etiez en France; 
c’est ce melange de liberte et d’autorite, de lois et d’opinions, qui faisait croire a 
l’etranger, sujet d’une monarchic, voyageant en France, qu’il vivait sous un autre 
gouvemement que le sien.”
Note 191 -  II [le roi] a le droit de rendre justice, et de la faire rendre par ses 
officiers; de faire grace, d’accorder des privileges et des recompenses; de 
disposer des offices, de conferer la noblesse; de convoquer, de dissoudre les 
assemblies de la nation, quand sa sagesse le lui indique; de faire la paix et la 
guerre, et de convoquer les armees.
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Note 192 -  ...voyons ce que la constitution frangaise a mis dans l’autre bassin de 
la balance.
Note 193 -  Le roi ne regne que par la loi, et n ’a puissance de faire toute chose a 
son appetit.
Note 194 -  H est des lois que les rois eux -  memes se sont avoue.. .dans 
I ’heureuse impuissance de violer, ce sont les lois du royaume a la difference des 
lois de circonstances ou non constitutionelles,appelees lois du roi.
Note 195 -  .la constitution n’est que le recueil des lois fondamentales; et le roi 
ne peut toucher a ces lois.
Note 197 -  ...car nul pouvoir ne pouvant posseder une force coercitive sur lui- 
meme, toute puissance amenable devant un autre pouvoir est necessairement 
sujette de ce pouvoir, puisqu’ il fait des lois qui la dominent.
Note 198 -  a) ...l’art de reformer les gouvemements ne consiste pas de tout a les 
renverser pour les refaire sur des theories ideales, mais a les rapprocher de ces 
principes internes et caches, decouverts dans les temps anciens par le bon sens 
antique...
b) - . .  .(3) Les droits des peuples proprement dits, partent presque toujours de la 
concession des souverains, et alors il peut en conster historiquement: mais les 
droits du souverain et de l’aristocratie n ’ont ni date ni auteurs connus. (4) Ces
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concessions memes ont toujours ete precedees par un etat de choses qui les a 
necessities et qui ne dependait pas du souverain. (5) Quoique les lois ecrites ne 
soient jamais que des declarations de droits interieurs, il s’en faut de beaucoup 
cependant que tous ces droits puissent etre ecrits.
Chapter 4
Note 8 -  a) .. .puisque l’Eglise, comme tout autre corps moral, ne pouvant exister 
sans unite, les promesses ne peuvent avoir ete faites qu’al’unite...
b) Oter la reine d’un essaim, vous aurez des abeilles tant qu’il vous plaira, mais 
de ruche jamais.
Note 30 -  Le principe de la Monarchic, comme de toute espece de 
commandement, c’est qu’il n’ya qu’une volonte.
Note 32 -  Cette suprematie indispensable ne peut etre exercee que par un organe 
unique: la diviser, c ’est de la detruire.
Note 33 -  Car il ne s’agit pas de monarchic dans cette question, mais la 
souverainete; ce qui est tout different.
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Note 35 -  a) Mais le fait est que sans puissance dans l’Etat, sans corps, sans 
societe, sans institutions fortes, bien organisees... le Souverain ne peut pas 
gouvemer puisque il n ’a qu’une tete et deux bras.
b) Les Souverains legitimes ont sanctionne publiquement la maxime des 
divisions, morcellements et adjucations de Souverainetes pour de simples raisons 
de convenance.
Note 36 -  Partout ou les pouvoirs sont divises, les combats de ces differents 
pouvoirs peuvent etre consideres comme les deliberations d’un souverain unique, 
dont la raison balance le pour et le contre. Mais des que le parti est pris, l’effet 
est le meme de part et d’autre et la volonte de Souverain quelconque est toujours 
invincible.
Note 37 -  En considerant les gouvemements ou les pouvoirs sont divises, il est 
plus aise de croire que le souverain peut etre juge, a cause de l ’action de chacun 
de ces pouvoirs qui agit sur Tautre et qui, forgant son action dans certaines 
occasions extraordinaires, opere des insurrections du second genre qui ont 
beaucoup moins d’inconvenients que les insurrections proprement dites, ou 
populaires. Mais il faut se garder d’un paralogisme ou Ton tombe aisement, si 
Ton ne considere que Tun des pouvoirs. II faut les envisager dans leur reunion et 
se demander si la volonte souveraine qui resulte de leurs volontes reunies peut 
etre arretee, contrariee ou punie?
Note 39 -  Je ne comprendrai jamais ces mots: le roi ne peut pas.
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Note 40 -  .. .toujours il faudra qu’il y en ait un auquel on ne puisse dire: Vous 
avez erre.
Note 41 -  L ’autorite souveraine ne peut pas plus se modifier que s’aliener: la 
limiter, c’est la deruire. II est absurde et contradictoire que le souverain 
reconnaisse un superieur...
Note 4 2 - Le souverain ne peut done etre juge: s’il pouvait l’etre, la puissance qui 
aurait ce droit serait souveraine, et il y aurait deux souverains, ce qui implique 
contradiction.
Note 45 -  Le souverain qui ne viellit jamais n’est, par consequent, jamais sujette 
a perdre la memoire.
Note 47 -  C ’est qu ’une souveraineteperiodique ou intermittente est une 
contradiction dans les termes\ car la souverainete doit toujours vivre, toujours 
veiller, toujours agir. II n ’y a pour elle aucune difference entre le sommeil et la 
mort.
Note 49 -  Je ne conteste nullement sur ce point; je  dis seulement que le corps 
representatif intermittent, s’il est surtout accidentel et non periodique, est par la 
nature meme des choses, partout et toujours inhabile a gouvemer; et que pendant 
ses sessions meme, il n’ a d’existence et de legitimite que par son chef.
368
Note 5 2 - La souverainete a des formes differentes sans doute. Elle ne parle pas a 
Constantinople comme a Londres; mais quand elle a parle de part et d’autre a sa 
maniere, le bill est sans appel comme le Fetfa.
Note 74 -  L ’accord du peuple est impossible; et, quand il en serait autrement, un 
accord n ’est point une loi, et n ’oblige personne, a moins qu’il n’ait une autorite 
superieure qui le garantisse.
Note 75 -  Dans l’ordre judiciare, qui n ’est qu’une piece du govemement, ne voit- 
on pas qu’il faut absolument en venir a une puissance qui juge et n’est pas jugee; 
precisement parce qu’elle prononce au nom de la puissance supreme...
Note 78 -  [Maistre’s own index to notebook] Saint Thomas -  cite sur les voies 
de la Providence dans la punition des crimes; - sur les demonstrations; - sur 
l’optimisme; - sur l’enseignement de la verite; sur la necessite d’une Revelation; 
sur la Foi; - sur la science divine.
Note 81 -  a) La politique va nous foumir de nouvelles analogies.
b) L’Eglise ne demande rien de plus que les autres souverainetes....
c) Les Conseils sont les parlements religieux comme les parlements sont les 
conseils politiques.
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d) Mais la revolte n’est que le schisme politique, comme le schisme n’est qu’une 
revolte religieuse...
e) N ’ayons par exemple aucune repugnance a croire et a dire qu’on prie Dieux, 
comme on prie un souverain...
f) Ainsi les conciles oecumeniques ne sont et ne peuvent etre que le Parlement 
ou les Etats-generaux du christianisme rassembles par Vautorite et sous la 
presidence du souverain.
(g) Quelle difference y a t ’il entre YEglise de Dieu, uniquement conduite par sa 
parole, et la grande republique une et indivisible, uniquement gouvemee par les 
lois et par les deputes du peuple souverain? Aucune.
h) Si quelqu’un s’avisait de proposer un royaume de France sans roi de 
France... on croirait justement qu’il a perdu l ’esprit; ce serait cependant 
rigoreusement la meme idee que celle d ’une Eglise universelle sans chef.
i) II y a tant d ’analogie, tant de fratemite, tant de dependence entre le pouvoir 
pontifical et celui des rois, que jamais on n’a ebranle le premier sans toucher au 
second...
j) Dans le XVIe siecle, les revoltes attribuerent la souverainete a Veglise... Le 
XVEUe ne fit que transporter ces maximes dans la politique; c ’est le meme 
systeme, la meme theorie, jusque dans ses demieres consequences.
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Note 82 -  Tout souverain est un etre ordonnateur et regulateur; il est ne pour 
l ’ordre et il ne comprend que l’ordre.
Note 83 -  ..mais heureux l ’homme qui pourra lui faire comprendre combien le 
talent du souverain, qui emploie les hommes et les met a leur place, est suffisant 
par lui meme et independent de toute autre qualite.
Note 84 -  Aimez le souverain, comme vous devez aimer Yordre: avec toutes les 
forces de votre intelligence.
Note 96 -  L’un et l ’autre [1’infallibility dans l’ordre spirituel et la souverainete 
dans l ’ordre temporel] exprime cette haute puissance qui les domine toutes, dans 
toutes les autres derivent, qui gouveme et n ’est pas gouvemee, qui juge et n’est 
pas jugee.
Note 97 -  a) La souverainete est avant tout, et tout doit lui ceder.
b) ...il faut que les grands principes tombent sur le peuple de haut en bas, comme 
la pluie.
c) On trouvera d’abord que tout souverain est despotique, et qu’il n ’y a que deux 
partis a prendre a son egard: l ’obeissance ou 1’insurrection.
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d) ..la Souverainete doit etre estimee, non par son caractere essentiel, mais par sa 
puissance physique, contre la maxime antique, universelle, invariable qui 
demandait toujours a chaque Prince: Qui est vous? et non: Que pouvez vous?
Note 98 -  Tout le monde sait qu’il ya des revolutions heureuses et des 
usurpations tres criminelles dans leurs principes, auxquelles cependant il plait a 
la providence d ’apposer le sceau de la legitimite par une longue possession.
Note 101 -  Je crois avoir lu quelque part qu’il y a bien peu de souverainetes en 
etat de justifier la legitimite de leur origine.
Note 102 -  ...le souverain agit, l ’obeissance est generale, tranquille et constante; 
l ’opposition, s’il y’en a, est particuliere, turbulente et passagere; enfin, la 
souverainete s’assied, et sur son trone est ecrit: je  possede, parce que je  
possede...
Note 103 -  Jamais souverain n’est oblige de rendre raison a son sujet, ou bien 
tout societe est dissoute.
Note 104 -  De quelque maniere qu’on definisse et qu’on place la souverainete, 
toujours elle est une, inviolable et absolue.
Note 105 -  Le roi est souverain ... Sa personne est inviolable; nul n ’a le droit de 
le deposer ni de le juger.
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Note 106 -  D one les souverains sont inviolables e t ne peuvent etre juges.
Note 107 -  ...il serait aise de vous prouver que tout ce qu’ils ont fait contre les 
Souverains tendait a rendre la Souverainete plus inviolable pour les peuples.
Note 108 -  ...l’autorite royale ne vient point des hommes, que Dieu en est 
1’auteur, que le Souverain est inviolable, que personne ne peut le juger pour 
aucune raison, et que tout homme qui y touche est infame...
Note 109 -  Le grand probleme ne serait done point d’empecher le souverain de 
vouloir invinciblement, ce qui implique contradiction; mais de l ’empecher de 
vouloir injustement.
Note 110 -  a) Comment on peut restreindre le pouvoir souverain sans le detuire.
b) Que si le roi trouvait que plusieurs choses auraient ete faites 
parlementairement, e ’estadire suivant les veritables principes de la constitution, 
il pourrait donner la sanction royale a ces differentes dispositions, qui viendraient 
des lois obligatoires, meme pour le roi, qui se trouve, en cela surtout, image de 
Dieu sur la terre; car, suivant la belle pensee de Seneque, Dieu obeit a des lois, 
mais c ’est lui qui les a faites.
Note 117 -  En terminant cette discussion, je  declare protester egalement contre 
toute espece d’exageration. Que la puissance pontificale soit retenue dans ses 
justes bomes...
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Note 118 -  Une institution quelconque n’est qu’un edifice politique.
Note 125 -  ...le Souverain agit, l’obeissance est generale, tranquille et 
constante...
Note 126 -  Le respect pour 1’autorite, par exemple, se trouve partout puisqu’il est 
necessaire, obligatoire, fondamental et que sans lui, le monde politique ne 
pourrait pas toumer...
Note 128 -  C’est qu’elleslles [i.e. les races royales] s’avancent comme d ’elles 
memes, sans violence d ’une part, et sans deliberation marquee de 1’autre: une 
espece de tranquilite magnifique qui n’est pas aise d ’exprimer.
Note 132 -  S’il etait permit d’etablir des degres d’importance parmi les choses 
d’institution divine, je placerais la hierarchie avant le dogme...
Note 133 -  Dans un sens Monsieur le Comte, on peut dire que tous les hommes 
sont les memes; mais, dans un sens tout aussi vrai, on peut dire aussi qu’ils sont 
tous differents.
Note 134 -  Les souverains ont plus d’affaires avec l ’avenir qu’avec le present.
Note 136 -  Les formes de la souverainete d’ailleurs, ne sont point les memes 
partout: elles sont fixees par des lois fondamentales, dont les veritables bases ne
374
sont jamais ecrites.. .Car il ne s’agit pas de monarchic dans cette question, mais 
de souverainete; ce qui est tout different.
Note 137 -  La souverainete politique n’etant de sa nature ni universelle, ni 
indivisible, ni perpetuelle...
Note 138 -  Personne ne pourra raisonnablement douter que les caracteres 
particuliers et distinctifs de ces diverses souverainetes n’eussent des causes tres 
profondes quoique souvent invisibles. Les peuples tiennent a ces formes 
nationales au point qu’ils se trouvent malheureux et memes insultes, lorsque’ils 
voient detruites ou contrariees.
Note 140 -  a) ...la masse du peuple n ’entre pour rien dans toutes les creations 
politiques. Es ne respectent meme le gouvemement que parce qu’il n’est pas son 
ouvrage.
b) Qu’un bon conseiller doit done toujours parler aux peuples des droits des 
souverains et aux souverains de la force des peuples; en d ’autres termes, qu’il 
faut precher sans cesse aux peuples les bienfaits de 1’autorite et aux rois , les 
bienfaits de la liberte.
Note 141 -  Or ces sortes d ’opinions sont le plus grand besoin de l ’homme, les 
veritables elements de son bonheur, et le Palladium des empires. Sans elles, il ne 
peut y avoir ni culte, ni morale, ni gouvemement.
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Note 142 -  ...vous ne pouvez asseoir un grand edifice sur des fondements etroits, 
ni un edifice durable sur une base mouvante ou passagere. Si l ’on veut done, 
dans l ’ordre politique, batir en grand et batir pour les siecles, il faut s’appuyer sur 
une opinion, sur une croyance large et profonde: car si 1’opinion ne se domine 
pas la majorite des esprits et si elle n’est pas profondement enracinee, elle ne 
founira qu’une base etroite et passagere.
Note 143 -  D faut que il y ait une religion de l ’Etat comme une politique Ede 
l’etat; ou plutot il faut que les dogmes religieux et politiques meles et confundus 
forment ensemble une raison universelle ou nationale...
Note 144 -  Les grandes institutions politiques sont parfaites et durables a mesure 
que 1’union de la politique et de la religion s’y trouve plus parfaite.
Note 145 -  Le gouvemement est une veritable religion...
Note 146 -  Numa avait donne a la politique romaine ce caractere religieux qui 
fut la seve, l ’ame, la vie de la Republique, et qui perit avec elle. C’est un fait 
constant...que le serment fut le veritable ciment de la constitution romaine: c ’est 
par le serment que le plus turbulent plebeien, baissant la tete devant le conseil qui 
demandait son nom, portait sous les drapeaux la docilite d’un enfant.
Note 147 -  Or si l’on recherche quelles sont les grandes et solides bases de toutes 
les institutions possibles de premier ou de second ordre, on trouve toujours la 
religion et le patriotisme.
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Note 156 -  L ’immense posterite de Sem et de Cham, a pris une autre route. 
Depuis les temps primitifs, jusqu’a ceux que nous voyons, toujours elle a dit a un 
homme: Faites tout ce que vous voudrez, et lorsque nous serons las, nous vous 
egorgerons. Du reste, elle n’a jamais pu ni voulu comprendre que c ’est qu’une 
republique; elle n ’entend rien a la balance des pouvoirs, a tous ces privileges, a 
toutes ces lois fondamentales dont nous sommes si fiers.
Note 157 -  Les rois abdiquent le pouvoir de juger par eux-memes, et les peuples 
en retour declarent les rois infaillibles et inviolables.
Note 158 -  Cet equilibre miraculeux est tel, qu’il donne au prince toute la 
puissance qui ne suppose pas la tyrannie proprement dite, et au peuple toute la 
liberte qui n’exclut pas l’obeissance indispensable.
Note 159 -  ...qu'est ce qui arretera le Pape? Je leur repondrai: TOUT; les 
canons, les lois, les coutumes des nations, les souverainetes, les grands tribunaux, 
les assemblies nationales, la prescription, les representations, les negotiations, le 
devoir, la crainte, la prudence, et par dessus tout, 1’opinion, reine du monde.
Note 160 -  Dans les actes les plus severes de Tancien gouvemement, vous avez 
toujours aper$u une moderation marquee.[...]Le Prince le plus absolu connait une 
multitude de freins; il est retenu par son caractere particulier, par la religion, par 
la honte, par la politique, par les conseils salutaires, par l ’opinion publique...
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Note 162 -  Je me confirme, tous les jours plus, dans mon opinion que c ’est fait 
de la monarchic absolue, et je penche a croire que le monarque qui voudra sauver 
sa puissance, fera bien d’en sacrifier une portion; ou pour mieux dire d’en 
restreindre legalement les abus.
Note 163 -  Soyez persuadez que pour fortifier la monarchic il faut l ’asseoir sur 
les lois, eviter l’arbitraire, les commissions frequentes, les mutations continuelles 
d ’emploies et les tripots ministeriels.
Note 165 -  L’essential pour chaque nation est de conserver sa discipline 
particuliere, c’est-a-dire ces sortes d’usages qui, sans tenir au dogme, constituent 
cependant une partie de son droit public, et se sont amalgames depuis longtemps 
avec le caractere et les lois de la nation, de maniere qu’on ne saurait y toucher 
sans la troubler et lui deplaire sensiblement.
Note 168 -  Quand je dis que nulle souverainete n ’est limite, j ’entends dans son 
exercise legitime, et c ’est ce qu’il faut bien soigneusement remarquer.
Note 171 -  Car on peut dire egalement, sous deux points de vue differents, que 
toute souverainete est limitee et que nulle souverainete n ’est limitee. Elle est 
limitee, en ce que nulle souverainete ne peut tout; elle ne l ’est pas, en ce que, 
dans son cercle de legitimite, trace par les lois fondamentales de chaque pays, 
elle est toujours et partout absolue, sans que personne ait le droit de lui dire 
qu’elle est injuste ou trompee. La legitimite ne consiste done pas a se conduire de 
telle ou telle maniere dans son cercle, mais n ’en pas sortir.
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Note 174 -  En second lieu, le maintien des formes, suivant les lois 
fondamentales, n ’altere ni l’essence ni les droits de la souverainete.
Note 176 -  Ce qui doit s’entendre suivant l ’explication que j ’ai donnee plus 
haut... c ’est-a-dire qu’il y a point de souverainete qui, pour le bonheur des 
hommes et pout le sien surtout, ne soit bomee de quelque maniere, mais que, 
dans l’interieur de ces bomes, placees comme il plait a Dieu, elle est toujours et 
partout absolue, et tenue pour l ’infaillible. Et quand je  parle de l ’exercise 
legitime de la souverainete, je  n’entends point ou je  ne dis point l’exercise juste , 
ce qui produirait une amphibologie dangereuse, a moins que par ce demier mot 
on ne veuille dire que tout ce qu’elle opere dans son cercle est juste ou tenu pour 
tel: ce qui est la verite. C ’est ainsi qu’un tribunal supreme, tant qu’il ne sort pas 
de ses attributions, est toujours juste; car c’est la meme chose dans la pratique 
d ’etre infaillible, ou de se tromper sans appel.
Note 184 -  ...et du moment ou l’on peut lui resister sous pretexte d ’erreur ou 
d ’injustice, il n ’existe plus.
Page 43, note 185 -  ...que Von peut priver une nation, malgre elle, de son 
legitime Souverain.
Note 186 -  Lorsque 1’autorite commande, il n’y a que trois partis a prendre: 
l ’obeissance, la representation et la revolte...
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Note 187 -  J ’admire fort ces belles maximes; mais elles ont le defaut de ne 
foumir aucune lumiere a 1’esprit, pour se decider dans les occasions difficiles ou 
les theories sont absolument inutiles. Lorsqu’on a decide (je l ’accorde par 
supposition) qu’on a le droit de resister a la puissance souveraine, et de la faire 
rentrer dans ses limites, on n ’a rien fait encore, puisqu’il reste a savoir quand on 
peut exercer ce droit et quels hommes ont celui de l’exercer.
Note 188 -  Les plus ardents fauteurs du droit de resistance conviennent (et qui 
pourrait en douter?) qu’il ne saurait etre justifie que par la tyrannie. Mais qu’est 
-  ce que la tyrannie? Un seul acte, s’il est atroce, peut -  il porter ce nom? S’il en 
faut plus d’un, combien en faut -  il, et de quel genre?
Note 189 -  Nous croyons que la perfection n ’appartenant point a l ’humanite tous 
les souverains (prenez garde que nous ne disons point tous les rois) abusent 
necessairement plus ou moins de leur pouvoir; en sorte que si tout abus du 
pouvoir s’appelait tyrannie, et si toute tyrannie legitimait 1’insurrection, tous les 
peuples seraient a tous les instants en etat d’insurrection.
Note 190 -  Quel pouvoir dans l’etat a le droit de decider que le cas de resistance 
est arrive? Si le tribunal preexiste, il etait done deja portion de la souverainete, et 
en agissant sur l ’autre portion il l’aneantit; s’il ne preexiste pas, par quel tribunal 
ce tribunal serait-il etabli?
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Note 191 -  a) Une assez belle experience vient de nous apprendre que les plus 
grands mots resultant de l ’obeissance n ’egalent pas la millieme partie de ce qui 
resulte de la revolte.
b) L ’histoire n ’a qu’un cris, pour nous apprendre que les revolutions 
commencees par les hommes les plus sages, sont toujours terminees par les fous; 
que les auteurs en sont toujours les victimes et que les efforts de peuple pour 
creer ou accroitre leur liberte, finissent presque toujours par leur donner des fers. 
On ne voit qu’abimes de tous cotes.
Note 193 -  Presque tous les grands legislateurs ont eterois [...]Enfin les plus 
grands legislateurs ont ete des souverains.
Note 194 -  Mais s’il fallait absolument en venir a poser des bomes legales a la 
puissance souveraine, j ’opinerais de tout mon coeur pour que les interets de 
l ’humanite fussent confies au Souverain Pontiff.
Note 195- a) Ds n’ont jamais pretendu que le droit de juger les princes qui leur 
etaient soumis dans Vordre spirituel, lorsque ces princes s ’etaient rendus 
coupables de certains crimes.
b) Qu’est ce done que cette toute- puissance tempo re lie qui n ’a nulle force  
temporelle, qu’il ne demande rien de temporel ou de territorial chez les autres, 
qui anathematise tout attentat sur la puissance temporelle, et dont la puissance
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temporelle est si faible, que les bourgeois de Rome se sont souvent moques 
d ’elle?
Note 196 -  Les peuples, dans le moyen age n ’avaient chez eux que des lois nulles 
ou meprisees et des moeurs corompues. 11 fallait done chercher czfrein  
indispensable hors de chez eux. Cefrein  se trouva et ne pouvait se trouver que 
dans 1* autorite des papes.
Note 197 -  Mais si le droit de resister se changeait en droit d’empecher et qu’au 
lieu de resider dans le sujet, il appartint a une puissance d ’un autre ordre,
1’inconvenient ne serait plus le meme, parce que cette hypothese admet la 
resistance sans revolution et sans aucune violation de la souverainete.
Note 198 -  De plus, ce droit d’opposition, reposant sur une tete connue et 
unique, il pourrait etre soumis a des regies et exerce avec toute la prudence et 
avec toutes les nuances imaginables; au lieu que, dans la resistance interieure, il 
ne peut etre exerce que par les sujets, par la foule, par le peuple en un mot, et par 
consequent, par la voie seule d’insurrection.
Note 203 -  Vinfaillibilite dans l’ordre spirituel, et la souverainete dans l ’ordre 
temporel, sont deux mots parfaitement synonymes.
Note 204 -  a) La seule mais bien importante difference qu’il y ait entre la societe 
civile et la societe religieuse, c’est que, dans la premiere, le souverain peut se 
tromper, de maniere que 1 ’infaillibilite qu’on lui accorde n ’est qu’une
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supposition (qui a cependant toutes les forces de la realite); au lieu que le 
gouvemement spirituel est necessairement infallible au pied de la lettre...
b) Puisque la souverainete est infaillible de sa nature, Dieu n’a done fait que 
diviniser cette loi en l’apportant dans son eglise qui est une societe soumise a 
toutes les lois de la souverainetee
c) Quand nous disons que VEglise est infaillible, nous ne demandons pour elle, il 
est bien essentiel de 1’observer, aucun privilege particulier; nous demandons 
seulement qu’elle jouisse du droit common a toutes les souverainetes possibles, 
qui toutes agissent necessairement comme infaillibles; car tout gouvemement est 
absolu et du moment ou l’on peut lui resister sous pretexte d’erreur ou d’injustice 
il n’existe plus.
d) Ce gouvemement est done de sa nature infaillible, c ’est a dire absolu, 
autrement il ne gouvemera plus.
Note 209 -  L’infaillibilite ... et la souverainete... expriment cette haute 
puissance.. .qui juge et n’est pas jugee.
Note 212 -  a) II n ’est pas au pouvoir de l ’homme de creer une loi qui n ’ait besoin 
d’aucune exception. L’impossibility sur ce point resulte egalement, et de la 
faiblesse humaine qui ne saurait tout prevoir, et de la nature meme des choses 
dont les unes varient au point de sortir par leur propre mouvement du cercle de la 
loi, et dont les autres disposees par gradations insensibles, sous des genres
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communs, ne peuvent etre saisies par un nom general qui ne soit pas faux dans 
les nuances. De la resulte, dans toute legislation, la necessite d’une puissance 
dispensante. Car partout ou il n ’y a pas dispense, il ya violation. Mais toute 
violation de la loi est dangereuse ou mortelle pour la loi, au lieu que toute 
dispense la fortifie: car Ton ne peut demander d’en etre dispense sans lui rendre 
hommage, et sans avouer que de soi-meme on n’a point de force contre elle.
b) Un grand homme seul a pu donner cette definition. L ’homme ne saurait faire 
que des lois generates; et, par la meme, elles sont de leur nature injustes en 
partie, parce qu’elles ne sauraient jamais saisisr tous les cas. Uexception a la 
regie est done precisement aussi juste que la regie meme et partout ou il n’y aura 
point de dispense, d’exception, de mitigation, il y aura necessairement violation...
Note 215 -  Demandez au Pape s’il entend gouvemer sans regie et se jouer des 
canons; vous lui ferez horreur. Demandez a tous les Eveques du monde 
catholique s’ils entendent que des circonstances extraordinaires ne puissent 
legitimer des abrogations, des exceptions, des derogations; et la souverainete, 
dans 1’Eglise, soit devenue sterile comme une veille femme, de maniere qu’elle 
ait perdu le droit inherant a toute puissance de produire de nouvelles lois a 
mesure que de nouveaux besoins les demandent? Ils croiront que vous plaisantez.
Note 216 -  Dans le monde politique et moral, comme dans le monde physique, il 
y a un ordre commun, et il y a des exceptions a cet ordre. Communement nous 
voyons une suite des faits produits par les memes causes; mais a certaines 
epoques nous voyons des actions suspendues, des causes paralysees et des effets
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nouveaux. Le miracle est un effet produit par une cause divine ou surhumaine, 
qui suspend ou contredit une cause ordinaire... La revolution fran9aise...est tout 
aussi merveilleux dans son genre que la fructification instantanee d’un arbre au 
mois de janvier...
Note 219 -  ...il ne s’agit pas seulement de savoir si le Souverain Pontiffe est, 
mais s’il doit etre infaillible.
Chapter 5
Note 41 -  a) Quand done on demande absolument quel est le meilleur 
gouvememnt, on fait une question insoluble autant qu’ indeterminee; ou, si l,on 
veut, elle a autant de bonnes solutions qu’il y a de combinaisons possibles dans 
les positions absolues et relatives des peuples.
b) Le despotismes pour telle nation, est aussi naturel, aussi legitime que la 
deocratie pour telle autre...
Note 46 -  H faudrait dire les hommes en general sont gouvemes par des rois. On 
voit cependant des nations ou la souverainete appartient a plusieurs, et ces 
gouvemements peuvent s’appeller aristocratie ou democratic, suivant le nombre 
des personnes qui forment le souverain.
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Note 47 -  On trouvera en second lieu qu’il est parfaitement egal d’etre sujet d’un 
souverain ou d’un autre.
Note 58 -  a) Nulle nation ne doit son caractere a son gouvemement...
b) ...le caractere des nations a des racines plus profondes.
Note 49 -  a) ...D est prouve, par la theorie et encore plus par 1’experience, que le 
gouvemement aristocratique hereditaire est peut etre le plus favorable a la masse 
du peuple: qu’il a beaucoup de consistance de sagesse et de stabilite et qu’il 
s’adapte a des pays d ’une etendue tres- differente.
b) ...il est certain que, dans les temps de sa vigeur, elle doit, par la nature meme 
des choses, enfanter un groupe eblouissant de grands hommes dont les hauts faits 
donnent a l’histoire un charme et un interet inexprimables. II y a d’ailleurs dans 
les gouvemements populaires, plus d’action, plus de mouvement et le 
mouvement et la vie de l ’histoire.
Note 51 -  Mais les sujets des monarchies n ’en sont point reduits a se sauver du 
desespoir par des meditations philosophiques: ils ont quelque chose de mieux a 
faire, c ’est de se penetrer de 1’excellence de ce gouvemement, et d’apprendre a 
ne rien envier aux autres.
Note 52 -  J’observerai a ce sujet, que la division vulgaire des gouvemements en 
trois especes, le monarchique, l’aristoctatique et le democratique, repose
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absolument sur un prejuge grec qui s’est empare des ecoles, a la renaissance des 
lettres, et dont nous n’avons pas su nous defaire.
Note 53 -  Les Grecs voyaient toujours l ’univers dans la Grece; et comme les 
trois especes de gouvemements se balan£aient assez dans ce pays, les politiques 
de cette nation imaginerent la division generate dont je  parle. Mais si l’on veut 
etre exact, la logique rigoureuse ne permet point d’etablir un genre sur une 
exception: et, pour s’exprimer exactement, il faudrait dire ‘les hommes en 
general sont gouvemes par des rois’.
Note 55 -  Si l ’on demande quel est le gouvememnt le plus naturel a l’homme, 
l’histoire est la qui respond: C ’est la monarchic.
Note 56 -  Oui, sans doute, le roi est la, au milieu de tous les pouvoirs comme le 
soleil est la au milieu des planetes: il regit et il anime.
Note 57 -  Dans le gouvemement de plusieurs la souverainete n ’est point UNE 
UNITE; et quoique les fractions qui la compsent represent theoriquement 
L’UNITE, il s’en faut de beaucoup qu’elles fassent la meme impression sur 
l ’esprit.
Note 58 -  L ’imagination humaine ne saisit point cet ensemble qui n ’est qu’un 
etre metaphysique....
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Note 59 -  De la vient que la souverainete, dans ces sortes de gouvemements, n ’a 
point la meme intensite, ni par consequent la meme force morale.
Note 60 -  Ce mot de ROI est un talisman, une puissance magique qui donne a 
toutes les forces et a tous les talents une direction centrale.
Note 61 -  “Tout y repond” ,dit -  il, “au meee mobile: tous les ressorts de la 
machine sont dans la meme main; tout marche au meme but; il n’y a point de 
mouvements opposes qui s’entredetruisent, et l ’on ne peut imaginer aucune sorte 
de constitution dans laquelle un moindre effort produise une action pus 
considerable. Archimede, assis tranquillement sur le rivage et tirant sans peine a 
flot un grand vaisseau, me represente un monarque habile, gouvemant de son 
cabinet ses vastes Etats, et faisant tout mouvoir en paraissant immobile”.
Note 62 -  ...c’est un bien sans doute; mais a la place de sa personne, son nom 
suffit.
Note 63 -  Le mot habile est de trop dans ce morceau. Le gouvemement 
monarchique est precisement celui qui se passe le mieux de l’habilete du 
souverain...
Note 64 -  ...le pouvoir deegue par le souverain, obtiennent dans le gouvemement 
d’un seul une consideration extraordinaire et tout a fait particuliere a la 
monarchic. Dans le gouvememnt de plusieurs, les emplois occupes par les 
membres du souverain, jouissent de la consideration attachee a cette qualite.
388
C ’est l ’homme qui honore l’emploi; mais parmi les sujets de ces gouvemements, 
les emplois elevent tres-peau celui qui en est revetu au-dessus de ses semblables, 
et ne le rapprochent point des membres du gouvemement. Dans la monarchic, les 
emplois reflechissant sur le peuple une lumiere plus vive, l’eblouissent 
davantage: ils foumissent une carriere immense a tous les genres de talents et 
comblent le vide qui se trouverait sans eux entre la noblesse et le peuple.
Note 66 -  ...on peut assurer que le gouvemement d’un seul est celui ou les vices 
du souverain influent le moins sur les peuples gouvemes.
Note 67 -  Dans les gouvemements absolus (il fallait dire arbitrages: car tout 
gouvemement est absolu) les fautes du maitre ne peuvent guere tout perdre a la 
fois, parce que sa volonte seule ne peut pas tout faire; mais un gouvemement 
republicain est oblige d’etre essentiellement raisonnable et juste, parce que la 
volonte generate, une fois egaree, entraine tout.
Note 68 - ...il y aura toujours, en derniere analyse, un pouvoir absolu qui pourra 
faire le mal impunement, qui sera done despotique sous ce point de vue, dans 
toute la force du terme, et contre lequel il n’y aura d ’autre rampart que celui de 
1’insurrection.
Note 69 -  ...il s’en faut infinitement que la volontedu roi fasse tout dans la 
monarchic. Elle est censee tout faire, et c’est le grand avantage de ce 
gouvemement; mais dans le fait, elle ne sert guere qu’a centraliser les conseils et 
les lumieres.
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Note 70 -  La religion, les lois, les coutumes, 1’opinion, les privileges des ordres 
et des corps contiennent le souverain et l’empeche d ’abuser de sa puissance.
Note 71 -  Mais l’aristocratie pyramidale qui administre l’Etat dans les 
monarchies a des caracteres particuliers qui meritent toute notre attention.
Note 73 -  a) “L ’antiquite ne nous a point laisse de modele de ce gouvemement. 
A Rome, a Sparte, l ’aristocratie jouait sans doute un tres-grand role comme dans 
tous les gouvemements, mais elle ne regnait point seule.”
b) ....si quelque fois elle est timide, c’est parce qu’elle n’est jamais imprudente...
c) A tout prendre, le gouvemement aristocratique hereditaire est peut-etre le plus 
avantageux a ce qu’on appelle le peuple.
Note 74 -  La monarchic est une aristocratie centralisee.
Note 75 -...dans la monarchic, le roi est le centre de cette aristocratie; c’est bien 
elle qui commande comme partout; mais elle commande au nom du roi ou si 
l’on veut, c’est le roi eclaire par les lumieres de 1’aristocratie.
Note 76 -  Or c ’est un des grands avantages du gouvemement monarchique que 
1’aristocratie y perd, autant que la nature des choses le permet, tout ce qu’elle 
peut avoir d’offensant pour les classes inferieures.
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Note 77 -  ...l’homme du peuple, qui se trouve trop petit lorsqu’il se compare a un 
grand seigneur, se compare lui-meme au souverain, et ce titre de sujet qui les 
soumet l’un et 1’autre a la meme puissance et a la meme justice est une espece 
d’egalite qui endort les souffrances inevitables de 1’amour-propre
Note 78 -  a) ...ce qu’on peut imaginer de mieux pour oter a cette influence ce 
qu’elle peut avoir de trop fatigant pour l ’orgeuil des classes inferieures, c’est 
qu’elle n ’etablisse point une barriere insurmontable entre les families de l ’etat, et 
qu’aucune d’elles ne soit humiliee par une distinction dont elle ne peut jamais 
jouir.
b) ...le gouvemement aristocratique le cede au monarchique. Dans celui-ci une 
famille unique est separee de toutes les autres par 1’opinion, et consideree, ou 
peut s’en faut, comme appartenant a une autre nature. La grandeur de cette 
famille n’humilie personne, parce que personne ne se compare a elle. Dans le 
premier cas au contraire, la souverainete residant sur la tete de plusieurs hommes 
ne fait plus la meme impression sur les esprits, et l ’individu que le hasard a fait 
membre du souverain est assez grand pour exciter l ’envie, mais pas assez pour 
l ’etouffer.
Note 79 -  Cette espece d’aristocratie est legale; c ’est une piece integrante du 
gouvemement, tout le monde le sait, et elle n ’eveille dans l ’esprit de personne 
l ’idee de l’usurpation et de l ’injustice. Dans les republiques au contraire, la 
distinction des personnes existe comme dans les monarchies; mais elle est plus 
dure et plus insultante, parce qu’elle n’est point l ’ouvrage de la loi, et que
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1’opinion du peuple la regarde comme une insurrection habituelle contre le 
principe de l’egalite admis par la Constitution.
Note 80 -  Or c ’est precisement le cas d’une monarchic assise sur de bonnes lois. 
II n ’ya point de famille que le merite de son chef ne puisse faire passer du second 
ordre dans le premier, independamment meme de cette agreggation flatteuse, ou, 
avant qu’elle n ’ait acquis par le temps 1’influence qui en fait le prix, tous les 
emplois de l ’Etat, ou du moins une foule d ’emplois, sont places sur la route du 
merite....
Note 81 -  Ce mouvement d ’ascension general qui pousse toutes les families vers 
le souverain et qui remplit constamment tous les vides que laissent celles qui 
s’eteignent; ce mouvement, dis-je, entretient une emulation salutaire, anime la 
flamme de l ’honneur, et toume toutes les ambitions particulieres vers le bien de 
l ’Etat.
Note 83 -  L ’idee d’un peuple entier souverain et legislateur choque si fort le bon 
sens, que les politques grecs qui devaient s’entendre un peu en liberte, n ’ont 
jamais parle de la democratic comme un gouvemement legitime...
Note 84 -  Aristote surtout definit la democratic 1 ’exces de la republique (politia) 
comme le despotisme est l ’exces de la monarchic.
392
Note 85 -  Nul peuple comme nul individu ne pouvant posseder une puissance 
coercitive sur lui-meme, s’ill existait une democratic dans sa purete theorique, il 
est clair qu’il n ’y aurait point de souverainete dans cet Etat...
Note 86 -  ...il est impossible d’entendre par ce mot autre chose q’un pouvoir 
reprimant qui agit sur le sujet et qui, lui, est place hors de lui.
Note 87 -  ...je crois pouvoir definir la democratic: une association d ’hommes 
sans souverainete.
Note 88 -  On trouve dans tous les pays du monde des associations volontaires 
d’hommes qui se sont reunis pour quelques vues d’interet ou de bienfaisance.
Note 89 -  Ces hommes se sont soumis volontairement a certaines regies qu’ils 
observent tant qu’ils le trouvent bon: ils se sont meme soumis acertaines peines 
qu’ils subissent lorsqu’ils ont contrevenu aux statuts de 1’association...
Note 90 -  ...mais ces status n’ont d ’autre sanction que la volonte meme de ceux 
qui les ont formes; et des qu’il se trouve de dissidents, il n’y a point parmi eux 
de force coercitive pour les contraindre.
Note 91 -  Les ordonnances qui emaneraient d ’un peuple constitue de cette 
maniere seraient des reglements, et non des lois.
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Note 92 -  La loi est si peu la volonte de tous, et moins elle est la loi; en sorte 
qu’elle cesserait d ’etre loi, si elle etait, sans exception, l’ouvrage de tous ceux qui 
devraient lui obeir.
Note 93 -  Cet esprit d’association volontaire est le principe constitutif des 
republiques....
Note 94 -  ...1’ordre et 1’arrangement se montrent de toute part; les proprietes 
communes sont respectees meme par la pauvrete, et jusqu’a la propriete generate, 
tout donne a penser a l’observateur.
Note 95 -  Un peuple republicain etant done un peuple moins gouveme qu’un 
autre, on con^oit que 1’action de la souverainete doit etre suppleee par 1’esprit 
public....
Note 97 -  Mais comme la democratic pure n ’existe pas, l ’etat d’association 
purement volontaire n’existe pas non plus. On part seulement de ce pouvoir 
theorique pour s’entendre; et c ’est dans ce sens qu’on peut affirmer que la 
souverainete nait au moment ou le souverain commence a n ’etre pas tout le 
peuple, et qu’elle se renforce a mesure qu’elle est moins tout le peuple.
Note 98 -  Mele en plus ou en moins avec la souverainete, base commune de tous 
le gouvemements, ce plus et ce moins forment les differentes physionomies des 
gouvemements non -  monarchiques.
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Note 99 -  L ’observateur...distingue fort bien Taction de ces deux principes. 
Tantot il sent la souverainete, et tantot 1* esprit de communaute qui lui sert de 
supplement...
Note 100 -  ...la force publique agit moins et surtout se montre moins que dans les 
monarchies...
Note 101 -  Un certain esprit de famille, qu’il est plus aise de sentir que 
d’exprimer...
Note 102 -  ...dispense la souverainete d’agir dans une foule de circonstances ou 
elle interviendrait ailleurs....
Note 103 -  Un peuple republicain etant done un peuple moins gouveme qu’un 
autre, on congou que l ’action de la souverainete doit etre suppleee par l’esprit 
public
Note 104 -  ..moins un peuple a de sagacite pour apergevoir ce qui est bon, et de 
vertu pour s’y porter de lui-meme, moins il est fait pour la republique.
Note 105 -  Mais d’abord, il n’est fait que pour de tres -  petits peoples.
Note 106 -  ...dans ses beaux jours, il eclipse tout, et les merveilles qu’il enfante 
seduisent jusqu’a l’observateur de sang- froid qui pese tout.
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Note 107 -  ...la formation et la duree de 1’esprit d’association sont difficiles, en 
raison directe du nombre des associes, ce qui n’a pas besoin de preuve.
Note 109 -  II vaudrait mieux faire cette autre question: La republique peut-elle 
exister? On le suppose, mais c ’est aller trop vite, et la question prealable semble 
tres -  fondee; car la nature et l’histore se reunissent pour etablir qu’une grande 
republique indivisible est une chose impossible.
Note 114 -  Commen9ons par remarquer que ce systeme n ’est point du tout une 
decouverte modeme, mais une production, ou pour mieux dire une piece du 
gouvemement feodal.
Note 115 -...la  representation se trouve dans toutes les monarchies de
L’Europe; mais elle est vivante dans la Grande Bretagne: ailleurs elle est morte 
ou elle dort...
Note 116 -  II suffit d ’observer, d ’apres l’histoire (1) qu’en Anlgeterre, ou la 
representation nationale a obtenu et retenu plus de force que partout ailleurs, il 
n’en est pas question avant le milieu du treizieme siecle; (2) qu’elle ne fut point 
une invention, ni l ’effet d’une deliberation, ni le resultat de l ’action du peuple 
usant de ses droits antiques; mais qu’un soldat ambitieux, pour satisfaire ses vues 
particulieres, crea reellement la balance des trois pouvoirs apres la bataile de 
Lewes sans savoir ce qu’il faisait, comme il arrive toujours; (3) que non 
seulement la convocation des communes dans le conseil national fut une 
concession du monarque, mais que, dans le principe, le roi nommait les
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representants des provinces, cites et bourgs; (4) qu’apres meme que les 
communes se furent arrogees le droit de deputer au parlement, pendant le voyage 
d’Edouard Ier en Palestine, elles y eurent seulement voix consultative; qu’elles 
presentaient leurs doleances comme les etats- generaux de France, et que la 
formule des concessions emanant du trone ensuite de leurs petitions, etait 
constamment accordee par le roi et les seigneurs spirituels et temporels, aux 
humbles prieres des communes', enfin que la puissance co -  legislative attribute a 
la chambre des communes, est encore bien jeune puisqu’elle remonte a peine au 
milieu du quinzieme siecle.
Note 117 -  Si l’on entend done par ce mot de representation nationale, un certain 
nombre de representants envoyes par certains hommes, pris dans certaines villes 
ou bourgs, en vertu d’une ancienne concession du souverain, il ne faut pas 
disputer sur les mots, ce gouvemement existe, et c ’est celui d’Angleterre.
Note 118 -  On nous cite 1* Amerique; je  ne connais rien de si impatientant que les 
louanges decemees a cet enfant au maillot: laissez-le grandir.
Note 119 -  ... une piece du gouvemement feodal....
Note 120 -  L ’autorite royale, ayant forme les communes, les appella dans les 
assemblies nationales; elles ne pouvaient y paraitre que par leurs mandataires; de 
la le systeme representative.
Note 121 -  C’est le noeud de la question...
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Note 122 -...car si la republique est dans la capitale, et que le reste de la France 
soit sujet de la republique, ce n’est pas le compte du peuple souverain.
Note 124 -  Un petit nombre de republicans renfermes dans les murs d’une ville, 
peuvent sans doute avoir des millions de sujets: ce fut le cas de Rome; mais il ne 
peut exister une grande nation libre sous un gouvememnt republicain.
Note 125 -  Mais ce qu’il ya de sur, c’est que le systeme representatif exclue 
directement l ’exercice de la souverainete, surtout dans le systeme frangais, ou les 
droits du peuple se boment a nommer ceux qui nomment....
Note 126 -  ...ou non seulement il ne peut donner de mandats speciaux a ces 
representants, mais ou la loi prend soin de briser toute relation entre eux et leur 
province respective, en les avertissant qu*ils ne sont point envoyesr par ceux qui 
les ont envoyes mais par la nation; grand mot infiniment commode parce qu’on a 
fait ce qu’on veut.
Note 127 -  Eh! Qu’importe a la nation le vain bonheur de la representation dont 
elle se mele si indirectement, et auquel des milliards d’individus ne parviendront 
jamais? La souverainete et le gouvemement lui sont-ils moins etrangers?
Note 128 -  Mais, dira-t’on en retorquant l ’argument, qu’importe a la nation le 
vain honneur de la representation, si le systeme regu etablit la liberte publique?
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Note 129 -...la  question n’est pas de savoir si le peuple frangais peut etre libre 
par la constitution qu’on lui a donnee, mais s’il peut etre souverain.
Note 130 -  Que le peuple demeure parfaitement eetranger au gouvemement; 
qu’il est plus sujet que dans la monarchic...
Note 131 -  La question se reduit done a savoir s’il est de l’interet du peuple 
frangais d ’etre sujet d’un directoire executif et de deux conseils institues suivant 
la constitution de 1795, plutot que d’un roi regnant suivant les formes anciennes.
Note 132 -  Or ce qui distingue la revolution frangaise et ce qui en fait un 
evenement unique dans l’histoire, e ’est qu’elle est mauvaise radicalement; aucun 
element de bien n’y soulage l’oeuil de l’observateur: e ’est le plus haut degre de 
corruption connu; e ’est la pure impurete.
Note 134 -  Je crois le gouvemement actuel usurpateur de Vautorite, violateur de 
tous les droits du peuple q u ’il a reduit au plus deplorable esclavage. C ’est 
I ’affreux systeme du bonheur d ’un petit nombre, fonde sur Voppression de la 
masse. Le peuple est tellement emmusele, tellement environne de chaines par ce 
gouvemement aristocratique, qu ’il lui devient plus difficile que jamais de les 
briser.
Note 136 -  Quelques politiques ont pretendu qu’un des beaux cotes du 
gouvemement republicain etait la sagacite qui possede le peuple pour ne confier 
l’exercice de son autorite qu’a des hommes qui en sont dignes.
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Note 137 -  Personne, disent -  ils, ne choisit mieux que le peuple: lorsqu’il s’agit 
de ses interets, rien ne peut le seduire, le merite seul le determine.
Note 138 -  ...la democratic ne pourrait subsister un instant si elle n’etait pas 
temperee par l’aristocraite, et surtout par l’aristocratie hereditaire.
Note 139 -  La masse du peuple influe done tres-peu sur les elections, comme sur 
les autres affaires. C ’est l ’aristocratie qui choisit, et, comme on sait, elle choisit 
fort bien.
Note 140 -  Lorsque la foule se melait des affaires, e’etait par une espece 
d’insurrection, necessaire quelquefois pour arreter Taction trop rapide de 
Taristocratie...
Note 141 -  “Qu’on juge,” dit Rousseau, “de Tembarras que causait quelquefois 
la foule, par ce qui arriva du temps des Gracques oil une partie des citoyens 
donnait son suffrage de dessus les toits”. II aurait du remarquer que, lorsqu’on 
opine sur les toits, on s’egorge dans les rues...
Note 142 -  La justice n ’y a point cette marche calme et impassible que nous lui 
voyons communement dans la monarchic.
Note 145 -  Le magistrat n’est pas assez superieur au citoyen...
Note 146 -  ...il a flair d’un arbitre plutot que d’un juge.
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Note 147 -...on voit qu’il ne croit pas a sa propre puissance; il n ’est fort que de 
1’adhesion de ses egaux, parce qu’il n’y a point de souverain, ou que le souverain 
ne l’est pas assez.
Note 148 -  Dans les republiques rien n’egale l ’iniquite ou, si l’on veut, 
l ’impuissance des tribunaux lorsqu’il s’agit de decider entre l’etranger et le 
citoyen...
Note 149 -  ...plus la republique est democratique, plus cette impuissance est 
frappante.
Note 150 -  C’est que moins la souverainete est separee du peuple, et moins elle 
existe...
Note 151 -  ...mais ils la [i.e. justice] refusent impunement a l’etranger, celui -  ci 
ne pouvant la demander au souverain qui n ’existe pas, ou qui n ‘existe pas tout 
entier.
Note 152 - “// est impossible d ’obtenir justice contre ces gens -  la !”[ in a 
democracy] C’est que moins la souverainete est separee du peuple, et moins elle 
existe...
Note 153 -  En general, la justice est toujours faible dans les democraties 
lorsqu’elle marche seule, et toujours cruelle ou etourdie lorsqu’elle s’appuie sur 
le peuple.
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Note 154 -  La justice, dans les democraties, est tantot faible et tantot passionnee; 
on dit que dans ces gouvemements, nulle tete ne peut braver le glaive de la loi. 
Cela signifie que la punition d’un coupable ou d’un accuse illustre etant une 
veritable jouissance pour la plebe...
Note 155 -  Dans la monarchic, l’immunite, differemment graduee, est pour le 
petit nombre; dans la democratic, elle est pour le grand.
Note 156 -  II ne faut point etre la dupe d ’une certaine pedanterie reglementaire 
dont le peuple est fou, parce qu’elle lui sert a impatienter les riches.
Note 157 -  Dans une ville ou on est mis a 1’amende pour avoir mene un cheval 
au trot, on peut tuer un homme impunement, pourvu que 1’assassin soit ne dans 
une boutique.
Note 158 -  L ’histoire depose encore en faveur de cette grande verite, que la 
liberte du petit nombre n’est fondee que sur l ’esclavage de la multitude...
Note 159 -  ...les republiques n’ont jamais ete que des souverains a plusieurs 
tetes, dont le despotisme, toujours plus dur et plus capricieux que celui des 
monarques, augmentait d’intensite a mesure que le nombre des sujets se 
multipliait.
Note 160 -  Mais de tous les monarques, le plus dur, le plus despotique, le plus 
intolerable, c ’est le monarque peuple.
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Note 172 -  a) Tacite a dit en parlant des gouvemements republicans: Quelques 
nations ennuyes des rois leur preferent des lois. II opposait ainsi le regne des lois 
a celui d’un homme, et comme si l ’un excluait l’autre.
b) On a beaucoup critique les jurisconsultes romains pour avoir dit que le prince 
est au-dessus des lois (princeps solutus est legibus). On aurait ete plus indulgent 
a leur egard si Ton avait observe qu’ils n ’entendaient parler que des lois civiles, 
ou, pour mieux dire, des formalites qu’elles etablissent pour les differents actes 
civils.
Note 174 -  Nous naissons tous despotes, depuis le monarque le plus absolu de 
l ’Asie jusqu’a l’enfant qui etouffe un oiseau dans sa main pour le plaisir de voir 
qu’il existe dans l’univers un etre plus faible que lui.
Note 175 -  C’est en vain qu’on crierait au despotisme. Le despotisme et la 
monarchic temperee sont-ils done la meme chose?
Note 176 -  Mais l ’auteur de la nature a mis des bomes a l ’abus de la puissance: il 
a voulu qu’elle se detruise elle- meme des qu’elle passe ces limites naturelles. De 
tout cote il a grave cette loi; et dans le monde physique comme dans le monde 
moral, elle nous environne et nous parle a chaque instant. Voyez cette arme a 
feu: jusqu’a un certain point, plus vous l ’allongerez, et plus vous en augmenterez 
l ’effet: mais si vous passez cette limite d’une ligne, vous le verrez diminuer. 
Voyez ce telescope: jusqu’a un certain point plus vous en augmenterez les 
dimensions, et plus produira d’effet; mais au dela, l’invincible nature toume
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contre vous les efforts que vous faites pour perfectionner l ’instrument. C’est 
1’image naive de la puissance. Pour se conserver elle doit se restreindre, et 
toujours elle doit se tenir eloignee de se point ou son dernier effort amene son 
dernier moment.
Note 179 -  Ne confondons point les essences des choses avec leurs 
modifications: les premieres sont inalterables et reviennent toujours; les secondes 
changent et varient un peu le spectacle, du moins pour la multitude; car tout oeil 
exerce penetre aisement 1’habit variable dont l’eternelle nature s’enveloppe 
suivant les temps et les lieux.
Note 180 -  Qu’y a t il par example de particulier et de nouveau dans les trois 
pouvoirs qui constituent le gouvemement d’Angleterre, les noms de Pairs et celui 
de Communes, la robe des Lords, etc?
Note 181 -  Mais les trois pouvoirs consideres d’une maniere abstraite, se 
trouvent partout ou se trouve la liberte sage et durable...
Note 182 -  ...le gouvemement avant Lycurgues estoit toujours en branle, 
inclinant tantost a tyrannie, quand les roys y avoyent trop de puissance, et 
tantost a confusion populaire, quand le commun peuple venoit a y usurper trop 
d ’autorite. Mais Lycurgue mit entre deux le senat, qui fu t , ainsi que dit Platon, un 
contrepoids salutaire.. .et une forte barriere tenant les deux extremites en egale 
balance...
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Note 183 -  Le grand malheur des romains et de la plus grande partie du monde 
connu qui leur etait soumis fut qu’a 1’ accesion d’auguste la revolution ne s’opera 
point d ’une maniere assez complete. Que de larmes et de crimes une monarchic 
hereditaire eut epargnes au monde!
Note 184 -  a) La prerogative des empereurs etait plutot une puissance de fait 
qu’une puissance de droit...
b) Dans certains gouvemements aristocratiques, ou meeles d’aristocratie et de 
democratic, la nature de ces gouvemements est telle que la souverainete de droit 
doit appartenir a un certain corps, et la souverainete du fait a un autre: et 
l ’equilibre consiste dans la crainte ou 1’inquietude habituelle que le premier 
inspire au second.
Note 186 -  On verra que les pouvoirs qui semblent posseder une portion de la 
souverainete ne sont reellement que de contre-poids ou des moderateurs qui 
reglent et ralentissent la marche du veritable souverain. Peut-etre qu’on ne 
definirait pas mal le Parlement d ’Angleterre: “le Conseil necesaire du Roi”; peut- 
etre est-il quelque chose de plus; peut-etre suffit-il qu’on le croie.
Note 187 -  Prenons, par exemple, le gouvemement anglais: l ’espece de trinite 
politique qui le constitue n’empeche point que la souverainete ne soit une...
Note 188 -  ...les trois pouvoirs consideres d’une maniere abstraite, se trouvent 
partout ou se trouve la liberte sage et durable.
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Note 189 -  ...la constitution d’Angleterre qui est cependant, a ce qu’il parait, ce 
qu’on peut imaginer de plus parfait, du moins pour un grand peuple...
Note 190 -  “Tout gouvemement”, dit Tacite, “est deemocratique, aristocratique 
ou monarchique; il serait plus aise d’admirer que de trouver une constitution 
formee de ces trois pouvoirs meles et temperes l’un par l’autre; ou, si jamais elle 
existe, elle ne saurait durer.” Voila la constitution anglaise condamnee en terme 
expres et par un excellent juge.
Note 191 -  La formation parfaite, le complement, la consolidation de la 
constitution anglaise telle qu’elle existe de nos jours, a coute aux Anglais des 
torrents de sang...
Note 192 -  ...mais il y a de fortes raisons de craindre que ce bel ouvrage ne soit 
pas durable.
Note 193 -  Cette consitution, telle qu’elle existe depuis qu’elle a regu sa demiere 
forme, ne date que de l’annee 1688...
Note 194 -  Ce qui est, est bon; ce qu’on croit, est bon; tout est bon, excepte les 
pretendues creations de l’homme.
Note 195 -  Cette fameuse division des pouvoirs qui a si fort agite les tetes 
fran5aises, n’existe reeellement pas dans la Constitution fransaise de 1791.
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Note 196 -  Pour qu’il y eut eu reellement division de pouvoirs, il aurait fallu que 
le roi eut ete investi d’une puissance capable de balancer celle de 1’Assemblee et 
de juger meme les representants dans certains cas...
Note 197 -  ..tous les travaux des legislateurs n ’aboutissaient reellement qu’a 
creer un pouvoir unique et sans contre-poids, c’est -  a- dire une tyrannie...
Note 198 -  ...toutes les monarchies qui se sont formes en Europe apres la chute 
de 1’Empire romain ont un caractere particulier qui les distingue des monarchies 
etrangeres a 1’Europe.
Note 199 -  Inhabitant de 1’Asie ne cherche point a penetrer ce nuage sombre qui 
enveloppe ou qui forme la majeste du monarque. Pour lui son maitre est un dieu, 
et il n’a avec cet etre superieur d’autre rapport que celui de la priere.
Note 200 -  Les lois du monarque sont des oracles. Ses graces sont des dons 
celestes, et sa colere est un calmite de l’invincible nature. Le sujet qui s’honore 
de s’appeler escalve re£oit de lui un bienfait comme un rosee, et le cordon 
comme un coup de tonnere.
Note 201 -  Ce monarque absolu peut-etre depose; on ne lui dispute point le droit 
de demander la tete qui lui deplait; mais souvent on lui demande la sienne.
Tantot les lois le privent du sceptre et de la vie; tantot la sedition va le saisir sur 
ce trone eleve et le renverse dans la poudre.
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Note 202 -  “Le gouvemement des Germains”, dit fort bein Hume, “et celui de 
toutes les nations du Nord qui s’etablirent sur les mines de l ’empire romain, fut 
toujours extremement libre.
Note 203 -  Ces reflexions sont d’une verite frappante. C’est au milieu des forets 
et de glaces du Nord que nos gouvemements ont pris naissance.. ..nous sommes 
encore tous freres, durum genus.
Note 204 -  La Providence a dit a tous les souverains de 1’ Europe: “vous ne serez 
point juges”, mais tout de suite elle ajoute: “Vous ne jugerez point”. C ’est le prix 
de ce privilege inestimable.
Note 205 -... la plus sage des nations d’Europe, en faisant une loi fondamentale 
de l’inviolabilite de ses souverains, n’a fait que sanctionner l’opinion universelle 
de cette partie du monde. Nous ne voulons point qu’on juge les souverains, nous 
ne voulons point les juger.
Note 206 -  Toujours inquiets, toujours alarmes, le voile qui leur cache les 
ressorts du gouvemement les depite; sujets soumis, escalves rebelles, ils veulent 
anoblir T obeisance et, pour prix de leur soumission, ils demandent le droit de se 
plaindre et d’eclairer la puissance.
Note 207 -  a) II n’a pas le droit de condamner a mort, ni meme a aucune peine 
corporelle. Le pouvoir qui punit vient de lui, et c ’est assez.
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b) Le roi ne peut juger au civil; les magistrats seuls, au nom du souverain, 
peuvent prononcer sur la propriete et sur les conventions.
Note 209 -  ...la communication patemelle du prince et des sujets qu’on trouve le 
veritable caractere de la monarchic europeene.
Note 210 -  Ce qui nous deplait generalement, ce qui ne s’accorde nullement avec 
notre caractere et nos usages anciens, incontestables, universels, c’est le 
gouvemement ministeriel ou le Visirat.
Note 211 -  ...il s’ensuit que tous les depositiares du pouvoir delegue n ’etant 
comprimes par rien, et ne relevant point assez directement de 1’opinion, 
s’emparent du sceptre et se le divisent en petits fragments proportionels a 
l’importance de leurs places, de maniere que tout le monde est roi excepte le roi.
Note 212 -  Le peuple se plaint du despotisme, parce qu’il n ’est pas assez fort 
contre 1’action desordonee du pouvoir delegue....
Note 213 -  Le remede a de si grands maux n ’est pas difficile a trouver: il ne 
s’agit que de renforcer 1’autorite du roi et de lui rendre sa qualite de pere en 
retablissant la correspondance antique et legitime entre lui et la grande famille.
Note 214 -  Sous le nom de Champs de Mars ou de M ai, de Parlements, d'Etats, 
de Cortes, d’Etablissements, de Dietes, de Senats, de Conseils, etc. tous les
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peuples de 1* Europe moderne se sont m elis plus ou moins de 1’administration 
sous l’empire de leurs rois.
Note 215 -  Les sujets ont le droit, par le moyen de certains corps, conseils, ou 
assemblies differemment composees, d ’instruire le roi de leurs besoins, de lui 
denoncer les abus, de lui faire passer legalement leurs doleances et leurs tres- 
humbles remontrances.
Note 216 -  ...on congoit, par example, que les hommes charges de porter au pied 
du trone les representations et les doleances des sujets peuvent former des corps 
ou des assemblies', que les membres qui composent ces assemblies ou ces corps 
peuvent diffirer par le nombre, par la qualiti, par le genre et l ’itendue de leurs 
pouvoirs; que le mode des ilections, l ’intervalle et la durie des sessions etc. 
varient encore le nombre des combinaisons\ facies non omnibus una...
Note 217 -  ..il ne s’agit que de renforcer l’autoriti du roi et de lui rendre sa 
qualiti de pere en ritablissant la correspondence antique et ligitime entre lui et la 
grande famille.
Note 218 -  ...lois sacries d’autant plus viritablement constitutionnelles qu’elles 
ne sont icrites que dans les coeurs....
Note 219 -  ...toujours des hommes choisis, portant ligalement au pere les 
plaintes et les voeux de la famille: nec diversa tamen.
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Note 221 -  Dans tous les pays et dans tous les gouvemements possibles, les 
grands emplois appartiendront toujours (sauf exception) a l ’aristocratie, c’est-a- 
dire a la noblesse et a la richesse le plus souvent reunies.
Note 222 -  Le gouvemement aristocratique est une monarchic dont le trone est 
vacant. La souverainete y est en regence.
Note 223 -  Les regents qui adminsitrent la souverainete etant hereditaires, elle 
est parfaitement separee du peuple, et en cela le gouvemement aristocratique se 
rapproche du monarchique.
Note 224 -  Tant que l ’aristocratie est saine, que le nom de roi est sacre pour elle, 
et qu’elle aime la royaute avec passion, l ’Etat est inebranlable, quelles que soient 
les qualitites du roi. Mais des qu’elle perd sa grandeur, sa fierte, son energie, sa 
foi, l’esprit s’est retire, la monarchic est morte, et son cadavre est aux vers.
Note 235 - H a  fort bien vu qu’il ne fallait jamais demander quel est le meilleur 
gouvemement en general, puisqu’il n ’y en a pas qui convienne a tous les peuples.
Note 236 -  Chaque nation a le sien, comme elle a sa langue et son caractere et ce 
gouvemement est le meilleur pour elle..
Note 237 -  D ’oii il suit evidemment que toute la theorie du contrat social est un 
reve de college.
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Note 238 -  Comme aucune de ces combinaisons ne depend des hommes, il ensuit 
que le consentement des peuples n’entre pour rien dans la formation des 
gouvemements.
Note 239 -  Nulle nation ne doit son caractere a son gouvemement, pas plus que 
sa langue; au contraire, elle doit son gouvemement a son caractere, qui, a la 
verite, est toujours renforce et perfectionne dans la suite par les institutions 
politiques.
Note 240 -  Si vous voyez languir une nation, ce n ’est point parce que son 
gouvemement est mauvais; c ’est parce que ce gouvemement, qui est le meilleur 
pour elle, deperit comme toutes les choses humaines...
Note 241 -  ...tous les gouvemements sont bons.
Note 242 -  Le comble de la folie serait de soutenir que le caractere des peuples 
est leur ouvrage; mais quand nous disons qu’ils ont fait leur gouvemement, c’est 
la meme folie en d’autres termes.
Note 243 -  Mais si l ’on demandait a quel signe on peut connaitre qu’un peuple 
donne est bien ou mal gouverne, ce serait une autre chose, et la question de fait 
pourrait se resoudre.
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Note 244 -  ...la question n’est jamais de savoir quel est le meilleur 
gouvemement, mais quel est le peuple le mieux gouveme suivant les principes de 
son gouvemement.
Note 246 -  Considerons encore les gouvemements du cote de la population. “Le 
meilleur”, dit encore Rousseau, “est celui qui peuple le plus”....M ais ce plus haut 
point possible ne depend nullement de telle ou telle forme de gouvemement.
Note 247 -  Les plus beaux monuments d’Athenes appartiennent au siecle de 
Pericles. A Rome quels ecrivains a produits la Republique? Plaute et Terence 
seuls. Lucrece, Saluste et Ciceron l’ont vue mourir. Vient ensuite le siecle 
d’Auguste oii la nation fut tout ce qu’elle pouvait etre en fait des talents. Les arts, 
en general, ont besoin d’un roi: ils ne brillent que sous l ’influence des sceptres.
Note 248 -  ...quel est le peuple relativement le plus nombreux, le plus fort, le 
plus heureux, depuis plus longtemps, par Vinfluence du gouvemement qui lui 
convient.
Note 249 -  Par quelle bizarrerie ne veut-on point employer, dans l ’etude de la 
politique, la meme maniere de raisonner et les memes analogies generates qui 
nous conduisent dans 1’etude des autres sciences? Toutes les fois qu’il s’agit, 
dans les recherches physiques, d ’estimer une force variable, on la ramene a une 
quantite moyenne. Dans l ’astronomie, en particulier, on parle toujours de 
distance moyenne et de temps moyen. Pour juger le merite d’un gouvemement, il 
faut operer de meme.
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Note 250 -  Le meilleur gouvemement pour chaque nation est celui qui, dans 
l’espace de terrain occupe par cette nation, est capable de procurer la plus grande 
somme de de bonheur et de force possible, au plus grand nombre d’hommes 
posssible, pendant le plus longtemps possible.
Note 252 -  “Quel est”, dit-il, “la fin de l’association politique? -  C’est la 
conservation et la prosperity de ses membres”. Jusque-la, fort bien.
Note 253 -  Dans toute republique d’une certaine etendue, ce qu’on appelle 
liberte n’est que le sacrifice absolu d’un grand nombre d ’hommes fait a 
l’independence et a l’orgeuil du petit nombre.
Note 254 -  A tout prendre, on peut avancer sans exaggeration que la monarchic 
comporte autant et peut etre plus de liberteet d’egalite que tout autre 
gouvemement.
Note 255 -  ...comme toutes les revolutions politiques entrainent necessairement 
de grands maux, le plus grand interet des peuples est la stability des 
gouvemements.
Note 256 -  La democratic a un moment brillant, mais c ’est un moment, et il faut 
le payer cher.
Note 257 -  En general, tous les gouvemements democratiques ne sont que des 
meteores passagers, dont le brillant exclut la duree.
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Note 258 -  Les republiques aristocratiques ont plus de consistance parce qu’elles 
se rapprochent de la monarchic, et que la masse du peuple n’y joue aucun role.
Note 259 -  A proprement parler, tous les gouvemements sont des monarchies qui 
ne different qu’en ce que le monarque est a vie ou a temps, hereditaire ou 
eligible, individu ou corps...
Note 260 -  ...tout gouvemement est aristocratique, compose de plus ou moins de 
tetes dominatrices, depuis la democratic, ou cette aristocratie est composee 
d’autant de tetes que le permet la nature des choses, jusqu’a la monarchic, ou 
1’aristocratie, inevitable dans tout gouvemement, est dominee par une tete seule 
qui termine la pyramide, et forme sans contredit le gouvemement le plus naturel 
a l ’homme.
Chapter 6
Note 5 -  ...en politique , comme ailleurs, et plus qu’ailleurs, necessite n’a point 
de loi.
Note 6 -  Je crois avoir lu quelque part qu’il y a bien peu de souverainetes en etat 
de justifier la legitimite de leur origine...\t nuage qui envelopperait plus ou 
moins l ’origine de son autorite ne serait qu’un inconvenient, suit necessaire 
d’une loi du monde moral
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Note 7 -  comme la politique ne hait personne, elle n ’aime personne.
Note 12 -  les nations sont, comme les individus, un assemblage des 
contradicitions.
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